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Abstract
SONGPHAN CHOEMPRAYONG: The Transition of Worldviews:
Collective Information Behavior during the 2006 Thai Coup D’e´tat.
(Under the direction of Paul Solomon)
This study explores the way in which people sought and shared information during a
socio-political crisis, using the September 19, 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand as a case
study, where the traditional flow of information and communication was interrupted.
Using Chatman’s notion of small world and Merton’s Insider and Outsider conception
as major theoretical frameworks, this study particularly focuses on collective information
behavior and the roles of insiders and outsiders in this disruptive situation. Exploratory
qualitative methods were applied, including document analysis and semi-structured in-
terviews. The document analysis covers coup-related public online documents (i.e.,
blogs, photos, videos, and Wikipedia entries) created and/or uploaded during Septem-
ber 19 to September 23, 2006. Sense-Making Methodology (SMM), including the Micro-
Moment Timeline interview approach and SMM question roster, was used to frame the
interviews. The interview informants were selected using two methods: eight from ex-
treme case selection (whose content was most visible, commented, viewed, ranked during
the coup), and four from a snowball sampling technique. The data analysis used both
deductive and inductive coding techniques. The findings explain how people sought and
shared information in order to make sense of the situation as well as to serve other
motivations (e.g., to persuade others, to be part of a history, and to entertain). Some
factors influencing information behavior during that period were examined including
individual (i.e., emotion, memory, and physical capacity), collective (i.e., to know bet-
ter and faster, to achieve particular goals, to feel secure, and to be encouraged), and
contextual constructs (i.e., time and place). In addition, this study found that there
iii
was still a strong form of the Insider among those who were in Thailand during that
time, confirming the applicability of Chatman’s small world. However, there was also
evidence of the Outsider, especially highlighting the eminent roles of converted members
– insiders-out and outsiders-in – in terms of bridging worldviews. This study supports a
call to reconsider threats from censorship as a derivative form of information poverty as
well as revisit the creation and adjustment of social norms, and the sense of excitement
in the context of information behavior in socio-political crisis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Statement of Problem
On September 19, 2006, the Royal Thai Army staged a coup d’e´tat against the elected
government led by Thaksin Shinawatra. It was the first coup d’e´tat in fifteen years and
the twelfth coup since Thailand was first introduced to democratic administration in
1932. The 2006 coup was apparently motivated by long and intensive political turmoil,
resulting in a mass polarization between those who supported and opposed the Thaksin
administration. The military, calling itself The Council for Democratic Reform(CDR),1
canceled the upcoming election, suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament,
arrested cabinet members, banned political meetings and gatherings of political parties,
and controlled and censored the media.
Although it was claimed as a bloodless coup, freedom of expression became a major
concern among active citizens, the media, scholars, and activists. During the first twelve
hours of the coup, all free-to-air national television stations were under the control of
the military and became the official source of information regarding the coup. The CDR
1The exact transliteration of the name is “The Council of Democratic Reform under Constitutional
Monarchy.” However, the “under Constitutional Monarchy” portion of its English name was removed
later to avoid the suspicions about the role of the monarchy in the coup. However, such part remained
in the Thai version.
banned any discussion about the coup and the overthrown government, particularly
the ousted prime minister who was working overseas at that time. The censorship of
communication during that period raised serious concerns regarding the trustworthiness
of traditional media.
It is important to note that people were aware of a substantial role of the media prior
to the coup. Mass media had been perceivably used to propagate political campaigns
(either to support or oppose the Thaksin government). Opinions and critiques – instead
of facts – overwhelmed the media space. Journalists had been questioned in terms of
transparency and neutrality. Self-censorship evidently became a common practice among
Thai journalists and editors (Woodier, 2008).
When the coup was first announced, the traditional mass communication channels
and official sources apparently did not satisfy the needs of those who hungered for
information. They sought information from alternative sources. Based on a preliminary
observation, this phenomenon seems to deviate from the pattern of information behavior
in a normal situation. As a Thai person living abroad, my experience during the early
stage of the coup was memorable to me. I wrote down my observation on my personal
blog uploaded on September 20 2006 at 1:22am (Eastern Standard Time).
Seeking information in a critical situation: 2006 Thailand coup
d’e´tat
After I enjoyed having lunch with my doctoral fellows on Franklin Street, I got
a note from a news reporter to contact him back about the attempted coup in
Thailand. I was quite shocked because I remember the military leaders gave an
interview and told they would not do this. But they broke their words. Well I
am not going to talk about what it is actually going on there politically. But
I think it would be important for me to record what happen to me in terms of
experience on information seeking and communication aspect. I would think
we, as information professional, might learn something from this situation
especially the understanding of how people cope with their information needs
in a critical incident.
Instant Reaction
Instead of calling the reporter back right away, I turned on the computer and
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checked on a couple of Thai national newspaper websites at least to verify
whether his statement was true or not. However, it took a while for the pages
to load and [the websites] looked malfunctioned. Some of them were even gone
oﬄine. I guess there would be enormous access at that period of time. So my
first attempt to get the information was to answer “true” or “false”. No detail
was gathered at that point.
Meanwhile, I signed on my Microsoft Live messenger (or MSN messenger).
A bunch (about 10 people) of people in Thailand sent me notes right after I
signed on asking me if I heard the news. The message alerts kept annoying
my colleagues in the office. So I decided to turn the sound off.
My friends asked me if I could watch the CNN, BBC or any international
news outlets (either on TV or radio). They told me that all national television
channels have been controlled by those who called themselves “the reform
group”. They asked me if I see the tank. I was really surprised and began panic
after realizing that all Thai people cannot access other news sources except
the ones controlled by the military. All international television channels were
terminated. [I later found out that some were still accessible] Only national
televisions were running official coup announcements. The announcements
were the only information sources they got at the moment.
A number of friends formed group chats discussing about the issues and kept
updating the situation. We were sharing and verifying the news that we had.
There were a lot of rumors throwing out into the group. What we all do were
checking where the rumors were from. For example, we got the rumor about
who took control, who will be the next prime minister, the communication
that would be cut off since the coup d’e´tat group will take control of the
Communication Authority of Thailand (CAT). I believe that the rumors sent
from one-to-one connection rather than mass communication.
Then I decided to check out international media websites like CNN and BBC.
There I could see the video and read the whole story. I tried not to get the
news from any national news websites since the political turmoil, been in this
country for a while, made me curious about their standing points whether they
are English or Thai newspapers. Therefore, I decided to use the international
agencies because they seems to be more neutral and off the issues. (Note:
The political tension against Thaksin involved a lot of media engagement. A
number of leaders of the mob are from media agencies.)
This was also the case when the coup happened in 1992. The only source of
information at that time was BBC news radio (Thai Language). The station
was based in London. People would like to know what was going on from
the sources that were available and trustworthy. As a result, the situation
made a hero. BBC news radio (Thai) became one of most favorite and reliable
radio station during that time. Unfortunately, last year BBC Headquarters
decided to shut down the operation of the BBC Thai station due to financial
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constraint. There were a lot of calls to reconsider the decision from the audi-
ences. However, they did not make it through. I wonder if today the station
still operated, it would have been once again the most heroic situation for the
station. Anyway, when people do not have any other choice, we had to find
the way out but how?
Among a number of instant messenger windows, there had been rumors all
along that all communication channels, Internet and telephone, which mainly
controlled by Communications Authority of Thailand (CAT) would be shut
down for a while. At the same time, a friend of mine in Chapel Hill told me
that he tried to call his girlfriend in Thailand. The phone call was cut off. I
felt overwhelmed by the information and was kind of worried that I would not
be able to connect to my family and friends in Thailand. The only way to
prove the rumor was to call my mom.
I called my mom. It worked very well. My mom did not sound panic at all.
It seemed like she heard and prepared for the rumor of coup before as well
as other people I read on BBC opinion section. (I supposed those are people
who are against Thaksin) During the talk, the announcement was coming up.
My mom put the phone near the TV set so I could hear the announcement. I
hardly heard what it said but at least I felt involved in the event. She told me
that she was able to call my brother and her siblings who live in Bangkok. The
network was not that bad. Then I was relieved emotionally. I figured it out
myself that there would be enormous connection that caused fail connection.
Anyway, I still needed to keep watching if all the communication channels were
going to cut off as the rumor said.
Gathering Information
The phenomenon was interesting in that it revealed the importance of social
capital. I was fascinated by how groups rapidly formed via instant messenger.
Microsoft Live Messenger (or MSN Messenger) is the most popular tool among
my Thai community. I got involved with two groups without getting their
permissions. They dragged me in because they wanted me to report as an
“outsider”. This reminded me of Chatman’s theory of life in the round. My
friends’ and family’s world at the moment was restricted. Unfortunately, I
could not access any media in my office except the Internet by that time. I
believe that if at that time I was able to connect to other live media, I could
have been one of the trusted sources among my friends.
There were actually two IM groups on my desktop. One group included my
friends in college and I have their contacts in my list. The other group of
people were those who I know from previous work and those who have become
friends of mine now. Also I got IM messages from other individuals on my
list as well including those whom I rarely talked to. I could also have merged
this two group together. I did not do so because I thought there might be an
explosion of information for all. The conversations went very fast. I could not
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keep track of both of them. I had to decide which is the main one and then
left the other one behind. This situation brought people together to perform
“collaborative information seeking” tasks.
Another source of information that I usually use to update what is going on
in Thailand is the most popular and largest national online community named
“pantip.com”. With pantip.com I can get the news from the mainstream
media as well as behind-the-scenes information. There are a number of rooms
in the webboard, including, for example, seeking relationships (Siam Square),
entertainment (Chalermthai), and Thais overseas (Klaiban). One of the most
active rooms is the political room (Rajdumnern). I checked the Rajdumnern
room first. The room was closed (until the time I am writing this post) because
they said they cannot control the post. They also asked for attention not to
create politic-related posts in other rooms.
However, it is hard to control the enormous waves of thoughts. I went to
Chalermthai, the entertainment room. It is hard to control people not to talk
anything about their experiences, especially on how they could not get access
to mainstream media (e.g. “bring CNN BBC Bloomberg back”; Note: This
post may not stay much very long). Also there have been questions regarding
the temporary termination of their usual and special entertainment activities
since the group declared today (September 20, Thailand Time) as a holiday
for government offices and banks. Also there are a couple of posts calling for
respecting the norms of not talking about politics.
However, at the time, I looked at Chalermthai recently. There were less than
100 posts since the first post about the emergency call by Thaksin (about 10pm
on September 19). I actually expected more posts though. However, since the
administrator asked for cooperation, I figured that might be the reason that
there were less posts than I thought. Among those posts, there were a few
posts that do not relate to the turmoil.
In Klaiban,the Thais overseas room, there were less than 20 discussions about
the situation, at the time of writing. Again, I thought this would be a good
spot for people outside Thailand to update and share their information they
got. It did not turn out as I expected, anyway.
Social Networking
When I looked at international mainstream media websites such as BBC and
CNN. On their websites, there were options where local people could report
what was going on there (e.g. CNN i-report and BBC’s Eyewitnesses: Bangkok
turmoil.) Although one would imagine and wonder about the filter process,
they were some sources that people could use collaboratively to build a pic-
ture of the situation. Actually there seems to be more posts saying that the
situation was calm and quiet there. But most of the “identity” on that web-
site seems to be from an English-speaking person, which frankly I trusted less
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than the words from Thai people. Anyway, those words made me feel more
comfortable with the situation there.
Wikipedia is one of the most updated places. There is a topic called “2006
Thailand coup d’e´tat”. A lot of people have been active in writing the topic.
The item has evolved as time goes by. It is actually interesting that these
people do not write only the encyclopedia record, but also the history of the
country and the world. However, as the classic inquiry about Wikipedia, it
would be nice to know who those people are.
Blog is another space where the updates could be harvested. In my blogroll,
I have not seen any post regarding the situation until an hour after the an-
nouncement. There is a Thai blog called “revolution,” mainly summarizing
and citing the news from different mainstream sources. Also 19sep is an En-
glish blog updating news from various sources. However, There are not many
other blogs I could think or link to. Therefore, I went to Technorati to check
English blog. Not surprisingly, “Thailand” and “Bangkok” were among the
top search terms, although the first result from “Thailand” search was Lesbian
Strippers Sex Games (- -”).
In addition to keep watching CNN on TV, I also keep refreshing Google news
to see the latest news. However, I did not read every single piece. Instead I
read only the headlines and the excerpts. Until I found any piece new, I then
click to read more detail.
As the time I am writing this post, I keep CNN international on and updating
the news to them. I still get IM from Thai folks. I hope the situation will
return to normal soon.
In such a critical situation like a coup d’e´tat, the world of the insider was re-
stricted. However, accessing information is the only way to cope with people’s
stress, uncertainty, and confusion. Only a single official source did not serve
the hungers for information. The Internet, especially through social network-
ing tools, has shown its power as the major communication channel to fulfill
people’s information need in this critical situation.
We have learned that people seek and share information in order to cope with stress,
uncertainty, and confusion in everyday life. Nevertheless, it is a critical situation that
assumingly increases the degree of the desire to seek and share information. In closing
her article The Impoverished Life-World of Outsiders, Chatman (1996) asserted that
“[i]t is the [recognition] of the existence of a critical situation which converts what was
otherwise mere information into news” (p.29). The fundamental goal of this study is to
explore and explain the way in which people seek and share information during political
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crisis.
Another focus of this study emerged from the utilization of Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICTs) by people during the early stage of the coup (i.e., while
the operations of the media were under the control of the military). ICTs evidently
have essential roles during social crises, especially diminishing the difficulties posed by
geographic separation (e.g., Hagar, 2005). When ICTs are substantially involved in
the space of crisis, the physical and virtual world become simultaneous and intertwined
(Palen, Hiltz, & Liu, 2007; Palen & Liu, 2007; Palen, Vieweg, Sutton, Liu, & Hughes,
2007). From preliminary observations as a Thai person who was living abroad during
the coup, the world of insiders seemed to be restricted. It is apparent that the role
of outsiders, such as those who live outside Thailand and the international media, was
crucial. Thus, this study particularly pays attention to the deviated flow of information
through the interactions between insiders and outsiders.
Chatman’s (1999) Theory of Life in the Round discusses the way in which people
(i.e., the information poor), in everyday life, construct social boundaries and tend to
restrict themselves from crossing such boundaries (i.e., decline to seek information from
the outside world). In particular, the sixth proposition of the theory provides three
conditional exceptions that make a member who lives in a round (i.e., an insider) to seek
information from outside their own world. This exploratory study aims to validate and
extend the theory by 1) expanding the discourse of information behavior of information
poor beyond an everyday life context (i.e., a political crisis, in this study); and 2)
extending the understanding of conditions/factors influencing the interactions between
insiders and outsiders especially when the insiders step outside of their own world to
obtain information.
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1.2 Research Questions
To respond to the conditions addressed above, this study focuses on the following re-
search questions regarding collective information behavior during the early stage of the
2006 coup d’e´tat.
1. How did people seek and share information during the early stage of the 2006 coup
d’e´tat?
2. What were the factors influencing the way people sought (and did not seek) infor-
mation during the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat?
3. What were the roles of insiders/outsiders in terms of seeking and sharing informa-
tion during the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat?
1.3 Contributions of the Study
Fundamentally, it is believed that the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand was a contextual
stimulus to changes in information behavior.
Context has become the focus of information behavior and system design research
since the call for a paradigm shift by Dervin and Nilan (1986). In addition to the
everyday life of specific populations, attention has been paid to non-routine contexts
such as natural crises, wars, and personal health issues (e.g., McKnight & Zach, n.d.;
Featherstone, Lyon, & Ruffin, 2008; Turoff & Hiltz, 2008; Robbin & Buente, 2008).
However, most of these studies are from a top-down perspective. In other words, re-
searchers have viewed the phenomena from practitioners’ and institutions’ point of view
(i.e., disaster planning, emergency preparedness, disaster recovery). Only a few have
interests in a critical context from the users’ perspectives (e.g., Hagar, 2005). Therefore,
this study aims to extend the understanding of information behavior, from the users’
perspectives, in a context outside everyday life.
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The world has been facing numerous critical moments, including social, political,
and environmental crises. It is apparent that context plays a significant role in the
valuation of information. This study aims to illustrate how people define the value
of information in the context of disturbed information flow from both individual and
collective perspectives.
The way in which the findings from this study can be transferred/carried on to other
studies would come from the consideration of the 2006 coup d’e´tat as an extreme case
study (Yin, 2008). There are two unique characteristics of the 2006 coup d’e´tat that are
of interest for this study.
The first characteristic of the coup is based on the perception of a coup d’e´tat as a
socio-political crisis, a disruption of social and political system and order. The discussion
of the socio-political crisis can be analyzed into three basic conditions.
1. The coup was a short-lived and non-routine event (e.g., Duggan & Banwell, 2004;
Hagar, 2005). In addition to such descriptions, one would also consider that the
event was sudden and unexpected to most people.
2. Since the impact of the coup was massive, not only within Thai society but also the
global community, the consideration of people’s reactions should involve collective
influences.
3. The topical elements of the context were specific to the perceived threats/risks of
political life (for instance, Robbin & Buente, 2008). Such a perception may have
different implications from threats/risks in other personal and social life situations
(such as health issues, financial crisis, crimes, etc.). It is important to note that a
coup, as a result of a human-made crisis, may be less serious than natural disasters,
which may eliminate the power supply and other infrastructure, making the use of
ICTs impossible. However, a coup could still pose a substantial threat to people’s
lives.
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The second characteristic of the coup is derived from the disruption of communication
channels (i.e., censorship). The significance of a coup in the context of information
behavior is mostly related to the way in which the free flow of information is disrupted.
Governments or those who deploy coups use mass media and telecommunication facilities
in order to neutralize political forces. The main objective is not merely to control but
also to monopolize the flow of information (Luttwak, 1979). The situation during the
2006 Thailand coup d’e´tat is similar to other coups in terms of the limited flow of
information, which essentially threatened the fundamental right of expression. A critical
situation, such as a coup d’e´tat, becomes a crisis of isolation; the information sources and
channels that people usually use to access and exchange information become unavailable
(see Hagar, 2005). Nevertheless, Mufti (2007) observed that such a restricted condition
encouraged people to find new and creative ways to share information, especially through
the use of ICTs.
1.4 Scopes and Definitions
1.4.1 Political Crisis
Researchers have been studying sociological constructs during pre- and post-phases of
crises for nearly 100 years (R. Perry & Quarantelli, 2006). There are a number of events
that can be easily recognized as crises, such as natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes,
floods, and drought). Crises can be variably identified depending on “the constructs,
limitations, and perceptions of the crisis situation” (Hagar, 2005, p.5). Thus, one should
view crises from multidimensional perspectives (Fotopoulous, 2009).
The term crisis is originally rooted from Krisis, a Greek word that means a moment
of decision. Gregory (2000) identified a crisis as “an interruption in the reproduction of
economic, cultural, social and/or political life” (p.123-5). Shrivastava (1993) examined
three characteristics of crises including “urgency of decision, large impacts, and system
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restructuring” (p.25). Crises can be categorized at various levels, including personal
(e.g., Westbrook, 2008), organizational (e.g., Jasanoff, 1994), communal (e.g., Walker,
2004), national (e.g., National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
2004), and international contexts (e.g., Garthoff, 1989). A crisis can be caused by nat-
ural, human-induced, and technological forces. Thus, the implications for various types
of crises are different.
According to O’Connor (1987), the use of the term crisis in political discourse be-
ginning in the late eighteen-century was similar to its Greek root, referring to “time
for decision” and “political transformation” (p.108), in particular the trials and tribu-
lations of nation building and the expansion of empire. In the nineteenth century, the
notion of crisis was used to explain the “critical moments when national character and
institutions were thought to have been decisively shaped and tested” (Starn, 1971, p.9).
Grew (1978, p.12) indicated that there are three concepts associated with political crisis:
a serious threat, an irreversible change, and a political problem. Zimmermann (1984,
p.320) insisted that the scope of political crisis is broader than the change of personnel
(i.e., government, cabinet, and coalition). Rather, political crisis is essentially related
to the change in policies and political order. O’Connor (1987) further elaborated events
that could be considered political crises, including “sharp turns to the political right
or left; a polarization of attitudes towards the capitalist state or political system; mass
discontent with bourgeois democratic norms; and political revolution” (p.109).
Nonetheless, the consideration of political crisis in context can be highly subjective
and culture-specific. According to Edelman (1971, p.32–33),
political beliefs, perceptions, and expectations are overwhelmingly not based
on observation, or empirical evidence available to participants, but rather upon
cuing among groups of people who jointly create the meanings they will read
into current or anticipated event[s]. . . The particular meanings that are consen-
sually accepted need not therefore be cued by the objective situations; they are
rather established by a process of mutual agreement upon significant symbols.
Vatz (1999, p.230) adopted Bitzer’s criteria on rhetorical situation to analyze whether
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a political crisis is a rhetorical or situational issue. Vatz (1999) indicated that the
declaration of victory in the Vietnam War by George Aiken is merely rhetoric, since
people did not understand what actually happened in Vietnam. On the other hand, the
Cuban Missile crisis in 1962 is situational as the nation was threatened.
A political crisis is intertwined with social systems such as juridical, educational, and
cultural institutions. It is apparent that politics has a great impact on social order. On
the other hand, social systems are significant to the stability of political institutions.
Thus, many studies use social and political crisis as a single frame of analysis (e.g.,
O’Connor, 1987). Political events such as coup d’e´tat could pose perceived risks to
various elements of society, such as safety and economic and financial crisis.
1.4.2 Coup D’e´tat
According to Luttwak (1979), coup d’e´tat is the “infiltration of a small but critical
segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its
control of the remainder” (p.24). The motivation for a coup mostly comes from economic
recession and political instability. Although seizures of power are mostly done by military
power, Farcau (1994) pointed out that armed forces are not always part of coups, for
instance, the Bolshevik coup in Russia in 1917. A coup d’e´tat is usually perceived as a
problematic event for the state from a democratic point of view. Nonetheless, in Latin
America and some other developing countries, people apparently perceive coups as just
another way of changing the state administration (Farcau, 1994).
Within the context of this study, the coup d’e´tat (or coup) refers to the seizure
of power in Thailand by the military on September 19, 2006. However, it is hard to
define a clear cut boundary for the situation, even though the coup leaders have already
given the power back to the civil government. The consequences of the 2006 coup seem
to be continuous and diffuse, even until the time of writing this research report. The
political polarization has continued to lead to other critical events in 2008-2009 such
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as the invasion of Government House and the closure of the two major International
Airports. Conceptually, people still seek and share information as an impact of the 2006
coup.
Of particular interest for this study are the first few days (September 19-23, 2006) af-
ter the seizure of power in September 2006, implying that people had just heard/learned
about the situation. This includes the first twelve (12) hours when most television and
radio stations were under the control of the CDR. Only video clips of royalty and royal
music were played during that time. International programs from local cable operators
were censored. Only those who received TV from satellite could watch news from the
international media. The Internet and mobile phones became the major communication
devices. Although TV and radio stations continued their normal programs during the
next day of the coup, the military still controlled and censored the programs at a high
level. By framing this period, it highlights a critical moment when the normal flow of
information was dysfunctional.
1.4.3 Collective Information Behavior
Regardless of the variety of the fundamental concepts used (see also Savolainen, 2008;
Wilson, 2009b; Savolainen, 2009b; Wilson, 2009a; Savolainen, 2009a), the intention of
the use of information behavior in this study is merely to differentiate itself from what
is known as communication research. The focus of this study is primarily to explain
the way in which people seek and share information, rather than explore the effects of
information activities/practices/behaviors on human attitudes and behaviors. In addi-
tion, this study applies collective behavior/action theories to frame the observation of
people’s behavior in a group setting during the disruptive moment of the coup. Al-
though the boundaries of collective behavior/action, from a sociological perspective, are
mostly based on rationality and irrationality, this exploratory study does not reject both
hypotheses; rather it views the phenomenon as being located somewhere on a continuum.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter introduces and reviews the theoretical framework of the study as well as
literature related to the study of information behavior during the 2006 coup d’e´tat.
The 2006 coup d’e´tat can be considered as an exemplar of the dynamics between
chaos and order (i.e., certainty and uncertainty perspectives; Dervin, 1999a). People
become information poor, with presumably a higher degree of information needs than
in normal contexts. On the basis of such a conclusive assumption, the notion of small
world (Chatman, 1999) becomes the foundational framework of this study as shown in
Figure 2.1.
The unique characteristics of the coup pose distinctive threats to people’s lives, and
therefore can be expected to affect the way in which people seek and search for in-
formation. In a small world perspective, Chatman (1999) referred to Merton’s (1972)
notion of the Insider and Outsider to discuss the interactions among people from dif-
ferent backgrounds and contexts. In this study, the Insider and Outsider perspective is
applied to investigate the way in which insiders in Thailand interacted with outsiders
while communicative resources are restricted and information flow is either stopped or
constrained.
The next aspect of the research framework grows out of an information need per-
spective. Given the coup as a political event, it is certain that people, more or less,
Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework of the study
would look for information regarding political life. Therefore, the effects of politics on
information behavior are discussed, including cognitions and behaviors, and context.
The related literature from a collective behavior/action perspective are also included
in this chapter. Such perspectives contribute to the understanding of a collective sense
making of behaviors during social crises. Particular attention is given to rumor as a
form of informal communication and the roles of mass media and ICTs during crisis
situations.
2.1 The Small World of the Information Poor
2.1.1 Information Behavior of the Information Poor
The majority of the works related to the information behavior of the information poor
are concerned with a socioeconomically disadvantaged group; for instance, janitors
(Chatman, 1987, 1990), senior citizens (e.g., Chatman, 1992; Pettigrew, 1998; Wicks,
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2004), homeless people (Hersberger, 1998, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Hersberger & Columnist,
2005), immigrants (Fisher, Marcoux, et al., 2004; Fisher, Durrance, & Hinton, 2004),
low-income minorities (e.g., Spink & Cole, 2001; Spink, Jaeckel, & Sidberry, 1997;
L. Jackson et al., 2003) and inmates (Chatman, 1999; Campbell, 2005).
The discourse of information poverty is highly embedded in an assumption that
the center of the issue is about the weakening characteristics of users, what Dervin
(1980) called receiver deficits. Empirically, a number of studies show that the char-
acteristics of users alone could not even answer the basic gap questions: whether the
gaps exist, and why they exist. In particular, the basic assumption of a relationship
between economic poverty and information poverty seems to be most noticeable (e.g.,
Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1970). However, Chatman (1996, p.194) argued that “[the]
linkage is not necessarily true.” Dervin (1980) even broadened this perspective beyond
receivers by pointing to ceiling effects, where “some kind of ceiling prevents the informa-
tionally/communicatively rich from acquiring more, giving the poor a chance to catch
up, or, in some cases, reverse the gap” (p.24). She further suggested seeking more ex-
planation from an understanding of the source deficits and communication foundations.
2.1.2 The Development of the Small World Concept
Chatman was a pioneer in constructing theories of the information behavior of the infor-
mation poor. Her early works directly focused on the information behavior of marginal-
ized populations. Later, her works shifted to impoverished information environments.
Her ethnographic investigations centered on a theoretical framework, known as small
world (Chatman, 2000) including the theory of information poverty, the theory of life in
the round also known as “rounding theory” (Solomon, 2005), and the theory of norma-
tive behavior.
Chatman (1983) began investigating information behavior of the working poor by
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applying diffusion theory in conjunction with opinion leadership theory in her disserta-
tion. She found that diffusion theory could not fully explain the nature of information
environments. For example, the short life cycle of a certain type of information (i.e.,
employment information) affects the utility of such information. In addition, she found
that the impact of opinion leadership theory was very minor since the working poor were
not sharing information (Chatman, 1986, p.384). Chatman (2000, p.4) also found that
there are risks involved in the information exchange.
These limitations of the application of diffusion theory led to the study of the infor-
mation world of janitors. By adopting Seeman’s (1959) alienation theory as a framework,
Chatman particularly investigated what factors were hindering information sharing, em-
phasizing secrecy and defense mechanisms. Alienation theory is comprised of five con-
cepts: powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, self-estrangement, and normlessness.
Chatman’s findings indicated that every concept of alienation is applicable to janitors,
except normlessness. Chatman observed that the janitors were obedient to social norms
(Chatman, 1990, p.361). In addition, alienation theory does not consider “information
as a critical element in one’s sense of isolation” (Chatman, 2000, p.5). The results of
these two studies led to the application of the small world concept to the problem of the
information poor.
Chatman continued to observe the information seeking behavior of the same group,
janitorial workers at a southern university, but, framed the analysis in gratification the-
ory (Chatman, 1991). The findings indicate that, even though such a lower economic
class population stated their information needs, they were not active in seeking infor-
mation from sources outside their social milieu. In this particular case, the institution
where they worked had little to no role as a source of information, as the janitors saw
the information as too costly (in the sense of revealing information about themselves)
and irrelevant to them (Chatman, 2000, p.5). With this study, the influence of the small
world became clearer as the application of gratification theory helped to identify the role
of an individual’s perception on how information poor seek and avoid information.
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To expand the observation to a network level, Chatman utilized social network the-
ory to investigate how aging women in a retirement community shared information.
Chatman indicated that social network theory was chosen because “it appears to lend
itself to an examination of ways in which older people might resolve some of their con-
cerns. Not only does the theory explore the types and degrees of relationship comprising
a person’s network but also more importantly the emotional or financial resources that
might be exchanged” (Chatman, 1992, p.43). The findings reaffirm her earlier observa-
tions, especially the exploration of self-imposed social risks that become a major barrier
to information sharing, even to others who had strong ties such as family members.
Based on these observations of impoverished information worlds, Chatman used the
notion of small world as a major construct to explain the boundaries of the information
life-world of information poor. The notion of small world, framed by a sociological
and social psychological concept (e.g., Schutz & Luckmann, 1973; Kochen et al., 1989),
refers to “a world in which everyday happenings occur with some degree of predictability”
involving other people “who share physical and/or conceptual space within a common
landscape of cultural meaning” (Chatman, 2000, p.3).
Chatman began conceptualizing the small world concept based on the fact that there
is a disconnection between the world-at-large and the information poor’s interests. Four
critical social elements of impoverished lifestyle were examined: secrecy, deception, risk-
taking, and situational relevance (Chatman, 1996). These elements contributed to the
construction of her theory of information poverty, intended to explain “ways in which
people define their life experiences in order to survive in a world of distrust.” (Chatman,
2000, p.7) Six propositions were addressed including:
1. People who are defined as information poor perceive themselves to be devoid of
any sources that might help them.
2. Information poverty is partially associated with class distinction. That is, the
condition of information poverty is influenced by outsiders who withhold privileged
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access to information.
3. Information poverty is determined by self-protective behaviors, which are used in
response to social norms.
4. Both secrecy and deception are self-protecting mechanisms due to a sense of mis-
trust regarding the interest or ability of others to provide useful information.
5. A decision to risk exposure about our true problems is often not taken due to a
perception that negative consequences outweigh benefits.
6. New knowledge will be selectively introduced into the information world of poor
people. A condition that influences this process is relevance of that information in
response to everyday problems and concerns. (p.198)
The second theory that was proposed by Chatman came after her exploration of the
strong influence of social norms and self-protective behaviors (2000, p.7). This time
Chatman chose female prisoners as her study participants. She found that the female
inmates established their own insider world and ignore information from the outside
world. The small world conceptualization evolved into Chatman’s theory of life in the
round (1999), which was grounded in a number of sociological theories; for instance,
Luckmann’s (1970) editorial works on a small life-world, Douglas’s (1971) Understanding
Everyday Life, and Merton’s seminal work on the Insider and Outsider (1972).
The small world sets the social boundaries by influencing its members’ world-
views, representing a collective sense of belief of members who live within a small
world. The major characteristics of the small world are commonness, which “lacks
sweeping surprises or catastrophic problems, at least as these are commonly defined”
(Pendleton & Chatman, 1998, p.733). Social norms set the standard of what is appro-
priate or not. Additionally, the concept of social types, referring to a social classifi-
cation given to a member of the small world, influences the desirability of a member
to that particular world. The Insider and Outsider concept (Merton, 1972) becomes
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the manifestation of the social type in a small world. Information behavior, in this
model, is “a state in which one may or may not act on available or offered information”
(Burnett, Besant, & Chatman, 2001, p.537), which can be predicted by examining and
linking contextual elements together. Applicable to particular types of information,
Chatman (2000) pointed out that the members who live in the round “will not search
information if there is no need to do so” (p.10), since their world is seemingly working
without such information. Chatman also indicated that the members of a small world
tend to limit themselves by not seeking information from outside of their world unless
it falls into these conditions (Chatman, 1999, p.214):
1. the information is perceived as critical,
2. there is a collective expectation that the information is relevant, and
3. a perception exists that the life lived in the round is no longer functioning.
The way in which everyday life in a small world is predictable, routine, and manage-
able becomes a framework for Chatman’s third theory, the theory of normative behavior
(Chatman, 2000). The theory extends her previous theory in terms of defining the com-
monness or routineness of everyday life in small world. Normative behavior refers to a
“behavior which is viewed by inhabitants of a social world as most appropriate for that
particular context” (Burnett et al., 2001, p.538).
Four concepts were discussed in relation to the theory of normative behavior: so-
cial norms, worldview, social types, and information behavior. Social norms provide a
sense of balance between rightness and wrongness, which leads “the way to acceptable
standards and codes of behavior.” Social norms also play a significant role in holding
the small world together (Chatman, 2000, p.11). In terms of worldview, Chatman in-
cluded the concept of collective sense in the theory. Using Weber’s definition of social
type (1978), Chatman modified the notion by including the commonsense to identify the
connection between individuals in the small world. These conceptual constructs lead to
five propositions of the theory of normative behavior including:
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1. Social norms are standards with which members of a social world comply in order
to exhibit desirable expressions of public behavior.
2. Members choose compliance because it allows for a way by which to affirm what
is normative for this context at this time.
3. World-view is shaped by the normative values that influence how members think
about the way of the world. It is a collective, taken-for-granted attitude that
sensitizes members to be responsive to certain events and to ignore others.
4. Everyday reality contains a belief that members of a social world do retain at-
tention or interest sufficient enough to influence behavior. The process of placing
persons in ideal categories of lesser or greater quality can be thought of as social
normalization.
5. Human information behavior is a construct in which to approach everyday reality
and its effect on actions to gain or avoid the possession of information. The choice
to decide the appropriate course of action is driven by what members’ beliefs are
necessary to support a normative way of life.
For a small world, it seems likely that the major theme and pattern for observation is
routine activities as Pendleton and Chatman (1998) indicated that “linking individual
behavior with what appears to be patterned routine activities will allow the application
of conceptual schemes in order to anticipate normative behavior” (p.747).
Applications and extensions of the small world concept
A number of works apply and extend the small world as a theoretical framework for
investigating information behavior in various contexts. Pendleton and Chatman (1998)
suggested practical implications for developing policy and research in public libraries
from the small world concept. Burnett et al. (2001) extended the four elements of the
small world conception to the online environment, where members of a small world are
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not located at the same geographical location. In addition, they also applied the concept
to a group of feminist booksellers, which was “purposefully and self-consciously dedicated
to the sharing of information” (p.545). Jaeger and Thompson (2004) used the normative
behavior theory to explain why e-government in the US is ignored by some populations.
Hersberger (2003a) applied the six propositions from information poverty theory to ex-
plain the way in which homeless people access information. Burnett and Jaeger (2008)
found the connections between Chatman’s small world and Habermas’s lifeworlds con-
cept. They elaborated the way in which both concepts can be applied to online commu-
nities (e.g., blogs, wiki, and e-government).
Huotari and Chatman (2001) integrated the concept of social capital and the small
world theories to identify the process of value creation in strategic information man-
agement. Trust is an essential element of the integration since it plays a significant
role in information behavior in a small world, which is also involved in social capital.
Solomon explored the generalization of Chatman’s work in the context of work planning
(Solomon, 1997a, 1997b, 1997d, 1997c), college students’ use of the Internet, and travel
planning (Solomon, 1998)(see also Solomon, 2002, 2005).
In addition, the notions “way of life” and “mastery of life”, described in Savolainen’s
Everyday Life Information Seeking (ELIS), are similar to the small world conception as
both seem to explain the contributions of a “socially and culturally determined system of
thinking, perception, and evaluation, internalized by the individual” (Savolainen, 1995,
p.262), known as habitus and social class (Bourdieu, 1984). Although ELIS was not in-
tended to exclusively apply to the information seeking behavior of the information poor,
the ELIS model partially grew out of an interest in the information seeking behavior of
a marginalized population, industrial workers, by comparing them to those of teachers
(Savolainen, 1995). Interestingly, Savolainen also found that “information seeking does
not always follow the boundaries of social class” (p.288). In 2006, he collected data
from a group of unemployed persons and compared it to the information practices of
environmental activists (Savolainen, 2008).
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Another aspect of a small world is related to the construction of spatial context
(Savolainen, 2009c, 2006). Space, either physical or conceptual, is a central idea to
capture in the context of a small world (Chatman, 2000). Chatman (1999, p.210) stated
that location is another way to identify a small world. Thus, the small world became one
of the fundamental concepts of the notion of an information ground. The information
ground conception is also influenced by Oldenburg’s third place concept (1999) referring
to where someone can be found at other than a residence and workplace. Although the
studies of information ground as a conceptual model do not pay attention explicitly to
the information poor, the concept arose from Pettigrew’s (Later Fisher) dissertation on
information sharing between nurses and the elderly at community foot clinics (Pettigrew,
1998). In addition, the later works supporting the conception of information grounds
center around information poor populations, for example, immigrants in Queens, New
York (Fisher, Durrance, & Hinton, 2004), Hispanic farm workers and their families in
Yakima Valley, Washington (Fisher, Marcoux, et al., 2004), and sexual minorities in
Seattle (Unswort, n.d. cited in Fisher & Naumer, 2006)
The small world concept not only provides a theoretical construct related to an
impoverished life world, but also sheds light on the role of qualitative data collec-
tion, particularly an ethnography approach, in the information seeking research stream.
Chatman (1984) highlighted the importance of field research, in particular the way
in which researchers gain entry to informants (Carey, McKechnie, & McKenzie, 2001).
Pendleton and Chatman (1998) also suggested three approaches, which seem appropri-
ate for analysis of ethnographic data: contextual findings, co-associational findings, and
causal data.
Criticisms of small world concept
As far as the small world concept has been applied and validated within LIS community,
the major criticism of the theory is that it emphasizes the impact of social norms on
information seeking behavior. At the same time, it pays less attention to the influence of
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individualism. Savolainen (2008) argued that “a broader view of information seeking is
also needed because it is obvious that in times of increasing individualization characteris-
tic of reflexive modernization and the extensive availability of networked sources, people
may be less subject to the norm-based pressures that direct information seeking” (p.6).
This question becames a case for the online environment. Burnett et al. (2001) found
that a number of computer-mediated communications studies indicate a phenomenon
where a person become less aware of themselves and others as a social individual due to
the reduction of social cues in online communication.
Sligo and Jameson (2000) focused on the social isolation aspect of Pacific Island fe-
male immigrants in New Zealand, particularly focusing on the use of information regard-
ing cervical cancer. Interestingly, contradicting what Chatman found, Sligo and Jameson
found a strong sense of community awareness and connectivity among others who share
ethnic and cultural background. Sligo and Williams (2001) tested six propositions of
Chatman’s information poverty theory in a low socio-economic group in Auckland, New
Zealand. They found that two of the propositions were supported, three were unsup-
ported and one was neutral. Sligo and Williams (2001) questioned whether the way in
which interviewers were insiders or outsiders to the subject influenced the observed level
of secrecy and deception. In another word, the cultural milieu seemed to affect the way
social barriers were created.
In defense of the small world concept, Thompson (2006) argued that many stud-
ies (e.g., Hersberger, 2003a; Sligo & Jameson, 2000) that found Chatman’s theory of
information poverty inapplicable focus exclusively on each proposition rather than the
theory as a whole. As a result, such studies may overlook the coherence of the concept,
and therefore misinterpret the findings. The difference that Sligo and Williams found
from Chatman’s propositions may reflect a different set of social norms among these
New Zealanders than for the people studied by Chatman. Thompson (2006) asserted
that these studies used a semi-structured interview as the main instrument for collecting
data, rather than extensive field observation – another difference possibly contributing
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to variation in findings. In addition, Thompson argued that these works were trying to
make connections between material poverty and information poverty, which Chatman’s
later works found not always to be the case.
Beyond the small world concept
There are a number of works that have studied information behavior in information
poverty environments outside of Chatman’s small world framework. One aspect that is
usually emphasized is the channel of information transfer. In terms of information source,
a number of studies (e.g., Childers & Post, 1975; Dervin & Greenberg, 1972) assert that
television has become the medium of choice for the information poor. However, the con-
sumption of information from mass communication does not necessarily contribute to
new knowledge. On the other hand, interpersonal sources among the information poor
contribute less due to high mistrust related to Chatman’s conceptions of secrecy, de-
ception, risk-taking and situational relevance (Chatman & Pendleton, 1995). However,
the study by Wicks (2004) on information seeking by older adults found that this may
not always be the case. Spink and Cole (2001) investigated low-income African Ameri-
can’s use of information channels in their daily lives by applying a structured interview
approach. Their information environment model was developed based on the formality
and type of information (i.e., news, security, health, education, and employment). In
terms of needs, Hersberger (1998, 2001) adapted Dervin’s taxonomy for analysis of ev-
eryday information needs (1976) to address information needs of homeless people based
on their everyday life problems. Dunne (2002) modified Allen’s person-in-situation ap-
proach (1997) to describe how battered women seek information and help. In addition
to personal and situational barriers to information seeking, Dunne added responsive
constraints to the model to explain a progression during an abusive situation.
Information poor are favored as subjects-of-interest in constructing information be-
havior theories and frameworks since these groups presumably present the extreme cases
and live in an environment where they usually face crises in daily life. The studies of
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these phenomena help to define the boundaries of information behavior. However, it
seems likely that a focus on everyday life information and help seeking may limit the
definition and explanation of information behavior of the information poor.
In addition, information poverty is not only a direct result of material poverty, ed-
ucational shortcomings, behavioral deficits, and technological deficiency. According to
Haider and Bawden (2006) and Britz (2006), it can also apply to situations in which
information is restricted due to censorship, freedom of speech, human rights, or intel-
lectual property violations. Britz (2006) recognized the brain drain (the migration of
well-educated and skillful personnel from developing to developed countries) and infor-
mation and document trade (i.e., the dominance of Western scholarly works in high-
ranking journals and research tools) as causes of information poverty as well.
It is apparent that research in the area of the information behavior of the informa-
tion poor seldom addressed people who are restricted in access to information from such
conditions or those who define their small worlds in such a way as to create a situation
of information poverty. Britz (2006) observed that this may be because the discourse
on information poverty primarily comes from a perspective of developed countries. In
addition, these issues have been overwhelmed by studies from a public policy perspec-
tive. By allowing the extended perspective of information poverty, the notion of a small
world and its elements may be revisited. For example, the notion of responsiveness in
Dunne’s person-in-progressive-situation (2002) may need to be reconsidered. Moreover,
the development of ICTs increases the complexity in information delivery and dissemi-
nation, and, thus, affects our everyday life as well as information behavior. As such, it
may strengthen or lessen the creation and maintenance of a small world.
Another aspect of a small world that may need to be further investigated is the role
of outsiders in an insiders’ world. Chatman (1996) identified the Outsider from a study
of female prisoners. In her theory of life in the round, she addressed the situations
where insiders can go outside their world to get information from outsiders. What are
the kinds of situations when insiders would seek information from outsiders? What does
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the world of outsiders look like to insiders?
To bridge the knowledge gap in society, Chatman and Pendleton (1995) suggested
that as information scientists and professionals, we should help the information poor to
acknowledge people who are out of their life world, in particular ourselves, as well as
items that are valued as trustworthy, reliable, and useful from the outside world applying
to their situation. By studying these groups, we can collect the holistic concept and could
find that way in which outsiders approach the small world.
2.2 Insiders’ and Outsiders’ Information Behaviors
2.2.1 From Sociology of Knowledge to Information Behavior
To consider why people select and interact with specific information sources during a
coup, Merton’s conceptions of Insider and Outsider (1972) seem to be useful. They
can broaden the explanation of information behavior during such critical situations,
especially through the interactions among various groups and communities as well as in
the sense of geographic differences.
Merton’s work on Insider and Outsider is primarily based on epistemological devel-
opment. At the beginning of his paper, Merton mentioned polarization as a general
social and political phenomenon, but he admitted that the development of these concep-
tions was heavily framed within the context of the black social movement in the United
States. Yet Merton’s subjects of interest were mainly scholars and scientists. Therefore,
Chatman’s small world concept is used as a construct linking the concepts of Insider
and Outsider to the context of information behavior through social structure.
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2.2.2 The Insider/Outsider and Small World in Social Struc-
ture Terms
The common aspect of both Merton’s conceptions of Insider and Outsider and Chat-
man’s small world conception is the application of structural analysis to the domain
of knowledge and information seeking. For Merton, trust plays an essential role in the
polarization of society, especially in claiming and aspiring to truth. The separation is
typically based on the “membership to certain social identities, statuses, groups, or col-
lectivities” (p.11). Merton noticed that the way in which groups are active is based on
the ascription, rather than the acquisition, of social status or identities, which features
some sort of collective affirmation (such as pride and solidarity).
It is crucial to note that the notions of the Insider and Outsider, in Merton’s view, are
the basic categories in social structures. He explained it in the simplest form by saying
that “[i]nsiders are the members of specified groups and collectivities or occupants of
specific social status; [o]utsiders are the nonmembers” (p.21). Every person pertains to
both categories as we all have multiple social statuses that are interrelated and deviated,
which Merton called a status set.
A single social status already has its own dynamic (e.g., Merton, 1957) (i.e., the
collective aspect of status set doubles the complexity of structural analysis). In his
example (Merton, 1972, p.22), “if only whites can understand whites and blacks, blacks,
and only men can understand men, and women, women, . . . some insiders are excluded
from understanding other insiders with white women being condemned not to understand
white men, and black men, not to understand black women, and so through the various
combination of status subsets.” In addition, the complexity is augmented by institutional
autonomy and social situations (p.25–26).
In a small world perspective, Chatman approached such complexity with the notion
of social type, “traits or characteristics that distinguish them from other members of
their world” (p.214). By assigning certain roles as social types, Chatman (1999, p.209)
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explained that roles would collectively provide a sense of the perceptions and expecta-
tions of others. She also proposed that social types are certainly subjective and never
neutral.
Chatman’s (1999) small world is central to a worldview, defined as “a collective set of
beliefs held by members who live within a small world” (1999, p.213). Merton focused on
the intellectual and ideological domain of knowledge, which is sometimes also referred to
as interpretation. However, he later addressed that perception can be more reasonable
to be used to draw the line between the Insider and Outsider (Merton, 1972, p.30).
What the small world concept contributes the most seems to be the idea of social
structure that can deal directly with issues in communication and information seek-
ing patterns (e.g., the contribution to the gratification perspective in Chatman, 1991).
However, what has been constructed so far is seemingly limited to one world or another,
mostly through the notions of the Insider. This may be because of the specific character-
istics and social status of Chatman’s participants, for instance, prisoners, janitors, and
elders in a retirement residence that try to limit themselves to their own world. They
lose a sense of control of their small worlds when their lives are dependent on outsiders.
For example, Chatman (1996) described how “a number of inmates experience both
emotional and physical problems because of their sense of helplessness. In these cases,
they know that it will be better for them to focus instead on the daily living patterns,
relationships and issues that come within the prison environment” (p.215).
Beyond social structure, there are also some other contextual qualifiers underlying so-
cial processes that need to be addressed. The most visible one is social location. Merton
(1972, p.16) referred to Weber (1922) regarding the way in which “social locations, with
the distinctive interests and values, will affect the selection of problems for investiga-
tion.” For a small world, Chatman paid attention to physical proximity (Chatman, 1999,
p.210) and social events (Chatman, 1992, p.122). Savolainen (2009c, p.41) concluded
that the spatial factors in the small world construct are interlaced with other social fac-
tors (e.g., social norms and social types). In other words, the physical/virtual location
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would convey nothing meaningful without the analysis of social elements of doers (p.43).
2.2.3 The Insider
For Merton, the core element of the Insider is the inequality in access to knowledge. He
argues that certain individuals/groups have monopolistic or privileged access to certain
kinds of knowledge. On the other hand, access to such knowledge poses a high risk cost
to others (p.11). Generally it is the Insider who earns such privilege and the Outsider
is forbidden. Such a nonequivalent phenomenon has existed in various platforms, such
as social, political, demographic, geographic, and even biological grounds, divided by
different ascribed statuses (p.13).
From an extreme perspective, the major metaphor of the Insider is, “you have to
be one in order to understand one” (p.15). The major process in this view is con-
tinued socialization, which contributes to shared experiences, symbols, sensitivity, and
realities. Merton (1972, p.17) also used Sumner’s ethnocentrism(1906) and Caplow’s
aggrandizement effect(1964) to explain the distorted views of centrality and superiority
that fertilize pride and solidarity of groups. The Outsider is incapable of understanding
the others regardless of how skillful and thorough they are. In this view, the meaning
within a group is totally preserved, even though the underlying assumptions, signs, and
symbols are implicit (e.g., Suchman, 1997; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1996). When insiders,
if necessary, have to communicate with outsiders, the message content tends to be rein-
terpreted and repackaged (e.g., Paepcke, 1996; Agada, 1999, p. 82). At the same time,
a high level of distrust is applied to information from the Outsider.
Binding to this extreme perspective, nevertheless from the opposite side, Chatman
(1992) found that the disclosure of insiders’ information has costs to insiders themselves,
for instance, a fear of a trip from independent living to assisted living or a nursing home
when an elderly person discloses their health or physical issues.
In the more humble perspective, outsiders may be allowed to be included only if they
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are relevant and there are not enough insiders (p.13). This view considers outsiders, who
engage in the same domain, as having significantly different foci of interest, which are
relevant to their group (p.16). By adding a subordinated layer within a domain, Merton
(1972, p.17–18) remarked that it stretches out the metaphor of this perspective to say
that “one must not only be one in order to understand one; one must be one in order
to understand what is most worth understanding.”
2.2.4 The Outsider
Merton (1972, p.30) used one of the four Idols (i.e., sources of false opinion) from Bacon’s
metaphor of the Idol of the Cave, to explain the stringent perspective of the Outsider.
In this perspective, the Insider’s worldview, as well as the way in which it is created,
is believed to be restricted. Thus, one needs to leave one’s group affiliation, as well
as perhaps one’s social location, in order to extend one’s vision and be able to access
authentic knowledge. The Outsider rejects the opposing Insider view by referring to a
temporal implication. Merton applied this argument to the epistemology of historical
knowledge indicating that, “[i]f direct engagement in the life of a group is essential
to understanding it, then the only authentic history is contemporary history” (p.32).
According to Merton, when historians study phenomena in a time other than their own,
they are already outsiders.
Drawing from Simmel (1908), Merton (1972) remarked that one who is not commit-
ted to the group tends to be more objective strategically and “finds what is familiar to
the group significantly unfamiliar and so is prompted to raise questions for inquiry less
apt to be raised at all by insiders” (p.32–33). Major components of the notions of Out-
sider include passivity, detachment, distance and nearness, indifference, and involvement
(p.33).
However, in reality, this perspective in sociology of knowledge appears to be in a
more or less weaker form. For example, studies of the Insider and Outsider succession in
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a closed environment such as a work setting (e.g., Wishart, 1989) have indicated that the
Outsider is more likely to be taken when change is needed, although Dalton and Kesner
(1983, 1985) speculated that this is more probable in smaller and more poorly performing
organizations.
In the weakest form of this conception, the Outsider have only a passive impact on
the Insider, for example, the way in which cancer patients seek information from sources
outside their trusted network (e.g., Ankem, 2006; Carlsson, 2000; Mills & Davidson,
2002).
Above all, Merton (1972, p.36) suggested that the quest for truth is not a one way
or the other perspective, but involves worldviews from both the Insider and Outsider,
which have their own distinction and interaction. Thus, methodologically one should
not look at the Insider and Outsider as a dichotomy, but rather two separate continuum
scales.
2.2.5 Transition of Worldviews
It is apparent that both perspective have their own advantages and limitations (Merton,
1972, p.33). One need not be committed to any particular perspective regarding any
domain of our worldview at a certain place and period of time. Applying these per-
spectives to everyday context, Merton (1957) suggested that there are two types of
people/networks that we seek for help and support: cosmopolitan (who have an orienta-
tion outside one’s social world) and locals (whose interests are focused on the everyday
reality of life within one’s social world; Chatman, 1999).
The line dividing insiders and outsiders blurs to a certain extent in many situations.
Merton (1972, p.29) acknowledged Mannheim’s(1952) notion of classless position of the
socially unattached intellectuals, saying that:
[T]here is a category of socially free-floating intellectuals who are both In-
siders and Outsiders. Benefiting from their collectively diverse social origins
and transcending group allegiances, they can observe the social universe with
32
special insight and a synthesizing eye.
Additionally, as one may realize, the Insider is rather competitive in the extreme
sense. Groups in conflict try to make their worldview dominant, measured by the accep-
tance by others. Such a perspective leads to the other extreme point of view regarding
the way in which the converted Outsider seeks validation from others (p.20). Merton
pointed out that these converted outsiders are more advocative than the insiders, giving
the example that “[h]e then becomes more royalist than the king, more papist than the
pope” (p.20).
On the contrary, insiders sometimes have to convert themselves to be outsiders pri-
marily for two major purposes: 1) to obtain trust from the evaluation of their own
group (p.18), and 2) to get a better understanding of “alien social structure and cul-
ture” (p.29). Furthermore, Merton (1972, p.29) specifically paid attention to “outsiders
who have been systematically frustrated by the social system: the disinherited, deprived,
disenfranchised, dominated, and exploited outsiders.” He argued that this special cate-
gory of people is distinctively capable of understanding both worlds and more likely to
pick up or seize what has been taken for granted by others (p.29).
In many cases, the converted insiders and outsiders become opinion leaders of both
groups. For instance, Agada (1999) applied Taylor’s (1991) information use environment
framework to investigate information behavior of African-American gatekeepers who
apparently connect the communities together.
Nonetheless, the challenge of ever-changing structure needs to be considered. In
general, the way in which people cross the boundaries of a life world is usually through
the spatial and temporal shift (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973). Dervin (1997, p.14–15)
also addressed similar concerns regarding the subjectively constructed context that is
emergent and fluid.
In the transition across physical boundaries, the notion of globalization diminishes
the wall of geographic segmentation. The perception of reality is no longer dependent
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on firsthand experience. From medium theory, Meyrowitz (1997) pointed to the evolu-
tion of media society, from oral to print and to electronic societies, influencing people’s
awareness of the existence of outsiders. The social structure of groups has been trans-
formed. Considering the social process that produces social information, we may no
longer need to be physically with someone to know about someone. The traditional
social boundaries (e.g., family) become weaker. The Internet facilitates such social pro-
cesss to make them possible without investing physical effort. One of the attempts was
the study of a virtual community that incorporated local communities (Burnett et al.,
2001). By applying the small world concept to the online environment, the study shows
that the concept is more relevant to firmly established and fairly closed environments
(Savolainen, 2009c, p.44).
Another aspect of the outcome of the transition of worldview that may need to be
further discussed is the observation of “asymmetrical relations between diverse kinds
of insiders and outsiders” (Merton, 1972, p.30). Merton pointed out, as an example,
the fact that black people have worked in white environments, crossing “the walls of
segregation to discover with little effort what was on the other side.” On the other
hand, it was quite apparent that “the highly visible whites characteristically did not
want to find out about life in the black community.”
To a certain extent, Chatman’s sixth proposition in her Theory of Life in the Round
is supplemental to the understanding of the conditions of the transition of worldviews
(Chatman, 1999, p.214). The competitive view of this notion provides an underlying pic-
ture of how insiders and outsiders interact with each other. In this view, the worldviews
of both perspectives are comparable to a certain extent as “[c]ompeting or conflicting
groups take over ideas and procedures from one another” (Merton, 1972, p.37). At the
end, Merton (1972, p.38) argued that it is the interaction between conflicting groups
that causes the intellectual exchange as an outcome of this social process. Sharing and
exchanging information, whether within or across groups is eventually mutual enhance-
ment (e.g., Wittenbaum & Park, 2001; Wittenbaum & Bowman, 2004).
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2.3 Political Information Behavior
Since most coup d’e´tats are rooted in political tension, it is speculated that under-
standing political context is central to understanding information needs and behaviors.
Therefore, it is important to understand the process of political information transfer.
This section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on how people seek and dis-
cover political information as well as the factors affecting the ways in which people seek
political information. In addition, it provides insights on how political context influences
information seeking behavior.
2.3.1 Political Context
Researchers in political communication derived their understanding of context from so-
cial structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). In political discourse, context is viewed as
an arena for action. According to Nash, Hudson, and Luttrell (2006, p.1), “political
context refers to the political aspects of the environment that are relevant to action.”
Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987) highlighted the relationship between people and context
saying that “contexts are external to the individual even if the composition of the context
depends upon the makeup of individuals contained within it” (p.1200). Yet context may
exert pressure, which shapes political information behavior in the duality of structure
and action as noted in Gidden’s structuration theory.
Political context can be viewed from a political system perspective. Easton (1965)
provided a definition of a political system as “the authoritative allocation of values
for a society” (p.49–50). Authoritative, according to Easton, refers to the collective
values that are bounded by the political system. There are two types of people in a
political system: members and authorities. The system operates through authorities.
On the other side, members provide inputs to the system. Inputs can either be demands
or supports. In general, demands are what members want and need, as well as their
opinions. On the other hand, supports (e.g., donations) can be delivered to a system
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in general or specific units. The support could be for government (and non-government
agency), regime (constitution), or country. The system produces outputs, which are
rules, policies, decisions, actions and services. In this model, Easton also mentions that
social stress (e.g., in the form of a crisis of some sort) could affect the persistence of the
system.
Thus, areas that are of interest to political researchers could relate to any part of
a political system: distribution of power, political organization, and the applications
and interactions of formal and informal rules among stakeholders (Nash et al., 2006).
There are three major arenas that shape the boundaries of political context: electoral
politics, civic engagement and organization, and political movement. However, electoral
politics apparently dominates the study of information transfer and the communication
processes of political information (Robbin & Buente, 2008). Weissberg (2005) called for
researchers to expand the analysis of political participation beyond electoral politics.
In addition to the political aspects of social context, many discussions focus on the
impact of social setting on political activity. To clarify, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987)
pointed out that “social context is clearly a much broader concept that encompasses
wider domains, such as religious affiliation, recreation activities, and social organization”
(p.1201). According to Scheufele et al. (2004), social context plays an essential role in
political participation. For example, those who participate in volunteer group-based
discussion tend to be active information seekers (p.330). On the other hand, work-based
discussion does not have a relationship with the way in which people participate in
politics. Furthermore, a number of studies show that involvement in even temporary
social situations stimulates increases in political activity resulting in active seeking of
information regarding political and public affairs (Atkin, 1972; Kanihan & Chaffee, 1996;
Pinkleton & Austin, 2001).
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2.3.2 Psychological Factors Related to Political Information
Behavior
Related to active citizenship, there are a number of cognitive and behavioral indicators
that empirically have a relationship with political participation and information behav-
ior. For instance, a number of studies indicate the relationship between political interest
and information behavior. Bimber (2001) conducted an analysis of how Americans used
three different media – television, newspapers, and the Internet – to obtain information
about the 1996 presidential campaign. The results show a significant effect of political
interest on the use of all types of media. Also within the context of the electoral process,
Xenos and Moy (2007) pointed to the role of political interest in how the Internet, in
particular, enables political and civic engagement.
When it comes to certain political issues, differences in individual opinion seem to
have an impact on information behavior. Robbin and Buente (2008) found that political
attitudes and beliefs is one of several significant factors influencing how people used the
Internet to seek and share information on the Iraq War. Other significant factors include
gender, political motivation, traditional media consumption, perceptions of bias in the
media, and computer experience and use.
A number of studies have confirmed that people who have a higher level of po-
litical knowledge tend to seek news and information more than those who have a
lower level of political knowledge (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Price & Zaller, 1993).
Althaus and Tewksbury (2000) suggested that political knowledge is the leading indi-
cator for information need, in particular of active information seekers who tend to be
satisfied by information sources that contain a variety of public strategies.
Another personality trait that has proved to be relevant to political information
behavior is the desire for control. In Althaus and Tewksbury’s study (2000), the findings
indicate that the desire for control and political knowledge are good predictors of the
exposure to news and information, measured by time using media. The desire for control
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appears to be associated with a motivational tendency (Burger & Cooper, 1979). In
other words, those who have a higher level of desire to be in control tend to take on
leadership roles as well as to make decision for themselves.
Political efficacy is another construct that has been consistently shown to influence
political information seeking. Political efficacy is defined as “the feeling that one is capa-
ble of influencing the decision making process” (Goel, 1980, p.127). There are two types
of political efficacy: internal efficacy (one’s perception of personal effectiveness that
participatory channels are open to them) and external efficacy (one’s belief about the
authorities’ or regimes’ responsiveness to individual inputs; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy,
1999). Political efficacy tends to have a positive relationship with political interest
and education (Blasius & Thiessen, 2001). In general, many studies have found two-
way interactions between political efficacy and the selection of information source (e.g.,
McLeod et al., 1999; Pinkleton, Austin, & Fortman, 1998). However, it seems that in-
ternal efficacy tends to have a stronger effect.
Another concept related to political efficacy is political trust, which concerns the
anticipated quality of government outputs (Craig, 1979). A study done in Western Eu-
rope (Kaase, 1999) indicates that the effect of interpersonal trust on political trust is
relatively small, though positive. Moreover, a positive relationship between interper-
sonal trust and non-institutionalized political participation was found. All in all, these
factors informed the impact of political activism on information seeking behavior (e.g.,
Robbin & Buente, 2008; Shaheen, 2008).
Emotion also plays a significant role in political information seeking behavior, es-
pecially when conflicts in political opinions emerge. Emotion appears in politics ev-
eryday. The major argument of emotion in political context has its roots in percep-
tions from popular culture that emotion is related to irrationality or lack of self control
(Pantti & Zoonen, 2006). However, a number of researchers argue that emotion should
be viewed as a fundamental construct of political activity and decision. Researchers
from this school of thought point out that a lack of passion results in political apathy.
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They also suggest that irrationality and emotion should be viewed separately. There is
also the view that emotion is the original source of practical rationality, which is fun-
damental for collective action. Nonetheless, emotional commitment is required as well.
A number of political movements, revolving around such events as the assassination
of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands or the White Marches in Belgium, are emotionally
driven, in particular, with media as a main mechanism for information transfer. Such
events portray that emotion is central to self-identification and the social bond, which
represents, for example, nationalism.
Emotion seems not to be allowed in many formal political environments or in some
societies. However, some societies accept collective emotion for its moral, historical,
and cultural values. Hochschild (2003) introduced feeling rules, which indicate when
and in which situations simultaneous emotions are accepted. As a result, this view
suggests that there is an inequality of the expression of emotion between elites and other
groups. There are also studies examining public mood (Rahn, Kroeger, & Kite, 1996;
Rahn & Hirshorn, 1999; Rahn, 2000), “a diffuse affective state that people experience
as a consequence of their membership in a national political community” (Rahn et al.,
1996, p.389–390). The results from the experiment conducted by Rahn and Hirshorn
(1999) indicate that children, who have low political efficacy, tend to be influenced by
media on diffuse emotional states. Richards (2004) reviewed the literature regarding
emotional aspects of political communication through postmodern and popular culture
discourse. He listed three affective dimensions of politics, including: 1) diffuse affective
states in the public mind; 2) emotionalized forms of political discourse, and 3) individual
personalities of political actors (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Mazzoleni, 2000). He also
highlighted the role of fear appeal in political discourse. Based on psychodynamic theory,
Richards (2004) also suggested the following basic themes in the study of the affective
aspect in the political context, as follows:
• dependency and autonomy,
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• loss and mourning,
• gender and sexuality,
• authority (including leader-follower relationships),
• rivalry (within and between generations), and
• guilt and forgiveness.
Selection of Information Sources
Mutz (2001) asserted that “the emphasis in today’s communication environment is on
choice, on making it easier for the consumer to get what he or she wants when he or
she wants it” (p.232). The wealth of information and the advancement of ICTs provide
us various alternatives to obtain information. Knoke (1989) examined two general ap-
proaches, persuasion and selection, to study how people shape their political attitudes
and activities in a network context. It seems likely that these two approaches can be
adapted for use in exploring the fundamental question about the relationship between
political information users and information sources, particularly in the context of ICTs.
For persuasion, it is believed that a social actor intentionally transmits information
to alter another’s actions “from what would have occurred in the absence of that infor-
mation” (p.1042). What influences people’s actions is not the ability to control people.
Instead, it is the application of information based on the judgment of credibility and
trustworthiness.
Generally individuals choose information sources based on their own preferences,
which could be shaped by social and attitudinal characteristics. The discussion of
the preferences is divided into two points of views: homogeneity and heterogene-
ity (Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2004). Homogeneity can be described as a phe-
nomenon where people tend to seek information from/to others with shared interests.
In his diffusion model, Chaffee (1975, p.112) used a principle of relevance overlap to
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explain the phenomenon by saying that “[i]nteractions between citizens of similar ori-
entation to the system would be more likely to foster diffusion of mutually relevant
information than would interactions between citizens of different orientations.” For
Knoke (1989), homogeneity of point of view plays a significant role in network settings.
In addition, when an actor has to confront another who has contrasting interests, it
is likely that they would either resist the exposure to information or misperceive and
misrepresent the information and situation (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987; Knoke, 1989,
p. 1044).
The discussion can be applied to an online world. There are a number of observers
suggesting that people who participate in online discussions tend to fragment into like-
minded groups (Davis & Owen, 1998; Selnow, 1998). These observations are based on
the belief that people hear what they wish to hear, which is grounded in the limited
effects or minimal consequences model, regarding the selective exposure and interpre-
tation of political communication (Klapper, 1960; Chaffee, 2001). As a result of this
fragmentation, Sunstein (2001, cited in Stromer-Galley, 2003) observed that the mem-
bers of like-minded groups will hold a more extreme perspective than each individual
would hold alone.
On the contrary, the heterogeneity perspective believes that people would like to seek
information from those who have a different worldview. It is apparent that this view has
been highly supported since the introduction of ICTs. ICTs, particularly the Internet,
are perceived as a tool to facilitate political pluralism (e.g., Truman, 1965; Walker,
1991; Dahl, 1989; Bimber, 1998). Huckfeldt et al. (2004) pointed out that people do
not eliminate someone who they disagree with politically in their social network. In
Stromer-Galley’s (2003) study of users of online political discussion forums, the findings
show the strong appearance of the desire for experience of diversity. However, one would
not assume that people do not enjoy talking to people who share similar opinions to their
own since the participants expressed their enjoyment of socializing with people who are
similar to themselves as well.
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The findings of these studies favor the sense that people are likely to go online for com-
prehensiveness of sources and points of view. One example comes from the reasons that
Americans go online to get information about the Iraq war. Rainie, Fox, and Fallows
(2003) found that the majority of Americans (about 66 percent) were seeking a variety
of information sources. They expected points of view that are different from what they
have learned from traditional media or official sources.
Some believe that the extreme consequences of the heterogeneity perspective result
in a conversation that is “unruly, irrational, and far from ideals of public deliberation”
(Stromer-Galley, 2003). Huckfeldt et al. (2004) argued that political disagreement is
vital to sustain the vitality of democratic politics. However, it is important to note that
ICTs might enable political discourse that involves constructive dialog beyond discussion
and disagreement.
Avoidance of Political Information
It is interesting to consider avoidance in the political context. Political matters seem to
be inevitable as they are intertwined with our everyday life, especially through the media
(Jones, 2005). However, some people perceive politics from a pessimistic perspective.
According to Robbin and Buente (2008), politics is usually viewed, to many Americans,
as a site of conflict and to be avoided. Childers and Post (1975) noted that disadvantaged
people see politics as complex systems of role behavior, which exclude them from the
dialogue. Buckingham (2000) pointed out that politics alienated children and young
adults because: 1) the majority sees politics as simply irrelevant to their lives (i.e., there
is no stake to make a change – for instance, they did not pay taxes and were not allowed
to vote); and 2) they have a negative perception of politicians. It seems that politics
is generally not central to people’s everyday lives for reasons which may be related to
Chatman’s (1999) theory of life in the round. T. Brown (1981) asserted that, when it
comes to choice, politics is not the major criterion affecting people’s decisions. People
are more likely to make decisions based on other matters than politics and political
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preference.
McLeod and Becker (1974) employed a uses and gratifications approach to make
sense of the way in which people avoid or receive political information from television.
It is essential to point out that avoidance can be seen either from positive (e.g., I already
made up my mind) or negative perspectives (e.g., I am not interested in politics). A
number of empirical studies show that partisanship, relaxation, and alienation influence
the interaction between exposure to television and political activities. Patterson (2002)
indicated that a long presidential campaign could also have a negative effect on political
interest. In addition, a number of studies show that programs that are superficial and
image-oriented and use negative tactics could lead to political disaffection, alienation
and apathy with regard to the democratic system, which eventually may result in a lack
of effort in seeking political information (e.g., Pinkleton & Austin, 2001; Martinson,
2009).
Additionally, the notion of disinformation plays a significant role in political dis-
course, especially through mass media (Montgomery, 2006). Disinformation basically
refers to deception or falsehood. Disinformation has been studied from various con-
texts such as political campaigns (Rodriquez, 2002), warfare (Barnes, 1994), racism
(Skinner & Martin, 2000), and historical fabrication (Drobnicki & Asaro, 2001). Hernon
(1995) explored the accuracy of information available online and oﬄine, and found that
there seems to be little difference in perceptions of disinformation between oﬄine and
online information. Floridi (1996) argued that disinformation can originate in three
ways: lack of objectivity such as the case of propaganda, a lack of completeness, or a
lack of pluralism such as censorship. These causes can exist separately or together. The
diffusion of disinformation can be supported when the information source is viewed as
authoritative and the users are more naive. Furthermore, the distribution of disinfor-
mation depends upon “how easy it is, on the part of receiver, to control the level of
objectivity, completeness, and pluralism of information received” (Floridi, 1996, p.511).
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2.4 Seeking and Sharing Information During Crisis
Another important contextual construct that is worth for an investigation is human
behaviors in social crises. The current perspective of such context is primarily based on
the development of the notions of collective behavior, originating from an observation
of composite reactions to various kinds of social strain. From an early observation
during the coup as discussed in Chapter 1, people sought supports from each others to
access and distribute information (e.g., discussion forums, and chat rooms). Therefore,
considering information behavior as collective behavior/action extends the fundamental
understanding of how people as in a group environment seek and share information
during social crises such as the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand.
There are a number of connections between the study of information behavior in
everyday life, and even scholarly, context and information behavior during a social crisis.
For example, central to ambiguous situations is the focus of emotion. Negative feelings
such as uncertainty, anxiety, and frustration have been frequently observed in collective
behavior. At the same time, researchers in ILS have also been investigating the role
of emotion in information behavior (e.g., Nahl & Bilal, 2007; Kuhlthau, 2004; Mellon,
1986). In addition, the methodological approaches to collective behavior/action are, to
some extent, similar to those employed in ILS and communication studies. For instance,
social behavior interactionists are interested in significant symbols, including verbal
and nonverbal gesture, action or action trace (McPhail, 2006). Rumors or informal
communication in a crisis can be considered as a sense-making function, from either an
individual or collective sense (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007).
A number of scholars in collective behavior/action suggest that the difference be-
tween collective behavior and normal behavior is a matter of degree, not of type (e.g.,
J. Perry & Pugh, 1978; Ginneken, 2003; D. Miller, 2000). Therefore, instead of explor-
ing deviant types of components of behavior, this study investigates the impact of the
intensity of situation and related constructs on the way in which people seek and share
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information.
Therefore, collective behavior/action is used as a frame of reference providing justi-
fication, from a socio-psychological perspective, for the way people sought and shared
information in response to the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand. Specifically focusing on
a communication and interaction perspective, this section also reviews the literature
related to the concept of rumor and communication during situations of social crises.
Then, the roles of mass media and ICTs are also discussed.
2.4.1 From Irrational Behavior to Rational Action
Since the mid-nineteenth century, scholars in sociology and social psychology have been
studying the way in which people, in a collective sense, respond to critical situations
(D. Miller, 2000, p.4). However, Park and Burgess (1921) first used the term collective
behavior, which is defined as the behavior of individuals under the influence of a collective
impulse. The study of collective behavior originated with an interest in mass hysteria,
such as Le Bon’s classic work, The Crowd (2001[1895]).
According to D. Miller (2000) the idea of collective behavior can be divided into
three subareas. Firstly, collective behavior is seen as aroused by emotion. In this view,
the emotions and behavior of people in crowds tend to be exaggerated. Secondly, collec-
tive behavior is defined as adaptive response. This definition focuses on emergent and
temporary behavior that is adaptive to new and ambiguous situations, especially where
there is no pre-existing social norm. Finally, collective behavior is conceptualized as a
non-institutionalized response to social strain – the phenomenon through which normal
social structure fails. This perspective leans toward explaining social mobilization events
such as panic, fads, riots, and civilian coups.
The traditional conception of collective behavior has been criticized as being based
on stereotypical characteristics (i.e., irrational, emotional, and impulsive). A number
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of models and explanations do not fit the increasing interest in politically-oriented so-
cial movements that are goal-oriented and mostly in control. Social researchers have
empirically examined whether the way people behave in social movements is different
from what they do in normal situations. The notion of collective action, then, has been
introduced to explain such purposive and justifiable actions within the context of social
movements. McPhail (2006, p.455) argued that the notion of collective action provides
a clearer perspective on “what people do with and in relation to one another.” In addi-
tion, the original principle of collective behavior focused on non-interpretative actions,
while the collective action perspective recognizes that people make decisions on whether
or not to act the way they do. He highlighted the role of language as a significant tool
in his temporary gathering model.
The nature of collective events is extremely diverse depending on the particulars of
a case (e.g., Weessies, 2007). Thus, epistemological and methodological approaches are
also varied. For example, Le Bon’s (2001[1895]) classical perspective of crowds illustrates
a strongly pessimistic picture of the crowd. This point of view highlights the role of
mental unity created by opinion leaders or elites. However, Le Bon’s work is unclear
in many respects. Turner and Killian (1957, 1987) rejected Le Bon’s mental contagion
assumption and proposed an emergent norm approach, which emphasizes that groups
affect the way people respond to normative constraint (e.g., social pressure toward the
reactions to polices during a protest (D. Miller, 2000), and the helping behavior at the
stairwell during the evaluation of the World Trade Center complex (Connell, 2001)).
In addition, Smelser’s (1962) value-added theory pays attention to values, norms, the
organization of motivation, and situational facilities. These components incorporate
social action within the goal of changing society. From an organizational perspective,
resource mobilization theory is used to explain how a group gathers and moves through a
social network and utilizes material resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1973). Moreover, the
social behavioral interactionist (SBI) perspective led by McPhail (1991, 2006) focuses
on the organization of convergent activity by interpreting different forms of social action
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(e.g., chanting, singing, waving, and gesturing). Adopting Goffman’s (1966) conception
of the gathering, the additional focus of SBI is on the assembling and dispersing process
of temporary groups.
Although there were street demonstrations or announcements of various different
political groups after the 2006 coup, such organized collective activities are not the
main focus of this study. It is worth noting that the first street protest was not until
three days after the seizure of power (on September 22, 2006). This study primarily
focuses on the way in which people sought and shared information during the first
couple days of the coup. Therefore, the notion of collective behavior is fundamental
to this study. However, the idea of rational collective action is not totally discarded
from the frameworks of interest, but supplements and is an alternative to the collective
behavior perspective.
2.4.2 Emotion
Normally in response to critical situations, people’s cognitive state would be reflected
in emotion. For example, most survey respondents articulated shock and disbelief after
first hearing about the assassination of Kennedy. Later on, they developed an awareness
of loss leading to mixed feelings of sorrow, sadness, shame, and anger (Schramm, 1965).
Apparently these emotions, especially negative ones, lead to motivation and effort to
learn about critical events (Boyle et al., 2004).
Panic is apparently the most visible phenomenon to collective behavior in the tra-
ditional perspective. Panic is usually seen in association with anger, fear, and anxiety.
Panic is viewed as “responsible for the sense of confusion and personal helplessness
within communities confronted with disaster” (D. Miller, 2000, p.256). In an extreme
case, panic “may easily overrule conventional types of mental and social functioning”
(Ginneken, 2003, p.178). There are numerous cases of panic that originated via rumors,
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for instance, the 1979 concert stampede in Cincinnati, Ohio (Johnson, 1987), the stam-
pede as a result of a rumor about a suicide bomber in 2005 in Iraq (Worth, 2005, cited in
DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007), and the failed escape of the smokejumpers during the Mann
Gulch disaster in 1949 (Weick, 1993).
Mawson (2007) suggested that there are two behavior classes relevant to the notion
of panic: stimulation-seeking and stimulation-avoidance behavior. Stimulation-seeking
behavior refers to behaviors that involve an intensive level of activity, for instance wild
running, agitation, and aggression. In this view, the susceptibility to social influence is
often considered, speculating that anxious situations could increase suggestibility (i.e.,
people are more likely to be imitative of or receptive to others’ behaviors). At the
same time, it could weaken cognitive function and personality. These intensive behav-
iors are seen as expressions to “increase sensory input and at the same time reduce the
level of arousal” (p.117). On the other hand, when an individual is alone, there is a
chance that one would respond to the event with immobility (“freezing”) referred to
as stimulation-avoidance behavior. Mawson explained such behaviors as “a biological
phenomenon that serves to minimize contact with the environment and to reduce all
forms of sensory input” (p.179). Mawson’s behavior classes seem to be in line with
what information professionals have observed as information seeking and information
avoidance (e.g., Case, Andrews, Johnson, & Allard, 2005; S. Miller & Mangan, 1983;
Brashers, Goldsmith, & Hsieh, 2002).
However, the perspectives on collective behavior and collective action, such as
emergent-norm and social behavioral interaction, attempt to minimize or even elimi-
nate the effect of panic by explaining such irrational activities in a more organized form
(D. Miller, 2000, p.256). McPhail (2006, p.455) asserted that “panic is no longer a
useful description or explanation of the individual or collective actions people take in
the face of life-threatening situations.” He argued that panic rarely appears in disaster
incidents and other emergency contexts (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1972, 1977; Quarantelli,
2001; Clarke, 2002). In disaster contexts, Ginneken (2003) observed that confidence
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and trust in authorities, including efficiency, concern, and credibility, lessen such panic
incidents, especially in developed countries.
2.4.3 Rumor/Informal Communication during a Crisis
Although there are various approaches to studying collective behavior and collective
action, it is apparent that, to a certain extent, these approaches fundamentally view
the concept of rumor in similar ways. Rumor is viewed as the major communication
and interaction function of groups or collectivities, as Turner (1994) described rumor
as intensified (and active) information seeking. While the traditional view of collective
behavior recognizes rumor as simplistic, usually inaccurate, and emotion-provoking, the
collective action view leans toward adopting normal communication models (D. Miller,
2000).
As Aguirre (2002) asserted, rumor is perhaps one of the least understood forms of
collective behavior. By definition, DiFonzo and Bordia (2007, p.13) viewed rumors as
“unverified and instrumentally relevant information statements in circulation that arise
in contexts of ambiguity, danger, or potential threat and that function to help people
make sense and manage risk.” However, it seems that there is no consensus on the use
of the term, rumor. Rumor can either be considered as a process or a product. Aguirre
(2002) used the term rumoring to refer to “the search for meaning through information
sources of information,” while rumor may be understood as a cultural object as defined
by Griswold (1987). Rosnow and Kimmel (1974) used the term rumor discussion, de-
fined as a group interpretation process, to differentiate this process from rumors as a
product of informal communication.
Evidently there are numerous ways to typify rumors. Certain criteria have been
used to categorize rumors, including their temporal aspects, subject matter, content
or theme, pattern of discussion (low-anxiety to high-anxiety), origins, motivations, and
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sense-making functions (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007, p.36). However, these diverse perspec-
tives share at least one common characteristic: that rumor is represented as informal
communication.
Rumors and ambiguous situations seem to have a reciprocal relationship. In other
words, certain types of situations cause and maintain rumors. At the same time, ru-
mor can turn a normal situation into a chaotic situation. Additionally, rumors can be
investigated prior to or after the occurrence of critical events such as crisis or disaster.
Functions and Motivations of Rumors/Communication in Crisis
The traditional view of the function of rumors can be obtained from Shibutani’s (1966)
perspective. He indicated that people use rumors to share information as well as evalu-
ate, compare, predict, and interpret an ambiguous situation. DiFonzo and Bordia (2007)
asserted that the key construct of rumor is sense-making of the situation. Cantril (1941)
addressed rumor as the pursuit of meaning. Additionally, Festinger et al. (1948) sug-
gested that rumor is a way to gain cognitive clarity.
In addition, the literature also suggests that rumor can serve other purposes as
well, however secondary, such as entertainment, wish fulfillment, alliance making and
maintenance, and enforcement of communal norms (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007, p.15).
DiFonzo and Bordia (2007, ch.3) used the motivation model to characterize differ-
ent functions of rumors including fact-finding, relationship-enhancement, and self-
enhancement. The fact-finding motivation is driven by a combination of uncertainty
and the importance of the situation as well as personal attributions of lack of control
and anxiety. People are basically motivated to reduce uncertainty and anxiety while
they renew the sense of control over the situation. For the relationship-enhancement mo-
tivation, the minimized unpleasant message effect, describing the reluctance to transmit
negative information, is applied. In other words, people tend to pass positive rumors
more than negative ones since the latter could generate a bad social image (see also
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Noelle-Neumann’s 1974 concept of the spiral of silence). Additionally, sharing informa-
tion that is believed to be accurate and valuable could enhance reputation as a credible
and trusted source of information as well as status and prestige in one’s social network.
The self-enhancement motivation can be based on two primary sources: consciously ma-
licious intent to others (e.g., product rumors and rumors during war-time) and enhancing
self-identity (e.g., to support or justify pre-existing prejudices).
Rumor Content
The roughest classification of rumor content would be positive and negative rumors.
In addition, the nature of a rumor may be explained by the distance of the impact
to oneself. For example, during the invasion of Iraq, Muhammed (1994) found that
two types of rumors were spread: 1) unpleasant news (e.g., death or arrest of lead-
ers), and 2) threats to lives and property (e.g., censorship of carrying certain objects).
Bordia and DiFonzo (2004) conducted a content analysis of rumors posted on the In-
ternet, dividing rumor content into 11 categories, including delivering an explanation,
evaluating an explanation, verifying an explanation, falsifying an explanation, accepting
an explanation, reporting other information related to the explanation, seeking infor-
mation, directing, justifying an explanation, hoping for certain positive consequences,
motivating by considering losses, and casual participating.
There are four basic attributes of rumor including informative, communicative, in-
strumental, and unverified (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007, p.16). Although some rumors
could raise questions, be persuasive and direct behavior, the form of a rumor statement
is simple and informative (i.e., telling a story). In addition, rumor has to be commu-
nicated. It could not be recognized as rumor if it is only situated in someone’s mind.
Rumor is perceived as purposive, not just being “entertaining, sociable or aimless.” Ru-
mor also refers to information that has not yet been proved to be true. In other words, it
is “constructed around unauthenticated information” (Rosnow & Kimmel, 1974, p.27).
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Ginneken (2003, p.31) asserted that the way rumors are viewed as unverified and unau-
thenticated information can be explained by at least three conditions: “1) the original
author of a rumor is usually not known, 2) the author is usually not the appropriate au-
thority to make official statements about the matter, and 3) the rumor is often explicitly
at odds with authorized information.”
By comparing rumors to news, DiFonzo and Bordia (2007) pointed to the similarity
between rumors and news, which is sharing new information. In addition, topics that
attract people are relatively more urgent, significant, purposeful, or important. However,
the fact that rumors are unverified and could fall into what is called misinformation
makes a rumor different from what is labeled news.
A rumor could begin with a one-line message. However, the snowball effect could
make the content more elaborate (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007). The life of a rumor may
depend upon various variables. For example, dramatic rumors, even though they are
inaccurate, have longer lives. DiFonzo and Bordia (2007) saw rumors as a subclass of
memes which are ideas, symbols, or practices that survive through cultural processes
analogous to those of natural selection. However, the most important aspect of rumor
content seems to be its accuracy (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007, chapter 6), which not only
affects the life of a rumor, but also belief in the rumor as well.
It is worth noting that the content of a rumor is likely to change throughout the
transmission process, in accord with Shibutani’s (1966) notion of rumor as improvised
news. The alteration of rumor content is generally based on the principle of assimilation
(Allport & Postman, 1965). Assimilation denotes the distortion of a message to lean,
to some degree, toward one’s personal psychological schemes. In other words, we “tend
to see things in a way that fits in with our preconceptions and bias” (Turner, 1994).
Generally, there are three practices in changing a rumor’s content: leveling, sharpening,
and adding (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007, p.135). Leveling refers to the simplification of
content, usually reducing the detail so the content can be transmitted easily. Sharpening
means highlighting or paying more attention to particular details so as to make the story
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more coherent. Adding refers to the action of inserting additional detail into the content.
Factors influencing Transmission of Information in Crisis
DiFonzo and Bordia (2007, p.69) reviewed the psychological literature and found out
that there are five individual-level psychological factors affecting the transmission of ru-
mors, including uncertainty, importance or outcome-relevant involvement, lack of con-
trol, anxiety, and belief.
In collective terms, group standards of the plausibility of rumors seem to matter
to some extent (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007). In other words, if the group standard of
plausibility is high, such behavior/action can be considered as fact finding. On the
contrary, when the group standard of plausibility is low, the notion of contagion or
panic is in focus.
In addition, the study conducted by Aguirre (2002) indicates that the way in which
mass media predict the occurrence of a crisis plays a significant role in the transmission
of rumors. His study supports Shibutani’s (1966) prediction of the positive relationship
of the exposure to information between formal and informal sources. At the same time,
it also indicates the chance of participating in rumoring based on a person’s availability
as well as social network density (McPhail, 1991, p.91–94). The most visible examina-
tion of person’s availability (i.e., time and spatial location) would be the study of the
assassination of US President John F. Kennedy (Greenberg & Parker, 1965). Schramm
(1965) observed that the time of day of the event (i.e., morning, daytime, evening or
night) impacted where people heard the news and how. Subsequently, Greenberg (1964)
pointed out that physical location and source of information were highly correlated. For
example, those who received the news about the assassination at home were likely to
hear it from relatives, neighbors, or friends. Those who were at their workplace would
get information from colleagues. Interestingly, most people who were out there some-
where were firstly informed by strangers. However, Greenberg (1964, p.231) concluded
that “access to other persons may be not only a matter of physical location, but also to
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some degree a matter of social location”. That is, some people seem to be able to locate
themselves in, or perhaps create, a social situation in which interpersonal communication
is more likely, regardless of physical location.
However, in most cases, rumoring seems to depend on the plausibility of rumors and
the extent to which they fill a gap. It is speculated that when people believe in rumor,
the speed of rumors is accelerated. DiFonzo and Bordia (2007, p.111) presented factors
related to belief in rumor based on Brunswick’s lens model of judgment (1952). These
factors include the receiver’s attitude (i.e., rumors are more likely to be spread if they
are consistent with our exisiting attitudes), source credibility, hearing repeatedly, and
rumor rebuttal. Moreover, when a rumor already fits the social pattern, emerging data,
or expert consensus, it increases the probability that one would believe such a rumor.
Furthermore, intensity of emotions or moods can also affect the pattern of rumor
as well. Shibutani (1966) introduced two forms of rumor construction based on the
emotional intensity: deliberative and extemporaneous. When the unsatisfied demand for
information and the emotional state of the collectivity is perceivably mild to moderate,
rumor can be critically and deliberately constructed. For extemporaneous construction,
DiFonzo and Bordia (2007) suggested that, when collective excitement is intense, the
construction of rumor turns into social contagion.
2.4.4 Roles of Mass Media in Communication during Crisis
Rumor is perceived as mass behavior, usually through interpersonal interaction and
communication. However, there is an essential role of the mass media in delivering
information during social stress. In everyday contexts, mass media have proven to be
a main source of information (see also Political Information Seeking Behavior). Mass
media can be used as a tool to spread rumor and even construct the mythology of an
event (e.g., Fischer, 2008, p.75–59). On the other hand, media can be the source of
rumor in an ambiguous situation (e.g., Aguirre, 2002). In addition, the way in which
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mass media fail to meet audience expectations can motivate them to seek information
from other information sources, including interpersonal channels.
For instance, Muhammed (1994) interviewed sixteen Kuwaiti families who lived in
Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation in 1990. By comparing their communication patterns
prior to and after the invasion, Muhammad observed the way in which Kuwaitis used
the mass media as well as interpersonal channels. Based on the use and gratification
theory and Shibutani’s analysis of rumor (1966), the results show the transition from a
communication pattern that was primarily based on the availability and trustworthiness
of mass media (i.e., damaged or taken by the Iraqi military) to one that was founded in
rumoring. During the occupation in Kuwait, local newspapers, radios, and televisions
were controlled by the Iraqi government. People relied more on news media outside
Kuwait (e.g., other Arab radio stations, BBC, Radio Monte Carlo, and Gulf Television
Channel). A television program about/from the departed Kuwaiti was the most popular
program among the respondents. However, rumor/word of mouth became the primary
source of information about local situations. Although telephone service was available at
that time, some respondents preferred to meet in-person with people who they trusted
because they were afraid of being monitored. While word of mouth was perceived as
being exaggerated, it was necessary to live in such an uncertain situation. Although
most of the informants were getting news from people within their social networks (e.g.,
family and friends), they could not specify exactly where the news came from. The
rumors were used to express people’s frustration and desperation. In addition, people
needed to complain about the situation as well as help each other interpret the messages.
According to Shibutani (1966), rumors are more likely to spread under these three
conditions: 1) disasters when the news media could not keep up, 2) situations in which
the media could not be trusted, and 3) situations where the media is suddenly unavail-
able. For Turner (1994), rumor is situated on the upper level of a normal collective
information seeking model, which basically consists of four action stages. Firstly, after
hearing about a social strain situation, people turn to mass media as they would do in
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an everyday context. Then, they begin to discuss these media accounts with others in
their social network such as relatives, friends, colleagues, and neighbors. Turner spec-
ulated that rumoring begins at this second stage. Thirdly, the discussion tends to get
amplified. People become intolerant to the situation and begin seeking both official and
unofficial information, which is then broadly shared. In the end, intensive demand for
information contributes to the offer and accepting of wild inventions and speculations
as fact.
2.4.5 Roles of ICTs in Communication during a Crisis
A number of research studies have attempted to explain the way in which people use
ICTs in response to social stress. Once again, two major technologies are highlighted in
this study: the Internet and mobile communications.
The most promising role of the application of the Internet in crisis is related to
the sense of place and community (Shklovski et al., 2008). Hagar and Haythornthwaite
(2005) indicated the emergence of a new virtual space in place of physical gathering
due to the restriction of movement during the Foot and Mouth Disease epidemic in
2001. While creating and maintaining connections at a local level, the Internet also
extended Cumbrian farmers’ perspectives to an international ground. Hagar indicated
that ironically “the need for international contact was driven by geographically local
conditions” (Hagar, 2005, p.48).
There are evidently various applications/platforms on the Internet that people
utilize to seek and share information during critical events, such as discussion fo-
rums and bulletin boards (e.g., Abdulla, 2007; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007; Rosson, 1999;
James, Wotring, & Forrest, 1995), blogs (e.g., Sweetser & Metzgar, 2007; Ramos & Piper,
2005; Hughes & Palen, 2009), instant messenger, and social networking sites (e.g.,
Shaheen, 2008; Palen, 2008).
Evidently the pattern of use of these applications during crises is different than in
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normal situations. For example, Eisenberg and Partridge (2003) observed the pattern
after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 saying:
[People] sent less e-mail overall (although some substituted e-mail for phon-
ing where the telephone networks were congested), and they used news sites
more heavily. They made greater use of instant messaging. Those unable to
view television often substituted Internet news. The telephone, meanwhile,
remained the preferred means of communicating with friends and loved ones,
but chat rooms and e-mail were also used, especially where the telephone in-
frastructure was damaged or overloaded. The levels of other activities on the
Internet, such as e-commerce, declined. One consequence of this decrease was
that in spite of larger numbers of person-to-person communications, total load
on the Internet decreased rather than increased, so that the network was not
at risk of congestion.
There seem to be a number of factors affecting the way in which people seek infor-
mation online. For example, Spence et al. (2006) found that gender and age are related
to the way in which people perceived the Internet and other types of mass media as
useful sources of information after the 9/11 terrorist attack. In addition to demographic
factors, Liao, Finn, and Lu (2007) found the importance of Internet dependency and
positive attitude toward seeking information online to motivate international students
to seek information online about the critical events. Moreover, also based on the 9/11
events, Dutta-Bergman (2006) highlighted the channel complementary theory stating
that those who communicate to people in their social network via telephone were more
likely to use the Internet to communicate with their families and friends.
According to Rainie and Keeter (2006, p.1), “74 percent of the Americans who own
mobile phones said they have used their hand-held device in an emergency and gained
valuable help.” This may prove the perceived benefit of mobile communication technol-
ogy in critical situations. Such technology has played a significant role in various crisis
contexts. The portability of mobile devices enhances the accessibility of information and
connectivity to others. The application of mobile communication has extended beyond
just voice communication to multimodal communication such as Short Message Service
(SMS), camera, video, and even Internet connections.
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In particular, SMS seems to be the most studied cell phone feature for communicating
during crisis. For instance, SMS was widely used to disseminate information among
Chinese people during the SARS epidemic in early 2003 (Law & Peng, 2004). Although
the connectivity was broken during the London subway bombing in 2005, a number of
people used cell phone cameras to take photos and videos of what was going on.
However, these ICTs are still vulnerable to a certain extent. People’s reactions to
crises could produce an enormous number of messages, which could cause what is known
as information overload. Klapp (1972, ch.9) argued that the information overload can
lead to decision lags, failure to integrate information into new common meanings, and
inability to effectively construct meaning of the situations. In addition, although infor-
mation is now in digital form, the delivery of digital information, either through wired or
wirelesses, is still reliant on physical communication infrastructures and facilities. There-
fore, in crisis and disaster situations, these technologies could fail to operate to some
extent (e.g., Palen & Liu, 2007; Latimer, 2008; Meng, Zerfos, Samanta, Wong, & Lu,
2007).
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the literature related to this research
study. However, it is essential to note that the primary focus of this study is to validate
and extend the understanding of the notions of the information poor outside an everyday
life context. The analytic mechanisms for validation is through the investigation of
the Insider and Outsider perspective: the roles of insiders and outsiders. Other major
concepts discussed in this chapter (e.g., political information behaviors, and information
behaviors during a social crisis) provide the basis for the contextual analysis of the study
through a grounded theory approach. In addition, concerning the cultural perspective
of the setting of this study, Appendix F also discusses the background and contextual
information about the political turmoil in Thailand in 2005 leading to the coup d’e´tat on
September 19, 2006 as well as the current perspective on the information infrastructure
in Thailand.
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology
This chapter presents insights on methodology, data collection, and data analysis to
the study of collective information behavior during the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand.
A methodology emphasizing qualitative data collecation and analysis was selected for
this exploratory research, influenced by Dervin’s Sense-Making Methodology (SMM).
The research design was primarily based on the opportunities and limitations that were
shaped by the following research questions:
• How did people seek and share information during the early stage of the 2006 coup
d’e´tat?
• What were the factors influencing the way people sought (and did not seek) infor-
mation during the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat?
• What were the roles of insiders and outsiders in terms of seeking and sharing
information during the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat?
3.1 Qualitative Methodology
Qualitative research is a broad framework to study social phenomena in a naturalistic,
interpretive, and holistic way. It highlights the complexity of social phenomena as well as
the interactions between an inquiry and a researcher. Even though there is no singular
consensus on the definition of qualitative research, Denzin and Lincoln (2000, 2005)
identified the two core elements of such an approach: “a commitment to some version of
the naturalistic, interpretative approach to its subject matter and an ongoing critique
of the politics and methods of postpositivism” (p.8; 10).
Qualitative research facilitates the study of depth and detail (Patton, 2002, p.14),
providing deeper understanding of social phenomena (Silverman, 2005) “from the point
of view of the meanings employed by the people being studied” (Bryman & Burgess,
1999, p.X). The flexibility and recursivity of qualitative methods allow an investigator
to review and revise the procedures and instruments used during the research project.
A qualitative approach was selected as a broad framework for this study because it
maximized the opportunity to gain a comprehensive picture of the situations as well as
the details of people’s reactions to the event.
The nature of inquiry for qualitative research is context bound. This study was
founded on the major assumption of the situational approach that the 2006 coup d’e´tat
as a social situation had a significant impact on human cognitive and behavioral at-
tributes. Meyrowitz (1985, p.vii) described the situational approach saying “people
behave differently in different social situations,” depending on where one is and who one
is with. Implicit in such an approach is the idea that behavior in a given situation is
also affected by where one is not, and who is not there. Basically, a situational approach
is inherently a study of boundaries and limits. For Meyrowitz, a situation is considered
as an information system. Nodes within the system include people and intermediaries
(e.g., mass media and the Internet) in the social setting.
Qualitative methods consist of three kinds of data collection: 1) in-depth, open-ended
interviews; 2) direct observation; and 3) documents. Although it is possible to directly
observe a crisis situation (e.g., Kraus, Davis, Lang, & Lang, 1975), it requires prompt
response, primary planning, and a large amount of resources, which are beyond the
means of this study. Therefore, two types of data collection are considered in this study:
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in-depth semi-structured interviews and document research. While adopting Dervin’s
Sense-Making Methodology to frame and guide the data collection (e.g., initial questions
and interview protocol), this study also used grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967)
as a framework for data collection and analysis in order to increase the flexibility of the
data handling as well as connect to theoretical constructs.
3.2 The Insider and Outsider Perspective
A qualitative approach allows the integration of multiple realities (e.g., J. Miller & Glassner,
2004), especially emerging from the complexity of the Insider and Outsider perspec-
tive. Considering the impact of the Insider and Outsider on qualitative research (e.g.,
Carey et al., 2001), the “complex set of insider/outsider identification” (Bridges, 2002)
of the researcher seemingly affected to the quality of the study results.
Two characteristics of a member of a social group during the 2006 coup in Thailand
were observed in order to identify each individual’s small world membership: inherited
social status (i.e., nationality) and geographical location. With the juxtaposition of
these two characteristics, there are four categories of membership of a small world as
shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Status of small word membership
Spatial location
Nationality Inside Thailand Outside Thailand
Thai Absolute Insider Insider-Out
Foreigner Outsider-In Absolute Outsider
Only two levels of spatial location are noted: those who were in Thailand and those
who were outside Thailand. Nationality refers to the country of a person’s citizenship.
Similar categorization is applied, dividing between Thai nationality and non-Thai. It
is important to note that nationality could not be directly observed in the content.
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Therefore, it was identified by other means, for instance, language. See Appendix D for
a complete coding scheme.
Thai people who resided in Thailand during the period of interest are considered
Absolute Insiders. Examples of other types of small world membership are Thai students
who studied abroad as Insiders-Out ; foreign correspondents who worked in Thailand as
Outsiders-In; and foreign scholars who are interested in Thailand and were outside
Thailand during that time as Absolute Outsiders.
As a Thai native studying abroad for many years, I, as the main researcher of this
study was considered as what Merton (1972, p.29) called an insider as an outsider during
the time of the coup. Although being Thai contributes to a general understanding of
the social, economic, cultural, and political context of Thailand, the physical distance,
especially during the early stage of the coup, prevented me from gaining direct (or
firsthand) experience compared to those who were living in the country.
According to Olson (1977), “insiders can provide information about their subjective
reality, and outsiders can provide data on objective reality, and both realities are impor-
tant.” In general, it seems to be an advantage to be an insider, as J. Perry and Pugh
(1978, p.19) noted that “what appears haphazard or senseless to outside observers may
be quite rationale from the point of view of participants.” However, when an insider
converts to being an outsider, according to Merton (1972), this person gains trust from
insiders as well as being capable of understanding both worlds, especially from observing
what has been taken for granted by others.
However, the Insider/Outsiders dichotomy is not limited to direct experience and as-
cribed status (i.e., nationality). Considering the situational approach here, it is believed
that the coup d’e´tat, highly motivated by a long period of political turmoil in Thailand,
had an impact on the way in which people sought and shared information. Therefore,
the effect of political attitudes should be noted in this study as well. The researcher’s
political point of view potentially challenged the way in which the researcher gained ac-
cess to subjects. Even though a researcher could label him/herself as politically neutral,
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academics and researchers from various disciplines have substantially and visibly partic-
ipated in the discussion of political turmoil in Thailand. Thus, one could easily question
the plausibility of such a claim, which leads to various implications and, eventually, bias
in data collection.
In order to respond to such challenges, two methodological approaches were applied.
The first approach focused on the quality of the research report, which is the critical
part of qualitative research (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 1990). In this sense, the information
on the historical background and current state of Thailand’s political system, provided
as Appendix F, in addition to serving as environmental scanning, represents the re-
searcher’s political knowledge and perceptions. Although the researcher attempted to
comprehensively investigate the situation and its context, the exposure to and selec-
tion of materials were limited to personal capacity and based on his political stance.
Therefore, it is ultimately up to the readers to make the interpretation in terms of the
researcher’s political knowledge and attitude.
3.3 Sense-Making Methodology
Sense-Making Methodology (SMM) is focused on the study of sense-making and sense-
unmaking as metaphoric phenomena, and was mainly developed along with Brenda
Dervin’s research stream since the 1970s. The grounded framework of sense-making
metatheory can be described in metaphoric terms (Dervin, 1999b) as shown in the
Figure 3.1.
[A] person is seen as embedded in a context-laden situation, bounded in time-
space. The person pictured as crossing a bridge is used to metaphorically
describe the way that humans are mandated by the human condition to
bridge gaps in an always evolving and every gappy reality. The person is
seen facing a gap (i.e., a sense-making need) that arises out of a situation.
Through the process of gap bridging, people seek inputs (sometimes the stuff
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Figure 3.1: Sense-Making metaphor (Naumer, Fisher, & Dervin, 2007).
systems call information) and engage in other activities through the time-
space continuum that lead to outcomes. (Naumer, Fisher, & Dervin, 2007,
p.2)
As Savolainen (1993, p.16) elaborated, “[s]ense-making behavior is communicating
behavior. The central activities of sense-making are information seeking, processing,
creating, and using. Sense-making is a process; sense is the product of this process.”
Two fundamental assumptions of the metaphor are essentially addressed, “the universal
gappiness of the human condition”, and “the extraordinary capacities of human be-
ings to bridge these gaps in a multitudinous array of possibilities” (Dervin, 2008, p.8).
Conceptually, situations refer to what people see themselves departing from. A gap is
perceived as the struggle that results as a person moves through time-space. The specifi-
cation of the bridge broadly covers various constructs such as ideas, thoughts, emotions,
memories, and values that are used for making sense or, in metaphorical terms, bridging
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the gap. “The outcomes are as defined by the sense-maker and often form part of the
situation for the next step-taking” (p.8).
The development of Sense-Making Methodology is intended to bridge polarizations
(i.e., “methodology between the cracks”) in research of human information and commu-
nication behavior (Dervin, 2003). Such polarizations include, for instance, structure and
agency ideologies, quantitative and qualitative approaches, critical and administrative
research, and American and European perspectives. Therefore, sense-making is highly
cited as one of the provocative approaches for the paradigm shift from system-centered
to user-centered research in information science (Naumer et al., 2007).
In addition, Sense-Making Methodology is also constructed and differentiated from
other methodologies based on five other essential assumptions (Naumer et al., 2007, p.3),
including that: 1) “communication must be studied and practiced communicatively with
the realization that research is itself communication practice”, which leads to a focus on
the 6Hs - head, heart, hand, habit, hegemony, and habitus; 2) “people perpetually move
between states of certainty and uncertainty;” 3) “it is important to focus on processes and
verbs rather than descriptors and nouns;” (see also Dervin, 1993) 4) “power is assumed to
be ontologically real, as a force acting on – constraining and/or facilitating sense-making
and sense-unmaking processes;” and 5) humans are recognized as “theorists engaged in
identifying the nouns of their world and the linkages between them.”
The goal of SMM is to hear informants’ voices in their own way and in the way
that could facilitate both qualitative and quantitative methods (Dervin, 2008, p.15). A
core set of fundamental mandates is suggested. For example, Sense-Making interviewing
suggests that researchers be less intrusive in terms of their credentials and expertise. In
addition, researchers need to respect informants by not being their representatives, but
aware observers, of collective impact. Moreover, SMM recognizes various dynamics of
the human being such as the ability to answer questions immediately or even in a well-
articulated manner, and to incorporate subjective reality into what they experience.
Sense-Making interviewing also suggests that interviewers see informants as unstable or
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varied through time-space, as well as confused and muddled.
Thus, the informants should be allowed to see situations outside the frame of reference
shaped by researchers and be aware that they create their own worldviews. Researchers
are also encouraged to build trust from informants as sense-makers and to use redun-
dancy to link informants’ and researchers’ worldviews. Furthermore, informants should
be allowed to discuss their situations in terms of constraints and forces. The goals and
these guidelines seems appropriate to respond to the challenges of the complexity of
political worldviews, addressed earlier.
3.4 Research Design
Two sources of data were collected in this research: document research and in-depth
interview. The flowchart shown in Figure 3.2 illustrates the work flow and time line of
the data collection and analysis processes.
The data collection and analysis were conducted between November 2009 to May
2010. It began with the aggregation of publicly available online documents. The flexi-
bility of the qualitative method allowed data analysis to be integrated into the process
of data collection. Therefore, the researcher began the analysis of documents using both
deductive and open coding techniques right after finishing the aggregation of documents.
The analysis of these public documents informed the recommendations for selecting in-
terview informants as well as guiding the interview questions. After finishing the analysis
of public documents, the researcher began the interviews. After each interview, the re-
searcher transcribed, cleaned, and analyzed the data in order to ensure that the data
obtained were rich enough and to check whether the overall analysis reached theoretical
saturation. Although during the interview, the informants were asked to voluntarily
provide personal records (e.g., personal diary, history logs of instant messenger, and
other records of online/oﬄine activities) relating to their behaviors during the coup, it
is noteworthy that none of them provided any additional private records as they did not
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Figure 3.2: Data collection and analysis processes.
keep any records. The informants were also asked to address their contacts as a snowball
sampling technique. The purpose of the snowball sampling technique was primarily to
contribute to the trustworthiness of this study (i.e., data triangulation). It is important
to note that, during the whole process of data collection and analysis, the researcher
wrote memos regarding his reflective ideas and thoughts regarding every step of the
study. The memo-notes also contributed to the process of writing the research find-
ings. After finishing the data analysis, intercoder reliability was tested for the deductive
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coding only. Then the researcher began writing the research report. Most of the data
management and analysis processes relied on the capacity of NVivo (version 8) qualita-
tive data analysis software. NVivo allows researchers to work with different document
formats (i.e., text, image, audio, and video) in one workspace. One can preview/code
imported image, audio, and video files in NVivo. It also supports data analysis based
on the grounded theory approach.
3.4.1 Document Research
Documents represent nonliving forms of data (see also Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2004, part
III), providing a primary method for unobtrusive observation. In the context of study-
ing events in the past, where the researcher could not observe the situation directly,
documents seem to be a more reliable source. It is important to recognize the nature
of the document that uniquely contributes to the quality of qualitative research. Prior
(2004) addressed three features of documents as a field of social research: documents
as product, documents in action, and text and identity. These features provide evi-
dence, to some extent, of the authenticity of data (i.e., unobtrusive and reaction; see
also Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p.108), responding to the requirement of two frames
of reference in this study: communication functions in collective behavior/action (i.e.,
rumor is a communicated statement) and the focus on communication practice of Sense-
Making Methodology. Document analysis also contributes to data/method triangula-
tion, improving the trustworthiness of research findings which will be discussed later.
Providing the richness of data collected from documents, document analysis was a main
approach for this study.
Another purpose of document research was to provide a direction for the interviews,
especially in terms of selection of informants and construction of interview questions.
The first group of informants were purposefully selected from people who appeared
(as users, creators, references, and commentators) in publicly available documents. In
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addition, the documents were referred to during the interviews to assist the informants
to recall the situation.
Publicly Available Documents
Publicly available documents are documents for which the online contents are available
to the public. Four content types were aggregated including:
• weblogs (i.e., blogs),
• photos,
• videos, and
• Wikipedia.
The following are the general criteria for document selection applied (as a search
strategy) across various types of documents used in this study:
Time frame Since the focus of this study is on the early stage of the 2006 coup in
Thailand, the period that is used to frame the coup is from September 19 - 23,
2006. The time frame of interest were applied to the search strategy in two ways:
1) contents created and uploaded during the given period, and 2) contents created
during the specified time frame but uploaded to the Internet later.
Topical relevancy In order to aggregate relevant documents, the scope of relevant top-
ics is defined. The following entities guided the construction of keywords or search
terms. These terms were connected with boolean logic operations. Truncation was
also applied, where appropriate, for covering all of the variations of search terms.
• concepts (i.e., politics, democracy, authoritarian, revolution (“Rattapraharn”),
seize the power (“Yudamnard”), and coup d’e´tat (“Patiwat”))
• persons (i.e., Thaksin Shinawatra, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin)
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• organizations or groups of people (i.e., Council of Democratic Reform - CDR
(and its various forms of name), People Alliance for Democracy - PAD, mili-
tary, army, soldiers)
• places or locations (i.e., Bangkok and Thailand)
• objects (i.e., tanks and guns)
Language Due to the limited capacity of the researcher, only content posted in Thai
and English languages was collected. The keywords illustrated above were also
translated into Thai.
Different techniques were used to collect different types of contents applying the above
criteria to select relevant documents. Google Blog Search (blogsearch.google.com)
was used to aggregate relevant blog posts. The search results were exported into
RSS feeds and imported into Google Reader. Flickr (www.flickr.com) was a pri-
mary source of photos posted online. To collect relevant video posted online, YouTube
(www.youtube.com) was the main data source. In addition to the content itself (e.g., blog
posts, photos, and videos), associated data, such as metadata, rating, and comments,
were also included. The data were saved manually to a local machine. All blog data were
stored in .PDF format due to its readability and portability to different platforms. The
photos were downloaded to a server/local machine and kept in original formats (.JPG).
The videos were converted into (.MP4) which is an NVivo-compatible format.
Instead of relying on a search engine, two Wikipedia entries were specifically selected
(i.e., “2006 Thai coup d’e´tat” for an English entry and “Rath pra harn nai pra thet Thai
Por Sor 2549” [Coup d’e´tat in Thailand 2006] for a Thai entry). Instead of collecting the
current content of the entries, the history of revision and discussions during the focused
period was crawled.
As a result, there were 814 photos from 110 Flickr accounts, 990 blog posts from 775
bloggers, and 112 videos from 61 YouTube accounts representing documentary data of
this sort. For the English Wikipedia entry (2006 Thai coup d’e´tat), there were 978 entry
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revisions and 376 discussion (talk) revisions. For the Thai Wikipedia entry, there were
293 entry revisions and 61 revisions for the discussion page during the first four days of
the coup.
3.4.2 Interviews
In-depth interviews were used as a supplementary method to document analysis. Ac-
cording to W. Miller and Crabtree (2004, p.185), the interview as data collection is “a
research-gathering approach that seeks to create a listening space where meaning is con-
structed through an interexchange/co-creation of verbal viewpoints in the interest of
scientific knowing.”
A semi-structured interview or what is also known as the general interview guide
approach (Patton, 2002) was applied. This approach allowed informants to address
their views in various ways. In the meantime, it provided, to some extent, a structure
for managing and analyzing data. Such an approach often begins, prior to the interview,
with a set of issues and related questions that are to be investigated. A guideline is
created to “ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each person
interviewed” (Patton, 2002, p.343). The interviewer can alter the order of the questions
or further probe the informants to clarify or elaborate certain issues (Berg, 2001).
In addition to the quest to reach theoretical saturation, the Sense-Making inter-
view approach also played an important role in guiding the interview techniques of this
research. Generally, the underlying assumptions of sense-making on communication
practice support the use of an interview since such a method provides informants the
“freedom to define themselves and also license to present themselves as both flexible
or inflexible, as both centered and decentered” (Naumer et al., 2007, p.3). The Sense-
Making Methodology was applied to the study of information behavior during political
crisis in two major practical aspects: interview technique and interview guide.
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Interview Technique
The first application is based on the fact that Sense-Making Methodology is a situation-
oriented approach. The contextual corpus of the methodology is apparently time-space.
As the object of this study, the Thai coup in September 2006 is a time-specific event,
which is considered a critical entry in an SMM interview (Dervin, 2008, p.28). In this
case, the interviewer induced informants to recall the situation where/when they first
heard about the coup in 2006.
Aligned to Sense-Making philosophical assumptions, the Micro-Moment Time-Line
interview approach (Dervin, 1992) was applied in this study. The informants were asked
to explain what happened in a situation step-by-step. Each moment is called time-line
step (e.g., “I tried to contact my parents”, “I saw something wrong on the television”).
Then they were asked to express questions, doubts, or difficulties related to each time-
line step.
After that, the questions reflecting sense-making concepts (i.e., situation, gap,
uses/helps) were used (Savolainen, 1993, p.24). Such a technique allows informants
to focus on the situation.
Another practical aspect of Sense-Making Methodology relies on the premises of talk-
ing cure and conscientizing process, digging deeper for studying the tacit, unarticulated,
and unconscious (Dervin, 2008, p.12). Thus, the interviewer explicitly allowed time for
informants to articulate their realities. In addition to allowing the interviewer to obtain
deeper data, it appeared to allow informants to systematically recall the situations and
what happened to them in the past.
Interview Guide
The second application of Sense-Making Interviewing deals with the interview guide,
which was derived from the Sense-Making question roster (Dervin, 2007, 2008, p.10–11;
19) as shown in Appendix C. The interview guide began with the reconfirmation of
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privacy assurances and ended with demographic information.
The way in which the researcher asked questions applied the notion of SMM trian-
gulation. In addition to the main roster, which is considered as the first level of SMM
triangulation (Dervin, 2008, p.21), the second level of SMM triangulation was also used
to gain deeper detail on a certain situation by “re-asking the same array of SMM ques-
tions but now focused on the particular conclusion” (p.22). Dervin suggested that the
second level SMM questions should be handled as flexibly as possible (i.e., the order of
questions depends on the relevant point). In addition, most of the questions in this level
are done on the fly. (p.22) Dervin also argued that the SMM triangulation approach
“can be very deep and seemingly very repetitive. This built in redundancy is considered
(and has been empirically shown to be) a crucial aspect of the deep consciousness-raising,
bringing-to-articulation dig” (p.29).
In addition to the Sense-Making roster of questions, background/demographic in-
formation (i.e., age, education, occupation, political orientation) about informants were
also collected at the end of interview. However, more than half of informants did not
provid demographic information because they would like to remain anonymous as much
as possible.
Interview Mode
Due to the difficulty of conducting face-to-face interviews, this study took advantage
of Internet technology as a medium for the interview process. There are various ap-
plications/tools to be utilized as communication media. Although the recruitment of
the informants and scheduling of the interview was primarily done via electronic private
message and email, this study design allowed informants to choose the medium based
on their own preferences including, but not limited to, email, instant messenger (IM),
telephone, video conference, and chat room.
However, when it came to selection, nine out of twelve informants preferred to use
email as a main communication channel. One was interviewed via telephone. One wanted
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to be interviewed in the text mode of instant messenger. One requested to use the voice
communication feature of instant messenger. However, due to network difficulty, the
interview was later changed to telephone. There was no interview via video.
In addition to increasing the level of participation (i.e., convenience) (Sturges &
Hanrahan, 2004), such a technique balanced out the medium effects (i.e., synchronicity
and asynchronicity; textual, vocal, and visual cues; e.g., Kazmer & Xie, 2008; Meho,
2006; Bampton & Cowton, 2002), since each medium has its own strengths and weak-
nesses. For instance, although email provided more time for informants to think about
questions/issues, participant attrition, leading to an incomplete process, was a major
concern. Conducting interviews via textual conversation (e.g., email, instant messenger,
chat) may lessen the burden of transcription. However, it instead increases the cost on
the informants’ side (i.e., typing). While video conference/chat requires additional ex-
penses on both interviewer’s and informants’ sides, such a medium allows the interviewer
to observe visual cues such as facial expression and body language (Bryman, 2001).
For synchronous textual and verbal communication (i.e., text mode of instant mes-
senger, and telephone), the interview was done in one session. The researcher posted
a number of questions one-by-one. All textual conversations on screen were save into
.TXT file format and then imported to NVivo. The telephone conversations were recorded
and imported directly to NVivo. Both questions and answers were stored and marked
in NVivo. This channel of communication allowed the researcher to probe the inter-
view questions better than asynchronous mode. The average length of a synchronous
interview session was about 2 hours.
For asynchronous communication (i.e., email), the researcher first asked informants to
provide background information about themselves. In the same message, the informants
were asked to explain the situation (see “To tap situations” section in the question
roster). After receiving the first set of answers, the researcher sent a couple of follow-
up questions. This process was reiterated until the researcher obtained perceivably
enough data or the informant stopped the interview. On average, there were 7 email
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conversations per informant over a 12-day period.
Recruiting Informants
Ragin, Nagel, and White (2004) asserted that “considerations of the scientific founda-
tions of qualitative research often are predicated on acceptance of the idea of cases”
(p.9). Therefore, the process of recruiting informants of this study was based on the dis-
cussion of case selection (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2008). As mentioned above, there were two
major rounds of recruiting interview informants: 1) selecting from document analysis,
and 2) snowball (or chain) sampling.
For the selection from document analysis, informants were primarily chosen based on
theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling was first introduced by Glaser and Strauss
(1967), referring to “seeking and collecting pertinent data to elaborate and refine cat-
egories in your emerging theory” (Charmaz, 2006). However, purposive sampling (i.e.,
critical case sampling) was also utilized when it came to the selection of a single indi-
vidual.
After finishing the data analysis of a document, the researcher looked for concepts,
relationships, and details that were still missing or needed to be explored. The selection
of informants was primarily based on these missing links. Another set of selection criteria
was derived from the identification of a “case” (e.g., an author, a commentator, or even
a reference). In order to guarantee the diversity of the pool of informants, three more
user characteristics were also considered when selecting informants: type of content the
informants originally created, status of small world membership, and critical case. Note
that the status of small world membership is discussed in the data analysis section.
Informants were selected from critical cases (e.g., the first, the last, the most visible, the
most popular, the richest content). According to Patton (2002), critical cases are “those
that can make a point quite dramatically or are, for some reason, particularly important
in the scheme of things” (p.236). It is speculated that such a technique would yield the
“the most information and have the greatest impact on the development of knowledge”
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(p.236).
These criteria were transformed into the attributes of each case in NVivo. NVivo
allows the researcher to create a table of attributes for each case. The analysis for the
selection of informants was done by generating matrices and queries to classify cases
based on the above criteria.
The second selection of informants came from a snowball sampling technique. During
the interview, the informants were asked to provide at least one reference to someone
who they contacted during the early stage of the 2006 coup. Warren (2002, p.87) ar-
gued that “theoretical sampling may be carried out through a snowball process: One
respondent is located who fulfills the theoretical criteria, then that person helps to locate
others through her or his social networks.” This study especially focused on the trans-
mission and diffusion of information. This perspective of linking through social networks
is critical to complement the research findings. In addition, the data from the snowball
technique helped the researcher to construct a collective perspective of relevant phenom-
ena. At the same time, it was used to increase the trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba,
1985) of the study by verifying data obtained from the informants recruited from the
document analysis.
In total, 40 invitations were sent to potential informants. Twelve people responded
to the invitation. One said they were willing to participate, but eventually could not
allocate the time to participate. Three rejected to the opportunity to participate. The
rest did not respond to the invitation. As a result, there were 8 informants recruited
in follow up to people identified during document analysis. One of the eight informants
stopped responding during the middle of the interview via email. Since his responses at
the beginning of the interview were valid, he, however, was included as a valid informant.
Four of the eight informants recruited through document analysis were bloggers whose
blogs were popular during that time. Two informants were among the earliest to upload
photos on Flickr. One was a YouTube user whose video of the coup announcement was
one of the first coup-related videos during that time. The last informant was one of the
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most active Wikipedia users.
Four informants were successfully recruited through the snowball sampling technique.
Apparently, the major reason for references was that they were contacts during the early
days of the coup. One informant did not use the Internet during that time.
It is important to note that only a couple of people reported all of the requested
demographic information. Some answered some questions. The majority said they did
not want to provide any demographic information at all.
Approaching Informants
After the potential informants were chosen, an invitation to participate was sent through
the electronic mail features of each of the platforms (e.g., Youtube Message, Flickr Mail,
Wikipedia talk page). Unless email addresses were not identified, the invitation letter
was sent through each channel individually. A couple of informants reported that they
did not check private messages often. This may be one of the contributors to a low
response rate.
For those who were referred from the first group of informants, the invitation letter
was sent through email, citing the identity of their reference (with permission). If the
nationality of an informant was known, the language used in the invitation was based
on the informant’s nationality (i.e., Thai or non-Thai). When the informant’s language
preference was unknown, both versions (Thai and English) of the invitation were sent.
The invitation mail included background information about the study (with minimal
information about the researcher) accompanied with a fact sheet about the study. The
informant was asked to reply with a choice of interview mode. To increase the efficiency
of the study, informants were given one week (seven days) to respond to participate.
However, most of the informants responded on the next day after receiving the invitation.
Then the researcher scheduled the interview time with the informants individually.
Since the study obtains data directly from human subjects, ethical concerns were ob-
served. Fontana and Frey (2000) discussed three major ethical issues related to research
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interviews: “informed consent (receiving consent by the subject after having carefully
and truthfully informed him or her about the research), right to privacy (protecting the
identity of subject), and protection from harm (physical, emotional, or any other kinds)”
(p.662).
The fact sheet was sent as an attachment with the invitation. The content of the
fact sheet includes “detail information about the research in which they are asked to
participate and ensuring that they understand fully what participation would entail,
including any possible risks” (Meho, 2006, p.1288). In addition, the researcher asked
informants not to distribute interview transcripts or documents to others either privately
or publicly (Kazmer & Xie, 2008). This is to protect the researcher’s privacy as well as
to not affect the study results, especially for a study that is using a snowball sampling
technique.
Another concern was to preserve the anonymity of informants to protect their privacy
as well as building trust with the informants (Meho, 2006, p.1289). In response to this
concern, the informant’s real name was not asked, unless the informants preferred to
use their real identity during the interview. However, whether the informants preferred
to use real names or pseudonyms during the interviews, their names were replaced with
pseudonyms specifically assigned for this study (based on the classification of small world
membership). These pseudonyms were used in the interview transcript, memo-notes, and
coding documents. The researcher created and maintained a list of informants privately.
The list of informants links the informants’ identity and contact information used during
the interviewing process and the pseudonyms. Once this project was finished, the list
was destroyed. This blind process was chosen to standardize the anonymization process
since the implications of anonymity were various based on different interview modes.
Another way to build trust was making the conversations informal and accepting
the complexity of human subjects. Based on the Sense-Making Methodology (Dervin,
2008), the researcher explicitly gave informants time to recall the situations and step
outside of the question framework, as well as gave informants permission to be less than
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perfect. Before every interview began, the informants were informed that they were not
expected to answer the question right away. They were allowed to take some time to
recall the situation. They might use any references to start thinking about the situation.
They might correct their previous responses at any time, if they would like to. Some
informants, contacted via email, took a few days to answer questions. Some reported to
correct what they said earlier.
In addition, the researcher used probing questions and techniques from the second
level of SMM triangulation (i.e., re-asking the same set of questions, but focusing more
on particular issues) to assure informants that whatever they said was heard and that
their comments would not be evaluated.
Recording and Transcription of Interview Data
Since email, instant messaging, and text chat are self-transcribing, there was no need
to transcribe these interviews (Herring, 1996; Meho, 2006). However, since there was
variability of responses, especially from the interviewee’s side (e.g., typing skill, use of
emoticons and abbreviated terms), such data was reorganized and cleaned, for instance,
distinguishing between interview-related and non interview related threads.
For voice-based communication (i.e., telephone and video conference), the interviews
were recorded electronically since the researcher used a Voice over Internet Protocal
(VOIP – i.e., Skype) application to communicate with informants verbally. The record-
ings of the interviews were directly imported to NVivo without being transcribed. How-
ever, partial transcriptions (i.e., only main questions and responses) were applied during
the first round of the coding process.
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3.4.3 Data Analysis
Unit of analysis
There were two units of analysis in this study: person and “person-in-situation.” The
notion of person-in-situation was used throughout the qualitative content analysis, which
was the major analytical part of this study. This approach is derived from the micro-
moment time line interview technique of Sense-Making Methodology. Dervin (2008) ar-
gued that “communicating (internal and external) is assumed to occur in micro-moments
in time-space and the bracket of time-space chosen for consideration is itself a method-
ological choice” (p.23).
Deductive coding
The deductive coding (i.e., content analysis) is, itself, a systems analysis of various
types of content. One of the main characteristics of deductive coding is that the coding
scheme is developed before the analysis begins (Spurgin & Wildemuth, 2009). For this
particular study, the only code that was pre-defined prior to the analysis was the status
of small world membership. The criteria were discussed above (see also: coding scheme
in Appendix D). The unit of analysis for deductive coding was person which was used
to identify the status of small world membership of an individual (i.e., case). The
development of the coding scheme was done right after finishing the collection of public
documents. The coding scheme was tested with a small set of data and revised before
use with the whole collection of data. As a result, the final coding scheme, considering
missing values, includes nine categories. In this coding scheme, one person (i.e., case)
can belong to only one category. Figure 3.3 shows the final codes using in the analysis.
Table 3.2 illustrates the number of cases by status of small world membership and
content type. The majority of bloggers (517 out of 775) aggregated through Google
Blog search were absolute outsiders. About 67 percent of Flickr users were identified as
outsiders-in. The YouTube videos were uploaded mostly by outsiders-in and absolute
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Figure 3.3: Coding categories of small world membership
insiders; 22 and 19 users, respectively. Wikipedia editors were the most challenging
group to identify the small world membership. Only 161 out of 462 Wikipedia editors
(approximately 35 percent) indicated both nationality and geographical location.
However, it is important to point out that the status of small world membership
obtained by deductive coding was not directly used for any quantitative or systematic
analysis (e.g., cross-tabulations). It was used only as a reference for open coding and
pseudonyms.
The intercoder reliability test was conducted after the development of the codes.
Another coder, a Thai graduate student in the United States, was selected. The second
coder coded 10 percent of the cases across all types of content. The selection of cases for
the intercoder reliability was via systematic randomization. The cases of each content
type were sorted alphabetically. The researcher chose one out of every ten cases for this
reliability test. The researcher conducted an informal training session for the second
coder, including co-coding in order to make sure that the second coder understood the
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Table 3.2: Number of cases by small word membership and content type
Membership Type Blog Flickr YouTube Wikipedia Total
Absolute insider 98 21 19 36 174
Absolute outsider 517 7 10 116 650
Insider-out 9 1 2 9 21
Outsider-in 108 74 22 0 204
Anonymous-in 0 5 2 21 28
Anonymous-out 0 0 0 136 136
Insider-anonymous 8 0 2 19 29
Outsider-anonymous 35 1 2 29 67
Absolute-anonymous 0 1 2 95 98
Total 775 110 61 461 1407
procedure and the coding scheme. After the second coder finished the coding, the codes
were compared. Scott’s pi was used to report the reliability of coding as it is appropriate
for a nominal variable and two coders (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). For
this study, the minimum acceptable coefficient (i.e., acceptable level of agreement beyond
chance) was at 0.70, which is appropriate for an exploratory study (Lombard et al.,
2002). The Scott’s pi value computed for this study based on the above procedure was
0.763, which was deemed acceptable.
Open coding
This study applied qualitative content analysis as a main analytic framework. In gen-
eral, the analysis relied on an inductive strategy, which generates and confirms theory
based on patterns, themes, and categories emerging from data (Patton, 2002). How-
ever, in terms of practical and theoretical process, a grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss,
1967) approach was specifically implemented. Patton (2002) noted that grounded the-
ory “operates from a correspondence perspective in that it aims to generate explanatory
propositions that correspond to real-world phenomena” (p.489).
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Grounded theory emphasizes what is known as open coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998,
p.223), which highlights the discovery of concepts, their properties, and dimensions
directly from data. Thus, the categories and a coding scheme are derived from the data,
rather than from other studies or theories.
There are three phases for grounded theory coding: 1) an initial phase involving
naming each segment of data; 2) a focused, selective phase that derives the codes from
the initial phase; 3) an axial coding phase focusing on the properties and dimensions of
the categories (Charmaz, 2006).
The initial coding is to ensure that the analysis is based on careful reading and
observation. For this study, different techniques were implemented based on content
types. For textual data (including blog posts, Wikipedia entries, and associated data of
non-textual contents – metadata, tags, comments, etc., and memo notes), the researcher
read and observed text (and its context) carefully and created a new code or applied an
existing code to appropriate messages. Basically, codes, marks, and annotations were
attached to each phrase, sentence, or paragraph of interest. Note that one message could
have more than one code. For still image data, position-based coding was applied. NVivo
allows position-specific description of image. Certain descriptions refer to the specific
area of an image, rather than the overall picture. A researcher can highlight a spot of
interest (the size is flexible) and insert a description of that spot. For audio and video
files, the coding technique was based on timeline coding. The researcher listened and
annotated the codes at the timeline (in range). Partial transcription was applied only
for responses that might be used for citing. The transcription consisted of timestamps
and text.
The second phase of the coding is called focused coding, referring to the use of “the
most significant and/or frequent earlier codes to sift through large amounts of data.
One goal is to determine the adequacy of these codes. Focused coding requires decisions
about which initial codes make the most analytic sense to categorize data incisively
and completely” (Charmaz, 2006, p.58). In this phase, the researcher reviewed the
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codes generated from the initial phase. The researcher used NVivo to organize the
data by code. The analytical process included sorting, synthesizing, integrating, and
organizing data. In addition, data that belong to the same codes were compared to
ensure consistency. With the query (search) functionality of NVivo, the researcher used
keywords referring to each of the codes to check if there was anything else that might
be included.
After finishing the focused coding, the codes were aggregated into a separate space
(i.e., coding book). Then the researcher conducted theoretical coding (i.e., axial coding)
by making connections among the substantial codes and constructing the hypothesis to
be integrated into a theory based on such connections. In this phase, the researcher con-
structed a coherent picture (i.e., analytic story) by sorting, synthesizing, integrating, and
organizing categories. In addition, the coding involved the construction of relationships
between codes and categories (i.e., codes and codes; codes and categories; and categories
and categories). At the same time, the researcher also evaluated the convergence – in-
ternal homogeneity (the extent to which the data that belong in a certain category hold
together or “dovetail” in a meaningful way) and external heterogeneity (“the extent to
which differences among categories are bold and clear”; Guba, 1978; Patton, 2002).
As a result, the coding schemes were primarily framed by the three research questions
of this study. The code book is shown in Appendix D.
Throughout data collection and analysis processes, the investigator made informal
memo-notes. According to Charmaz (2006), memo-writing helps the researcher to con-
struct and elaborate the analytic frameworks, and accelerates productivity. The memo-
notes will be written throughout data collection and data analysis.
It should be noted that NVivo was used throughout the process of data analysis
including coding and annotating transcripts and documents, memo writing, retrieving
data and codes, manipulating codes and categories, and creating visual diagrams.
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3.4.4 Writing the Research Report
The findings were divided into three parts based on the three major research questions.
It is noted that the findings include an abundant supply of text and quotations from
the document analysis and interviews in order to provide a thick description of each of
the constructs. In an online environment, it is apparent that the way in which people
communicate informally changes the structure of language (e.g., the use of abbreviation,
sign language). In addition, the way in which people used language could indicate their
fluency with the English language. Some grammatical errors were forced by contextual
bound (e.g., in a hurry; group-specific jargon). Therefore, I decided to include items
written in English verbatim. For the original texts that were written in Thai, the
English translations are provided after the original text in a bracket.
3.5 Trustworthiness
Instead of using a conventional positivist paradigm for addressing quality of research (i.e.,
internal validity, external validity, reliability, objectivity, and generalizability), this study
applies a naturalistic/interpretive concept of trustworthiness to examine the quality of
research. The goal of this methodological paradigm focuses on intersubjective depth and
deep mutual understanding, rather than an absolute single reality (J. Miller & Glassner,
2004, p.127). Lincoln and Guba (1985) developed four criteria to address the trustwor-
thiness of qualitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirma-
bility.
3.5.1 Credibility
Credibility refers to the ability to prove that “the inquiry was conducted in such a manner
as to ensure that the subject was accurately identified and described” (Marshall & Rossman,
2006, p.201). Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested five major techniques to establish the
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credibility of qualitative research. However, this study focuses particularly on tri-
angulation, “a process of using multiple perception to clarify meaning, verifying the
repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (Stake, 2000, p.443). Denzin (1989)
proposed four different modes of triangulation including: 1) data triangulation (combin-
ing data from different sources; 2) investigator triangulation (combining data collected
by multiple researchers); 3) methodological triangulation (combining data collected via
different methods); and 4) theory triangulation (combining data collected from multiple
theoretical perspectives). Lincoln and Guba (1985, p.412) argued that the fourth type
of triangulation, the use of multiple theories, does not fit with a naturalistic paradigm.
In this particular study, two types of triangulation were implemented: the mix of
multiple data sources and methods. Within the collection of documents, there were
different types of data, including text, image, and video from different sources, repre-
senting different environments of information sources. In addition to documents, the
data in this study also came from interview informants. The documents were considered
as the products of information seeking and sharing processes, while the focus of the
interview was on gaining understanding from a process perspective. Within a group of
informants, triangulation was also used in terms of sampling. The first group of infor-
mants was selected from the document analysis, while other informants were referred by
the first group of informants through the snowball technique.
3.5.2 Transferability
Transferability refers to “the extent that the researchers’ working hypotheses about
one context apply to another” (Bradley, 1993, p.436). Lincoln and Guba (1985, p.412)
asserted that it is the responsibility of someone who is interested to make the comparison.
Thus, the only responsibility to address transferability for the researcher is to provide the
widest possible range of information for inclusion in the thick description. In addition to
the research report, the coding book and the memo-notes explaining the idea and logic
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throughout data collection and data analysis processes also contribute to transferability.
Such documentation allows future researchers to make judgments by comparing the
results in other contexts.
3.5.3 Dependability and Confirmability
Dependability deals with “the coherence of the internal process. . . and the way researcher
accounts for changing conditions in the phenomena” (Bradley, 1993, p.437). In other
words, the goal of dependability is to make sure that the results of the study could
be replicated if the study was conducted with the same respondents in the same con-
text. The basic idea of dependability can be compared to consistency or reliability in a
conventional perspective (Seale, 1999, p.468).
For establishing confirmability, the researcher should make sure that research re-
sults “reflect the participants and the inquiry itself rather than a fabrication from the
researchers’s biases or prejudices”(Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p.201). Bradley (1993)
implied that confirmability referred to “the extent to which the characteristics of data,
as posited by the researcher, can be confirmed by others who read or review the re-
search results” (p.437). It is apparent that confirmability is comparable to the notion of
neutrality or objectivity in a positivist’s perspective (Seale, 1999).
In this study, dependability and confirmability were developed by the use of a re-
flexive journal, “a kind of diary in which the investigator on a daily basis, or as needed,
records a variety of information about self and method” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.429).
The memo-notes in this study served as the trail of methodological decisions made
as the research progressed. The researcher used them to “audit his own inference
and interpretations, and other interested researchers could review the research finding”
(Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p.317).
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Chapter 4
Seeking and Sharing during
Disruptive Moment
This chapter provides an overview of how people sought and shared information during
the early stage of the coup. It is divided into three sections. The first two sections
discuss the major stages of information activities during that period: reactions after
first hearing about the coup, and sense making of the situation. The last section focuses
on how people utilized information sources and channels during the early stage of the
coup.
4.1 When I Heard about the Coup
This section investigates how people learned about the coup. The way people learned
about the coup can be described in three general scenarios based on sources of informa-
tion: firsthand experience, media reports, and word of mouth.
4.1.1 Firsthand Experience
Although the first coup announcement was broadcast around 11PM on September 19,
people in Bangkok and major cities in Thailand began to witness the appearance of
armed soldiers and military vehicles around important places, such as government
houses, royal palaces, government offices, media stations, and major streets, earlier
that night. As the situation was unusual to many people, many decided to take photos
and videos of the happenings. As the story developed, people began to speculate that
there was an attempted coup.
For example, AbsoluteInsider1, a Thai medical doctor, explained his experience in
the description of the video he posted on YouTube.
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/09/20/coup.email/index.html –
Rite, so I took the dogs to the vet, and ran out of gas when the Coup d’e´tat
was taking place. The intention was to park and see, but then they blocked
off the roads on both sides, trapped in between the media of the world. So -
I usually have a camera sometimes, so just stuck around the place along with
dazed tourists and everybody else. So here’s what I saw, and the rest of the
world didn’t see much coz they blocked off the satellite feeds.
(AbsoluteInsider1 - Video description)
AbsoluteInsider1’s video captured an American journalist on duty reporting the sit-
uation live on the first night of the coup. While leaving the audio in the background, he
inserted the photos he took while he went out at the end of the video. These photos were
also uploaded to his Flickr account. These actions suggest that people who witnessed
the situation in Thailand did not only capture the moment for personal record, but
they also tried to disseminate information about what they saw to either their personal
contacts or the public. It is apparent that AbsoluteInsider1 is an active Internet user
as his profile can be linked to his other accounts of online social media sites such as
BlogSpot, Wikipedia, Flickr, YouTube, Facebook, and LinkedIn.
Firsthand experience was not specific to only bystanders on the street. People
who worked inside major media facilities (e.g., government houses, media stations, and
telecommunication facilities) also witnessed the situation from a very insider perspec-
tive. For instance, OutsiderIn1, a foreign journalist and TV personality in Thailand,
who is famous for his English-learning program, wrote on his blog about his experience
while he was working for one of the free-to-air TV stations.
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It was about 8.30 pm on Tuesday night, as I was leaving Channel 3, that
I received a phone call. “There’s going to be a coup tonight,” I was told.
I quickly turned around and went back to the Channel 3 newsroom, where
we were preparing for that night’s edition of [an illegible name of a news
program]. It seems I had been the last to know about the coup... everybody
in the newsroom knew already.
In the channel 3 newsroom there are six TV screens in a row, with each of the
free to air channels being shown. We watch them to monitor the news. We
watched as Channel 5 started playing songs in honor of His Majesty the King
... then Channel 9 (after it had broadcast the State of Emergency address by
Taksin Shinawatra from New York)... then iTV.
We received a phone call that the military, along with their tanks, were coming
to Channel 3. We were told to go home, but we decided not to. We just waited.
...
Soon, Channel 7 changed over to the royal music. We knew then that it would
only be a matter of time before we, Channel 3, the last of the stations, would
be cut off.
...
Back in the newsroom, we heard word from downstairs that the military had
arrived. Not a tank. Just a group of soldiers carrying M-16s. They were
very polite, and asked us to switch our signal over to Channel 5, the military
channel. And so, just at the end of the soap opera, and just before [illegible
text] was about to start, Channel 3 joined all the other free to air stations in
showing the royal music.
...
“Why don’t you teach us some English while you’re waiting?” one of the
soldiers joked, and we all had a laugh.
Yesterday . . . there was a big tank outside Channel 3. Lots of people were
taking pictures of the soldiers and the tank. The soldiers were very friendly. I
invited them in to learn some English with me. They smiled and said they’d
like to, but they weren’t allowed to leave their posts. Channel 3 was deserted
yesterday morning. Finally, just after 9 am, we went back on the air, with
shows as normal.
...
There are still soldiers in and around the building today, but we are getting
used to them now. Last night I taught one or two of them how to pronounce
“coup” correctly.
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(OutsiderIn1 - Blog)
4.1.2 Media Exposure
As we can see from what OutsiderIn1 described, another sign of the coup was through
media exposure. It is important to note that the first sign of the coup on television
happened when Channel 5 terminated its normal programming. About an hour later,
Thaksin remotely attempted to declare a state of emergency on Channel 9. However,
his declaration was interrupted before the declaration ended. People who watched both
channels noticed the irregularity. After that nearly all local TV stations ceased their
normal programs and began to broadcast pictures of the royal family and His Majesty’s
picture and patriotic lyrical songs. The following is a blog post describing how Abso-
luteInsider2 learned about the coup from watching television.
19th September.
while I was watching a comedy show .. that program was suddenly stopped
and replaced by a blue screen with some text..
I didn’t have a clue that what was coming. Heard a rumour but I didn’t think
it would be real. But yes, it was.
It’s the coup.
(AbsoluteInsider2 - Blog)
Similarly OutsiderIn2, a foreign blogger, whose English posts during the coup were
cited by other bloggers and traditional media, described his first knowledge of the coup.
The moment I learned that something was going on was when Thaksin came
on TV and tried to declare a state of emergency and fire top military men (I
was recording at the time and that moment is on my YouTube channel here:
[URL]). The most shocking part was when Thaksin’s message was apparently
cut.
So I started out by thinking Thaksin was taking over, but clearly, since the
broadcast was cut, something more was happening. Within a few minutes,
various Thai media sources said a coup was underway.
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(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
It is important to note that the role of the media as the first source of information can
be divided into two perspectives. The first one considers traditional media, particularly
television, as the situation itself. As discussed above, here I refer to the fact that the
media was symbolically used as a battlefield between the ousted prime minister and the
coup leaders. The irregularities that appeared on television signaled the coup.
The second role of the media with regard to the coup exposure concerns the tra-
ditional perspective of media derived from an everyday life context. The mainstream
media that was not controlled by the military was still able to report what was happen-
ing. It is important to note that there were some cable TV stations broadcasting their
normal programs, including news stations such as ASTV and Nation Channel. People
around the world, including local people, also learned about the coup from international
media such as CNN, BBC, NPR.
There was a coup d’e´tat in Thailand yesterday. I heard about it on NPR when
I was driving home. They said, ’There was a coup in Thailand while the Prime
Minister was in New York.’ That’s all. I didn’t hear anything else about it
in the media until the next morning when they showed tanks rolling through
the streets of Bangkok, but didn’t say much more than the NPR report. Of
course I called my sister in law to see if her family are all OK, but she hasn’t
heard from them yet.
I hope Mike will let us know what really happened so we can either be properly
outraged or put our minds at ease.
(AbsoluteOutsider1 - Blog)
Thailand just called a state of emergency, according to the BBC. Tanks have
appeared in Bangkok, and “An army-owned TV station has altered its pro-
gramming to broadcast images of the royal family and songs associated in the
past with military coups.”
Not good.
(AbsoluteOutsider2 - Blog)
I woke up this morning to read headline news in most major papers that there
was a coup in Bangkok last night, rendering Thaksin, who is in New York for
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the UN meeting, powerless and toothless.
(Absolute Outsider3 - Blog)
It is evident that those who lived outside Thailand seemed to rely on media reports
more than those who were in Thailand during the time. People in Thailand who learned
about the coup from media reports were the regular audiences of those uncontrolled
media or people who heard about the coup later in the morning (e.g., from reading
morning newspapers).
4.1.3 Word of Mouth
Although mainstream media was the major place to learn about the coup for many
people, it was not really the first source. Many people heard about the coup from
personal contact instead. Consider the following message of AbsoluteInsider3, indicating
that, even though she learned about the coup from the media, it was her contacts who
woke her up to check the news.
i saw a tank.
it’s had a coup in thailand 19 sep 06. in that day i sleep early(around 21.00)
but announcement of coupe is around 10.00. :p but i don’t miss that because
a lot of people call me to tell me open a television and see it. then i open a
nationchannel (all channel is not boardcast) i watch a television until midnight
and go to sleep.
(AbsoluteInsider3 - Blog)
For OutsiderIn2, even though he witnessed the signs of the coup on television as
mentioned earlier, the coup was confirmed by words from his friend who was in the
controlled area.
I also had a friend later call me from the Silom area [one of the commercial
districts in Bangkok] saying soldiers were telling everyone to go home and
shutting the bars. Some business contacts he was meeting with at the time
received a call from their headquarters in the U.S. telling them to collect their
possessions at their hotel and go directly to airport and take the next flight to
flee the country.
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(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
The dissemination of information seems to be primarily through personal contact
such as from family members, friends, and colleagues who witnessed the situation around
Bangkok and its vicinity. These communications were conducted through different plat-
forms, for example, mobile phone, email, web forums, and even face to face. Here are
some examples of how people first heard about the coup from others.
I first heard about the coup the evening when it occurred. I was at home with
my partner (now husband). We had eaten dinner and returned home about
8:00. [My Thai partner] had heard many rumors floating around during the
day about a likely coup and shortly after dinner he started receiving phone
calls and text messages from various people. The first was a customer of his
who is well-positioned and probably heard about the coup earlier than other
people.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
I and Paula had no idea what was happening on the street as well. We were
about to start our quiet time in my room when my colleague called and in-
formed me about the revolution. Both of us rushed to downstairs and turned
on the TV just to find that every government channels were displaying the
story of King Bhumiphol on the screen. We looked at each other eyes and
knew that it was the sign of something very unusual was going on!!!
(InsiderOut1 - Blog)
I was in my apartment, surfing the Internet. I visited a webboard that I
regularly visit to talk to my friends. Then I saw a thread informing that there
was a coup. ...
It was an underground bittorrent website which I want to reserve its name....
(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
‘Just heard on the news. Military coup in Thailand to overthrow president.
Taken over bangkok while the president was overseas. They’ve impossed mar-
tial law.’
I received this msg at 8:55am. Thanks to [his friend’s name]..he woke me up!
haha
So...it makes no difference - I’m already booked to go to Thailand at the end
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of the year! =)
(AbsoluteOutsider9 - Blog)
Some people benefited from knowing someone who was perceived to be a very insider
source. For instance, AbsoluteInsider4, who worked at a university in the vicinity of
Bangkok, told how she heard about the coup from an interview. The fact that she was
working at a site that could potentially be a target spot for seizure during the coup did
not let her know about the coup earlier. Instead, her colleague’s friend, who worked at
a TV station in Bangkok, told her about the early signs of the coup.
ตอนทำงานเวลาประมาณ 20.00 น. มีเพื่อน [ของเพื่อนร่วมงาน] ที่ทำงานอยู่ที่สถานีโทรทัศน์
ช่อง 11 โทรมาบอกว่าจะมีการปฏิวัติในคืนน้ี ในกรุงเทพฯ มีรถถังวิ่งเต็มไปหมด พอเลิก
งาน 21.00 น. ก็กลับหอพัก... ห้อง [เพื่อนร่วมงาน] มีโทรทัศน์ พอเวลาประมาณ 22.00
น. [เพื่อนร่วมงาน] ก็มาเคาะห้องบอกว่าให้รีบเก็บของออกจากมหาวิทยาลัย เพราะว่ามีการ
ปฏิวัติแล้ว โทรทัศน์มีการหยุดถ่ายทอดรายการเรียบร้อยแล้ว (เพราะทหารได้ยึดสถานีโทรทัศน์
ทุกสถานีแล้ว )
[Around 8:00PM while I was working, one of [my colleague]’s friend who
worked at Channel 11 called and told us that there would be a coup tonight
in Bangkok. There were a lot of tanks running around. After 9:00PM, I went
back to my room in the dorm after I finished my work. [My colleague] has a
TV set. Around 10:00PM, my colleague knocked the door and told me to pack
my belongings because there was a coup. TV stations ceased their operations
(because the military already seized all TV stations.)]
(AbsoluteInsider4 - Interview)
Similar to AbsoluteInsider4, a political scientist, AbsoluteInsider5, also heard about
the coup from a very insider source whose identity should not be identified.
ทราบล่วงหน้าก่อน คือทราบตอนเย็น ก่อนที่ที่มีการให้ ‘‘โปรดฟังอีกครั้ง’’ ทาง TV ตอน
กลางคืน ตอนน้ันอยู่บ้าน ดูข่าวตามปรกติ แหล่งข่าวที่บอกเราไม่ต้องการระบุชื่อ
[I heard about it earlier which was around that evening - before what they
announced “Please listen again” on the TV at night. I was at home, just
watching the news. The source who told me did not want to be identified.]
(AbsoluteInsider5 - Interview)
People reactions to the coup were various based on how, when, and where they first
exposed to the coup. This section higlights the three major scenarios where the exposure
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occurred including self exploratory, media report, and interpersonal communication.
After they heard about the coup, people tended to begin actively seeking and sharing
information in order to resolve the puzzle about the situation that they had in mind.
4.2 Making Sense of the Situation
This section presents active information activities that people performed in response to
the first evidence of the coup. Based on the data collected, the way in which people
sought and shared information during the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand can be described
in three dimensions: sense-making of obstacles or gaps, sense-making of bridging the
gaps, and uses and gratifications of information sources and channels.
4.2.1 Making Sense of Obstacles or Gaps
The data from both publicly available documents and interviews indicates that people
reacted to the information received based on the obstacles they perceived. The major
obstacles include the censorship of mainstream media by the military, the difficulties of
accessing telecommunication networks, and cultural barriers.
Mainstream Media Censorship
The interruption of the traditional media played an important role in terms of influencing
people’s behaviors. As mentioned earlier the mainstream media was used as a battlefield
to gain authoritative power; a number of people witnessed the way the military controlled
the traditional media. As the situation seemed noteworthy and critical to them, some
people captured photos and videos of TV screens (either by using a camera or a special
screen capture device) and uploaded these images to the Internet. A number of bloggers
also reported what they saw on the TV screen. For example, AnonymousIn1 wrote one
of his first blog posts about the coup describing what was showing on the television
screen.
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Cable television is no longer operating in Bangkok (3:30am)
...
What was on Thai television at 11:30pm? Every Bangkok TV station was
playing a videos of the Thai Royal Family. Here is a photo of the local Thai
TV (four and a half hours ago). Shown on the screen is HM the King of
Thailand who is greatly beloved by the Thai people.
(AnonymousIn1 - Blog)
Two days later, even though the media resumed their normal programs, people still
experienced interventions in media operation, not only of local stations, but also inter-
national streams.
I was watching BBC World today. They interviewed a Thai academic who
had just begun to express an opinion critical of the junta. Zap! BBC World
was off the air until the segmant had finished. Clean and clinical censorship
– exactly the way it’s done in China today. It’s quite ironic, really. The guy
the army deposed, Thaksin, was widely criticized for having exerted too much
control over the Thai media.
(AnonymousIn1 - Blog)
Another example is from a Thai blogger, AbsoluteInsider6, who was among a few
bloggers who did live updating during the early stage of the coup. Below are examples
of her live blogging.
Blast to the Past
The tanks have taken to the streets.
Jesus Christ, we’ve gone back in time twenty years.
(Maybe this is inappropriate, but I wonder if this means finals are cancelled...)
@ 12:16 AM: CNN, BBC, CNBC, and Bloomberg news have all been suspended
due to a “sun outage.” I smell bullshit; lots of it. Interesting how the “sun
outage” should happen just in time for Thaksin’s speech at the UN General
Assembly.
...
Coup D’Etat Part Deux
@ 10:46 AM: I forgot to mention this earlier, but on my way back from the
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airport, I flipped on the radio to 102.5 and SexyBack by Justin Timberlake
was on, followed by silence, then Nelly Furtado’s Maneater, and then...more
silence. For some reason I have this mental image of a military dude sitting
in a closed radio booth trying to decide on what to turn on next – Stars are
Blind by Paris Hilton or Buttons by the Pussycat Dolls? Oh, the dilemma!
(AbsoluteInsider6 - Blog)
Other evidence of the way people experienced media censorship comes from a few
photos posted on Flickr depicting officers trying to stop or question cameramen from
recording the situation in prohibited areas (for example, the army headquarters, palaces,
etc.). One of the photos is of a soldier who was guarding the army headquarters and
its description says, “Posing for the camera. This guy wanted to know if we were with
CNN.”
Nonetheless, whether or not people agreed with the media censorship or the coup,
it was legitimate and understandable to many people when put it in the context of the
coup as OutsiderIn2 pointed out on his blog:
I thought, ‘In this day and age, censorship is clumsy, if not impossible to pull
off.’ It makes the coup plotters look ridiculous. However, I did understand
the immediate extreme sensitivity that exists after the coup as an insincere
military makes sure all bases are covered and no resistance will come.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
So as AbsoluteInsider7, a Thai Wikipedia editor, observed, local media were used to
formalize the operation of the coup.
TV was only for updating the announcements. My observation was the coup
was trying to formalize the procedure in order to be more transparent and
righteous.
...
There was no evidence to me that the media was bias or conceal anything.
(AbsoluteInsider7 - Interview)
However, when comparing the situation of the 2006 coup to other coups in the past,
especially the Black May coup in 1992, the media censorship in the 2006 coup was less
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intense as people had many more alternatives to access coup-related information. At the
same time, the fact that the regular TV programs were on the air the next morning led
to a sense of relief. What OutsiderIn2 described seems to summarize this perspective
well.
Just in comparison with [1992] when the radio and TV were taken over and
newspapers were hard to come by (there was also no foreign cable TV).
...
In 2006 there were websites, blogs, newspaper websites, SMS messages, email,
cable TV, and even the TV stations locally were back to normal right away.
It seemed like one had access to a lot more sources of info than ever before.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
Difficulties of Communication Networks
Although there was no official announcement from the coup leaders on restriction of
communication networks, some people had difficulty accessing phone lines and the In-
ternet during that time. Apparently, the inability to access the communication network
intensified the need for information to many people. Without any clarification from the
military or telecommunication service providers, people had to deal with uncertainty,
speculating what actually caused such difficulties (mostly between the military interven-
tion or traffic jam).
I was not that panic[ed] but rather dying to know what would be the next
thing the military do. I first called my mom and told her that I was ok and
later tried to call my friends but suddenly the telephone connection just broke
down. We could only get the information from the internet only. One thing
that made me feel upset is the truth that in Thailand, we always like to shut
people[’s] eyes from the truth when something serious happen!!! we will cut
the phone line, show only the beautiful thing on the TV while letting people
guessing what is going on... I knew in my heart that I couldn’t wait longer
to hear the further info. of the news, I needed to come before my Father and
asked Him to give me a peaceful heart and gave me the wisdom to pray for
my country. I came back to my bed room and started to pray and pleaded
[to] God to bring the revival and healing to this country...
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(InsiderOut1 - Blog)
In addition to speculating on the cause of the difficulty, people also thought about an
alternative plan. With the rumor that the Internet might be closed down, AbsoluteIn-
sider6, for instance, expressed her concerns about how the coup leaders were going to
deal with such a situation.
They better not “suspend” the internet. If I wanted to be cut off from the
rest of the world, I’d live in North Korea.
...
@ 2:22 AM: Internet’s going to be cut down in a few hours. I’m trying to get
as much down here while I can. With access to CNN, BBC, and CNBC down,
who knows how we’re going to find out what’s going on now?
(AbsoluteInsider6 - Blog)
However, since the difficulty in access was temporary and sporadic, some people were
not concerned and perceived that such an obstacle was not an issue.
It worked. Everything worked. All communication was up and working in-
cluding the internet (although the net slowed to almost a stop at some points–
probably due to heavy usage).
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
Cultural Barriers
Another obstacle that arose during the early stage of the coup came from a cultural
perspective. Since the coup was not only of domestic interest, people around the world
also wanted to know about the situation. However, communicating across cultures was
somewhat problematic and challenging. The role of cultural barriers has two apparent
aspects: political knowledge and language.
With regard to political knowledge about Thailand and the coup, people who were
not familiar with Thai politics were confused with names and ideas. One form of evidence
comes from pictures and videos of the official coup announcements. There were a number
of comments related to these items that asked about the cultural significance of those
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who appeared in the pictures or videos.
Another form of evidence of the political knowledge gap comes from the people,
bloggers in particular, who raised questions and provided the answers that they received.
The questions posted were often about the history of the coup d’e´tat in Thailand, the
coup leaders, or even the terminology used. InsiderOut2, a Thai student abroad, wrote
the following on his blog.
‘‘ปฏิรูปฯลูก ไม่ใช่ปฏิวัติ’’ พ่อบอกตอนโทรกลับบ้านเมื่อวาน
‘‘ต่างกันยังไงหว่า’’ คิดในใจ แต่ก็คุยๆต่อไป ‘‘เด๋ียวจะไปเปิดดูว่าต่างกันยังไง’’
แล้วก็เปิดดูเรียบร้อยละ ข้อมูลจาก Wikipedia
รัฐประหาร (Coup d’e´tat) คือ การเปลี่ยนแปลงการปกครองหรือองค์ประกอบของการปกครอง
อย่างกระทันหันและไม่เป็นแบบแผน เช่น ที่เกิดข้ึนเน่ีย
ปฏิวัติ (Revolution) คือ การเปลี่ยนแปลงระบอบการปกครอง เช่น การเปลี่ยนแปลงการ
ปกครองสมัยพ.ศ.๒๔๗๕
ปฏิรูป (Reform) คือ การเปลี่ยนแปลงอย่างค่อยเป็นค่อยไป และเป็นไปในทางที่ดีข้ึน
สรุปว่า เมื่อวานเขาทำรัฐประหาร เพื่อจะได้มีการปฏิรูปการเมืองการปกครอง ปฏิวัติมันแรงไป
[“A reform, son, not a coup.” My dad told me when I called back home
yesterday.
“How do they differ?” I thought, but keep talking “I will check about this
afterward.”
And I already checked it out. This is fom Wikipedia.
[Ratthapraharn] Coup d’e´tat is a sudden and non-pattern change of adminis-
tration or any component of administration like what is happening now.
[Patiwat] Revolution is a change of administration system such as the change
of administration in 1932.
[Patiroop] Reform is a slow-moving change and for a better result.
Therefore, they stage a coup d’e´tat to change politics and administration. The
term Revolution is too harsh.]
(InsiderOut2 - Blog)
It is interesting to note that such discussions of the appropriateness of the terms
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used were widespread across the Internet. In addition, during an interview for this
study, one of the informants asked me why I use the term Patiwat not Rattapraharn.
This terminological gap led to many discussions and conversations, regardless of whether
or not they involved Thai or foreigners.
The second element of cultural barriers deals with language across the international
community. It was not too surprising to see a number of conversations asking someone
to translate what is written or said in the photos or videos. For example, a user,
AbsoluteInsider8, uploaded a TV screen shot of the coup announcement in Thai onto
his Flickr account. The only description of the picture was the caption, which says in
Thai “Thai Coup tonight”. When a commentator asked him in English saying “What
does it say?”, he responded back in English saying:
Oh! I’m not good at [English], anyone could help me this? please....
sorry, but I’ll try later if I could.
(AbsoluteInsider8 - photo comment)
Other evidence of language barriers emerged even for bloggers who were fluent in both
Thai and English. Sometimes these bloggers decided to stop translating the content to
save time and labor. For example, when it comes to providing links to other sources,
instead of translating, some bloggers inserted a caption next to the links informing the
readers that these links are for Thai readers only.
The inability to translate in juxtaposition with the intensified need for information
led to confusion and frustration, which appeared in a number of the discussions and
conversations online. Consider the comments on a video of the third announcement of
the coup posted by AnonymousOut1.
[Comment1] (2006-09-19T19:56:52.000Z): Can someone put up a translation
for this announcement?
...
[Comment2] (2006-09-19T21:52:55.000Z): Anyone have a translation for this
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and who is the man speaking?
[Comment3] (2006-09-19T22:37:51.000Z): Yeah, really interesting! I hope
there won’t be any bloodshed.
[Comment4] (2006-09-19T22:46:39.000Z): seriously...can we get a thai speaker,
please???
[Comment5] (2006-09-19T23:22:26.000Z): I’m in Bangkok right now, but I
can’t speak Thai... we desperately need someone to translate. News/phone
networks has been cut off and we can’t find out anything but from the slow
internet
[Comment6] (2006-09-20T00:01:50.000Z: Translation in English : “We’ve de-
cided to have a mass sex change operation..We all decided to come out of the
closet today. Yay Gay. Gay Pride Hurrah tumbalo pi pi”
[Comment7] (2006-09-20T00:15:10.000Z): Bangkok got Coup’d out the Wazoo.
[Comment8] (2006-09-20T01:04:32.000Z): Using a lot of formal language...a lot
of unnecessary words. Simply put, a new PM is being assigned.
[Comment9] (2006-09-20T01:49:03.000Z): Too bad! I really hope the military
begins to target westerners and begins a mass extermination of people who
don’t speak Thai. SIEG HIEL!!!
[Comment9] (2006-09-20T01:51:31.000Z): Disregard my comment, I typed it
up but didn’t mean to post it. Sorry, just ignore it again, I’m an f***ing
dumbass...
[Comment10] (2006-09-20T02:22:49.000Z): I hope no civilian will be the victim
in this military operation.
[Comment11] (2006-09-20T02:35:45.000Z): He just says the constitution has
been revoked, also the Assembly. Privy Counsil still maintain their positions.
Lastly, all courts except Constitution Court still able to do their jobs. Peaceful
movements to let Taksin didn’t work, so Thai Army just pushed a reset button.
I hope this coup is not gonna be worse like the one 15 years ago.
...
[Comment12] (2006-09-20T21:35:50.000Z): No translation arr?? I really insist
to know wht he says....
[Comment13] (2006-09-21T23:54:31.000Z): i hope so 2 :P
[Comment14] (2006-10-15T07:05:30.000Z): Well, that was pretty boring, errm
he didn’t really say anything significant. just stated some years and something
about democracy, but that’s as much thai as I know
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(AnonymousOut1 - Video comments)
Apparently this conversation ended unsatisfactorily with no translation of the content
of the video.
Another example is from Wikipedia editors and their discussion about the English
name of the coup. As there was no official name in English, there were a number of
variations of the name of the coup. When it comes to writing an encyclopedia article
about it, apparently one must be chosen.
Some naming conventions
Lets agree, if at all possible, on how to translate some Thai terms used in the
coup.
- The provisional government: Media sites have called this the Administra-
tive Reform Council [3], the Party of Democratic Reform [4], the Council for
Democratic Reform [5], and Council for Political Reform [6].
- - [WikiEditor1] 04:41, 20 September 2006 (UTC): Until this officially clears
up, I’d like to use “Administrative Reform Council”, as that is what The
Nation is using, and over the coming weeks, the Thai newspapers will become
the primary news sources.
- - [WikiEditor1] 04:47, 20 September 2006 (UTC): The Bangkok Post is using
Council for Democratic Reform. I’d rather use the Nations, as the Post doesn’t
keep permanent copies of articles up.
- [WikiEditor1] 06:43, 20 September 2006 (UTC): The regime leader: Sonthi
Boonyaratkalin is the spelling that is used for his article title. It is sometimes
spelt Sondhi; this isn’t his official spelling and can cause confusion with Sondhi
Limthongkul. Please make sure to change the spelling to make it consistent.
- - [WikiEditor2] 04:44, 20 September 2006 (UTC): Thai names: Thais use
their given names as the public form of their names. Thus with Thaksin
Shinawatra, his surname is Shinawatra, but he is always called Prime Minister
Thaksin.
- - [WikiEditor3] 05:45, 20 September 2006 (UTC): Wow, how interesting.
That’d be like us saying “President Bill” or “President George” rather than
Presidents Clinton and Bush.
- - - [WikiEditor1] 05:50, 20 September 2006 (UTC): Surnames are a relatively
modern innovation for Thais. I think less than a century ago, people still
didn’t use surnames, and Thai people to this day never address people by
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surname.
...
(English Wikipedia Entry - Discussions)
The sense-making of communication obstacles of people during the early stage of
the coup indicates that people expected they could have resumed the normal flow of
information. The roles of media, communication network, and language difference were
rising as they seemed to be “taken for grant” prior to the normative world failed to
function properly.
4.2.2 Sense Making of Bridging the Gaps
This section addresses how people sought and shared information as ways to bridge the
gaps described above. The way people bridged the gaps involves four major categories:
fact finding and validating, clarification, translation, and support and entertainment.
Fact Finding and Validating
Since the coup was not officially announced until late on the night of September 19,
a sense of uncertainty was strong. People wanted to know what was going on as the
story developed. There was a lot of information/rumor - neither validated nor confirmed
- that was floating around. Even though writers tried to identify sources of informa-
tion/rumor as much as they could, this unofficial information (i.e., not announced by
the coup leaders) made people question the trustworthiness of all the information that
they received. Nevertheless, writers still shared with others as they seemed to hope that
there might be someone who could validate the information they received. Therefore,
people were not just looking for new updates during that time, but they also wanted to
confirm what they already knew.
There are apparently two types of information that people were looking for and
sharing during that time: collective sense of situation, and personal interest.
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Collective sense of situation primarily deals with national or international interests.
Inevitably, politics was the most visible topic during that time. When asked during the
interview, most of the informants said that the major questions they had during the
time were, for instance, where was Thaksin? Who was behind the coup? Was this coup
related to the insurgency in the South? Was there a sign of violence? How did the
international community react?
อยากรู้เหตุผลที่ปฏิวัติ และอยากรู้เหตุการณ์ที่เกิดข้ึนในตอนน้ีว่ามีเหตุการณ์อะไรเกิดข้ึนบ้าง
(ข้อหลังน่ีน่าจะเป็นคำถามข้อใหญ่)
[I wanted to know the reason of the coup and wanted to know that what was
going on (the latter seems to be a major question)]
(AbsoluteInsider4 - Interview)
I wanted to know exactly what was happening. Some coup attempts fail so
wanted to know if there was a successful coup attempt.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
My key concern was whether there was any “counter-attack” from Thaksin’s
allies. In the hours and days after the coup that was, by my estimation, all
that really mattered. As it turned out, there was only a whimper of immediate
resistance, and that burned out quickly. We then had to wait until 2007 before
the real anti-coup resistance took up the electoral challenge of fighting the pro-
coup forces. We all know how that ended.
(AbsoluteOutsider4 - Interview)
Mainly clarification on what the viewpoint of the coup plotters was: Were the
military units taking over for or against Thaksin? Would pro-Thaksin military
units fight back? Would they be able to take over cleanly or would there be
resistance?
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
In addition to political interest, another collective concern relates to the issue of
finance and economy. Here are some blog titles during the early stage of the coup that
relate to finance and economy in both national and international levels.
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What Investors Did on News of a Thai Coup
(AbsoluteOutsider5 - Blog)
Thai Baht [stock market?] shakes off political crisis
(AbsoluteOutsider6 - Blog)
S&P puts Thailand rating under watch with negative implications, post coup
(AbsoluteOutsider7 - Blog)
‘‘วิเคราะห์ เศรษฐกิจ ช่วงน้ี’’ [“The economic analysis this period”]
(AbsoluteInsider9 - Blog)
The second type of information that led to fact finding and validating during the coup
concerns personal interests. People sought and shared information that had potential
threats to their daily lives. For example, when asked what the major concerns were
during that time, AbsoluteInsider3’s response seems to be more concerned with the
effect on everyday life than with political interests.
อยากรู้ว่ามีต่อสู้ มีนองเลือดหรือเปล่า มีการปิดกั้นสื่ออะไรบ้าง ออกไปนอกบ้านจะอันตราย
ไหม วันรุ่งข้ึนต้องไปทำงานหรือเปล่า
[I wanted to know whether or not there was any fighting or violence. What
media was censored? Was it dangerous to go outside? Did I have to go to
work the next day?]
(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
AbsoluteInsider3 was not the only one who was concerned about his daily life. A
number of people also shared information about the effects of the coup on various topics
regarding their daily lives such as work, school, food, traffic, and travel. The following
quotations were examples of blog posts addressing such concerns.
ปฎิวัติ ซะแล้ว
วันน้ี ทำงานถึง ทุ่มครึ่งตามปกติ (จริงๆแล้วต้องบอกว่า โชคดีที่หนีมาได้ตอนทุ่มครึ่ง) กลับ
บ้าน ทำโน่น ทำน่ีเหมือนทุกที
อยู่ดีๆน้อง ที่ทำงานอยู่ ตจว ก็โทรมาถามว่า ในกทม เค้าเกิดอะไรข้ึนเหรอ เพื่อน น้องโทรไป
บอกว่า เค้ากะลังจะปฏิวัติ เราก็ยังว่า ไม่เห็นได้ยินข่าว แล้ว ซักพัก ข่าวก็มา แล้วก็ ปฎิวัติ
จริงๆ เฮ้อ แล้วคำถามก็พุดข้ึนมาในหัว
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แล้วพรุ่งน้ี ตรู จะต้องไปทำงาน ไหมหว่า คราวที่แล้วเรียนอยู่ ยังได้หยุดเรียนเลย ——–
>คิดได้แค่น้ีใช่ไหม
แล้วก็มาน่ัง ตามข่าวอยู่ตอนน้ี ช่องไทยใช้ไม่ได้แล้ว
[Coup already
Today I worked until 7:30 as I normal do (Actually I have to say that I was
very lucky to be able to escape at 7:30.) I went home and worked a little bit
of this and that as always.
All of sudden my colleague who work outside Bangkok called and asked me
what happened in Bangkok. My sister’s friend told [earlier] that they were
about to stage a coup d’e´tat. I reckoned I had not heard the news. Well the
news came so as the coup. Then a question got into my head.
Do I have to go to work tomorrow? When it happened last time, I was still a
student. I did not have to go to school. ——>Is that all I can think of?
Now I am sitting and following the news. Thai [TV] channels are no longer
working.]
(AbsoluteInsider10 - Blog)
สอบ
สอบวันแรก...
ความจิงแล้วต้องสอบวันแรก เมื่อวานน้ี แต่...
เหตุการณ์ปฏิวัติช่วยชีวิต 555555555555
............กู ล่ะ ขำ................
อุตส่าห์น่ังต่ออ่านหนังสือถึงเช้า5555 ตายไป
วันน้ีก็เลยเป็นวันแรก ที่มาสอบ จิงๆ....French VI
ตายหมดทั้งห้อง.............ข้อสอบผีผ่วน
[Exam
The first day of exam
Actually it should have been yesterday, but...
the situation of the coup saved my life ha ha ha ha ha ha ha.
............ It was funny ................
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I stayed up all night reading. ha ha ha
So today is the first day of the exam.... French VI
We were dead..... Ghostly exam.]
(AbsoluteInsider11 - Blog)
ปฏิวัติ !!!
วันน้ีหยุดกระทันหันเพราะมีการปฏิวัติหล่ะ ยังเรียนไม่จบเลยวิชาวันน้ี ไม่มีวันอื่นแล้วด้วย ทำ
ไงหล่ะน้ัน จะสอบไงอ่ะเน่ีย แต่ก้อเอาเหอะ อ่อ วันน้ีมี presentงานด้วย embryo
ไม่ได้presentซะแล้ว แต่ก้อทำไรไม่ได้คงไปพูดวันอื่นแทนมั้ง วันไหนอ่ะ ไม่มีแล้วจะสอบแล้ว
เป็นเรื่องของอนาคตอ่ะนะเด๋ียวก้อรู้ เด๋ียวหาเน้ือเพลงมาลงเล่นดีกว่า
[Coup !!!
Today the class was ceased because of the coup. We were not even finished
today class. There will be no more class on another day. What should I do?
We are about to have an exam. And today we were supposed to present our
works too, embryo.
We did not present. We could do nothing. We might have to present another
day. When? No more. The exam is coming. It’s about the future. We’ll
know. Let find some music lyrics to play with.]
(AbsoluteInsider12 - Blog)
It is also interesting to note that there were a number of photos showing how street
merchants made financial benefits from selling merchandise related to the political sit-
uation in Thailand (e.g., yellow shirts, and screen printed clothes with sayings about
Thaksin – the deposed Prime Minister) and foods. These people seemed to utilize the
information about the appearance of the military to identify the location where they
should sell their products.
As mentioned earlier, rumors seemed to be omnipresent during the coup as it was
hard to verify who the original source of some particular piece of information was. During
that time people exchanged information about what they heard from someone else. Here
are some of the examples of rumors during the early stage of the coup.
สิ่งที่น่าสนใจน่าจะเป็นเรื่องที่ว่า เมื่อพึ่งสื่อหลักไม่ได้แล้ว ก็ต้องอาศัยข่าวแบบปากต่อปาก ซึ่ง
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ในช่วงน้ันข่าวลือเยอะมาก เช่นว่า มีการยิงปะทะที่โน่นที่น่ี, ทักษิณพาเอากองทัพคอมมานโด
จากอเมริกากลับมาสู้, จะมีการตัดสัญญาณ internet
[What was interesting is when we could not rely on mainstream media, we
had to rely on word of mouth. During that time there were a lot of rumors,
for example, there were shootings here and there, Thaksin brought American
commando troops to fight back, and the Internet would be cut off.]
(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
@ 12:56 AM: There are rumors that all cell phone networks are going to be
cut off in the next hour. Hopefully this is just that – rumors.
@ 1:01 AM: Rumors are swirling like crazy. I have been getting phone calls
and text messages that say a new prime minister, Akrathorn Jurarat, has been
appointed.
@ 1:22 AM: Apparently Thaksin’s headed back to Thailand (by commando,
natch), and according to rumors, he might not be allowed to land.
...
@ 2:14 AM: Rumors (and I strongly emphasize this because rumors are going
around like crazy) say Pantongtae has been detained at the airport while trying
to leave the country.
...
@ 2:48 AM: A friend has told me of rumors of a shooting around the Ratta-
natibet area.
(AbsoluteInsider6 - Blog)
Rumours were written online that some recent events (Prem’s jockey speech
and transferring of some mid-level officers) months before the coup and then
from 7pm and 8pm on September 19 you could hear mention of troop move-
ments.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
10:24am - Somebody sent me this link. There is now a rumor that Thaksin’s
cabinet and political figures are now plan to hold a satellite government in Sin-
gapore with the hope to lobby the UN to back them as the true representative
government.
...
12:01pm - Rumours say Thaksin is fleeing to London.
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(Outsider-In5 - Blog)
’Rumor’: He had another riot plot that was supposed to happen on Wed. 20th,
hence a Coup on the 19th to prevent the possible chaos.
And that was why his whole family was out of the country and that was why
he rescheduled his speech at the UN G.A. from Wed. to Tue. and planned to
come back to Thailand a day earlier.
now, that’s just what I’ve heard through a grapevine. (it makes sense though)
(Anonymous1 - Comment to a photo posted on Flickr)
In addition to sharing what they heard, people also provided evidence to prove that
rumors were reportedly false. OutsiderIn6, a foreign Flickr user in Thailand, for instance,
posted a picture of himself holding a local English newspaper to falsify the rumor he
heard that the military controlled the newspapers.
We finally found the paper. Word on the street was that the newspaper
publishers were closed down and there would be no papers today. Word on
the street was wrong, I guess.
(OutsiderIn6 - Photo description)
Being a Part of a Historic Moment
It is interesting to learn that people perceived the 2006 coup d’e´tat as a historic moment.
Especially, people who were in Thailand during the coup night thought that they were
a part of the history. Therefore, the way people sought and shared information was also
substantially related to this perspective.
For many absolute insiders, the coup d’e´tat was a collective historic and memorable
event. Some related the event to their own memories. Below are some of the example
of how insiders perceived the situation as history in either personal or national context.
ประชาธิปไตยบนปลายกระบอกปืน
ว่ากันว่า สิ่งใดก็ตามเกิดข้ึนกับคนๆ เดียวจะกลายเป็นประวัติศาสตร์
แต่หากเกิดข้ึนกับคนหมู่มาก จะเป็น ประวัติศาสตร์
ไม่กี่วันที่ผ่านมา ประเทศของเรา ก็มีประวัติศาสตร์ เพิ่มข้ึนไปอีก 1 หน้า
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ปกติ ผมจะติดตามข่าวการเมืองตลอด จนมาถึงช่วง 1-2 เดือนล่าสุด ผมก็ได้เลิกติดตาม
มันน้ำเน่า เหมือนละคร หลังข่าว ของประเทศในแถบ เอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ บางประเทศ
จนมาวันนน้ีทำให้ผมต้องกลับมาติดตามอีกครั้ง
มีอะไรหลายอย่างอยากระบาย แต่ก็กลัวโดนจับ
[Democracy at the tip of a gun
It has been told that what happen to an individual becomes experience.
However, if it happens to a crowd, it is history.
A couple ago, our country has add a new page of history.
Usually, I always followed political news, until a month or two ago. I stopped
following.
It was sewage, like soap opera in some countries in South East Asia.
Today, I came back to follow again.
There are many things I want to say. But I am afraid to get arrested.]
(AbsoluteInsider25 - Blog)
ปฏิวัติ...
ประเทศไทยเกิดอะไรข้ึน...
นับว่าเป็นเหตุการณ์ครั้งประวัติศาสตร์ครั้งหน่ึงในชีวิตที่ผมได้มีโอกาสเข้าร่วม
[Revolution...
What happened to Thailand?...
This is one of historical events of my life that I had a chance to be involved.]
(AbsoluteInsider26 - Blog)
การรัฐประหาร...
เมื่อวันที่ 19 กันยายน 2549 เกิดการรัฐประหารข้ึน
อยากจดจำวันน้ีเป็นวันประวัติศาสตร์จังเยย
ตอนแรกที่รู้น้า กลัวมั่ก ๆ เลย แต่อีกวัน (20 กันยา)
เขาประกาศให้เป็นวันหยุดราชการ ดีใจมั่กๆ
แต่น้ีแหละ... อิอิๆ
[Coup D’e´tat
On September 19, 2006, there was a coup d’e´tat.
I want to remember today as a historical day.
When I heard about it, I was very scared. But they declared the next day
(September 20) as a holiday, I was very happy.
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That’s it... he he]
(AbsoluteInsider27 - Blog)
Many outsiders also expressed the importance of the situation as history in their
views as well, whether or not where they were during that time. OutsiderIn4 commented
about his online activities during the first night of the coup.
The reports over the first few hours were extremely limited and quite to-
the-point. I went online out of curiosity to see what, if anything, was being
reported and whether there was any effort being made to block access to news
sites. Because I didn’t feel any threat by the political instability, I wasn’t
worried and I wasn’t trying to get information out of concern. Instead, I
realized that I was in a moment that would have historic importance and
wanted to try and understand what was happening.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
It is important to note that OutsiderIn4’s video on YouTube was one of the first
uploads during that time. In response to a question asking the reason he decided to
record the first coup announcement, he made a similar comment about his experience:
I felt there might be some historical significance and knew that, for friends
and family reading my blog, they might not otherwise have a chance to see
what such an announcement looked like.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
Even for foreigners who live outside Thailand (i.e., absolute outsiders), what they
saw or heard from media also became historic moments.
Tanks, yellow ribbons, soldiers, threats, coyote dancers. TV brought all the
elements to life, in a sense; particularly the Thai TV channels that were then
under strict junta control. We saw that the basic elements of a Thai coup
haven’t changed much over the decades. Of course, it was fascinating to see
the old music and films rolled out to declare the coup. It was historic, in a
re-hashed kind of way.
(AbsoluteOutsider4 - Interview)
To some people, being a part of history also meant being involved. OutsiderIn7, a
foreign journalist and blogger, was eager to go outside to observe the situation as she
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wanted to be “in the thick of things”. Unfortunately, getting involved apparently was
something that taxi drivers wanted to avoid (presumably because they perceived that
the risk of getting involved was too high in terms of income, safety, etc.).
So when it happened last night (Tuesday, Sept 19), I was hardly surprise.
Nevertheless, I was excited. I have never experienced a coup before and I
wanted to be in the thick of things.
When I heard about the coup, it was already past 10pm, and I had just
returned to my apartment after dinner. I tried to get a taxi to where the
action is: the government house. But no taxi seem to want to ferry me there.
(OutsiderIn7 - Blog)
OutsiderIn7 was an unfortunate case. However, a number of people were able to go
outside of their residences to take photos and videos around important places. They
used the same expressions to describe their motivations to go outside. OutsiderIn3, for
example, was among the first group of people who posted pictures of the coup on Flickr.
He went outside and took photos of the situation. When asked what his concern was
during that time, he responded.
I felt that I was ‘in the right place at the right time’ and this was an opportunity
to share information of historical significance.
(OutsiderIn3 - Interview)
When asked if he could have changed anything, he replied:
I don’t think I could have hoped for the situation to have been any different.
It was a very memorable point in my life.
(OutsiderIn3 - Interview)
OutsiderIn3’s notion of “right place at the right time” seems also to fit many other
travelers’ perspectives, especially those who visited Thailand for a short period of time.
Therefore, it was not too surprising to see people put personal tags that were related to
the purpose of their visits to Thailand such as “honeymoon” on the photos of soldiers
and tanks.
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Clarification
As mentioned in the above section, the cultural aspect was one of the major barriers
in information dissemination and transfer during the early stage of the coup. To some
bloggers, sharing and providing firsthand experience was their first instinct. However,
for OutsiderIn2, the fact that his readers were foreigners inside and outside Thailand led
him to want to bridge the cultural barriers by providing an “almost like being there”
experience.
My website has a long tradition of shooting photos like this. I wanted the site
to be “almost like being there” so people could see themselves what is going
on (as opposed to having it filtered through reporters who try to tell you what
things are like). At one point, I was one of the only sites doing it in Thailand,
but today everyone is doing it and it is not remarkable anymore.
...
I had to go way downtown to the government district to take the shots and
my goal was to give the website viewers a look at what was happening.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
He explained that he wanted to explain to his readers that the situation was non-
threatening unlike other stereotypical coup d’e´tats. It is interesting to note that the
perception that traditional media, especially international ones, provided limited and
often opposing view points was a big drive to make people begin to think about sharing
information from their own perspectives to clarify the situation to others. As OutsiderIn2
pointed out during the interview:
Another thing that made us have to reassure business partners was the
’parachute journalism’ of CNN and others who kept asking their correspondent
if there was any death toll or casualties. The anchor seemed somewhat disap-
pointed when there was no casualties (again overseas reporters were assuming
that a coup must mean danger and fighting in the street).
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
It is interesting to note that people who were in Thailand, regardless of national-
ity, wanted to portray that the situation was nonthreatening, welcoming, and festive.
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Posting a photo of one intersection in Bangkok with normal traffic, AbsoluteInsider2
described the photo in the caption saying: “Nothing scary as it sounds on foreign TV
I think..?” Apparently AbsoluteInsider2 held the perception that the foreign media
did not report the real situation. That was why she had to take this photo. Another
example by AbsoluteInsider2 is the caption of a photo of a soldier with a tank in the
background, which AbsoluteInsider2 reproduced from the Associate Press, an interna-
tional news agency. She also expressed the same point of view.
Everything is under control.
I just went to 7-eleven. Lot of people hanging there, drinking coffee, buying
instant cup-noodles and talking about this craziness. Nothing seriously though
they’re even making jokes out of it. Everybody seems quite glad I must say.
(AbsoluteInsider2 - Photo caption)
In addition to mainstream media, another motive of clarification came from personal
contacts outside of Thailand. One of the first messages that commonly appeared on
outsiders-in’s content was a response to the concerns of their families and friends. Out-
siderIn4, for instance, wrote the following message on his blog apparently after receiving
a number of contacts enquiring about his safety.
Thank you to all the people who have sent emails expressing their concern for
the well being of [my partner] and myself. Rest assured that all is well here
and Bangkok and that the reporting you’re hearing and the pictures you’re
seeing represent a very narrow view of the overall situation.
(OutsiderIn4 - Blog)
OutsidersIn8, a foreign couple who went to Thailand for a vacation, wrote the follow-
ing on their online travel journal on the day after the coup, expressing their well-being
to the readers - presumably their families and friends.
Coup in Thailand
[We] are alive and well in Phuket Island of Thailand. We were staying at a
nearby beach bungalow last night without email or tv, so we were a bit out
of the loop. We headed back to our friend’s home an hour ago. They filled
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us in on the situation. ... We will stay abreast of the situation and keep
trying to find out about any travel warnings. Our plan is to fly up to Bangkok
tommorrow (Thursday), spend the night and then fly to [Cambodia] the next
day (Friday). We’ll be in Cambodia for a couple of weeks with the possibility
of a detour to Vietnam. We fly back to Bangkok on October 11 and head up
to Chang Mai for a few days before making one last stop in Phuket for the
Vegetarian Festival and then off to Malaysia on November 1.
Thanks for all of your concern and especially all the love. It’s good to know
we have eyes everywhere keeping tabs on what’s happening in the world. Rest
assured knowing that we’re probably, like today, on a beach somewhere far
from harms way.
(OutsidersIn8 - Blog)
For OutsiderIn2, a Westerner who conducted a business in Thailand for many years,
to clarify the situation to his clients was the first thing he did after the coup was
confirmed.
The first thing I did was to write a press release for the company I was COO
at explaining the nature of Thai coups to our overseas clients: that everyone is
working as normal, regular TV programming is continuing, the banks are open
and doing business, few, if anyone, even saw troops. Also, that all military
and political activity was confined to a small area downtown far removed from
the everyday business of the nation.
This was [to] assure foreign clients that we would continue to do business and
their business was still safe. Again, non-Thais would assume the coup meant
military units in rebellion fighting each other in the streets.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
Translation
Another aspect of cultural barriers is language. On media sharing websites, where
people posted photos and videos in the Thai language, a number of users provided
English translations or summaries in a description or caption. The translation was
helpful especially for those non-Thai people who were in Thailand during that time. As
OutsiderIn4 pointed out:
I’m sure I visited CNN, BBC, Bangkok Post and The Nation as well. 2bangkok.com
is a good consolidator as the editor reads Thai fluently so he’s able to translate
information from the Thai press as well as to include information from various
English-language sources.
(OutsiderIn4 - Blog)
Another example can be seen when a YouTube user, AnonymousIn2, posted a video
footage of the first coup announcement, apparently taken from a TV screen, without
the translation. After being requested by his viewers in the comment section, he later
inserted a translation in the description of the video. Note that other viewers also
provided a summary:
[Comment1] (2006-09-20T05:45:20.000Z): what does it say? pls update coz i
can read english
[Comment2] (2006-09-20T08:31:23.000Z): he said about Thai governent did
corruption and sh**. And the situation in Thailand doesn’t get any better
since February ( Terrorist in South). President still want to be involved for
reelection. Military afraid there will be a big Demonstration on Sept 20.
[Comment2] (2006-09-20T08:31:40.000Z): So they took over the government
power and kick the prime Minister out. They will give the power back to Thai
people when everything is over. It’s a good decision, b/c government doesn’t
really help Thai people at all since beginning of this year. Many demonstrators
in Thailand and we finally stopped it. Now we will have peace in Thailand
and South Thailand.
[Comment3] (2006-09-20T09:27:30.000Z): yea,pretty much he’s saying He’s
restoring the government to the ppl because the situaton is getting worse.
The king has even intervened but with no success, so as a necessity we have
to. He also assured that they are not intersted in taking over, [they are] doing
this in the name of the king and thai ppl and will restore everything as soon
as possible.
[Comment4] (2006-09-20T13:06:43.000Z): What he said is only means we must
sacrifice many fellow Thai’s life again. To bring down these dudes in the next
few years or many years.
[AnonymousIn2] (2006-09-20T14:53:37.000Z): I’ve updated the description
with a translation of the communique. Please correct if wrong, thanks to
UlaanBataar for this info
[Comment5] (2006-09-21T01:10:51.000Z): wow i give credits to the translator,
some of those words spoken are so hard to translate. I was just thinking about
what some of those words meant in english.
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(AnonymousIn2 - Video comments)
The following is the translation later provided in the description of the video.
English translation (please correct if wrong): COMMUNIQUE NO 1 It has
been clear that the administration of the country’s affairs by the current care-
taker government has created conflicts and division, and sowed discord among
the people of the nation. It is unprecedented in the history of the Thai na-
tion that groups were determined to win through ways and means. The trend
is getting more violent every passing day. The majority of the people are
suspicious of extensive corruption and malfeasance practices among the bu-
reaucracy. Independent agencies and organisations have been dominated by
politics and unable to fulfil the objectives as stipulated in the constitution of
the Kingdom of Thailand. Consequently, political activities have encountered
numerous problems and obstacles. Frequently, the dignity of the Thai people’s
king was affected. The efforts exerted by several sectors of society to alleviate
the situation have failed to bring an end to the conflict. It is necessary for the
Administrative Reform Group under the Democratic System with the King
as the Head of State, comprising commanders of the armed forces and the
National Police Bureau, to seize national administrative power from now on.
In so doing, the Administrative Reform Group under the Democratic System
with the King as the Head of State wishes to reaffirm that it has no intention
to become the administrators of the country. The administrative power under
the democratic system with the king as the head of the state will be returned
to the Thai people as quickly as possible in order to maintain peace and order
and preserve national stability, as well as to uphold the beloved institution of
the monarchy of all the Thai people.
(AnonymousIn2 - Video description)
4.2.3 Support
It is interesting to note that, during the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand,
there were not many help seekers, but rather providers. Those who were outside Bangkok
and Thailand during that time and who perceived that the coup was threatening sent
out messages offering mental and spiritual support (e.g., praying, encouraging, wishing,
hoping) on their blogs and media sharing sites. It is quite common to see comments
similar to the following example messages on many of those sites.
I hope everything is okay for you and everyone you know out there. I have
spent a bit of time in Thailand and really hope that things work out okay.
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(OutsiderIn9 - Photo comment)
Great shot
May justice be done to the Thai people
May the King’s powers be restored and honored by a good at heart leader
(AbsoluteInsider2 - Photo comment)
4.2.4 Recreation and Entertainment
To some people, the coup d’e´tat was another opportunity to have fun. People explicitly
enjoyed seeking and sharing information during that time. In this perspective, the
military sites were viewed as festive spaces where people could attend and had fun (e.g.
from taking photos and meeting others). The following was one of those people who
enjoyed going to see the situation.
วันน้ีไปเที่ยวมา
วันน้ีเราไปดูรถถังที่ถนนราชดำเนินมาด้วยหล่ะ ไปกับนุ๊กน๊ิกแล้วก็แบงค์ด้วย สนุกมากเลย
หล่ะ ตอนแรกก็ไม่ได้ต้ังใจไปหรอก แต่สุดท้ายก็ไปจนได้ ตอนแรกไปดูที่อะไรก็ไม่รู้อะแถวๆ
สนามม้านางเลิ้งอะ ไปถ่ายรูปกัน แล้วก็เดินไปที่ลานพระบรมรูปทรงม้ามีรถถังจอดเรียงเป็น
แถวเลยอะ มีคนไปถ่ายรูปเต็มเลย
เราก็ไปถ่ายมาด้วย เอารูปมาฝากเพื่อนๆด้วยนะ และก็บังเอิญมากๆเลยหล่ะ พวกเราไปเจอ
นักเทนนิสที่มาแข่ง thailand open 2006 ด้วยหล่ะ ดีใจมากเลย
ไอ้ น๊ิกน่ีเบียดเข้าไปถ่ายรูปใหญ่เลยเก่งมากเก็บภาพมาได้ด้วย ส่วนเรานะก็เอากล้องของ
แบงค์ถ่ายอะ ถ้ายังไงก็อย่าลืมไปดูรูปกันนะ วันน้ีสนุกมากๆเลย
[I had a trip today
Today I went to see tanks on Rachadumnern Rd. I went with Nuk Nik and
Bank. It was so fun. At first, I did not intend to go. But we ended up
going anyway. We went to see what, I don’t know, around Nang Lerng Race
Course. Just to take some photos. Then we walked to King Chulalongkorn
Monument. There were a lot tanks parking in straight line. There were tons
of people taking photos.
We also took some photos and brought them back to show you too. And it
was coincident that we met tennis players who came [to Thailand] for Thailand
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Open 2006. I was so happy.
Nick squeezed in there somehow and was able to get some photos. I used
Bank’s camera. Anyway, don’t forget to see them. I had a great fun.]
(AbsoluteInsider13 - Blog)
The perspective was also partially evident from those photos and videos that made
fun of the situation in Thailand. People in photos posted funny comments. The com-
mentators said something that was intended to make people laugh (e.g., sarcastic). A
small number of photos were reedited to make a parody of the situation (e.g., inserting
a cartoon character). Below is an example of a blog post that used the coup to insult
travelers in Thailand.
Thai Coup Strands Thousands of U.S. Sex Tourists
The ousting of Thai Prime Minister Thanksin Shinawatra has thrown Thailand
into political unrest, and filled the U.S. Embassy with thousands of American
sex tourists seeking safe passage to Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Red Cross is
urging all sex tourists to remain calm, and telling families that their relatives
need not be suspected of murdering Jon-Benet Ramsey to secure safe passage.
New military leader Gen. Sondhi Boonyaratkalin insists his country is still
safe for the perverts of the world saying, “Thailand - come for the come, stay
for the come.”
(AbsoluteOutsider8 - Blog)
During the early stage of the coup, a Thai blogger observed a web forum in Thailand
and found that there were a number of threads that showed how optimistic the Thai
people were during that time. I translated the topics of those threads in English and
uploaded them on my personal blog.
Optimistic Thais and the coup
[AbsoluteInsider14] posted highlights on jokes and gags about the coup on
Pantip.com (Lumpini forum), at least to show how some of Thais think about
the situation.
Here are some of post title listed in that forum. Most of them are question-
based posts. I translated only the one that would make sense to outsiders:
- I want to know a price of the tank.
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- One of the replies asked “first or second hand?”. Another one asked “Include
air conditioning?”
- Can a tank has NGV engine?
- How a tank make a turn?
- I already asked the soldiers. They told me that there is no air conditioning
in a tank.
- Do you want go out and take pictures of tanks with me?
- Is the lottery working tomorrow?
- This is the announcement of love revolution. Those who are in love, please
be calm.
- Is this coup d’e´tat or tank show?
In addition to posting non-serious questions, people also shared stories that were
unprecedented and unexpected and apparently had entertainment and informative value.
For example, people took photos and wrote a blog post about a Thai businessman who
sprayed a message on his own car supporting the military and drove around Bangkok.
Another example was the fact people took a number of photos in which soldiers and
symbols of religion, Buddhism in particular (such as monks and temples), are in the
same shots or even monks intentionally took photos with tanks and soldiers.
To summarize, while collecting information about the sitatuion, people observed and
evaluated the difficulties that were critical to the effectiveness of communication during
that time. The awareness of the obstacles informed different information seeking and
sharing strategies which are use to explain information behavior during that period of
time. It is noteworthy that various types of information sources and channels played
essential roles in the discussion of how people perceived the obstacles and how they came
across these issue.
4.3 Roles of Information Sources and Channels
This section focuses on how people utilized different types of information sources and
channels during the coup. According to what people expressed on their blogs and during
the interviews, it is apparent that people were multitasking and trying to use more than
just one information source and channel to serve their intensified information needs. The
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following are some responses from various sources.
I’m in town right now checking out the internet getting NEWS! I was like I
want news! May try to find a newspaper but I already looked at articles on
the web. If you want to know more check out the Washington Post newspaper,
the US Embassy in Thailand had an update also about the situation. They
are telling americans to keep an eye on the events but they are not telling us
to leave.
(OutsiderIn10 - Blog)
[I] had two computers running. One for writing up posts and viewing print
articles, the other for international radio and TV.
(AnonymousOut2- Interview)
I didn’t do anything other than to turn on the TV and see the montage of
patriotic songs and images that was playing. There wasn’t anything in partic-
ular to do. I recall going online and trying to get some news. I also posted a
blog entry, posting updates throughout the evening and following days. I also
sent a message to a friend from the US who was here visiting. I wanted to
ensure he was okay and understood what was happening. As it turns out, he
actually went out and took photos of the tanks.
...
I followed the situation by visiting websites, reading the paper and seeing what
additional limited information was available.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
[I used] websites, blogs, newspapers, TV, everything. The Google News func-
tion was consolidating all of the relevant English language stuff. And then I
read the Thai papers online too.
...
Google News was, and remains, the best way of consolidating English language
news on any topic. If you type in “Vajiralongkorn” you get all of the recent
news on the crown prince. It is simple, but very effective.
(AbsoluteOutsider4 -Interview)
I can’t say any [sources] were especially noteworthy. Most were just chugging
out scraps of info and facts. But no one in this day and age “relies on a source
of information” anyway. You look at the incredibly diverse soup of information
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coming for multiple sources. In a few minutes one scans dozens of sites, picking
up a sense of the overall situation. It doesn’t seem likely that one TV station,
website, newspaper would have any real insight on its own. The valkue comes
from multiple access to all of them...
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
พอขับออกมาถึงถนนด้านนอก รถไม่ค่อยมีให้เห็นตามท้องถนน [สามีเพื่อน] ก็ขับข้ึนทางด่วน
จากแยกบางพูน บริเวณทางด่วนก็มีรถทหารจอดอยู่ระหว่างทางหลายคัน โดยมีทหารน่ังอยู่
บนรถ คอยสังเกตรถที่ขับบนทางด่วน
พอมาถึงบ้าน[เพื่อน] ก็เปิดโทรทัศน์ก็ไม่มีการถ่ายทอดรายการใดๆ จึงเปิดอินเทอร์เน็ตเพื่อ
เช็คข้อมูลว่าเกิดอะไรข้ึน แต่เว็บไซต์ข่าวต่างๆ ในประเทศไทย ไม่ว่าจะเป็น ไทยรัฐ มติชน
หรืออื่นๆ ก็ไม่ปรากฎข่าวที่เกี่ยวกับการปฏิวัติในครั้งน้ี จึงเปิดเว็บไซต์ของ CNN และ BBC ดู
ปรากฏว่ามีภาพข่าวของการปฏิวัติของประเทศไทยในจุดต่างๆ มีรถถังอยู่ทุกจุดในกรุงเทพฯ
ทั้งถนนเส้นวิภาวดี พหลโยธิน ราชดำเนิน และก็มีประกาศออกมาทางโทรทัศน์เรื่อยๆ ถึงการ
ปฏิวัติครั้งน้ี และมีประกาศให้มีการหยุดงานในวันรุ่งข้ึนเพื่อเป็นการควบคุมสถานการณ์
หลังจากเกิดเหตุการณ์ ก็โทรหาแม่เพื่อบอกให้รู้ว่าได้ออกมาจากที่ทำงานแล้วและมาอยู่บ้าน[เพื่อน]เพ่ือ
รอดูว่าวันต่อไปจะต้องทำงานหรือไม่ ระหว่างน้ีก็จะมีเพื่อน มีป้า โทรมาถามเพราะรู้ว่าทำงาน
อยู่ที่มหาวิทยาลัย ส่วนใหญ่ก็โทรมาถามว่าอยู่ที่ไหน แล้วเหตุการณ์เป็นอย่างไร
[When we were driving on the highway [leaving work], there were not a lot of
traffic. [My colleague’s husband] drove for us and took the express way from
Bang Poon. There we saw a number of military vehicles parking along the
road with soldiers monitoring the situation on the express way.
After we arrived my colleague’s house, we turned on the TV and found noth-
ing. Then we logged on to the Internet to check what happened, but we could
not find any news about the coup from many websites in Thailand, for in-
stance, Thairath, Matichon, etc. So we visited CNN and BBC and found some
photos taken from different locations in Bangkok including on Vibhavadee, Pa-
holyothin, and Rachadumnern Rds. There were occasional announcements on
TV about this coup and an announcement saying that the next day was a
holiday for controlling the situation.
After that, I called my mom to tell her that I already left my work and stayed
with my friend to know that whether or not I had to go to work the next day.
During that time, my friends and my aunt called and asked about me because
they knew that I work at [one of Thaksin’s organizations]. Most of them asked
where I am and what the situation was like.]
(AbsoluteInsider4 - Interview)
These examples indicate that during the disruptive moment, people were not using
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one particular source or channel. Rather people used information sources and channels
to complement each other to gain as much information as possible. Therefore, when
considering the utility of particular sources or channels, these multitasking experiences
and use of multiple sources should be kept in mind.
4.3.1 Mainstream Media
During the disruptive moments of the coup, people still used various types of traditional
media, including local and newspapers, television, and radio. However, with the inter-
vention and control of the operation of these media, it is important to note that people
realized the limited role of traditional media in a critical situation like the coup in 2006.
รู้สึกว่าประเทศไทยกับการควบคุมสื่อมันยังคงเป็นของคู่กัน ข้อเท็จจริงของข่าวสารในประเทศ
ไทยยังคงตกอยู่ภายใต้การควบคุมของระบอบการเมืองอยู่อีกมาก ทั้งต้ังแต่ก่อนการปฏิวัติและ
หลังจากปฏิวัติ ความน่าเช่ือถือของสื่อลดน้อยลงมากในความรู้สึกของ [นาง] ข้อเท็จจริงในสื่อ
ต่างๆ หาไม่มีอีกแล้ว ทำให้ประชาชนที่รับรู้ข่าวสารด้านเดียวตกเป็นเครื่องมือของคนบางกลุ่ม
...
หนังสือพิมพ์ไทยส่วนใหญ่ก็ลงข่าวเกี่ยวกับการที่ประชาชนออกมาถ่ายรูปกับทหาร ลงข่าว
เกี่ยวกับประกาศของคณะปฏิวัติ คือมีการลงข่าวในแง่มุมเดียวเพ่ือให้ประชาชนรู้สึกว่าการ
ปฏิวัติครั้งน้ีดี
[I feel that Thailand and media control are still inseparable. Fact in news in
Thailand is still under the control of political system, both before and after
the coup. The trustworthiness of media were decreasing substantially, in my
opinion. We could no long find fact in media. This makes people who receive
information from one side are used as a tool by some groups of people.
...
Most Thai newspaper provided news about the way people came out and took
photos with soldier and the coup announcement. It was one-side of the story
to make people feel that this is a good coup.]
(AbsoluteInsider4 - Interview)
I turned on the TV out of curiosity to see what, if anything, was on it. I
anticipated that there would be some sort of a news black-out so didn’t re-
ally expect to find anything substantive, but did want to see what was being
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broadcast.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
It should be noted that these critical perspectives did not emerge because of the
coup, rather they were derived from what was perceived prior to the coup. Media
played leading roles in the recent long-standing political turmoil in Thailand. People
questioned the trustworthiness of media. Therefore, during the coup, some people used
media, but did not expect anything as AbsoluteOutsider4, a scholar on Thai studies
based outside Thailand, pointed out about the role of the newspaper.
Frankly, the newspapers do what they always do. There was a brief spurt
of action and anxiety, that was followed by some days of greater reflection
and analysis but, finally and inevitably, there was nothing, and Thailand was
relegated to its usual non-existence – a place of only marginal international
concern. That cycle tends to take two weeks but in the case of the 2006 coup
I recall that it was even quicker.
(AbsoluteOutsider4 - Interview)
As the coup leaders used TV stations to disseminate official announcements, some
people used television as a main channel to monitor the situation. Nevertheless, similar
to the newspaper, some people were aware of particular frames of reference that were
presented on TV screens. On his blog, after explaining his well-being in Thailand,
OutsiderIn4, an expatriate in Thailand, noted:
It reminds me of the case after the invasion of Iraq where we saw the images
of mobs of people toppling the statue of Sadam Hussein in Baghdad. Later on
we learned (source: Control Room) the pictures of the crowds bringing down
the statue were deceptive: upon viewing a wider angle view of that square,
there was only a small group of people, not the masses that it appeared in
close-up. Plus, those people turned out not to be Baghdad locals but people
who had been brought in from outside for the event. Interesting.
(OutsiderIn4 - Blog)
When I asked him about this perspective during the interview, he also elaborated
that:
The comparison I was drawing was how what you see on TV isn’t necessarily
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representative of what is going on more broadly. In this case, Bangkok wasn’t
under seige and the streets weren’t lined with tanks and soldiers, although
from what I understand from those outside Thailand, that was the impression
formed by the way the media was covering the coup
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
To some people, radio was an alternative choice during that time, as AbsoluteInsider2
described her experience on her blog.
First announcement came. Just after Thaksin’s “half” announcement that he
ordered a commander to be transfered to some other position .. that was really
TOO LATE.
And [the TV screen] stayed blue like that forever. We had to follow news from
radio kept waiting for more announcements. As soon as 2nd announcement
aired. I heard some people outside blowing horns.. riding around on their
motorbikes and shout “Yessss!!!! Thaksin GET OUTTTTTTT!!”
(AbsoluteInsider2 - Blog)
For those who did not use radios, they still perceived that radio was useful but only
to a particular group of audiences because of the mobility characteristics of the radio
device and socio-economic status of particular audiences.
I can’t really recall radio specifically at this time. Radio tends to have a lot of
talk and opinions of the man on the street. It was an interesting source that
makes one feel close to the common man or taxi driver on their day-to-day
business.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
4.3.2 Firsthand experience
In making sense of the way people went outside of their residences during the early stage
of the coup to have firsthand experience, there apparently are a number of explanations
to the phenomenon.
To some people who live or work close by a place where there was an appearance of
the military, seeing with their own eyes seems to be valued.
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I didn’t learn only from TV, because my home is located near former PM
Thaksin’s place. I met many military officers around my house and had some
chances to talk. ... Not only from my curiosity, but they seemed to me very
kind and polite, guarding us and neighbors nicely. Many of us gave them some
food, drinks, and flowers.
(AbsoluteInsider7 - Interview)
However, for other people, the motivation for going outside was mainly from dissat-
isfaction with the mainstream media’s reporting as OutsiderIn3 pointed out.
I realized that the media was unlikely to provide objective coverage of the
situation (being de facto state-controlled) and so decided to see things for
myself.
(OutsiderIn3 - Interview)
Another foreign traveler, OutsiderIn11, wrote on his blog how he decided to go
outside. It was apparent that the main motive for him was that what he heard during
the early stage of the coup was confusing. In the same post, he also provided some
photos that he took with his friends.
Ryan and the Coup in Thailand
On this evening, Sept 20th 2006 i was sleeping. My friend called me and
told me to turn on the TV. I put on CNN and saw that there was a coup in
progress.
Well, we went out to our ’ hang out’ restaurant Sabah Cafe & Cinema. There
we heard that we all had to go home. Hungry for information, we started to
ask arround. The stories were all different. Some said people died, others said
tanks were all over Bangkok.
After restless talking over and over, Tony Heiko and I, decided to take a tuk
tuk and cruise trough the city. We went to all the main spots, like Khaosarn
and from there to Sanam Luang, Democracy Monument and straight to the
government buildings.
At the time we arrived at Khaosarn it was already shutdown, on Sanam Luang
was nothing, not even a tank. Democracy monument same. When we got to
the area (the royal area) with all the government buildings we saw the first
tanks and soldiers. All wearing yellow ribbons, to show that they are loyal to
the King. It was great to see it. The atmosphere was quite relaxed. Al lot of
press, who had nothing to report, searching arround for a story.
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Tony, Heiko and I decided just to have some fun and we went out to shoot
some pictures. Later on i will also post the movies.
Long story short: it wasn’t as bad as the media displayed on TV. A lot of peo-
ple in Thailand were very happy with this coup. It was quiet and completely
without violence.
See the pics for an impression.
(OutsiderIn11 - Blog)
A YouTube user, OutsiderIn12, recorded a video of the situation with a camera
attached on his bike. The following is the description of his video.
I went for a jog around my neighbourhood at 12:30 am to see how things
appeared. All was quiet, uncannily quiet, even the soi dogs were not barking
and chasing me. So, I figured why not take a drive around on my bike with
a video camera in tow. It’s quite difficult to drive a bike and take video at
the same time. Mistake! At first I took video of whatever I saw. What I
saw was multiple tanks at every intersection, armoured vehicles, gun mounted
jeeps and 50 soldiers at ever intersection. I have never seen so many tanks. I
must have seen over 20 tanks and I only drove two miles before I thought I
better get back home. As I head back I was taking video and stoped at a red
light, btw, all lights were red! at one intersection soldiers saw my camera and
approached me, guns aimed at me. I freaked and I quickly offered them my
tape hoping they would not take my video camera. They checked my video
bag for more tapes. I had only brought two with me. One in the camera and
one I had stashed in my pants. When they were sure I had no more tapes they
let me continue home. 300 meters down the road I loaded my video camera
again. This time I knew if I got caught again I would probably have a bigger
problem than last time. So I tried to take hidden footage. Which I did but
the footage is really bad and you can’t really make out stuff... Sorry. As I
drove around taxi drivers gave me the thumbs up and said “Thaksin” and put
their wrists together as if in handcuffs. I will venture out again tomorrow and
see if I can get some good stuff.
(OutsiderIn12 - Video description)
4.3.3 Cellular Communication
As mentioned earlier, personal contact was one of the first reactions after hearing about
the coup. In addition to face-to-face communication, people used different technologies
to communicate with each other. The cell phone is inevitably one of them. People
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used cell phones to contact their family members and friends to inform them about the
situation and to check on their well-being.
Consider a comment shared on a blog post by AbsoluteInsider15 about his experience
during the coup; he was outside Thailand when he heard about the coup. Note that this
AbsoluteInsider15 blog was written as a memoir for two year anniversary of the coup.
ตอนที่ทราบข่าวผมกําลังเดินอยู่ที่มุสตาฟาในสิงคโปร์ พอนึกย้อนกลับไปก็ตลกดีตรงที่ว่า มี
คนหน่ึง รับโทรศัพท์แล้วส่งเสียงออกมาว่า อะไรนะ ทหารปฏิวัติแล้วหรือ
เท่าน้ัน
ปรากฎว่าคนที่ยืนอยู่รอบ ๆ ที่ได้ยินเสียง ยกโทรศัพท์ข้ีนมา แล้วโทรกลับเมืองไทยกันทุกคน
(อ้าว คนไทยเดินในมุสตาฟากันมากขณะน่ีเลยหรือ)
[When I heard [about the coup], I was walking in Mustafa in Singapore. Look-
ing back, it was funny. Someone picked up the phone and said out loud:
‘What? The army has seized the power?’
After that, all Thai people who were standing arou there and heard what s/he
said, picked up their phones and called back to Thailand.
(Oh! [I did not know] there were many Thai people in Mustafa at this time?)]
(AbsoluteInsider15 - Blog comment)
Particularly, the Short Message Service (SMS) was a quite popular feature during
the coup. People used SMS to communicate with their personal contacts. For exam-
ple, OutsiderIn4 used SMS to contact his friend who went out and took photos of the
situation.
He did not send me any information while he was out, as it was already late at
night. The following day he did send an SMS to me, telling me he had taken
some good pictures and had not encountered any problems. Subsequently, he
permitted me to use one or two of the pictures for my blog.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
SMS also used to distribute information among groups of people. AbsoluteInsider16
told that she received the news via SMS that her office was closing the next day.
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ก็คนที่ทำงานส่งข้อความต่อๆกันมา เพราะฝ่ายบุคคลได้รับโทรศัพท์จากผอ.สถาบัน ว่าเน่ืองจาก
เหตุการณ์บ้านเมืองไม่สงบ จึงให้หยุด 1 วัน
[People at my work sent messages to each other informing that the HR de-
partment received a phone call from the director saying that since there was
a difficult situation in the country, the next day was a holiday.]
(AbsoluteInsider16 - Interview)
In addition to voice and text communication, people used cell phones to take photos
and videos of the situation. By looking at the device model reported on Flickr, a number
of photos available were taken by cell phones. Therefore, cell phones were not only used
as communication tools, but also as recording devices in this disruptive situation.
4.3.4 Internet
During the early stage of the coup, the Internet seemed to be the most successful as it
became the major channel for disseminating information. Some people chose to use the
Internet as a result of the hardship of accessing information from other sources and/or
via other channels.
ในเมื่อทีวีใช้ไม่ได้แล้ว สื่อที่หวังพึ่งพาได้ก็มีแต่ internet ก็พยายามเข้า manager.co.th ก่อน
เพราะว่าในช่วงน้ันเว็บผู้จัดการเป็นเว็บข่าวที่อัพเดตไวที่สุดแล้ว แต่ก็มีอาการติดๆ ดับๆ
เช่นเดียวกับ pantip.com เพราะ capacity ของทั้งสองเว็บไม่เพียงพอกับ traﬃc ปริมาณเยอะ
ขนาดน้ัน
[When TV became useless, the only media that we could rely on was the
Internet. I was trying to access to manager.co.th first because during that time
the manager[now ASTV] website was the fastest updated news site. However,
it was unreliable as well as pantip.com because the capacity of both websites
could not afford that enormous traffic like that.]
(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
I and a few others monitor newspapers, TV, some radio, and the net (although
back then there were not as many blogs and news sites on Thai issues or
opinions). These were simply sources of information. The internet turned out
to be a main source as many people went out on the street, took photos and
posted them.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
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This was also the case for OutsiderIn7, who also had difficulty accessing various
information sources during the first night of the coup. Remember that she could not
find a taxi to take her around Bangkok. Seemingly the Internet was her only success.
When I heard about the coup, it was already past 10pm, and I had just
returned to my apartment after dinner. I tried to get a taxi to where the
action is: the government house. But no taxi seem to want to ferry me there.
It became really frustrating. I wanted to know what was happening and started
making phone calls, to check if my friends were safe and to pass on the news
to those who were still partying. Some lines were interrupted and I couldn’t
get in touch with a few souls. Fortunately, some of my friends were online and
we started frantically exchanging information on the matter.
I checked the TV channels. The cable TV at my apartment only offered CNN,
but that too was shut down by 12am. The TV suddenly went blank, damn!
The coup plotters had taken control of all TV stations, apparently because
the embattled Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was in New York,
was giving interviews to the foreign press.
...
I turned to the Internet to get more information but due to overloading, news
sites unfurled slowly. I was desperate to know what was happening. From the
little that I read, I knew witnesses were saying that several hundred troops were
posted at key points around Bangkok, including at government installations
and major intersections.
(OutsiderIn7- Blog)
One of the utilities that people gained from the Internet during that period of time
was personal communication. Email was used, similar to phone, to connect with personal
contacts such as family members and friends.
The emails were from friends and family (presumably ones who hadn’t read
my blog entries) who were concerned for my safety. I let them know that
I was safe and that the media images they had seen (tanks, etc) were not
representative of what was happening in the entire city.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
I sent lots of e-mails – always do. We were all confused, and before too long
the coverage of the coup was overwhelmed by the “guns and roses” images
that flashed around the world. In general terms, I was in contact with my
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colleagues and friends.
(AbsoluteOutsider4 - Interview)
Another communication function of the Internet was through Instant Messenger
(IM). Some people talked to their contacts one-on-one. However, a number of people
created a temporary room and invited their contacts, whether or not they knew each
other, to exchange information.
Yes. By gmail chat. A few friends and a fellow blogger called [a blogger’s
name] who alerted me to the fact that normal programming had ceased and
was being replaced by pictures of the royal family and music - a typical sign
of a coup.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
คืนน้ันก็ต้ังห้อง chat ใน msn จับกลุ่มคุยถึงสถานการณ์ แล้วก็ตามข่าวจากแหล่งที่พอหาได้
เช่นจาก live blogging ที่ 19sep.blogspot.com
...
เป็นกลุ่มเพื่อนที่ทำงานที่เดียวกันครับ ประมาณ 6-7 คน ปกติก็ไม่ค่อยได้คุย MSN กับคน
กลุ่มน้ีเท่าไหร่ แต่คืนน้ันในกลุ่มก็ invite ให้ผมเข้าไป join ในห้อง chat ที่สักคนหน่ึงในกลุ่ม
ต้ังไว้แล้ว
...
ได้ประโยชน์แค่ว่า วันรุ่งข้ึนต้องไปทำงานหรือเปล่า เพราะในกลุ่มคนที่ chat กันอยู่น้ัน เกือบ
ทั้งหมดเป็นคนกลุ่มอายุ 20 ต้นๆ และไม่มีความสนใจเรื่องการเมือง
[At that night, I set up a chat room on MSN, talking about the situation with
a group of people. We followed and looked for news from sources that we could
find, for example, live blogging at 19sep.blogspot.com.
...
They were my colleagues at work, around 6-7 people. Normally, I did not talk
on MSN with this group of people. However, at that night, they invited me
to join one of the chat room that someone already set up.
...
The benefit we got [from using MSN] was just to know that whether or not
we had to go to work because nearly all people in the group were around early
20 and were not interested in politics.]
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(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
AbsoluteInsider17, a Thai blogger, made an observation about the role of instant
messenger during the coup on his personal blog saying:
ในคืนน้ัน ผมเจอคนเข้ามาออนไลน์ ผ่านโปรแกรม MSN Messenger เยอะมากเป็นประวัติการณ์
จากปกติ เวลา เที่ยงคืนจะเป็นช่วงที่ไม่ค่อยจะมีคนออนไลน์อยู่เท่าไร แต่อาจจะเป็นเพราะใน
คืนน้ัน ทุกคนรู้แล้วว่าสื่อทุกสื่อถูกปิดกั้นหมด และเค้ารู้แล้วว่า ‘‘สื่อไหนที่เค้าจะสามารถหา
ข้อมูลได้’’ ซึ่งสื่ออินเทอร์เน็ตคือคำตอบ สำหรับเหตุการณ์ในคืนน้ัน
ในช่วงเวลาน้ัน เกิดการจับกลุ่มรวมตัว เปิดห้อง Chat กันเป็นห้องใหญ่ๆ หลายๆ ห้องผ่าน
โปรแกรม Messenger กระจายตัวอยู่ ในอินเทอร์เน็ตโดยจับกลุ่มคุยในระหว่างกลุ่มเพื่อนๆ
ด้วยกัน และจะมีการพูดถึงเรืองที่เกิดข้ึน แลกเปลี่ยนข้อมูลข่าวสารระหว่างกันในห้อง Chat
ซ่ึงใครได้ข้อมูลข่าวสารอะไรมา ข้อมูลข่าวสารที่ได้มา ก็จะถูกกระจายผ่านลงไปในกลุ่มห้อง
chat น้ัน ๆและขยายตัวออกไปยั้งกลุ่มห้อง chat อื่นๆ อย่างรวดเร็ว ซึ่งไม่น่าเชื่อว่า ข่าวสาร
ใหม่ที่เกิดข้ึน จะสามารถกระจายออกไปยังกลุ่มคนไทย ออนไลน์ได้ทั่วประเทศและทั่วโลก
โดยใช้เวลาไม่ถึง 5 นาที ทุกคนก็สามารถรับรู้ข่าวสารเดียวกันแล้ว
ดังน้ัน ถึงแม้ว่าเว็บไซต์ ใหญ่ๆ โดนปิดไป แต่ข้อมูลข่าวสาร ก็ยังคง หาทางกระจายตัวออกไป
ผ่านช่องทางอื่นๆ ในโลกของอินเทอร์เน็ต เป็นในรูปแบบของคลื่นใต้น้ำ ที่ไหลผ่านในกระแส
ของ Social Network Service (SNS) คือ จากเพื่อนหรือสังคมของตัวเองออนไลน์ ไปยัง
สังคมอื่นๆ ต่อๆไปเป็นลูกโซ่ ผ่าน Instant Messaging (MSN, Yahoo messenger), ผ่าน
ทาง E-Mail หรือในหลักของการตลาดออนไลน์ เราเรียนรูปแบบการเกิดเหตุการณ์น้ีว่า Viral
Marketing (การตลาดแบบไวรัส) แต่เหตุการณ์ที่เกิดน้ี เป็นการแบ่งปันข้อมูลแบบ Real Time
ที่สามารถตอบสนองและโต้ตอบกันได้ทันที ([Interactive])
[During that night, I saw the largest group of people online on MSN Messenger
ever. Normally around midnight, there are not many people online. But it
might not be true because during that night everyone knew that all media was
censored. And they knew that “which media that could find information”.
And the Internet was the answer for the situation on that night.
During that time, people were grouped and opened a lot of large chat room
through Messenger programs, distributed on the Internet. They were grouped
among friends and talking about the situation, exchanging information in a
chat room. Who got what information distributed it in that chat room. It
then was quickly expanded to other chat rooms. It was unbelievable that
new information would be disseminated among Thai people online around the
country and the world within 5 minutes. Everyone could learn about the same
news.
Therefore, even though many large websites were closed, information can be
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disseminated through other channels in the Internet world. It was like under-
water waves that went through the stream of Social Network Service (SNS).
It were from friends or one society through other societies like chains through
Instant Messaging (MSN, Yahoo messenger), email, or online marketing. We
called the pattern of this phenomenon that Viral Marketing. However, in this
situation, people shared information real-time that could be responded and
interacted immediately(Interactive).]
(AbsoluteInsider17 - Blog)
In addition, the way people communicated via instant messenger was not only
through private chat, but also through status update. A number of people changed
their status on instant messenger, which were shown to their contacts, to reflect their
perspectives on the coup. For example, InsiderOut2 observed his contacts’ status and
published some of them on his personal blog.
- เพราะรัฐบาลเปลี่ยนแปลงบ่อย <– เลียนแบบ เพราะอากาศเปลี่ยนแปลงบ่อย Slogan ของ
ทิฟฟี่แผงสีเขียวและหนัง Season Changes
- เค้ากะลังปฏิบัติ? ปฏิบัติอะไรกันหว่า ปฏิสนธิอะไรกับทักษิณเน่ียแหละเพื่อนบอก (ผมอยู่ใน
ยุคที่รับฟังข่าวผิดๆหรือเน่ีย)
- พี่ๆเค้าเลื่อนวันเด็กมาเป็นวันน้ีหรอ? รถถังตรึมเลย?
- ‘‘Welcome to democracy Thai style’’ – TIME
- East Venice ก็อย่างน้ีคนชอบถอยหลังเข้าคลองกัน
- เราก้าวถอยหลังเพื่อต้ังหลัก หรือเพื่อก้าวถอยหลังต่อไป
[- Because the government changes often. <– Copied from “Because the
weather changes often”, a slogan of Tiffy, a green package drug, and a movie
Season Changes.
- Are they acting? Acting what? Impregnate something with Thaksin, my
friend told (Am I living in the age of deception?)
- They move the children day to today? A lot of tanks?
- “Welcome to democracy Thai style” – TIME
- East Venice, That is why people like to go backwards to canals [Thai idiom]
- We step back to stand firmly, or move further backward.]
(InsiderOut2 - Blog)
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AbsoluteInsider18 also captured a screen shot of her Windows Live Messenger, an
instant messenger by Microsoft, showing the status updates of her contacts, as shown
in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: An example of Windows Life Messenger screen shot during the coup (Re-
production permitted by the owner)
Speaking of status update, it was interesting to note that two of the interview in-
formants mentioned they wished that Twitter, which was not around during that time,
had been available. When asked if he had a magic wand, what would he do? Abso-
luteInsider3 said:
ในเชิงข่าวสาร ถ้าเปลี่ยนได้ คงอยากให้มี twitter ในช่วงน้ันหละมั้งครับ (และไม่ให้มันล่ม
ด้วย) แล้วก็ไม่ต้องการให้มีการปิดกั้นสื่อทุกชนิด ทั้งอินเทอร์เน็ตแล้วก็ช่องทีวีต่างประเทศ
[In terms of news and information, if it could be changed, I wish there was
Twitter during that time (and it was not down too.) And there was no media
censorship of all kind including the Internet and international TV channels.]
(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
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Similar to AnonymousOut2, he was not impressed with the way in which he commu-
nicated with others via Instant Messenger, and wished for the existence of Twitter.
Just some sharing some information, but it was still rather limited. Twit-
ter was not around then. If it had been, it would have easier to find out
information quickly.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
WWW is another common function of the Internet that people used during the early
stage of the coup, as OutsiderIn2 pointed out:
Since the coup, internet coverage of Thailand by all methods (news sites,
blogs, youtube, etc.) has exploded. Back in 2006 there were not as many sites
covering events moment to moment other than Thai newspaper sites. And the
newspaper sites just crib their information from Thai-language TV reports. I
was very satisfied with the sites at the time–there was a glut of event-based
information coming out that was quite exciting to follow. However, there is
little background–just what is happening. The situation was especially good
for me as I was one of the few English-language sites to have moment-to-
moment posts. It led a lot of readers to me.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
As already discussed, the role of the WWW, in particular, was amplified given the
fact that people were skeptical about what was provided from the traditional media.
Blog (or Weblog) was the most visible WWW platform/service during that time and
apparently were perceived as the most helpful.
Blog was had more coverage, more videos and photos, than I saw in interna-
tional media, and Thai media was off-the-air.
(AnonymousIn1 - Interview)
ในช่วงแรกที่ยังจับต้นชนปลายไม่ถูก บล็อกน้ี (19sep.blogspot.com) ถือว่าเป็นแหล่งที่รวบรวม
ข่าวไว้ได้เยอะ และมีที่มาชัดเจน ช่วยได้เยอะครับ แต่วันต่อๆ มาที่สื่อหลักเริ่มรายงานข่าว ก็
กลับไปหาสื่อหลักเหมือนเดิม
[During the first period that we could not figure out the story, this blog
(19sep.blogspot.com) was the place that collected a lot of news and clearly
provided sources. It helped a lot. But days after traditional media resumed
their duties in reporting news, I went back to the traditional media.]
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(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
For professional bloggers, keeping readers updated on the situation seems to be their
first instinct and passion. For example, AnonymousIn1 mentioned that he began to blog
when he first heard the rumors. When asked what made him decide to go out and report
the situation, he answered “[because of the] intention to report the events on my blog.”
During that early stage of the coup, there were a number of blogs that conducted what
is so-called “live-blogging” - another genre describing the way in which bloggers update
a situation/event in one or a couple of posts. Readers have to revisit the posts or keep
refreshing their browsers to see new items. There was not a concrete pattern in terms
of writing pattern. However, it is noteworthy that each news item is usually concise.
Except personal thoughts and opinions, most items refer to a source that comes either
from traditional media (such as television), personal contacts, personal experiences, or
other websites. Some blogs include timestamps for each news item.
A couple of blogs were created during that period just to report on the coup situation,
for example, thailandcoup.blogspot.com, and 19sep.blogspot.com. AbsoluteInsider15,
one of the founders of these blogs, wrote about this experience on his blog post titled
“Best Decision in My Life”, two years after the coup.
เมื่อสองปีที่แล้ว ผมกลับมาจากที่ทำงานมาอยู่บ้านเหมือนกับทุกคน ระหว่างน่ังเล่นคอมอยู่ใน
ห้องนอน ก็มีคนบอกมาทาง IM ว่าให้เปิดทีวีมีเพลง เหตุการณ์ที่เหลือคงไม่ต้องเล่า ทุกคน
คงมีประสบการณ์ร่วมและรู้กันดี
อินเทอร์เน็ตเป็นสื่อเดียวที่ยังทำงานได้ (มีมิตรสหายท่านหน่ึงให้คำอธิบายว่าทหารไม่รู้จักอิน
เทอร์เน็ต ซ่ึงผมคิดว่าเป็นคำอธิบายที่เข้าท่า) ผมจำได้แค่ว่าลิ่วลากผมเข้าไปในห้อง Chat ของ
MSN แล้วก็อปสถานการณ์ล่าสุดจากที่ต่างๆ มาแลกเปลี่ยนกัน
ผมอ่านเฉยๆ ไม่ตอบอะไร สมองยังงงๆ พอรวมสติได้สักพัก ก็ด่าลิ่วไปว่า ‘‘น่ีมึงทำอะไรของ
มึงเน่ีย’’
ที่ต้องด่าไม่ใช่ว่าไม่ดีนะครับ หลักการดี เพียงแต่ว่าวิธีการยังไม่เวิร์ค การสนทนาใน IM น้ัน
เป็น narrowcast เฉพาะกลุ่ม และไม่ persistence คือปิดหน้าต่าง IM ข้อมูลที่ (อาจ) มีค่า
เหล่าน้ันมันก็หายไป
ผมบอก[เพื่อนผู้ร่วมก่อต้ัง]ไปเป็นชุดว่าต้องทำอะไรบ้าง (เสียดายไม่มี chatlog เก็บไว้) ดังน้ี
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- ไปสมัครอีเมลใหม่ อย่าใช้ช่ือให้สาวถึงตัวได้
- เอาอีเมลไปลงทะเบียนเว็บบล็อก ตอนแรกจะเอา Exteen แต่กลัวพาน้องซวย เลยเอาของ
ฝรั่งซ่ึงมาลงเอยที่ Blogger
- แจก account ให้กับคนรู้จักที่ไว้ใจได้ และส่งต่อกันไปเป็นทอดๆ ตอนเขียนอย่าใส่ข้อมูลที่
สาวถึงตัวได้เหมือนกัน
- เขียนเป็นภาษาอังกฤษ!
เขียนมาถึงตรงน้ี หลายคนคงรู้แล้วว่า หมายถึง 19sep.blogspot.com
ที่บอกว่า perfect ที่สุดครั้งหน่ึง เพราะว่า 4 ข้อที่ว่าไปน้ันทรงพลังและรัดกุมอย่างมาก
- บล็อกเป็น persistence media แถมข้อมูลมีก็อปป้ีเดียว และไม่ซ้ำซ้อน อ้างอิงได้สะดวก
- ผู้ให้บริการบล็อกอยู่ต่างประเทศ สืบหาที่มายาก (เพราะตอนน้ันไม่รู้ว่าจะเกิดอะไรข้ึน)
- ถึงจะหาอีเมลเจอ ก็ไม่รู้ว่าเป็นอีเมลของใคร (กันไว้สองชั้น) มีทางเดียวที่จะหาตัวเจอคือ IP
ซ่ึงต้องใช้เวลาและความพยายามสูงกว่ามาก
- ดีมานด์ของข้อมูลมีสูงมาก (โดยเฉพาะจากต่างประเทศ) เราสามารถสร้างซัพพลายที่อ้างอิง
ได้ง่าย (ด้วย URL ไม่ใช่การก็อปแปะ) ให้ได้ ผลก็คือถูกอ้างอิงเป็นจำนวนมาก
- เขียนเป็นภาษาอังกฤษ ความคิดวูบแรกของผมคือทหารมันกลัวฝรั่ง แต่เอาเข้าจริงแล้ว
การเขียนเป็นภาษาอังกฤษช่วยให้ข้อมูลของเราสื่อถึงโลกได้ (เหตุการณ์น้ีทำให้ผมตระหนัก
ถึงความสำคัญของเน้ือหาภาษาอังกฤษ ดู Addicted to Blogging in English?)
นอกจากน้ีตัวบล็อก 19sep ยังมีพัฒนาการที่มาจากไอเดียของคนอื่นๆ อีก เช่น เอากล้องวิดี
โอมาต้ังถ่ายแถลงการณ์ของ คปค. แล้วอัพโหลดข้ึน YouTube, ภาพถ่ายหน้าจอ, transcript
ของแถลงการณ์แปลเป็นภาษาอังกฤษ (ซึ่งแปลกันแบบมั่วโคตรๆ เพราะตอนน้ันยังไม่มีใคร
รู้จักคำว่า Coup De’tat สักคน) ผมจำไม่ได้แล้วว่าทั้งหมดมีใครมาช่วยบ้าง เท่าที่นึกออกก็มี
เก่ง สุนิตย์ แล้วก็ Dr.Rider ถ้าตกไปก็ขออภัยด้วยนะครับ
การที่ข้อมูลมีดีมานด์เป็นจำนวนมาก และเราสามารถสร้างซัพพลายที่เหมาะสมได้ (เช่น มีวิดี
โอของจริง หรือ มี transcript ที่แปลกันสดๆ ออกให้อ่านแทบจะทันทีที่แถลงจบ) ดีกว่าและ
เร็วกว่าสื่อกระแสหลัก (ซ่ึงตอนน้ันเหลือเฉพาะสื่อต่างประเทศ) ถือเป็นจุดเปลี่ยนให้ผมเห็น
พลังของ citizen journalism อีกเหมือนกัน
...
‘‘I want to state cleary that there is no Gun Fire or any violence until now and doesn’t
tend to be too. Live seems to be as usual, anyone can walk around the street, some
companies still open. So you don’t have to worry about safety for your friends or
relatives, Thai or non-Thai, who currently are in all part of the country. They may be
exited but they all are still ﬁne.’’
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เมื่อสถานการณ์เริ่มกลับสู่ปกติ สื่อกระแสหลักต่างชาติเริ่มต้ังตัวติด และรายงานเหตุการณ์ใน
ไทยอย่างต่อเน่ือง ภารกิจของ 19sep ก็หมดไป เหลือทิ้งไว้เป็นอนุสรณ์ว่าเมื่อคืนน้ันเราทำ
อะไรกันไว้เพื่อประชาธิปไตยบ้าง
[Two years ago, I got back home from work like everyone else. While I was
playing on my computer in my bedroom, there was someone telling me via IM
that I had to turn on a TV set. There were songs playing on TV. I don’t have
to tell the situation after this. Everyone should have a shared experience and
know it well.
The Internet was the only media that worked. (One of my friends explained
that the military did not know about the Internet which I thought it make
sense.) I remembered that [his co-founder] dragged me to a chat room on MSN
where people copied and shared news from different places.
I just read, did not reply anything. My brain was still confused. After collect-
ing myself, I yelled at him “What the heck are you doing?”
The fact that I yelled at him was not in a negative way. Good approach,
but not-working method. The discussion on IM is narrowcast, specific to
particular group, and not persistent - after closing the window, all (potential)
valued information is also gone.
I told [the co-founder] what to do (Too bad I did not keep chat log) as follows:
- register a new email account that cannot be tracked.
- use this new email to register a new blog. At first, we thought about using
Exteen [a local Thai blog service]. But we were afraid that it would bring
trouble to our friend (the blog service owner). So we decided to use a foreign
service, ending up with Blogger.
- send this account to trustworthy people and let them distribute as snowball.
When writing, do not put any information that can be tracked.
- write in English.
After this point, many people would know that I mean 19sep.blogspot.com
What I just said one of the most perfect things because of these factors that
were very powerful and concise.
- Blog is a persistent media. It also maintains one copy, no redundancy. It is
easy to refer to.
- The service provider is outside Thailand. It is hard to track (because we did
not know what was going to happen).
- Even though they know the email, they would not know whose email (double
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protection). The only way to know is IP (address) which would take a long
time and a great effort.
- There was a high demand of information (especially from foreign countries).
We can create supplies that can be easily refer to (with URL not copy and
paste the whole content). The result was we got a lot of citations.
- Writing in English. My first thought was that the military is afraid of
foreigners. But for real, writing in English connected our information to the
world (this situation led me to be aware of the importance of English content
see Addicted to Blogging in English?)
19sep had also evolved from others’ ideas such as setting up a video camera
to record the announcement of CNR and uploading on YouTube, using screen
capture, writing transcripts of the announcement in English (They were very
poorly translated because at that time, none of us know the word Coup d’e´tat).
I don’t remember everyone who helped us. As I remember, there were Keng,
Sunit, and Dr.Rider. I am sorry if I miss anyone.
As there was a high demand of information, we could produce supply that are
appropriate (such as live video or live transcriptions that were translated right
after each announcement ended), better and faster [delivered] than mainstream
media (at that time there was only international media). It was a turning point
for me to realize the power of citizen journalism.
...
“I want to state cleary that there is no Gun Fire or any violence until now and
doesn’t tend to be too. Live seems to be as usual, anyone can walk around the
street, some companies still open. So you don’t have to worry about safety
for your friends or relatives, Thai or non-Thai, who currently are in all part
of the country. They may be exited but they all are still fine.”
After the situation resumed to a normal state, the international mainstream
media were settled and reporting the situation in Thailand continuously, the
duties of sep19 came to an end leaving as the memory of that we did for
democracy on that night.]
(AbsoluteInsider15 - Blog)
Unlike 19sep.blogspot.com, instead of having the public as an audience, some bloggers
also used their blogs to communicate with their personal contacts.
My blog exists to help family and friends back home stay up-to-date about my
life overseas. I know as a communication major that the way media represents
events if often more sensational and over-focused than in real life. Because of
that, I wanted my family and friends to know that I was okay and to try to
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put the information they might be hearing in a larger perspective.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
In addition to blogs, media sharing websites such as Flickr (photo) and YouTube
(video) also played substantial roles during the early stage of the coup. Similar to blogs,
media sharing websites seemed to be used to communicate to others and as a part of
their users’ memories.
To some people, taking photos and videos was recreational. However, some people
dedicated their time and effort to capture and report the experience. For AnonymousIn1,
he was so busy that he did not have time to check other sources.
During the coup night/morning I did not consult any other blogs or online
news media (I was too busy uploading photos and writing up my own account
of the coup.)
(AnonymousIn1 - interview)
OutsiderIn3, likewise, was excited to capture the photos and uploaded on Flickr.
I was hoping to see some activity at Rachdamnern Nok. When I arrived
there I witnessed tanks and soldiers blocking off the street and establishing
positions. There was a sense of tension in the air - the feeling that anything
might happen. I stayed there for a couple of hours. I was concerned only with
recording the situation with my camera and sharing what I saw with the world
(via Flickr).
(OutsiderIn3 - Interview)
It is noteworthy that photos and videos from these sites were linked and reproduced
among online content providers and online media.
And then I stumbled across the Flickr coverage, linked from the Flickr Blog.
They assembled photos from various Flickr users located in Bangkok, added
audio from an interview with one of the photographers, and the result is a
very powerful photographic slideshow.
(AbsoluteOutsider10 - Blog)
It is interesting to note that there were two types of photos posted online: original
photos (taken by posters) and photos taken from other sources (mostly news agencies).
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AbsoluteOutsider10 published his article in The Age, an Australian newspaper, com-
menting about the roles of media-hosting websites during that time.
Image-sharing website [Flickr] is host to more photographs of the coup while
blogger Jonah in BKK also offered his own images of the day after the night
before.
Video-sharing website YouTube has been slower off the mark, with a small
collection of videos relating to the coup - although they are mostly recordings
of the coup announcement.
(AbsoluteOutsider11 - Blog)
Another way of utilizing new media during the early stage of the coup was in the form
of Wikipedia and Wikinews. A number of people suggested the Wikipedia entries about
the coup on their blog posts. For a non-Thai blogger, AbsoluteOutsider10, Wikinews
was a better source than traditional media as he mentioned on his blog.
Thailand coup, as told by Flickr users
My brother has a house in Phuket, Thailand, so I’ve been trying to follow
news on this week’s coup to see what’s going on. I had no idea there was
an ongoing corruption scandal of that magnitude. It seems unclear whether
this coup was a good or bad thing. Some people say it’s bad because it’s
“against democracy” - others say it’s good because it gives a chance to reboot
a democracy after cleaning out the garbage first.
I’d been following the story via Wikinews, which has been more useful than lo-
cal/national newscasts. And then I stumbled across the Flickr coverage, linked
from the Flickr Blog. They assembled photos from various Flickr users located
in Bangkok, added audio from an interview with one of the photographers, and
the result is a very powerful photographic slideshow.
(AbsoluteOutsider10 - Blog)
It is interesting to note that the development of an English Wikipedia entry of the
coup during the early stage was in a narrative form from the beginning. However,
the pattern was quite different for a Thai entry. As the situation of the coup was still
developing on the first night, the editors during that time posted only the announcements
of the coup with links to additional resources. Later on, the development of the entry
was leaning toward the chronology of the situation in a form of event log. Then the
143
entry was expanded more toward important reactions toward the coup from inside and
outside the country (for example, from financial markets, from international leaders, the
protests).
However, from editors’ perspectives, it was apparent that they perceived themselves
as providers rather than receivers of the information. For example, AbsoluteInsider7, a
Thai Wikipedia editor, mentioned:
I have been a contributor for wikipedia for many years, started by my senior
colleague’s recommendation. I have never used wikipedia as a sources, I’m a
contributor not a user. But only as an editor.
(AbsoluteInsider7 - Interview)
Also when asked how her experience with Wikipedia during the coup differed from
her other participations, she said:
“I found no difference to my other contributions to wikipedia.”
Another platform of participation can be tracked from a web forum. As mentioned,
the web forum was one of the most popular online community platforms during that
time. People reported that they visited web forums that they belonged to, whether or
not they were related to Thai politics. The conversations in the web forums can be
solely about the situation as it developed or how the coup was related to their topics
of interests as AbsoluteOutsider11 pointed out what he observed in some of the web
forums for foreigners who are interested in Thailand.
Travel-related discussion boards such as Lonely Planet’s ThornTree, 2bangkok.com
and Thai Visa are abuzz with the coup, with many posters worried if the events
of the past 24 hours will affect their holiday plans.
(AbsoluteOutsider11 - Blog)
During that time, people used web forums as a place to exchange information as
OutsiderIn2 pointed out: “For me the forum was just an aggregator of additional infor-
mation and links on the situation...”
As we can see, the way in which people sought and shared information during the
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early stage of the coup may be partially explained through the discussion of the utility of
information sources and channels. It is believed that the selection and use of information
sources and channels are informed by the characteristics of users. In addition, in terms
of the social aspect, the community of users of each particular source and channel has
developed cultures and environments based on structure and roles. Therefore, the next
chapter discuss extensively individual and social constructs that were noticeable during
the early stage of the 2006 coup in Thailand.
145
Chapter 5
Constructs Related to Information
Behaviors during the Coup
This chapter highlights some related constructs from individual, collective, and con-
textual perspectives that played substantial roles in influencing how people sought and
shared information during the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand.
5.1 Individual Characteristics
The first group of related constructs to be discussed are socio-psychological, consisting
of cognitive, affective, and physical characteristics, and pertain to an individual. In
addition, the role of external factors such as resources is also examined.
5.1.1 Cognitive and Affective Constructs
It is apparent that emotions as well as memory of past experiences played important
roles in terms of information behavior during the early stage of the coup. While people
reacted to the situation differently, it was apparent that the sense of frustration that
emerged from the uncertainty of the situation and the excitement of a major political
event led people to pursue the information behaviors that they did during that time.
Mix of Feelings
During the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand, people expressed their
feelings and emotions in various ways. It is interesting to note that these affective
elements evidently were related to how people sought and shared information.
There are three plausible contextual stimuli that led to various expressions of emo-
tions during the coup: the political situation, the restricted information from mainstream
media, and the amount of information received.
The term coup d’e´tat typically carries a variety of negative feelings (e.g., fear, sadness,
and disappointment) to anyone who hears it. However, as thousands of photos and
videos depicted a welcoming and festive atmosphere during the 2006 Thai coup, there
is an indication of a sense of optimism among people who were there, either absolute
insiders or outsiders-in. People who did not favor Thaksin expressed their sense of joy
and happiness when they heard about the coup. Another group of people who had
positive feelings were those who were tired of ongoing political tensions. The military
coup was like a break event, bringing a sense of relief and calm. People who went outside
not only took photos and videos, but also showed their support to the military (e.g., by
giving flowers and food).
I think I also assumed at the time what many did as well: That this coup
reset the political clock and that Thaksin would play fair in the traditional
Thai way–he would lay low for a couple of years and then return to be a big
man again–albeit not in a political role–resuming his position on the boards
of major companies. ... I think most coups would make people feel anxious
and uneasy, but in the specialized context of the 2006, I think it resulted in
relief that a political stalemate had been broken.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
However, not all people were glad that there was a coup. There was also definitely
a sense of disappointment, shame, and sadness toward the situation. The negative
feelings were caused by the perception that the development of democracy in Thailand
was interrupted.
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As an absolute outsider who studied about Thailand for many years, AbsoluteOut-
sider4’s expression is a representative of those who disagreed with the coup.
Dread. I have read enough Thai history to appreciate that anti-democratic
interventions rarely end well. Thailand’s history since the coup bears out this
initial, pessimistic assessment: the country has hardly taken a forwards step
since the coup. This is a great shame, but a shame that the coup-makers,
alone, must bear. I probably also expected that there would have been a
more concerted counter-attack from Thaksin’s allies. That may have been a
naive expectation but having seen Thaksin in person merely one month before,
surrounded by all of the trappings of his high office, I found it hard to believe
that he would surrender quickly. As it turns out, he has decided on a prolonged
battle – and one where his foot soldiers bear the brunt of the hardships.
(AbsoluteOutsider4 - Interview)
It is also important to note that, since both positive and negative feelings came from
different causes - opinions toward Thaksin Shinawatra and the political system as a
whole (i.e., democracy) – the situation brought two opposite feelings at the same time.
เป็นความรู้สึกผสมปนเปอยู่พอสมควร เชื่อครึ่งไม่เชื่อครึ่ง ไม่คิดว่าประเทศที่ไม่มีการรัฐประหาร
มาสิบกว่าปีแล้วจะมีเหตุการณ์แบบน้ีได้ แต่อีกใจนึงก็รู้สึกดีที่นักการเมืองที่ตัวเองไม่ชอบหน้า
ถูกจัดการ
[It was quite a mix of feelings, half believable and half unbelievable. I never
thought that Thailand, which had not had a coup d’e´tat for ten years, would
have a situation like this. But on the other side, I felt good that the politician
that I don’t like was evicted.]
(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
I stayed there until about 1.30 am. It was raining when I left the studio.
I had to stand with three soldiers, no more than 25 years old, each holding
rifles. I was filled with different emotions - sadness that we had to have a
coup to solve our problems, relief that the stress and bad feelings we’ve had in
Thailand might be coming to a close, and excitement that I was in the middle
of something very historic.
(OutsiderIn1 - Blog)
AnonymousIn3’s blog is mainly a collection of personal records of exercise and health-
related activities. However, on the day after the coup night, instead of writing a reflective
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statement about the exercise as usual, AnonymousIn3 had to write about the coup
experience instead.
Week 22 Tuesday - Sep 19 Coup!
Activities/Actions:
Coup took over Thailand
Stat:
Course condition:
How I felt:
(the 5-point scale)
Physically 5
Mentally 3
About my nutrition 4
About my sleep 3
Having an anxious feeling from the first heard about the situation, I am con-
fused whether which side (([former] Thai Prime Minister or Thai army) is
taking control. No news on Thai TV stations.... my brother and sister were
very neverous, especially the Sis! She leaves some 50 kilometers from civiliza-
tion. Since all national TV stations are broadcasting the king and royal family
clips, I talked to both of them about what media here have covered. BBC,
besides CNN, uses very strong words against the coup which sucessfully takes
over the power of the former PM. I feel that they do not understand what
Thai people want. Even though this PM came from “people votes,” he is evil.
I use “votes” in a loss sense. They declare that they will bring justice to the
PM regime on corruption and such.
I feel a relief but just sad... Relief for Thaksin was ousted!!! Sad for a chapter
of Thai Demoracy with coup. Well, at least these coup leaders appear to be
nice and seem clean of what they want to do for Thailand.
(AnonymousIn3 - Blog)
At the end of this post, s/he posted a news item about a coup from mainstream
media and attached a photo of the coup announcement on TV.
Another example is the conversation happening on AbsoluteInsider19’s blog post.
Note that this blog post is not about the coup as it was posted hours before the coup
took place. It actually is the translation of a newspaper article on comparative economy.
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Nonetheless, it was one of her regular blog readers who started a comment about the
coup on this blog post. Her response is similar to what many other absolute insiders
and insiders-out mentioned elsewhere.
Comment1 (September 20th, 2006 at 1:31 am): Well?. What could we say
now? at the moment (as of now, 1:21am Bkk Time) Council of Political
Reform (military reform council) already overthrown PM?
Comment2 (September 20th, 2006 at 6:17 am): Can’t read the entry here,
but I’d just like to congratulate you and all of Thailand for taking control of
your own country at the hands of corrupt imperialism. (clich? rhetoric for the
win?) Long live revolutionary democracy and long live Rama IX.
AbsoluteInsider19 (September 20th, 2006 at 7:43 am):
[Comment1]: I think Thailand’s Bobby is probably Pridi Panomyongse
[Comment2]: Hey, thanks I am actually sad that it has to end in this “undemo-
cratic” way, but my happiness that the corrupt tyrant is gone far outweighs it.
In many ways, Thaksin’s own stubbornness and refusal to bend slowly reduced
alternatives until we have so few choices left. I’ll write something in English
about this in a few days. I’m sure this incident will be slammed as “a huge
step backward for Thai democracy” blah blah blah in all the foreign press for
many months to come. Let’s hope political reforms are real this time so we
can have a ’clean’ election in a year or so.
(AbsoluteInsider19 - Blog comment)
Additionally, when mainstream media could not provide information that people
needed during that time, it also led to the state of uncertainty and a feeling of lack of
control of the situation. The situation deviated from what people experience and expect
in an everyday life context. People expressed the feeling of frustration, which intensified
the need to seek and share information.
I will have to admit I was a little concerned at first. Information was hard
to get but I was able to find out TV stations had been seized and put off the
air. Nobody really knew what was going on or by who. Tanks and troops
had moved in the capital and surrounded several government buildings, while
others set up at key intersections.
(OutsiderIn13 - Blog)
Another example of the sense of frustration can be seen from AbsoluteInsider6’s
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response to one of the comments on a live blogging post during the first night of the
coup. Below is the conversation between AbsoluteInsider6 and her readers.
Comment1 (September 20, 2006 1:40:00 AM):
From what I heard on BBC.... Thaksin’s still going to be giving an address to
the UN General Council at 7pm EST!!! I’m going to be setting my alarm to
wake up in time to watch that...
Not knowing what’s really going on is.... FRUSTRATING!
I heard the internet’s also going to be cut too... (HOPE that’s just a rumor)
on the brighter side..... :) :) :) nice to see you updating your blog
again though....
Comment2 (September 20, 2006 2:32:00 AM):
Sorry to hear all that’s happening down there [AbsoluteInsider6]... Lots of
luck and Good Vibes!
[Comment2’s name]
Comment2 (September 20, 2006 2:49:00 AM):
Do you still have access to the BBC, etc on the net, or not even that?
AbsoluteInsider6 (September 20, 2006 2:53:00 AM):
Hey [Comment1]! Yeah, it IS frustrating not knowing what the hell is really
going on. This is seriously crazy. I have an exam on Friday and finals are
starting in a week. I’m in no mood to study with all this hoopla going on in
the city. I hope you’re well na ja!
Thanks for the vibes,[Comment2]. :) As of now, I still have access to the BBC
and CNN through the net. I don’t know how long that will last, though. So
far, blogs are still accessable, which is a good sign, I think. I don’t know about
tomorrow morning, though.
(AbsoluteInsider6 - Blog comments)
It is also interesting to note that when people had difficulty with telecommunication
networks in addition to mainstream media, it was a matter of degree of emotion (e.g., a
stronger sense of frustration) rather than a different type of feeling. As people speculated
about the termination of telecommunication networks, for example, when OutsiderIn7
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had difficulty accessing the Internet, she expressed her high level of frustration on one
of her blog posts:
You won’t believe me but I had been cut off from the Internet for a whole day.
I just manage to log in. My frustration grew by the minutes. As a blogger, I
feel pressured to update this blog, but everything was against me? sigh.
(OutsiderIn7 - Blog)
On the other side, since there was a lot of unverified information disseminated during
that period, a number of people said that they were overwhelmed and frustrated by
information overload, as the title of a blog post written by AbsoluteInsider21.
Information Overload
เหน่ือย...เหน่ือยที่สุด
เหน่ือยกับการรับข้อมูลข่าวสาร
รู้สึกว่า มันจะล้นทะลักมากเกินไปแล้ว
เพียงแค่น่ังอยู่ท่ามกลางโครงข่ายใยแมงมุม
ข่าวสารที่พรั่งพรูมาจากทุกสารทิศ
ไม่รู้อันไหน ‘‘แท้’’ อันไหน ‘‘เทียม’’ ??
มันก็ยากพอๆ กับการดูว่า คนไหน ‘‘แมน’’ คนไหน ‘‘เกย์’’ ?!?!
แต่ที่รู้แน่ๆ อย่างหน่ึง คือว่า ‘‘คณะปฏิรูป’’ ไม่เหมือน ‘‘คณะปฏิวัติ’’
อ้างอิงจากพจนานุกรม ฉบับราชบัณฑิตยสถาน
‘‘ปฏิวัติ’’ หมายถึง การเปลี่ยนแปลงระบบ เช่น ปฏิวัติอุตสาหกรรม, การเปลี่ยนแปลงระบอบ
การบริหารบ้านเมือง เช่น ปฏิวัติการปกครอง
ส่วน ‘‘ปฏิรูป’’ หมายถึง ปรับปรุงให้สมควร เช่น ปฏิรูปบ้านเมือง ในภาวะปัจจุบันน้ี
ต้องใช้คาว่า ‘‘ปฏิรูป’’ น่ะ ...ถูกแล้ว!!!
[Information Overload
Tired... most tired
Tired of receiving information I feel like there is too much overflow By just
sitting in the midst of spider web, news surge from everywhere I don’t know
which is ’real’, which is ’fake’?? It’s as hard as identifying who is ’straight’,
who is ’gay’?!?!
But I know one thing for sure which is “reform group” is different from “rev-
olution group”.
Citing from a dictionary, the Royal Institute edition:
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Revolution means the change of system such as the industrial revolution, the
administrative revolution (e.g., governmental revolution) Reform means ap-
propriately adjustment such as reform the country
In this situation, “reform” is correct.]
(AbsoluteInsider21 - Blog)
Sense of Excitement
Another state of emotion that seems to determine the way people sought and shared
information during that time was a sense of excitement and surprise.
Evidently, rumors about the coup were all over the country and disseminated
through, not only word of mouth, but by traditional and new media, even before the
coup night.
Coup rumours were circulating for hours before anything was confirmed, but
with international news channels off the air and Thai stations playing nothing
but images of the royal family, few people knew for sure what was going on.
(OutsiderIn5 - Blog)
A number of people explicitly projected that there might be a chance of a coup or
“something” happening. On the basis of what he heard through the mainstream media,
OutsiderIn14 was among those who suspected that the coup might happen. He wrote
on his blog.
As God as my witness, I have been meaning to write a blog post for the last
two weeks on how I thought there was a 1 in 5 chance of a military coup.
Everyone is relieved of believing me.
(OutsiderIn14 - Blog)
When I asked him about that his experience, he elaborated his feeling as follows:
I was taking a year off. I used to go to Journalism school. So I was thinking
about being a foreign correspondence. So while I was in Thailand, I read
the two English language newspapers, Bangkok Post and the Nation. And
actually for about two weeks before the coup, just kept reading the paper, it
was very obvious that something was going to happen. And you know, I did
not know much about Thai politics. But it was clear to me from what I was
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reading that a lot of people in Bangkok, especially more sort of established
people or wealthy people or government people did not like Shinawatra and
Did not want him there. But he kept winning election. And then there was
some sort of a rule of thumb that it said anytime of the year that the coup is
going to happen, it’s gonna happen when the leader in New York during the
meeting of United Nation General Assembly.
(OutsiderIn14 - Interview)
Nevertheless, the coup was still quite an unexpected situation to many people. It
brought a sense of excitement for people as they perceived that they were the witnesses
or even a part of a historic event (as discussed in the previous chapter). In addition,
for serious bloggers (i.e., so-called grassroots journalists), they were excited about the
opportunity to play a leading role in providing information to the public while the
mainstream media was limited.
Interviewer: What was your first response and feeling after hearing about the
coup?
OutsiderIn3: My first response was a sense of excitement that I was in the
midst of an exciting situation. I responded by rushing outside with my camera
and hailing a motorcycle taxi to take me to Rachdamnern Nok Avenue (approx
20 minutes from my home by bike).
Interviewer: Did you have any questions at the time related to the coup? If
so, what was the biggest question/issue?
OutsiderIn3: Although I was concerned for my well-being in a potentially
dangerous situation, my sense of excitement was far more powerful. I realized
that the media was unlikely to provide objective coverage of the situation
(being de facto state-controlled) and so decided to see things for myself.
(OutsiderIn3 - Interview)
At first, when I heard of the coup, it was uncertain there was actually a coup.
I was lucky to have a fast internet connection and was able to watch Nation
Channel, a then popular news channel, to see what was happening. You saw
music with pictures of the royal family which was the sign of a coup. However,
just 20 minutes later, programming appeared to resume to normal. Then
Chulalongkorn professor Dr. Panitan, and now Govt. spokesman, appeared
on TV stating that it appeared the coup was unsuccessful. He was cut off
mid-sentence and then we had coup announcements. It was clear then there
had been a coup. There was a sense of shock. There has been rumours of a
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coup for a while, but they had come and gone. In hindsight, it was naive to
think there would not be a coup, but at the time, it was a sense of surprise.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
My initial feeling was one of excitement - there was a rush of adrenaline as I
could scarcely believe that I was living through an event that I had previously
only read about in newspapers. Immediately after, I felt a sense of disappoint-
ment for the Thais as, given the number of coups that have happened since the
country ostensibly became a democratic monarchy, the Thai people deserve
better than this continual interference by the military in their lives.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
ไม่ได้ประหลาดใจเท่าไหร่นัก
แต่ต่ืนเต้น และลุ้นว่าจะเกิดอะไรต่อไป
ถ้าให้เปรียบเทียบ วันน้ันไม่ได้เสียใจที่เกิดปฏิวัติเท่าวันน้ี
คำตอบน้ีจะชัดกว่าว่ารู้สึกอย่างไร
[I wasn’t that surprised,
but excited to see what was going to happen next.
To compare, I was not that sad about the coup as I am now.
This answer would give a clearer picture of how I feel.]
(AbsoluteInsider5 - Interview)
The examples above indicate that a number of people perceived the coup in various
ways, for example, as critical, confusing, uncertain, exciting, or as an historic event.
These perceptions led to various actions to serve their needs to obtain and disseminate
information.
Nevertheless, when there was no strong sense of excitement (e.g., no sense of attach-
ment to self or society or risks), information behaviors during that period remained in
a passive mode.
When asked what her major question was during the early stage of the coup, Ab-
soluteInsider16, recruited through the snowball sampling technique, did not see any
substantial change around herself.
อยากรู้ว่าทหารมันปฏิวัติทำไม มีเรื่องอะไร
แต่ก็มารู้ทีหลังว่าปฏิวัติเรื่องทักษิณ
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ช่วงน้ันก็แค่อยากรู้ว่าจะปฏิวัติไปอีกนานแค่ไหน จะมีอะไรรุนแรงหรือเปล่า
แต่โดยภาพรวมก็ไม่ได้รู้สึกว่ามีอะไรแปลกประหลาด
หรือรุนแรงนะ ก็รู้สึกธรรมดาๆเหมือนทุกวัน
[I wanted to know why the military staged the coup. What was the story? I
knew after that it was because of Thaksin. During that time, I just wanted
to know how long the coup was going to be. Would there be any violence?
However, in overall picture, I didn’t feel any difference or violence. I felt
normal like any other day.]
(AbsoluteInsider16 - Interview)
She reported that she turned on a TV set and found nothing interesting.
ไม่นานอ่ะ เพราะทุกช่องเหมือนกันหมด ไม่มีข้อมูลอะไร นอกจากบอกว่าตอนน้ีทหารยึดช่อง
5 เพื่อความสงบเรียบร้อยให้อยู่กับบ้านไรประมาณน้ีแหล่ะ
[[I kept watching TV] not that long because every channel showed the same
thing. There was no information, except now the military seize Channel 5.
For peace, stay at home or something like that.]
(AbsoluteInsider16 - Interview)
When I asked what she did afterward, she responded:
คงดูซีรีย์เกาหลีต่อมั้ง อิอิ
[I might have gone back and continued watching a Korean series. He He]
(AbsoluteInsider16 - Interview)
Note that it was the Korean series that she paused after she was informed about the
coup from her sister who lived outside Bangkok. In addition, when asked how the coup
has had an effect on her, she also answered that:
ไม่นะ ก็ไม่ได้มีผลอะไร ปกติอ่ะ
แค่จะต่ืนเต้นนิดหน่ึงเวลามองไปแล้วเห็นรถถังออกจากททบ.5 เป็นขบวน
แล้วก็จะกลับบ้านเร็วข้ึนหน่อยไม่กลับดึก
แล้วสถาบันก็จะคอยติดตามสถานการณ์ตลอดว่าจะมีอะไรรุนแรงหรือเปล่า
[Not really. There was no effect. It was normal. I was probably excited when
I looked and saw a parade of tanks leaving Channel 5. And I went back home
a bit early, not too late. And my office would monitor the situation whether
or not there would be any violence.]
(AbsoluteInsider16 - Interview)
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AbsoluteInsider16’s expression was similar to OutsiderIn15, a foreign businessman
who was interviewed by a foreign media correspondent on the coup night. His live-
broadcasted phone interview was recorded and uploaded onto YouTube. As he perceived
the situation as being normal, he waited for information to get to him from his Thai
friends.
News anchor: I understand that you are stuck at home. What is it like for
you now?
AbsoluteInsider16: It’s just pretty normal. We are just at home, waiting the
news to get to us and we got [DVDs] to few of us. We are just waiting to see
things to blow over and get the green light to go to work.
(OusiderIn15 - Video transcript)
In addition, the role of the sense of excitement during the early stage of the coup
can be examined by looking at stopping behavior (i.e., how people stop actively seeking
and sharing information). Apparently, the sense of excitement was one of the major
indicators of whether to continue seeking and sharing or not.
Announcement: The Excitement is Over
Please be advised that the excitement related to our recent coup d’e´tat is
officially over. Unless you are a junkie for Thai political news, there really
isn’t much more to see or talk about. So unless we have any developments, I
think I’ll just move on to other stories.
(OutsiderIn4 - Blog)
When I asked OutsiderIn4 during the interview about the decision to stop writ-
ing about the coup on his blog, he mentioned that the sense of excitement was from
mainstream media and the people around him.
Regular TV programming, general discussion of people around us had moved
on to other topics, malls reopening, etc. Life was continuing as normal.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
When the situation turned back to normal as in everyday life, AbsoluteInsider20 also
decided to stop live blogging about the coup.
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REST
OK I’m giving it a rest. I live blogged because all the news channels were cut
off and all the websites were blocked. Now all major newssites and channels
are up and running, my job is done. Besides, school back to normal tomorrow
so I need to get back to my work.
It was quite a fun experience! Again big thanks to everyone for sticking by
and for linking back.
For intensive updates, again I’m handing the torch to[a fellow blogger]. For
major updates that all must now, I’ll post here.
Sigh there better be a backup seminar class after all this. It’s not our fault
it’s the government’s. If I’m not graduating because of this, there’ll definitely
be a coup from me.
(AbsoluteInsider20 - Blog)
Similar to AbsoluteInsider20, AbsoluteInsider6 decided to go to bed after many hours
of live blogging on the first night of the coup.
@ 4:48 AM: My phone has finally stopped ringing, so I’m off to get some shut-
eye now. Things seem to have calmed down around the city; hopefully it stays
that way when dawn breaks in a few hours...
(AbsoluteInsider6 - Blog)
AbsoluteInsider6 still updated the situation for the next couple of days. Then, on
the last post of live blogging, she said at the beginning of the post:
I’m off to bed now, folks. Now that the major media networks are up and
running again (with their lovely celebrity montages, but back nonetheless),
there’s little point in me carrying on with the live blogging.
(AbsoluteInsider6 - Blog)
Past Experience
Another aspect of the cognitive construct that seems to be associated with behavior
during the coup was memory. People sometimes related the situation to their past
experience. For example, many people who are familiar with Thai political history were
reminded of the 1991 coup, the one prior to the 2006 coup.
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The 1991 coup was a more traditional coup–military guys wanting to grab a
piece of the spoils of governing, but not wanting to go though the hassle of
elections. This was clear in the aftermath as they tried to set up military-
dominated parties and push unelected generals to lead coalition governments.
My feelings in 1991: I was quite shocked and surprised as well as a little scared.
The coup happened quite unexpectedly under the cover of eve of the first gulf
war and kind of got lost in the international media. The military was on TV
hour after hour explaining they were taking over to defend the monarchy and
broadcast “confessions” by people claiming they were involved in assassination
attempts and that the government was not preventing it, etc. It was clumsy
and unconvincing and seems like a ham-fisted grab for power.
The day after the coup I went to Siam Square with my girlfriend and was
surprised all life was proceeding as normal. I asked her what she thought
of the coup and she offhandedly said “Oh, well. No more democracy” and
continued shopping.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
Apparently, their experiences in the past influenced the way people sought and shared
information during the coup. After hearing about the coup, OutsiderIn1 went to an ATM
machine and withdrew some money as the situation reminded him of the financial crisis
in 1997.
I quickly went downstairs and took out some money from the ATM. Why? I
don’t know. Just to be safe. Who knew what was going to happen. It reminded
me of when, in 1997, the Baht devalued, and it tumbled and tumbled against
the American dollar. In the end I withdrew Baht and hid it under my bed,
for fear I would have to flee the country! That was nearly ten years ago, and
here I was doing it again.
(OutsiderIn1 - Blog)
For OutsiderIn4’s partner, the 2006 coup reminded him of the coup d’e´tat in 1991.
As such, they decided to shoot a video of the coup announcement on the TV screen and
upload it onto YouTube.
Watching the video, [my partner] translated what was being said. He explained
that everything was very similar to what he remembered from a coup that
happened in his childhood - probably in 1992?2 I shot the video of the
2In 1991, the military led by Army Commander Suchinda Kraprayoon staged a coup overthrowing
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footage using the video function of my camera and uploaded it to YouTube
shortly thereafter.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
Perceived Roles toward Themselves
As mentioned earlier, there was a group of people who perceived themselves as having
a role and responsibility to report the situation to their contacts and/or the public.
Professional journalists, for example, felt that it was their duty and main responsibility
to report the situation to the public, especially to those who were outside Bangkok and
Thailand. Similarly, those bloggers who perceived themselves as alternative/grassroots
journalists also shared the same feeling. Therefore, when I asked those bloggers whom I
interviewed, a number of them said that they started blogging right after hearing about
the coup as a deed to help others.
For personal reasons, foreigners who were in Thailand during that time felt obliged
to report their well being to their families and friends back home. Thai people outside
of Thailand, on the other hand, felt that they needed to check on the safety of their
families and friends. The details of the interactions among Thais and foreigners who
live in Thailand and abroad are discussed in the next chapter.
5.1.2 Physical Capacity and Resources
In addition to mental constructs, the way in which people sought and shared information
during the early stage of the coup was also determined by their physical capacity and
technical resources. Particularly for people who heard about the coup on the first night,
many reported that they stayed up all night. However, at the end, they decided to stop
as they ran out of energy.
Chatichai Choonhavan’s government. However, the major subsequent event was the mass protest
opposing Suchinda’s government in May 1992. The protest led to the bloody military crackdown.
Thus, many people remember that the coup happened in 1992, instead of 1991.
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Was simply tired. ... Simply that the coup had been successful. Was too busy
trying to catch up on news and hadn’t started to think about longer term
consequences.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
OutsiderIn4 also decided to go to bed on the first night of the coup because of limited
physical stamina.
I realized there wasn’t any more news, just rehashing of previously-reported
information. As I’m not much of a night owl I decided it was time for bed.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
In addition to physical capacity, sustaining involvement also depended on the tech-
nical resources that people had during that period. Technical resources in this case refer
to tools, devices, or services that allow people to access information. During the early
stage of the coup people tried to utilize all the resources that they had available to them
to access as much information as possible. When asked how he took photos of the TV
screen, OutsiderIn2 pointed out that:
I did have a screen capture hardware device that plugged into the TV and
computer, but I can’t recall if I used that at the time. At some point around
that time I just started taking photos of the screen with a digital camera.
That is probably how I got those shots.
(OutsiderIn2 - Blog)
In addition, some people realized that their access to information was limited due to
lack of resources.
พยายามตรวจสอบข่าวจากหลายๆ แหล่ง เท่าที่ยังไม่โดนบล็อก (ผมมีแค่ทีวีธรรมดา ไม่มี
เคเบิล แล้วก็อินเทอร์เน็ต แค่น้ัน)
[I tried to check news from different sources that have not been blocked. (I
had only normal TV, no cable, and the Internet. That’s it.]
(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
Personal memory, emotion, perception toward themselves, and physical capacities
are the essential characteristics that seem to be highly noticeable during that time.
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These personal traits also seem to explain the reaction to the information as well the
stopping behavior. However, the analysis of an individual trait would be less pertinent
without the investigation of social interaction. Therefore, the influence of group (i.e.,
collectivity) is examined in the next section.
5.2 Collective Information Behavior during the Coup
According to the official announcement, “political gatherings of more than five people
have already been banned, but political activities can resume when normalcy is restored.”
Obviously the coup leaders tried to control people to form a group for political reasons.
However, it is hard to imagine how such a rule can really be sustained in an online/virtual
environment.
Concerning how people sought and shared information during the disruptive mo-
ments of the coup, there are some collective elements that can be observed from data
collected in this study. The roles that collective elements played during that period can
be observed through the discourses among different groups of people during the early
stage of the coup. Apparently people utilized groups and collectivities for different pur-
poses including 1) to effectively know about the current status of the coup, 2) to achieve
particular goals/tasks, 3) to feel secure, and 4) to feel encouraged.
5.2.1 To Know Better and Faster
It is undeniable that rumors and word of mouth played a substantial role in disseminating
information during the early stage of the coup as discussed in Chapter 4. Apparently,
people were expecting to learn more about the situation and help each other verify
information during this stage of urgency.
The following is an example of the way in which people help each other verify infor-
mation on Wikipedia. This is one of the early threads on the discussion page of a Thai
Wikipedia entry on the coup.
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AbsoluteInsider21:
ตรวจสอบ
เวลา 22.25 น. สถานีโทรทัศน์เกือบทุกช่องตัดเข้ารายการเพลง เปิดเพลงที่มีเน้ือหาสรรเสริญ
พระบารมี ยกเว้นช่อง 9 และช่อง 3 ที่นาเสนอรายการปกติไม่ใช่ ช่อง 7 และ ช่อง 3 หรือ
ครับ? ผมว่าผมไม่ได้ดู คนค้นฅน อยู่นะ
AbsoluteInsider22:
ตอนน้ันกำลังมีคนค้นฅน พอประมาณ 4 ทุ่มครึ่งได้มีข่าวด่วนแทรกเข้ามาครับ พร้อมกับข้ึน
หน้าคุณทักษิณ ที่เขียนว่าสถานการณ์ฉุกเฉิน เปิดไปได้ชั่วหน่ึง ทีวีช่อง 9 ก็ดับ แล้วจึงเปลี่ยน
ไปเหมือนกับช่องอื่นครับ อันน้ีผมน่ังดูอยู่ มั่นใจ 100%
[AbsoluteInsider21:
To check
10:25 PM Nearly every TV station stopped its program and turn to music pro-
gram. They turned on songs that praise the charismatic of his majesty. Only
Channel 9 and 3 remained their normal programs. Weren’t they Channel 7 and
Channel 3? I thought I did not watch Khon Kon Khon [a TV documentary
program.]
AbsoluteInsider22:
At that time, Khon Kon Khon was still playing. Around 10:30PM, there
was an inserted news with the face of Thaksin with a text reads emergency
situation. It was on for a bit. Channel 9 was interrupted and then changed
like other channels. I was watching it. I’m 100% sure.]
(Wikipedia discussion)
The way in which people utilized rumor and word of mouth as a means to gain and
share information during the early stage of the coup was through various sources and
channels. However, people in a group communication during that time did not neces-
sarily know each other. Therefore, the source of information in a collective environment
during the coup was a mix of known and unknown people. AbsoluteInsider3 is one ex-
ample of someone who participated in collective information seeking and sharing. After
hearing about the coup, he reported that there were about 50-70 people who were mon-
itoring the situation together in a web forum where he was a member. When asked who
those people were, he replied:
บางคนก็รู้จักเป็นส่วนตัว บางคนเคยเจอตอน meeting แต่ส่วนใหญ่ไม่เคยเจอหน้าครับ
[I know some of them [in this community] personally. I met some of them
when we had a meeting. However, I have not met most of them.]
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(AbsoluteInsider3 - Interview)
At the same time, as mentioned earlier, he was also involved in a group chat room via
Window Live Messenger (MSN) with colleagues from work. Seemingly these collective
environments created a space for people to exchange and make sense of information and
news together.
For OutsiderIn2, who wrote a live blog, during the situation, reported in the interview
that during the early stage of the coup he and his virtual team helped each other with
seeking and verifying information. They used email to communicate.
The blogosphere is another interesting venue that indicated the existence of a collec-
tivity that helped its participants to learn about the situation. It is interesting to note
that a number of bloggers whom I interviewed reported that they heard about the coup
from their fellow bloggers via email.
The collectivity on the blogosphere has a characteristic that makes it different than
other types of collective activities, as the interactions among members can be observed
through comments on one’s space or conversations over two or more blogs. In more
basic forms of online participation (e.g., media sharing websites such as Flickr and
YouTube), people commented on particular content directly. However, bloggers could
create conversations by writing on their own spaces and interacting with each other via
links (e.g., pingback).
Another way that a blog facilitated the interactions among a number of people was
through group blogging where a group shared the same space and helped each other
by updating the situation. The example case in this matter is blog 19sep.blogspot.com
where a number of absolute insiders shared and translated information on a blog that
was created particularly for the coup.
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5.2.2 To Achieve Particular Goals/Tasks
During the early stage of the coup, a number of online groups of local people, whether
new or already existing, seemed to be challenged by the large amount of information
related to the rules posted by the coup leaders. Therefore, these groups had to com-
municate to adjust the norms of the group in order to achieve particular objectives.
Apparently, people who sought and shared information in a collective manner discussed,
created, and adjusted group norms in response to the coup situation. The discussion
(in the Talk page) on a Thai Wikipedia entry about the coup, 2006 Thai coup d’e´tat
[รัฐประหารในประเทศไทย พ.ศ. 2549], was an example of how members in an online group
set particular rules in terms of editing the entry.
It is apparent that one of the Thai Wikipedia members started the entry three min-
utes before midnight of September 19, 2006 with a brief summary of the coup. Minutes
later other users began to edit the entry as the story developed. It is interesting to note
that the early version of the entry included the coup announcements and a few online
resources (the first two were news video on the CNN website and the Flickr search result
page). One of the editors suggested that the transcripts of the announcements should
be moved to Wikisource since it was perceived that Wikipedia was not appropriate for
original documents.
Another important development of the entry is that later on people used a time log
to describe the sequences of the situation. Below is the example of the entry excerpted
from the entry edited on September 20, 2006 at 9:59AM.
ลำดับเหตุการณ์วันที่ 19 กันยายน 2549
- เวลาประมาณ 08.00 น. วันที่ 19 กันยายน มีคาสั่งจาก พ.ต.ท.ทักษิณ ชินวัตร รักษา
การนายกรัฐมนตรี เรียกผู้นาทุกเหล่าทัพเข้าประชุมร่วมกับคณะรัฐมนตรี (ครม.) ที่ทำเนียบ
รัฐบาล แต่ไม่มีผู้นำเหล่าทัพคนใดเข้าร่วม พล.อ.สนธิ บุญยรัตกลิน ผบ.ทบ. อ้างว่ากระชั้นชิด
เกินไป ทาให้ต่อมามีกระแสข่าวลือการปฏิวัติรัฐประหาร แพร่สะพัดไปทั่วทาเนียบรัฐบาล และ
เริ่มกระจายสู่ภายนอก โดยเฉพาะตลาดหลักทรัพย์
- เวลาประมาณ 12.00 น. หลังการประชุม ครม. โดยผ่านระบบเวบแคมเมอรา รัฐมนตรีหลาย
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รายได้สอบถามผู้สื่อข่าวถึงข้อเท็จจริงเรื่องน้ีอย่างต่ืนเต้น
- เวลา 18.30 น. มีข่าวกำลังทหารหน่วยรบพิเศษจาก จ.ลพบุรี เคลื่อนกำลังเข้ากรุงเทพฯ
มีข่าวว่า พล.อ.เปรม ติณสูลานนท์ ประธานองคมนตรีและรัฐบุรุษ เข้าเฝ้าฯ พระบาทสมเด็จ
พระเจ้าอยู่หัว แต่ข่าวระบุว่า เป็นเรื่องการทำบุญ หม่อมหลวงบัว
- เวลา 18.55 น. สำนักข่าวไทยรายงานว่า พ.ต.ท.ทักษิณ ชินวัตร รักษาการนายกรัฐมนตรี
ประกาศเลื่อนเดินทางกลับประเทศไทยเร็วข้ึนจากวันที่ 22 กันยายน เป็น 05.00 น. วันที่ 21
กันยายนแทน
- ...
[The sequences on September 19, 2006
- Around 8:00AM on September 19, there was an order from Thaksin Shinawa-
tra, caretaker Prime Minister, calling all military leaders to have a meeting
with the cabinet at the government house. However, none of the military lead-
ers showed up. General Sonthi Boonyaratglin said it was too close. Then the
rumors about the coup was disseminated throughout the government house
and then outside especially the stock market.
- Around noon, after the cabinet meeting via web camera system, a NUMBER
OF ministers excitedly asked journalists about the situation.
- Around 6:30PM there was a rumor that a special troop from Lopburi moved
to Bangkok. There was also a rumor that General Prem Tinasulanon, Head
of the Privy Council, had a meeting with the King. However, the rumor said
it was for making a merit for M.L.Bua [the Queen’s mother].
- Around 6:55PM, The Thai News Agency reported that Thaksin Shinawatra,
the caretaker, announced that he would come back earlier from September 22
to September 21 at 5:00AM.
- ...]
(Wikipedia entry)
Later on, an anonymous editor commented in the Take page of the entry after seeing
his edit was reverted:
วิกิพีเดียเป็น log repository เหรอ
ขออภัยที่พูดตรงๆบทความน้ีทุเรศที่สุดเท่าที่ผมเคยเห็นในวิกิพีเดียมาเลย คุณคิดว่า วิกิพีเดีย
เป็นlog repository รึอย่างไร? มีอะไรก็ append มีอะไรก็ append มันเป็นสารานุกรมนะ ใช้มัน
ให้เป็น Collaborative writing tool หน่อยซิ
[Is Wikipedia a log repository? Mind my frank speaking. This entry is the
worst entry I’ve ever seen in Wikipedia. Do you think Wikipedia is a log
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repository that you can append whatever? This is encyclopedia. Use it as
collaborative writing tool.]
(InsiderAnonymous1 - Wikipedia discussion)
Another instance concerns the pinned note about the enforcement of the coup’s law
on Wikipedia. One of the editors created a pinned note on this entry reminding people
to be careful when editing according to the fifth announcement of the coup regarding
the freedom of expression. A number of editors commented that they disagreed with the
message as Wikipedia is not under Thai law. They ended up conducting a poll to decide
whether or not to keep the pinned note. The majority of voters (8 out of 9) favored to
take down the note. Subsequently, the pinned note was eliminated.
5.2.3 To Feel Secure
People gathered as a group so they could feel they were not alone in a critical situation
like the early stage of the coup. In a situation in which searching and sharing information
could be monitored and was risky, like the 2006 coup, people collectively adjusted,
created, and maintained a set of rules to protect themselves as much as possible.
From my own observation during the early stage of the coup, I wrote on my blog:
I got an IM message from a friend telling me where the Rajchadumnern folks
would go for discussion, weekendcorner. However, I anticipated, because of
security and traffic issue, they moved the website from .com to .net and re-
stricted access. Only people who has registered before are allowed to get in.
For those who need to register, you have to ask any existing members to reg-
ister for you. That does mean you have to know some “insider” to be able to
participate. It is interesting to investigate that the community has to trans-
form into “close” model where only friends of a friend are welcome. I guess
there would be a bunch of people that could not get into this community. And
I am pretty sure that they are still a number of people finding the “locality”
of the community. It is interesting to see how the locality is moving from
one place to another place. And how they tried to protect themselves by set-
ting the rules and regulations. The ties are mainly from the power of instant
messenger.
This perspective also refers to a number of collective attempts to be anonymous.
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The 19Sept.blogspot.com blog is one example. When the founders set up a blog, one of
the rules was to use untraceable measures (e.g., fake email and identity) so they would
not be tracked. However, it was apparent that the blog was censored by the Ministry
of Information and Communication Technology the day after. It is interesting to note
some existing groups were not working, for instance, due to self censorship or congested
traffic. In those cases, people set up new spaces to facilitate the discussion of the same
groups of people. For example, when Rajdumnern Room of Pantip.com, one of the
biggest political web forums in Thailand, was closed temporarily, the users of this forum
set up new private forums and invited each other through word of mouth, keeping only
those whom they trusted in the group.
5.2.4 To Be Encouraged
Another role of collectivity during the coup can be seen through a support system. The
sharp increase of participation tended to encourage people to join with others in seeking
and sharing information. For instance, a number of bloggers and content creators during
the coup expressed their feeling of encouragement after realizing that their content was
viewed or used by many people. The fact that the viewership was increasing seemed to
be rewarding to many of them.
It was really fun to follow events as they happened–especially when I knew
people were checking back to my site constantly. That night I was expecting
the internet would be cut off (by the military) at some point so I wanted to
make sure I had as much posted to be useful as possible.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
Well, it was the first event, that I live-blogged and I got a lot of positive
feedback so continued this live-blogging for future events such as the TRT
dissolution, referendum results, and election.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
Thanks for stopping by, though – all 2,354 of you. I mean, really, that figure
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has left me reeling; that’s how many visitors I get in a month. Still, if there’s
one thing I’ve learned during the past 24 hours, it’s that blog networking and
the internet are seriously powerful tools. You may take away our TV, but you
sure has hell can’t shut us up!
...
In the meantime, if you’re craving for some fantastically thorough updates,
definitely stop by and visit blogger extraordinaire, Bangkok Pundit. The guy
is simply the best.
...
As for me, I’ll return to my usual brain fart-esque blogging soon. Or at least
once finals are over, I will.
(AbsoluteInsider6 - Blog)
During the early stage of the coup, it is apparent that people encourage each other
to seek and share information regardless of the existence of intentions. They seemed
to build a supportive and protective environment, although their relationships can be
considered as weak ties (e.g., blog readers, peer members in an online community, etc.).
In addition, it is also essential to note that groups emerged during that time were mostly
temporary. Some were adaptive from groups that existed prior to the coup.
5.3 Contextual Constructs: Time and Location
In addition to individual and collective factors, context is another construct essential to
the explanation of information behavior during the early stage of the coup. The impor-
tance of context in this situation can be addressed in terms of the temporal element.
It is interesting to note the effect of time with regard to how much information was
available during the coup night.
A blogger, AbsoluteOutsider12, commented about the perceived difficulty of getting
news, especially in relation to international investment, on the coup night.
What Investors Did on News of a Thai Coup
...
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It should be known that the Prime Minister of Thailand is currently in New
York at a Union Nations Assembly. After trying to access news sites within
Thailand they are not currently accessible. That may just be from a flood of
data traffic, and it may be from access being pulled. That just is not known.
Elections going against the pro-business factions of a country are rarely good
for stocks, and military coups are far worse. We do not even want to speculate
on the current situation because there just isn’t any good data. It is currently
11:47 PM EST in Bangkok, so it is going to be very difficult to get any solid
data that is reliable since everyone is at home right now.
(AbsoluteOutsider12 - Blog)
Similar to a blogger OutsiderIn13, the fact that the coup was staged at night was
somehow meaningful to her.
I think it was good idea for the coup to be put into action late at night... less
traffic and people to have to deal with, and when opponents would be at their
lowest reaction point. By day, the army had announced a ’holiday’ was to be
in effect... this kept many people from having to go to work or school.
(OutsiderIn13 - Blog)
The importance of time to information seeking and sharing during the disruptive
moment of the 2006 coup can be examined in two ways. The first interpretation is in
relation to the timing of the coup actions that took place during the night of September
19. Many people had already gone to bed even before the first announcement. My
mother, for example, was already in bed when I called, and she had no idea that there was
a coup happening in Thailand. As mentioned earlier, the sense of excitement emerged
as the story was being developed. Therefore, those who woke up in the morning and
found out about the coup would likely be less excited than those who stayed up during
the night. The fact that the coup began at night also relates to the physical limitations
mentioned earlier – that people in Thailand had to stop seeking and sharing because
they had already stayed up all night and were already tired.
Another aspect of time is derived from the finding that people tended to seek and
share information that potentially had effects on their daily lives. Therefore, time,
in relation to their everyday activities, also influenced the topics of discussions. For
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example, since September is the last month of the first academic semester, it is not
too surprising to see that a number of bloggers who were students reported that the
confusion during that time was about whether or not they were going to have an exam.
It is important to note that there is another contextual construct that played substan-
tial roles during the coup: geographical location. From a broad perspective, geography
concerns the differences in information behavior of people who were inside and outside
Thailand during that time. It seems that geographical location played an important role
during the coup. However, since geographical location is already embedded in identi-
fying small world membership, the discussion of geographical location as a contextual
factor is discussed in detail in the next chapter.
Based on the findings discussed in this chapter, we have learned that people’s reac-
tions to the situation reflect their memories (i.e., past experience) and emotions. People
expressed a mix of feelings that can be in contrast to each other at the same time (i.e.,
happy and sad). However, the most common emotional expression during that time was
the sense of excitement, which seems to play an important part for people to decide
whether or not they were going to seek and share information. As the coup was staged
at night (local time), physical stamina seems to be another indicator of how people
continue or stop seeking and sharing process.
In addition, people, as in group, influence each other in terms of seeking and sharing
information. The influence can be explained by common goals that were expressed during
that time, for example, to gain accurate and more information about the situation, to
develop a publication, and to feel secure. Furthermore, the comments exchanged through
social network and communication systems during that time also provided a sense of
encouragement.
Time and location of the situation as well as information activity also has an essential
presence in examining behavior, cognition, and emotion of people during that time.
In conclusion, there are various constructs/concepts that seem to be associated with
the way in which people sought and shared information during the early stage of the
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coup. The findings in this chapter are not specifically intended to suggest generalized
causal effects between these constructs and information behavior during a socio-political
crisis. Nevertheless, the findings suggest the concepts that stood out among others in
the pool of data. The relationships certainly need to be further investigated.
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Chapter 6
Roles of Insiders and Outsiders
The September 19, 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand raised concerns for people worldwide,
not just for those people who were in Thailand. However, the interactions among differ-
ent groups of people during the early stage of the coup were noteworthy, whether they
were inside or outside of the country or insiders or outsiders to the Thai language and
culture.
This chapter, adopting Chatman’s small world framework and Merton’s notion of
the Insider and Outsider, discusses the roles of insiders and outsiders on information
seeking and sharing during the early stage of the coup. However, the interpretation of
the framework is important to review here. In this study, there are four primary types of
small world membership, divided based on nationality and geographical location during
the first few days of the coup. An absolute insider refers to a Thai person who was
in Thailand and Bangkok in particular during the early stage of the coup. An abso-
lute outsider is a non-Thai citizen who was outside Thailand during that period. An
insider-out refers to a person who held Thai nationality, but was outside Thailand at
the time. An outsider-in is a non-Thai citizen who appeared to be in Thailand at the
time. However, since nationality and geographical location could not be directly ob-
served for all informants (including those from document analysis), there are additional
four types of small world membership. An anonymous-in is a person whose locality
is identified as inside Thailand but nationality is unidentifiable. An anonymous-out is
an unidentifiable-nationality person, who was outside Thailand during that time. An
insider-anonymous refers to a Thai person whose locality at the time of the coup could
not be identified. And outsider-anonymous is a non-Thai who did not identify his/her
geographical location during that time. Figure 3.3 illustrates a final coding categories
of smallworld membership.
This chapter begins with an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the cognitive
authority of each group through the discussion of the relationships and interactions
among these groups during the early stage of the coup. Then, the notion of converted
members, either outsiders in or insiders-out, is discussed as a key player who helped
bridging the communication gaps during that period.
Please note that major terms used in this chapter (i.e., the Insider, the Outsider,
and conversion) were substantially adapted from Merton’s work (Merton, 1972). Partic-
ularly, the idea of conversion is adapted from Merton’s notion of a ‘converted member’
explainning the way in which insiders and outsiders seek validation, evaluation, and
understanding of the world outside their own.
6.1 The Insider
Evidence from content analysis indicates that the privilege of access to information dur-
ing the early stage of the coup was related to an individual’s Insider and Outsider social
status. Instead of viewing themselves as subjects involved in the situation, absolute in-
siders seemed to perceive themselves as witnesses to a historic situation. The perception
that they could access information based on their first-hand experience within Thailand
as the coup was unfolding gave them such a privilege.
Many of the absolute insiders and outsiders-in apparently were granted authority of
information and worldview as a consequence of their knowledge of the political situation
in Thailand (for insiders) as well as their ‘being there’ (for insiders and outsiders-in). As
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mentioned in Chapter 4, many people perceived that the information reported by the
international media during the disruptive moment was different and misleading com-
pared to the information that they received from their firsthand experiences. Therefore,
these people wanted to share what they had observed in order to clarify the situation to
others, who could not gain information from firsthand experience.
In addition to their perceptions of international news outlets, their interactions with
contacts outside of Thailand also led to a similar impression for both absolute insiders
and outsiders-in. AbsoluteInsider19, for instance, wrote a blog post two days after the
coup, based on what she saw on the street with photos that she took, as a response to
what she heard from her contacts from outside of Thailand.
I was writing a rather lengthy post in English about my thoughts on the recent
bloodless coup, but I thought I should first post a few pictures of the coup,
for foreign friends and visitors who may be concerned about my safety (thank
you for all the kind e-mails ), so everyone can see how peaceful this event has
been and that most of us don’t feel threatened whatsoever by these tanks and
humvees. The atmosphere now in Bangkok as you can see from the pictures
below is much more like Children’s Day than a country under siege.
So, enjoy the pictures. I will post longer thoughts in 1-2 days, but in the
meantime, in case you are wondering:
1. I dislike military coups as much as any pro-democracy person, and I am sad it
happened, but I believe the coup leaders did this in goodwill to pull the country
out from a political quagmire. Their actions from now will prove or disprove this
goodwill.
2. I think the fact that many Thai people support this coup shows that “democracy”
comes in many shapes and forms, and that its “substance” (check& balance appa-
ratus) is as much as, if not more, important than its “form”(going to elections).
3. There is considerable risk of a counter-coup, since forces loyal to deposed Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra are still around, and some people are understandably
very angry at the coup. But the king’s formal endorsement of coup leaders’ power
structure (which he signed yesterday) should help defuse the tension.
All pictures except the second one (which is from CNN according to friend who
sent it) are taken by me and a friend yesterday during our tank-photo-hunting
tour of Bangkok. For much better pictures, see this post and another one at
Pantip.com.
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[Photo of tanks on street]
Like in any military coup around the world, lots of tanks have taken up posi-
tions in front of strategic locations in Bangkok
[Photo of kids and a foreigner on a tank and soldiers]
but I’m not sure how many coups see children and tourists gleefully pose for
pictures (which the soldiers are happy to oblige).
[Photo of a gun tied with a yellow ribbon and flowers]
All tanks have yellow ribbon around their muzzles to show allegiance to the
king (yellow is symbol of king in Thailand). Many people give flowers and
food, like fried rice in that plastic bag in the picture, to the soldiers.
[Photo of tanks in a crowd]
While we were at King Rama VI monument yesterday, there were about 200-
300 people taking pictures of tanks, which lined up on both sides of the mon-
ument. There were 10 tanks in total.
(AbsoluteInsider19 - Blog)
In addition, AbsoluteInsider2, a graphic designer, made a comparison between the
reactions she got from both insiders and outsiders on her blog.
Reactions
From those in Bangkok
First on MSN everyone was checking news with one another. Rumours spread
everywhere. Some real some crappy (As crazy as .. Thaksin would come back
with his own private army, something like that) But finally it was confirmed
that it was the coup.
Most of people I know they’re relieved. Finally it’s the end of all this craziness.
18 months we’ve been waiting for !!
Next day I went out to see the mood around the city. I shit you not. People
looked so happy, everybody got smiles on their faces. Families took children
out to take photos with army and tanks! (yeah, for real) They’re bringing
flowers to give to soldiers too.
This never happened in Thailand. Every time it’s a coup. Of course people
stay home and hold a grudge for a military. But this coup is different. Turned
out that 83% of us are supporting this decision.
Reactions
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From friends abroad, and foreign friends traveling in Thailand at the moment.
First I got text messages on my mobile phone.. messages on MSN.. email..
from everywhere I have friends there.. [Europe], [China], [India], US even
Serbia. Asking if I was still OK. Then I realized that it must be looking really
bad on the news in their countries. Since I live here, things look totally calm
even closer to a celebration time. Having tanks running around doesn’t mean
we’re having kind of civil war.
(AbsoluteInsider2 - Blog)
Note that AbsoluteInsider2 also has the largest collection of photos on Flickr, 187
photos, although the majority were from sources other than her own photos. The fol-
lowing dialog discloses the conversation that was happening in one of her photos. It is
a photo of two secondary school students in school uniform posing with a soldier who
was holding a gun. As response to other comments, her response indicates the strong
nature of the Insider.
[Comment1]:
I don’t know this is we call “Coupe”’....???? [I] am the one that agree with
this strategy of army to solve in serious Thai politics situation now even it
is not good image to foreigner...I saw the [newspaper] said it is the “Classic
Coupe” What do you think? ;-)
AbsoluteInsider2:
As I always say to my non-Thai friends.
Personally I don’t like the coup. But this coup, it’s apparently the last choice.
My friend in Denmark told me that their Minister called us “banana republic”
:-P
But they never walked in our shoes, They never know.
There’re so many factors. Not just one word that’s called “Democracy”
anyway, tanks are cool :-D haha
[Comment2]:
The minister of Denmark does not know Thailand, that is obvious. Banana
republic is a term that is applied to countries who were colonized and exploited,
and their products (bananas or coffee, etc) were exported by the companies
who basicly controlled the whole economy and politics of the country. And that
was certainly never the case for Thailand. It is unfortunate that democracy
had taken a detour, but I think that it will be only that, a detour, until things
can get back on track.
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Your pics are very interesting..I have recommended your site to friends who
have asked me what is going on in Thailand.
AbsoluteInsider2:
“thanks a bunch! :-)”
(AbsoluteInsider2 - Photo comments)
The perspective, similar to AbsoluteInsider2’s view that “they never walked in our
shoes”, seems to be quite common among those who expressed themselves online. In a
more intensive form, this kind of discussion also turned towards aggressive expressions.
Below are the comments posted on a YouTube video showing a news clip captured from
an international media.
[Comment1] (2006-09-20T16:41:44.000Z): The only COUP D’ETAT in the
world that will save country
[Comment2] (2006-09-20T22:23:08.000Z): This report came from BBC, not
CNN.
[Comment3] (2006-09-22T15:17:11.000Z): Most stupid and ridiculous phase
I’ve ever heard. This happened in Thailand many times. And the ending is
always the same, wait and see.
[Comment4] (2006-09-23T02:27:30.000Z): f*** those c*** who knows s*** and
try to comment on such a stupid sentences..if you are not part of the country
do not show your damn retard idea
(AbsoluteInsider24 - YouTube comment)
Another indication of the greater authority of absolute insiders is evident when out-
siders reported that they heard about the coup from insiders. Outsiders had to rely on
insiders whom they know to get information. Many absolute outsiders and insiders-out
reported on their blogs and interviews that they heard about the coup from their con-
tacts, who were in Thailand during that time. This phenomenon was obviously required
by geographical limitations that made it impossible for those insiders who were outside
of Thailand to get firsthand experience.
In addition to the geographical limitation, cultural differences, as pointed out in
Chapter 5, also brought challenges to outsiders-in as well. For those whose Thai language
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skills were not fluent or who had less knowledge about Thai politics, they had to rely
on absolute insiders to learn about the situation and its place in Thai history.
For instance, OutsiderIn15, a businessman who was in Thailand during the coup,
had a live phone interview with an international media organization during the coup
night. AbsoluteOutsider13, recorded the interview and uploaded the video to YouTube.
According to the interview, OutsiderIn15 had to rely on local friends to translate infor-
mation for him.
News Anchor: Who are you, errr, who do you expect to give you the green
light? What do you intend to do? Did you get any calls perhaps just to say
that you don’t come in [to work] today? or how did you get your news?
OutsiderIn15: Ahh well. I have a good friend updating us, local Thai people.
They’re just telling us what’s going on. Of course, they’re translating news
for us and, you know, see if there is any work that can be resumed, then we
will go back to work.
News Anchor: Are you concerned that this perhaps might be a long drawn
process?
OutsiderIn15: No, I don’t think so because at the end of the day everybody
involved just want the best for Thailand. So may be they might have different
views and stuff. But at the end of the day nobody wants a long run conflict
in Thailand. And I am pretty sure that political system and the people will
be able to work it out.
News Anchor: And you said you’ve been talking to friends over this matter?
What are the main concerns? And how are they looking at the situation?
With the optimism? Or perhaps nodding their heads that, perhaps, this is
not the right direction?
OutsiderIn15: Well people are pretty tight lipped about what’s going on. Over
here people don’t want to say the wrong thing in case. They don’t know [about]
this. I mean the local news channels have all been cut off. The only channel
that was on once in a while was a spokesperson of royal family giving out news
from the royal family and military. Other than that I’m not sure what people
think but they just want to resolve as soon as possible.
(OutsiderIn15 - YouTube video transcription)
As shown above, besides the inability to obtain information from local media because
of the language barrier, OutsiderIn15 was also told to stay at home. Therefore, he could
179
not access information regarding the coup from firsthand experience. Communicating
with local friends was the only option.
Outsiders-in could learn about the situation from local television via visual compre-
hension only, and the lack of language comprehension could lead to misunderstandings.
It is apparent that some of the information that OutsiderIn15 gave to the interviewer
was incorrect. The spokespersons, who appeared on local television during that time,
represented the military, not the royal family, though it is easy to see how an outsider
might make this misinterpretation, given the background of pictures and video of the
royal family.
The impression that OutsiderIn15 had when asked about local people’s perceptions,
“people are pretty tight lipped”, is also noteworthy. The sense of uncertainty and
confusion regarding the information that was available during that time may have been
overwhelming. Not all absolute insiders had the same privilege to access first-hand
information. With limited information from local media, being an absolute insider could
also become a disadvantage. For those who did not go out to see the situation with their
own eyes for any reason, local media was traditionally supposed to be a major source of
information. However, since the media was controlled by the military during that time
as mentioned in Chapter 4, being an absolute insider could be a weakness. They simply
could not access information from the sources they normal used.
It is important to note that, during the early stage of the coup, a number of people
in Thailand were critical of the limited role of local media.
Well the Thai TV channels had almost no information except the official coup
announcements. There were soldiers at the TV stations so we were not getting
much information.
...
[I] was surprised that the Thai media were very accepting of the coup. There
was very little criticism of the coup in the aftermath.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
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The quotes from the two outsiders’ perspectives above also indicated the notion of
reticence among absolute insiders (i.e., local media and Thai people in general) which
becomes another aspect of weakness in the Insider’s position of authority. Reticence
is probably a part of the self-protective measures of insiders who may fear that they
might be in trouble or that the situation might get worse if someone said anything
negative about the coup, the military, the monarchy, or even Thai politics in general. In
particular, even though there may be some speculations about the role of the monarchy
during that time, it was quite noticeable that such discussions originated only from
absolute outsiders and outsiders-in. Insiders or insiders-out seemed to be rather passive
on this sensitive matter (e.g., by commenting on someone else’s blogs, or responding
in web forums). As a result, some outsiders-in reported that they did not learn much
about the situation from absolute insiders.
Additionally, it was apparent that some people had difficulties in accessing commu-
nication networks such as the Internet and cellular network. As discussed in Chapter
4, a number of people reported that they had a hard time connecting to the Internet
or calling others. Regardless of the cause of the disruption, the fact that service and
content providers were located in Thailand created a vulnerable point with respect to
communication.
In terms of going out in the field, seeing soldiers and tanks in action brought live
experience and a sense of involvement. However, relying on such firsthand experience
might have limited the worldview of those who chose this approach to focus on a spe-
cific site, instead of the overall situation. Therefore, a few people whom I interviewed
indicated that they did not learn much about the situation from going out and talking
to people (including soldiers) on the site. Rather, they learned more from multitasking
their information seeking activities obtaining information from multiple sources.
Overall, one can claim that the Insider was evidently strong during the early stage
of the coup. People inside Thailand, both absolute insiders and outsiders-in, believed
that the fact that they were able to access first-hand experience gave them privileges
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in terms of accessing and sharing information. However, such a perspective also had
limitations as discussed above. Therefore, a number of people in Thailand had to seek
and share information with people outside Thailand.
6.2 The Outsider
Since the privilege of accessing information during the coup was limited for some insiders,
the role of outsiders as sources of information as well as gatekeepers was important.
Many people inside Thailand reported that they relied on outsiders to gain information
about the coup.
The first source of the outsiders’ cognitive authority comes from the dissemination
of information via personal contacts. It is apparent that there were those who were
in Thailand (either absolute insiders and outsiders-in) who learned about the situation
from those who were outside the country. An example can be drawn from my personal
experience when I contacted my mother and friends in Thailand to ask about the sit-
uation in the middle of the coup night. My mother and some of my friends did not
know about the situation. I had to inform them what was going on based on what I saw
on American media and the Internet. AnonymousIn1, a blogger, who was in Thailand
during that time, also learned about the situation from a friend in New York.
A cell phone call from a friend in New York City alerted me that there was
“a revolution” taking place in Bangkok. I was in the lobby of my guesthouse
checking my email at the time. I mentioned it to other guests – none of whom
were as yet aware. We turned on BBC where Bush was addressing the UN.
(AnonymousIn1 - Blog)
OutsiderIn16 was also another non-Thai person who visited Thailand during that
time apparently as a chaperone for some students. She got a call in the middle of the
night from a student’s parent asking about the situation.
Safe and Sound...update on the military coup
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I am safe and sound. Yes there is a military coup that took place last night
in Bangkok, Thailand. The military is in control because they do not like
the Prime Minister, Thaksin. The military are “better” than Thaksin. Many
Thais do not like the PM, if I’m not mistaken there’s been corruption surrond-
ing his re-election etc., I think even some dealings with Burma that haven’t
been very good either. Check him out on the web.
So last night like at 1:20 am I was awakened from my peaceful slumber to my
ringing cell phone. I slipped out of bed looked at the number on the phone and
thought maybe one of the students parents or something were calling. It was
[student]’s mother. She’d just seen on the news that a military coup had taken
over power in Thailand that there were tanks in Bangkok and that Americans
would be moved out of the country... boy was that a crazy call to get in the
middle of the night... I was disoriented some too....ahhhh!
(OutsiderIn16 - Blog)
Even though this particular study defined small world membership geographically
based on Thailand as a country, it is important to note that most of the coup movements
happened in Bangkok and other major cities. Therefore, the strength of outsiders, in
the sense of who was the first source, can also be examined from a local perspective,
comparing Thai people who lived in Bangkok and its vicinity with those who lived in
other areas. AbsoluteInsider16, for example, at the time, lived close by Channel 5, the
TV station owned by the military, where the first sign of the coup occurred. She did
not notice the irregularity until she got a call from her sister who lived hours away from
Bangkok.
รู้ข่าวตอนกลางคืนวันที่ทหารเข้าไปยึดช่อง 5
อ่ะ กำลังนอนดูหนังเกาหลีอยู่
แล้วพี่สาวโทรมาบอกว่าที่กรุงเทพมีอะไรไม่รู้ให้เปิดดูโทรทัศน์
...
ใช่ อยู่ที่หอที่กรุงเทพ พี่สาวอยู่ชล
[I heard [about the coup] at night on the day that the military seized Channel
5.
I was laying and watching a Korean movie.
Then my older sister called telling me that there was something going on in
Bangkok and to turn on the TV.
...
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Yes, I was in my dormitory in Bangkok. My sister was in Chonburi [a province
in the east of Thailand.]
(AbsoluteInsider16 - Interview)
In addition to personal contacts, the importance of the outsiders as information
sources can be viewed from the role of international media during that time. As the
operation of local news media was limited during that time, informants reported that
they turned to international media such as CNN, BBC, and other international news
agencies to follow the situation.
During the following days I was required by my organization to prepare reports
on the unfolding situation in Thailand. While I relied on the Thai media to a
certain extent, there was little substantive information available. Most of the
information I gained was from the international media and observations from
subsequent visits to coup-affected areas in the Government House area.
(OutsiderIn3 - Interview)
Even for those who worked in one of the free-to-air local TV stations, it is ironic that
they had to gain information about Thailand from international media.
We flicked on CNN and watched their live broadcast. It [was] the only story
on CNN and the BBC. “It’s funny,” I said. “The whole world is watching
what is happening in Thailand. The only people who don’t know what’s going
on are the Thais themselves!” It was true. The overseas media was soon cut,
too. The whole world watched as the tanks rolled into the centre of our city.
But we couldn’t find out anything.
(OutsiderIn1- Blog)
Coding international media to smallworld was complicated as they can be considered
both outsiders-in and absolute outsiders in this situation. Live broadcasting was taken as
evidence of outsiders-in. However, it is important to recognize that the dissemination of
information was based outside Thailand. Therefore, foreign editors and writers outside
Thailand involved in the dissemination of information can also be considered as absolute
outsiders.
In any case, the international media played a significant role in the online environment
as the majority of the content about the coup that was disseminated online referred back
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to the international media as sources of coup information. Many bloggers copied whole
articles from the media and pasted them on their blogs. A number of Flickr users took
photos of what was reported on television (e.g., CNN and BBC) and the Internet (New
York Times’ homepage, for example) and uploaded them to their accounts.
Although some people reported that they relied on international media more than
local media, it is important to point out that, during the early stage of the coup, the
military controlled the broadcasting of the international media as well. In addition, the
international media did not dedicate a great deal of time to report on the situation in
Thailand. Therefore, absolute insiders and outsiders-in perceived that the information
they received from international media was still limited.
BBC กับ CNN [เป็นเหมือนวีรบุรุษในช่วงน้ัน] ค่ะ เพราะว่าสามารถให้ข้อมูลในขณะน้ันกับ
หญิงได้ ถึงแม้ว่าจะไม่ 100% ก็ตาม
[BBC and CNN [were apparently the heroes during that time], because they
could gave me information I wanted, although it was not 100%.]
(AbsoluteInsider4 - Interview)
BBC and CNN had some limited reports, but Thailand is not a big story.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
In addition to quantitative measures, it is noteworthy that people were also critical
about the bias that might be disseminated by an international news outlet. It is apparent
that trustworthiness became the biggest concern related to outsiders’ cognitive authority.
I have to correct myself: If you are talking about right after the coup, there
WAS censorship of CNN/BBC World when stories that directly referring to
Thaksin or showing were being censored.
...
International TV stations were completely useless. Thailand is a hard country
to understand and gets little air time on international news generally, so the
reporting is incredibly superficial. As I noted before, the international net-
works seemed a bit befuddled since there was no strife or death toll to report
and they really had to struggle to put events into perspective.
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(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
In terms of personal contact, the coup d’e´tat in Thailand may be far from the interests
of absolute outsiders. Since they could not learn about the situation from first-hand
experience and did not have much background about Thailand, instead of considering
the coup as a context that they were living in, they provided information from their own
perspectives, which apparently did not match what the majority of people were looking
for.
For many absolute outsiders, outsiders-in, and even some insiders-out, the coup be-
came a reminder of particular persons and past experiences that they can relate to.
A number of bloggers who were absolute outsiders wrote blog posts saying who they
thought of after hearing about the coup.
First off, my thoughts and prayers go out to all my online friends in Thailand
who have to experience this firsthand. I pray that events will continue to
remain essentially peaceful and non-violent.
Of course, whenever the military of any country stages a coup to overthrow
the current leader and government, that’s a very serious matter. I couldn’t
even begin to imagine if a military coup like that would happen on American
soil. I would definitely be traumatized and shellshocked, like many were when
9/11 occured.
We just hope that anything like this anywhere will resolve itself by peaceful
means?
(AbsoluteOutsider14 - Blog)
Today’s has a very serious subject. A very good friend of mine lives in Bangkok
(no, he doesn’t know John Mark Karr, but he did live and work very near
him)...and in case you don’t know, there’s a military coup going on to over-
throw the government. The Prime Minister is in the US at the UN, so it was
‘perfect’ timing for the coup.
I was at the gym yesterday around 10-10:30 when I saw the Breaking News on
CNN. My thoughts immediately went to [AbsoluteOutsider15’s friend], and I
prayed for his safety. It was a prayer I repeated through most of the day.
Since Bangkok is exactly 12 hours ahead of where I live, he was just going to
bed as all this started. I finally got an email from him...here’s what he wrote.
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(AbsoluteOutsider15 - Blog)
This discussion gives me a flashback to the early sixties. I was a freshman in
college and a Thai graduate student lived down the hall. One afternoon he
showed my roomate and me a book of beautiful photos of his home country.
Leafing through the pages he got to a section near the end which had the
official pictures of the country ’s top leaders.
“This is the King,” he said, showing a splendid image that made us think of
European royalty.
“And this is the President,” he continued. We concluded at this point that
Thailand’s monarchy was something like those we already knew, figure-heads
and all that.
“And this,” he said, turning another page, “is our dictator.”
We were amazed at the casual way that he showed us these pictures, never
breaking that serene South Asian expression or showing any indication there
was any problem moving from king to president to dictator...and having them
all shown together in a single published book!
It was an early lesson in how, uh, carefully (?) democracy can be practiced in
other parts of the world.
(AbsoluteOutsider16 - Blog comment)
In addition, a number of absolute outsiders, instead of talking about the situation
in Thailand, related themselves to the coup by speculating on the application of similar
political measures to their own countries. When asked how the experience during the
coup has related to building/changing his sense of self, OutsiderIn4 who wrote numerous
blog posts and uploaded videos and photos online during that time, answered in an
interview.
One thing is that it has given me a greater appreciation for the political system
in the US. For all its faults (and there are many) I appreciate that there is
at least relatively greater transparency in terms of where different politicians
and groups get their support. I also appreciate that in the US, the military is
fully subservient to the civilian authorities and is not an independent political
actor.
(OutsiderIn4 - Interview)
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From a collective point of view, AbsoluteOutsider17, a Filipino journalist, wrote a
blog post about the coup in Thailand. A number of readers commented on how likely
such an incident would happen in their own countries.
[Comment1]( September 20, 2006 11:33 pm):
Is there one in the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] today capable of
rousing the good men of the AFP to replicate Thai Army Commander in
Chief’s coup d’e´tat?
I don’t think so. Sadly, Esperon will have taken precations.
[Comment2] (September 20, 2006 11:44 pm):
It was interesting to watch and stay tuned with the events in Thailand? it IS
an idea; it’s worth a try.
Isn’t it also interesting that Gloria had a meeting with her generals in Malaca?an
after the coup d’etat in Thailand? Hee hee hee.
What IS weird is the military coming out on television expressing support for
Gloria. I don’t think the other military in the region, or from other countries,
are doing that-expressing support for their respective leaders. It goes to show
that the possibility of the recent events in Thailand (coup d’etat) happening
in the Philippines is high. I think it’s more like SOMEONE is very insecure
and troubled by the recent events in Thailand.
One thing for sure is that the coup d’etat in Thailand killed the Cha-Cha. JdV
should be slapped silly on the face for telling the Filipino people that Cha-Cha
will prevent coups! Give it up, JdV. You’re a has-been trying so hard to be
“in.” You’re era is jurassic!
[Comment2] (September 21, 2006 12:01 am):
I was listening to Channel NewsAsia and it was interesting to note that Asian
analysts that the Thai, Indonesian& Philippine military are the “same” in
the sense that their respective miliatry relate to civilian politics. Asia is “in-
terrelated” in the sense that, as an example, when Nepal had their peaceful
protests, this influenced the protests in the Philippine. The events that re-
cently happened in Thailand will probably influence other Asian countries,
although this “new” type of coup d’etat may not happen immediately, THE
COUNTRY where this would most-likely occur would be the Philippines.
(AbsoluteOutsider17 - Blog comments)
The theme of this conversation continued. By September 26, 2006, there were 232
comments in total on this particular blog post.
In addition to involving themselves by speculating about the relationship of the coup
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to their own countries, some absolute outsiders also suggested their wishes to be part of
it as they viewed the coup as a historic situation.
Thailand
Two days ago, the general of the Thai military took control of the country
through a bloodless coup. Businesses and schools around Bangkok and the
military leader shut down international news stations on television. He has
promised to return power to the people as soon as possible. Thailand’s PM
has been out of the country this entire time and will most likely step down.
Should he return to Thailand, the military will arrest him under corruption
charges. Already four members of his government have been detained and
until a new election occurs, all political assemblies have been banned.
I wish I was living in Thailand right now. I look at pictures of people posing
with next to tanks in downtown bangkok and I can’t help but think how much
cooler Thai politics are than American or Japanese politics. It sounds like the
PM, Thaksin, had been pretty crooked, Based on what CNN had reported it
seems like he was pretty crooked; but, what Asian government isn’t corrupt?
And the fact that the military intervened with the nation’s political process
makes it apparent that the country isn’t ready to adopt democracy. Further-
more, as the general arranges for more democratic processes he is suspending
peoples’ fundamental rights until a sound democracy is created. I think it is
extremely dissapointing that the country couldn’t get rid of its leader through
a natural process (which it was about to do in two months with another elec-
tion).
(AbsoluteOutsider18 - Blog)
It is substantial to note that the information shared by outsiders, absolute outsiders
in particular, tended to be opinionated rather than based on factual information. A blog
post written by AbsoluteOutsider21 seems to a good example to highlight this point well.
For me, I thought this piece of news is interesting and refreshing. Don’t get
on me too emotional if any Thais reading this. I do not have any heritage/
bloodlines from Thailand. So I may be quite cold on saying Thaksin is greedy
for power. In any case, I myself would like to see the removal of some ministers
in my own country too... I think the whole lot of them will be awesome.
(AbsoluteOutsider21 - Blog)
The strength of absolute outsiders can be viewed from either the views of interper-
sonal or mass communication. It is noteworthy that the role of outsiders during the coup
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was stronger when the information activities during that time were viewed as supportive
and involving recreation and entertainment rather than fact finding and validation. The
limitations of being either insiders and outsiders led to the conversion of smallworld
membership – a member of a group was trying to or pretended to be a member of
anoother group.
In summary, the roles of outsiders in information seeking and sharing during the
early stage of the coup emerged due to the restricted flow of information inside Thailand.
As an advantage, outsiders had a greater opportunity to see a broader perspective of
the situation. This opportunity arose based on the fact that outsiders could access to
information from multiple views.
However, the contributions of outsiders, in particular absolute outsiders, could be
minimal as the content can be less relevant and less helpful. In addition, language and
political knowledge could also be major challenges for outsiders to exchange information
across worldviews.
6.3 Bridging the Two Worldviews
Insiders-out and outsiders-in, to some extent, seemed to hold a more privileged access to
information during the early stage of the coup than other members of the small world.
Being able to learn about the coup from first-hand experience as well as being a part
of a historic moment were perceived as advantages of being in the country during that
time. However, for outsiders-in, the privilege could be in understanding what foreigners,
who were either inside or outside the country, would want to know.
OutsiderIn2 has been a foreign resident in Thailand for more than ten years. During
the interview, he highlighted his role in communicating to absolute outsiders who would
not understand the context of Thailand well. Remember that he wrote a press release
to his clients right after he heard about the coup; his greatest concern was about those
who contacted him from outside the country:
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Again this [press release] was written because all the non-Thais dealing with
my business and who I knew personally called me with breathless questions:
Will you have to evacuate? Is the media censored? Can you go out to get
food? (So once again this is the general view of coups around the world that
might not exactly fit the Thai situation.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
He also elaborated about the world view of absolute outsiders toward the situation
that could be different from that of Thai people.
This is probably a good point for you: That non-Thais view a coup as a
state of rebellion with chaos in the streets and an utter breakdown of services,
fighting, etc. The reality is that Thai coups have tended to be (or seen as)
one of the informal checks and balances for civilian governments attaining too
much power or being seen as greedy. While they have often resulted in generals
trying to install themselves as PMs and becoming greedy themselves, normally
coups have meant little disruption to everyday life.
...
This is quite different than most countries where coups are mainly military
rebellions of lower level soldiers that result in fighting in the streets (and this
situation did happen in Thailand during the failed “Young Turk” rebellions of
the 1980s).
...
Simply the reaction of Americans and British I know including my own West-
ern perceptions: assuming that a coup means lines of communication are cut,
media is censored, people are fighting, and that it is not safe to go out. From
our experience seeing coups in Latin America and Africa, it appears that this
is the nature of all coups.
(OutsiderIn2 - Interview)
However, when it comes to bridging the gap, a number of people appreciated his
ability to translate Thai content into English. OutsiderIn4, another blogger, for example,
said that OutsiderIn2’s website was one of the most helpful sources for the non-Thai like
him. He noted during the interview that he had difficulties in learning about the coup
situation from absolute insiders due to the language barrier.
I’m sure I visited CNN, BBC, Bangkok Post and The Nation as well. 2bangkok.com
is a good consolidator as the editor reads Thai fluently so he’s able to translate
191
information from the Thai press as well as to include information from various
English-language sources.
...
At that time my Thai was still pretty limited so I didn’t watch local broadcasts
very often because I didn’t understand them.
(OutsiderIn4 - Blog)
On the other side (i.e., having an information need), the ability to learn about
the situation on-site as well as to speak the same language of outsiders seems to be
appealing for absolute outsiders to reach out to those in Thailand. AbsoluteOutsider22,
an American blogger, wrote a call for readers who were in Thailand to update the
situation. Note that a blog that he contributed is a collaborative blog that focuses on
American politics. Therefore, it would be easy to assume that the readership of this
blog is based outside Thailand.
A day after the coup d’e´tat in Thailand, the situation is becoming clearer
to distant observers. Local political observers are saying that the coup was
predictable and should have been seen by Thaksin, the PM of Thailand. I can’t
see how this is going to help Thailand in the short term but the problems of
corruption were widespread. During my own visits to Thailand I always heard
about corruption but it was not clear to me who was orchestrating it or where
the money flowed.
[A duplicate of news from other unidentified source]
Are there any [blog] readers in Thailand who have some local information?
It’s a shame to see this happen again so any feedback from the region would
be well appreciated.
(AbsoluteOutsider22 - Blog)
A call for local reporters (i.e., grassroots journalists or eye-witnesses) was apparently
common for international media (e.g., CNN and BBC) as well. They opened different
communication channels (e.g., email and web forum) for people who were in Thailand
during that time to submit photos, videos or comments.
For insiders-out, it is interesting to note that a number of Thai people abroad heard
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about the coup from absolute outsiders: either spouses, friends, international news me-
dia, or even an American journalist in my case. However, when it comes to seeking and
sharing information in order to make sense of the situation, there were still some senses
of privilege in terms of having more Thai political knowledge among this group, even
though they could not experience the situation with their own eyes.
Somebody even said it’s like we’re going backward to the undemocratic period-
although this is the softest coup he have known.
Nevertheless, Thai always be Thai. Thai people always be Thai people Thai
norm always still be Thai norm.
We have the way we are for a long time. We used to have a father-son system
and it did well until the population are growth. the system doesn’t have any
problem but we need to be changed because the number of people and the
globalisation.
Why we need to care those others outside the country criticise us with the
thing they have no idea.
It’s enough for me to be graded by others and i think the country should not
be graded by others as well.
Luckily, until now i don’t hear anyone talking the negative side of Thai sit-
uation now. the media here is quite medium even though most picts are the
tank :-(
(InsiderOut17 - Blog)
Besides the sense of attachment to the country, the fact that the geographical loca-
tion prevented them from learning about the situation from first-hand experience also
intensified the emotion to some insiders-out.
วันน้ีมีรัฐประหาร ... บอกได้คำเดียวว่าเครียด เพิ่งรู้ว่าเรารักและคิดถึงเมืองไทยแค่ไหน ก็
ตอนแบบน้ีแหละ กลัวกลับไม่ได้จัง
เฮ้อ...พาย...ช้ันคงต้องต้ังรกรากที่น่ีแล้วล่ะ
ครึ..ครึ ล้อเล่นน่า
ฮืม.....ขอให้สงบๆได้ไวๆเฮอะ ประเทศไทย เย่ ท้ากสิน............ออกไป
[There was a coup today. There is only one word that I could say: stress. I
just realized how much I loved and missed Thailand because of a situation like
this. I’m afraid I can’t go back.
Sigh...[her friend’s name]...I might have to settle down here.
he..he Kidding.
hmmm...I hope the peace returns soon. Thailand. Yeah! Thaksin............ Get
out!]
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(InsiderOut18 - Blog)
As seen above, there was still a sense of optimism, which brought humor to Insider-
Out18 ’s blog post. On the other side, the sense of optimism seemingly led to passive
information activities (e.g., waiting to hear from others), which appears to be common
among absolute insiders. This characteristic can be seen among insiders-out also. It
was apparent that AbsoluteOutsider19’s partner is a Thai abroad. The optimism of his
partner seems to be somewhat confusing, but justified, to him.
Up All Night
I was up late last night, expecting some major announcements to come out
of my company’s head office. At 2 AM, I checked the Blackberry and, sure
enough, the first of what I expect will be several had arrived.
Then I figured I’d do a quick news check and saw the info about the coup
in Thailand. Ran back into the bedroom, told T what was going on, and
switched on CNN. Back to the computer to look for more details.
I thought she’d be concerned, worried about family and friends, all that kind
of stuff. When I returned to the bedroom she had switched over from CNN
to HBO and was watching one of the Chuckie movies. I didn’t ask, but I
suspected this was due to a combination of her thinking that she and everyone
she knows are so far down the line in Thai society that this would not impact
them plus the general Thai “mai pen lai” [(no problem)] attitude.
(AbsoluteOutsider19 - Blog)
Obviously insiders-out gained the absolute insider’s perspective by using their close
relationships to absolute outsiders and their past experience with the country. A number
of bloggers who were insiders-out noted that they contacted people in Thailand right
after they heard about the coup. In addition, they also helped each other in terms of
sharing information.
For instance, during the early stage of the coup, I observed what people discussed
on a web forum on my personal blog. In Pantip.com, one of the most popular web
forums in Thailand, there was a forum for Thais living abroad called Klaibann [far
away from home]. An anonymous user posted a thread in the forum asking in the Thai
language “What should we tell foreigners about the situation (in a constructive way)?”
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Apparently, people participated in the thread proposed and discussed different ways to
explain about the situation in English. Note that the forum members are Thai living
abroad and Thai people who were planning to go abroad. Therefore the conversations
in the thread were the exchange of opinions between absolute insiders and insiders-out.
The way in which different groups tried to bolster their status in order to gain at-
tention from other groups is remarkable. Based on the perceived strength and accessory
of the insiders’ views, a number of absolute outsiders and outsiders-in tried to increase
the perceived trustworthiness of their information by explaining their relationships with
Thailand and Thai people. Some said they have studied about Thailand for many years,
married a Thai person, or just got back from a trip to Thailand. Some went there a
number of years ago. Some even were in the country during the bloodshed of the 1992
coup d’e´tat. These disclosures are usually stated at the beginning of blog posts, photo
captions, and video descriptions. For example, AbsoluteOutsider20 recorded a video of
himself discussing the situation in Thailand and uploaded it to YouTube. The following
is the beginning of his monologue in the video.
[Thai music in the background]
I know that might seem a little of out of place because I’m obviously not Thai.
but several years ago I dated a very nice Thai girl who was over here in US to
get her MBA. and we were very serious about each other, for a while. and she
flew back east and she met my parents. and I took off a couple of week and
went and flew to Thailand so that I can meet her family. and it was very nice
experience. let me tell you that country is a very beautiful country. and the
people over there for the most part are so very nice. They’re called the land
of smile. Now I know that it’s just the slogan from the tourism department,
but it really is true that people are extremely friendly.
That’s not to say that they are perfect people. They are things about their
culture that I don’t particularly care for. I’m not a big fan of their unwritten
class system. I don’t particularly like the fact that they talk bad about people
behind their backs quite a bit. And the level of corruption that they accept
as a way of life particularly is saddening to me. But that’s not to say that
my country, United States is any example of how to be. I understand that
every country every culture has good and bad people and I understand that
good people make mistakes and sometimes do bad things. But on the whole I
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found Thailand, the Thai people, to be extraordinarily friendly and warm and
caring and all around with great people. I think that’s why it’s particularly
saddening to me so much. The reason of the event with the coup by the army.
I understand that the Thai history is filled with coup....
(AbsoluteOutsider20 - Video transcript)
The goal of conversion was to reach out and get attention from audiences outside
of their own small world. The conversion from outsiders, either absolute outsiders or
outsiders-in, to insiders was mainly to seek acceptance of the information they provided
(i.e., why you should listen to me). For insiders, the purpose of conversion to outsiders
was ultimately to change the perception of outsiders, which apparently is beyond the
acceptance of information. As mentioned in Chapter 4, insiders were worried that the
information provided among outsiders could damage the image of the country, which
ultimately would affect economic development. Therefore, a number of bloggers created
or delivered information in a form that outsiders would be able to understand (e.g.,
writing in English, participating in an international community).
Some absolute insiders were not only trying to be just outsiders, but insiders-out.
AbsoluteInsider15, one of the founders of a collaborative live blog during the coup,
apparently perceived that Thai abroad would be eager to learn about the coup. So it
inspired him to create the blog.
ผลจากงานน้ีคือได้ลงบล็อกแนะนำของ Blogspot และถูกอ้างอิงจากสื่อฝรั่งจำนวนมาก ลิ่วถึง
กับบอกว่า ‘‘ทำเว็บ (blognone) มาสองสามปี สู้อันน้ี (19sep) ทำสามวันไม่ได้’’
จุดเริ่มต้นในตอนแรก ต้องการเป็นแหล่งข้อมูลกลางสำหรับการรัฐประหาร ผมจำลองตัวเอง
เป็นคนไทยที่อยู่เมืองนอกในขณะน้ัน ย่อมกระวนกระวายร้อนใจอยากได้ข้อมูลมากกว่าคน
ที่อยู่ในไทยเสียอีก ส่วนภายหลัง 19sep ได้ปรับตัวมาเป็นกระบอกเสียงให้คนต่างชาติได้รู้ว่า
ประเทศไทยยังสบายดีอย่าเพิ่งตระหนก
[The outcome of this effort was that the blog was highlighted on Blogspot and
heavily cited by foreign media. [My co-founder] told me that ’(the experience
of) making a website (blognone) for a couple of years could not compare to
this blog (19sep) that were maintained for a couple of days’
At the beginning, we wanted it to be a center point of information about the
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coup. I simulated myself to be like a Thai living abroad who would be more
furious to get information than those who lived in Thailand. Later on, 19sep
was transformed to become a speaker to the world to let them know that
everything was fine in Thailand, no need to be panic.]
(AbsoluteInsider15 - Blog)
AbsoluteInsider15’s attempt to feel like an outsider made his blog more accessible
and well received by a wider community, including absolute outsiders. The conversion
was apparently essential during the coup in terms of bridging the gap of information
and knowledge since it increased the usefulness of information. At the time, it also
diminished the cultural gaps between the two different worldviews.
As we can see, the conversion occurred in both groups, insiders and outsiders. Insiders
wanted to reach out audiences and clarify the situation to outsiders. At the same time,
they also tried to understand and made assumption about the culture of outsiders. For
outsiders, they primarily sought acception from insiders. They wanted to be heard
rather than access to first-hand information. Additionally, it is apparent that, some
of converted members during that time appeared to be community leaders during that
time.
This chapter applies the notion of Insider and Outsider to the explanation of informa-
tion behavior during the coup in Thailand. By observing cognitive authority, it is evident
that those who were in Thailand hold a perception that they had advantages from an
opportunity to access first hand information about the situation. However, since the in-
siders world was longer functioning due to the disruption of traditional information, they
began to seek information from outside. In addition, being insiders during that time
also had limitation since they could not view the situation from broader perspective.
That was seemingly when the role of outsiders was emerging in terms of accessing and
sharing information that was not available to insiders. However, the message/content
shared and accessed by outsiders may be irrelevant to many others, due to the lack of
sense of collective attachment (e.g., nationalism).
However, the gaps between these two different worldviews were apparently bridged by
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those who were called as converted members (i.e., insiders as outsiders and outsiders as
insiders). People who were converted members during that time included, for instance,
foreigners in Thailand and Thai people living abroad. This group of people seemed to
have an advantage from understanding both different worldviews. Their role as middle
men was essential in terms of connecting insiders to outside as well as outreaching people
from around the world.
After learning about the three primary concerns of this phenomenon, the next chapter
will summarize this research study and discuss the theoretical framework as well as
methodological critiques. These reflective perspectives later inform recommendations
for future research and practice.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Discussion
7.1 Summary of Research Findings
During the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand, the traditional flow of
information was interrupted through various measures (such as censoring mainstream
media, monitoring networks, and banning political gathering). From my observation as
an insider-out during that time as well as from the additional evidence gathered during
this study, the way in which people sought and shared information deviated from the
pattern of their everyday information behavior/practice. The goal of this research has
been to explore and explain information behavior during political crisis. In addition, it
aims to examine the interactions between insiders and outsiders in such a context.
This study developed as an extension to our understanding of information poverty
and information behavior outside of everyday life and/or a routine context. By using
the 2006 coup d’e´tat as an extreme situational case, the basic assumption of this study
is that a socio-political crisis will have an impact on information seeking and sharing
behavior. Given that those who were affected by the coup may be considered as in-
formation poor, Chatman’s notion of small world and her theory of life in the round
(1999) were used as a fundamental framework of this study. Chatman argued that, in
the context of information poverty, people set social boundaries that represent a col-
lective set of beliefs of members of the group. Note that the primary assumptions of
information poverty suggest the substantial roles of privileged access to information,
social class, secrecy, deception, trustworthiness, risk, self-protective behaviors, and rele-
vance of information in an everyday life context. In addition, since the coup impacted
various groups, Merton’s Insider and Outsider conception (1972) was adopted to focus
data analysis on the interactions among these various groups of people (i.e., social types
in Chatman’s small world framework). Emerging in the context of the sociology of
knowledge, the Insider suggests that group members have privileged access to certain
types of information or knowledge, while non-members do not. The Outsider presents
the opposite belief. However, in the social realm, there are conversions from one status
to another – as when normal information flows and communication channels are cut off
during political upheaval or natural disaster – that would help in facilitating a transition
in worldview.
Peripheral constructs that impacted the conceptual framework of this study also come
from the discussion of political information behavior and collective behavior/action (in
particular focusing on rumor as a sense making process during crisis). Political infor-
mation behavior introduces the influence of psychological determinants (e.g., political
knowledge, political efficacy) on the acceptance and avoidance of information. The
concept of collective behavior/action is used to explain people’s reactions to critical in-
cidents. The current literature indicates roles for social norms, emotion, and rumors
as contributors to the associated sense making process when people had to deal with
uncertainty, self-encouragement, and relationship enhancement in critical moments.
Qualitative methods were applied during this exploratory study using document
analysis as a major source of data. Semi-structured interviews were used to complement
and validate findings from document analysis. The document analysis covers various
types of public online documents (i.e., blogs, photos, videos, and Wikipedia entries)
that are related to the coup in Thailand and that were created and/or uploaded during
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September 19 to September 23, 2006. There were 814 photos from 110 Flickr accounts,
990 blog posts from 775 bloggers, and 112 videos from 61 YouTube accounts representing
documentary data of this sort. The document analysis also covered two Wikipedia
entries about the coup (one in Thai and another one in English). For the English
entry (2006 Thai coup d’e´tat), there were 978 entry revisions and 376 discussion (talk)
revisions. For the Thai article, there were 293 revisions and 61 revisions for the discussion
page during the first four days of the coup. The accounts (representing the notion of
case/doer/user) that were most visible, as they were commented, viewed, ranked during
that period among the various documentary sources, were invited for semi-structured
interviews. There were 8 interview informants recruited on the basis of the document
analysis. Additionally, there were 4 informants recruited using the snowball sampling
technique, referred by those who were recruited through the document analysis. Sense-
Making Methodology’s Micro-Moment Timeline interview approach and question roster
were used to frame the online interviews – both synchronous (i.e., Instant Messaging,
Voice over Internet Protocol) and asynchronous (i.e., Email). The data analysis was
comprised of two approaches: content analysis and open coding. The majority of data
was analyzed using inductive coding (open and thematic coding) based on a grounded
theory approach. Deductive coding was used for pre-defined codes, which are codes that
are related to the small world membership. An intercoder reliability test was conducted
using Scott’s Pi to evaluate the reliability of the codes. As a result, the Scott’s Pi value
is 0.763 which is acceptable for exploratory research studies (the acceptable level of
reliability is 0.70). The data analysis was based on three primary research questions.
1.How did people seek and share information during the early stage of the 2006 coup
d’e´tat?
The way in which people sought and shared information during the disruptive mo-
ment of the 2006 coup can be explained into two parts. The first part deals with how
people first heard about the coup and their first reactions. Most people heard about
the coup from word of mouth through various kinds of communication channels (e.g.,
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face-to-face, phone, and the Internet). They also learned about the coup from their first-
hand experience either on the street or seeing what was happening on TV screens1 . In
addition, some news outlets, in particular subscription-only and international stations,
were able to broadcast. Therefore, some people heard about the coup using particular
instances of the mass media.
After first hearing about the coup, most people seemed to try to make sense of the
situation. Firstly, they focused on obstacles or gaps that seemed critical to them. During
the early stage of the coup, people were trying to understand media censorship, network
access difficulties, and cultural barriers (e.g., language and lack of political knowledge).
Interestingly, a number of people perceived that the censorship of local media was jus-
tifiable for political reasons, even though they disagreed with the censorship. Since
there were rumors that the various communication networks might be shut down, peo-
ple thought about how they would live without such network access. Without knowing
the actual causes, people who experienced difficulties in accessing networks speculated
about what might have caused such disruptions. In addition, during the early stage of
the coup, most official information was released only in the Thai language. Therefore,
people who did not know the Thai language or were not familiar with Thai politics had
a greater challenge in understanding the situation.
Secondly, people tried to make sense of the situation. Like other critical situations,
many people reported that they were seeking and sharing information for fact finding and
verification in order to reduce their high level of uncertainty. It was apparent that people
exchanged information and rumors regarding their collective sense of the situation (i.e.,
risks or threats to the country) and personal interests (e.g., related to their everyday
life context). In addition, considering the coup as an historical event, people explicitly
expressed that they would like to be part of it. This perspective led them to be active
1the military and the ousted prime minister used the media as a battle field. Therefore, in this case,
witnessing the contest of political power on air was different than watching and listening to traditional
media reports.
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in terms of seeking and sharing information. In response to cultural barriers, people,
especially those in Thailand, tried to clarify the situation with those who they thought
had incorrect perceptions . In addition, translating information to other languages was
another way to cross cultural barriers. Furthermore, there was a sense of recreation and
entertainment attached to the way people sought and shared information during that
period (e.g., using parody and being sarcastic).
Lastly, it is also important to note that people were multitasking and used multiple
sources during that time. There was apparently no source or channel that was dominant
during that time. People went outside to the places where there were appearances of the
military and they took photos of and/or with them. They communicated back to their
contacts and the general public informing them about what they were seeing. At the
same time, they also followed what was reported by the mainstream media, realizing that
the information provided was limited. Lastly, they used various Internet applications
to disseminate information, not only to their contacts, but also the public. The roles of
telephone, live blogging and instant messaging seemed to be the most prominent during
that time.
2. What were the factors influencing the way people sought and shared information
during the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat?
There are three groups of factors that seemingly influenced information behavior
during the disruptive moment of the 2006 coup, including individual characteristics,
collective constructs, and contextual factors.
The first group deals with individual characteristics, focusing on cognitive, affective,
and physical elements. For affective constructs, the political situation itself led to a mix
of positive and negative feelings for numerous people. In addition, the disruption of the
traditional flow of information brought a sense of uncertainty and frustration. However,
it was apparent that a sense of excitement played an important role in influencing
information seeking and stopping behavior during the early stage of the coup. In terms
of the cognitive construct, the coup also reminded people of particular related points
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of life in the past (e.g., the 1991 coup d’e´tat or the financial crisis in 1995). This view
also influenced people’s reactions to the coup. Moreover, the roles people perceived
themselves playing during the coup seems to be influential (e.g., bloggers as grassroots
journalist). Physical limitations also played an important role in terms of how and when
people decided to stop following the situation. It is noteworthy that the coup began
during the late evening in Thailand. A number of people who were in Thailand during
that time reported that they stayed up all night to follow the situation and had to give
up because of tiredness.
Another set of factors relates to the role of collective activities during the coup. It
was apparent, due to the limitations of the mainstream media, that people helped each
other to be efficient and effective in terms of seeking and sharing information in the
disruptive moment. Some groups set or adjusted social norms for members to work
collaboratively and achieve particular information sharing-oriented goals or tasks (e.g.,
editing Wikipedia entries). In addition, people collaboratively sought and shared infor-
mation in order to maintain their personal security. Finally, people got encouragement
from others, whether or not they knew each other, to lead the discussions and become
the hub of information.
The last group of factors involves the context of the coup, which highlights the
temporal element of the situation. Time was meaningful in two ways: 1) the timing
of the coup actions as the story was unfolding during the night of September 19, 2006
and 2) time in relation to everyday life activities (e.g., the upcoming exam period). In
addition, the importance of place was highlighted during the discussions of insiders and
outsiders.
3. What were the roles of insiders/outsiders in terms of seeking and sharing infor-
mation during the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat?
This study operationalizes the notion of Insider and Outsider as based on nationality
and geographical location. As a result, there are four types of small world membership,
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including absolute insiders, absolute outsiders, insiders-out, and outsiders-in. It is im-
portant to note that there was still a strong form of the Insider – being a witness to
a historic situation gave absolute insiders and outsiders-in privileged access to certain
types of information. At the same time, those who had access to firsthand experience
assumed that outsiders might hold an inaccurate perception of the situation (e.g., the sit-
uation had turned into violence, etc.). This perception seemingly emerged in response
to what they heard from international media or their contacts outside Thailand, but
their lack of true insiders’ knowledge led them to interpret what they heard incorrectly.
Thus, language and political knowledge made the role of absolute insiders stronger than
outsiders-in in this situation. While being on the scene was an advantage, it was also
a weakness, in that seeing soldiers and tanks intensified the sense of uncertainty and
confusion among insiders. Being unable to access information from certain channels or
sources, insiders had to make sense of the situation from what they saw or heard; this
often led to a lack of comprehension of the whole situation.
This weakness of the Insiders became the strength of the Outsider as many insiders
reported that they had to rely on international news outlets and their contacts outside
of Thailand to learn about the coup. Nevertheless, people were still critical of the
quantity and quality of information disseminated by the international media, especially
outsiders. In addition, as the coup d’e´tat in Thailand may be far from the interests of
many absolute outsiders, or even some insiders-out and some outsiders-in, content from
these groups apparently did not contribute much to the story of the coup (e.g., what
the coup reminded them of in terms of the application of similar political measures to
their own countries).
Nevertheless, it is important to take notice of a broader understanding of the coup
claimed by outsiders-in and insiders-out. Outsiders-in claimed that they understood the
absolute outsiders’ background, while they were also able to access information on the
coup through their firsthand experience. Insiders-out had a strong role in bridging gaps
through communication. In addition, insiders-out claimed additional authority through
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their knowledge about Thailand (from being Thai natives). There was also an implicit
conversion among absolute insiders and absolute outsiders, primarily in order to reach
out to a wider group of audiences. For some absolute insiders, they thought about what
insiders-out would want to know during that time. In order to clarify the situation to
non-Thai audiences, absolute insiders also tried to understand the absolute outsiders’
perception of the coup. Absolute outsiders were also trying to convince others that they
had, to some extent, relationships to Thailand or Thai people in order to gain acceptance
for the information that they shared.
7.2 Information Behavior during Political Crisis
As mentioned in the introduction, the contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly,
it extends the discussion of information poverty beyond everyday life and/or routine
contexts. Secondly, it extends the understanding of conditions/factors influencing the
interactions between insiders and outsiders, especially when the insiders step outside of
their own world to obtain information. It is apparent that information behavior during
the 2006 coup can be explained by linking Chatman’s small world framework and the
notion of collective behavior to the context of the coup in Thailand.
7.2.1 Censorship as Derivative Form of Information Poverty
The notion of information poverty often assumes that material poverty is a leading de-
terminant of behavior. However, as Chatman (1992) found out, the major barrier of
the information poor is self-imposed, to avoid social risks that emerge from the lack of
sense of control outside their social milieu. Therefore, the notion of small world repre-
sents “a world in which everyday happenings occur with some degree of predictability”
(Chatman, 2000, p.3).
Nonetheless, the situation during the early stage of the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thai-
land presents a challenge to the traditional concept of information poverty as the coup
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represents the interruption of predictability in everyday life. However, Britz’s (2004)
extensive definition and interpretation of information poverty covers the state of infor-
mation needs of those who face a disruptive moment such as violations of freedom of
speech, human rights, and intellectual property (Haider & Bawden, 2006). He broadens
the scope of the notion by adopting a multidimensional approach to information access.
Information poverty is that situation in which individuals and communities,
within a given context, do not have the requisite skill, abilities, or material
means to obtain efficient access to information, interpret it and apply it ap-
propriately. It is further characterized by a lack of essential information and
a poorly developed information infrastructure. (p.194)
Although skills and materials are necessary to access information, the findings from
this study show a prominent role of information and communication infrastructure in
the context of information poverty. The control of information and communication fa-
cilities is a top priority in a successful coup d’e´tat (Luttwak, 1979). The difficulties of
communication network access without knowing the causes of interrupted access brought
a sense of uncertainty and frustration. The effect of such measures led people to ex-
perience information ’concussions’ in which they desperately needed information about
the current state of affairs and its impacts on their own lives, where information infras-
tructure is suddenly unavailable. The information rich in a normal situation became
information poor when regular sources and channels were no longer available or valid as
Dervin (1980) describes the phenomenon as ceiling effect.
There are some important distinctions between the notion of information poverty in
an everyday life context and in the context of socio-political crisis. In particular, infor-
mation poverty during crisis seems to be an adaptive behavior, considering that it occurs
when information behavior in the everyday context was interrupted. Nevertheless, the
findings from this study confirm the applicability of Chatman’s notions of information
poverty and small world outside an everyday context.
Ultimately, the data of this study confirms the existence of a world of distrust.
People definitely constructed their worldviews by comparing what they already knew
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or saw to what was learned by others. In order to construct their worldviews, they at
least had to acknowledge the existence of contrasting or conflicting perspectives. In the
case of the coup, many local Thai people heard about the coup from international news
outlets or from their contacts outside the country. Therefore, they formed the idea that
people, who could not be an eye witness or were not a native Thai, would hold opposite
perceptions – this view was at least in part corroborated by the nature of international
news reports of the Thai coup.
Information poverty, in an everyday life context, deals with self-protective measures
in order to maintain a predictability in a world of distrust. This characteristic of infor-
mation poverty seemed to be common among coup leaders and politicians during that
time. The way in which they tried to suppress, control, and monopolize the normal flow
of information (i.e., using mass media as a battle group) seems to be an exemplar of
how they utilized behaviors in an everyday life context in this crisis situation. In addi-
tion, the evidence of self-censorship (e.g., closure of web forums) and privacy protection
(e.g., using anonymity) in various online communities also supports the perspective of
information poverty presented in Chatman’s small world work; surviving in a world
of distrust (Chatman, 2000, p.7) but perhaps in a more intensive form. Interestingly
enough, applying this interpretation to the coup situation, sharing information in order
to clarify the situation to outsiders was also one of the self-protective mechanisms of
insiders as they were afraid that the wrong/opposite perception of the situation could
jeopardize the image of the country.
Even though the predictability of routine activities was interrupted by the coup,
there was still a strong sense of trustworthiness. During the foot and mouth outbreak
in the United Kingdom in 2001, Hagar (2005) argued that the issue of trustworthiness
especially in the online environment becomes crucial, but may be overlooked. Similar to
Hagar’s findings, during the 2006 coup in Thailand, the practices of fact finding were not
just to gain as much information as possible. To gain cognitive clarity (Festinger et al.,
1948), the sense-making process during that time also included people helping each other
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validate information. In other words, it was not only a matter of quantity, but of quality
of information received as evaluated by, particularly, the trustworthiness of information
sources. For example, many bloggers reported the sources of rumors/information they
posted or cited. This also became a norm among Flickr, YouTube, and Wikipedia users.
The dynamic of trustworthiness may interact with people’s perceptions toward their
lives ‘in the round’, whether or not they are functioning as desired. Note that one of
the most interesting findings from this study concerns the way people variably perceived
the coup situation. From a conventional perspective, a coup d’e´tat is a non-democratic
measure to alter a political system representing an unhealthy situation. However, the
2006 coup in Thailand has also been viewed as non-threatening and non-risky to many
people. This can be explained by understanding that a political situation may be inter-
preted as situational or an expression of rhetoric (Vatz, 1999). In addition, according to
Buckingham (2000), some people perceive that politics is irrelevant to their lives. For
those people, politics is not a part of everyday life. They were still able to fit the coup
situation in their everyday life routines that were still functioning without the availabil-
ity of broadcast channels. Therefore, many people resumed the normal behavior during
that time.
7.2.2 Collective Information Behavior during the Coup
Not only was ‘life in the round’ maintained by many as much as possible, there was
strong evidence of how people collectively created and negotiated social norms during
the disruptive situation of the 2006 coup. The analysis of social norms can be based
on the fundamental assumptions of collective behavior/action. Observing both implicit
and explicit expression, people’s behavior during that time can be explained in various
dimensions of collective behavior/action. Instead of a strong sense of irrationality and
panic as described in Le Bon’s notion of crowds, people in Thailand apparently dealt
with the constraints from the suppression of the traditional flow of information by going
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to their existing virtual groups. As adaptive responses (Turner & Killian, 1987), mem-
bers of local online communities discussed the effects of the new prescriptive rules with
positive sanctions (reinforcing the conformity) introduced by the coup (e.g., whether or
not the rule of the coup can be applied to the virtual community).
When an existing group was not functioning, they formed a new group (e.g., chat
room, or collaborative blogging) within a trusted network. Although recruitment was
selective, it does not mean that they had strong ties. Some did not know each other, but
recognized the existence of each other. Within a newly emerging group, they discussed
and created specific social rules in order achieve particular goals (e.g., writing blogs,
developing Wikipedia entries, crosschecking information).
Another noteworthy aspect of collective behavior during the coup was in emotion or
public mood (Rahn, 2000), as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. From a traditional perspec-
tive, Schramm (1965) argued that various negative expressions of feeling such as sorrow,
sadness, shame, anger, fear, and anxiety are common during critical events. During the
2006 coup in Thailand, people reported that they had mixed feelings. However, it was
the sense of excitement that seemed to lead people to choose particular behaviors during
that time.
Based on the dimensional theory of emotions, Lang (1995) suggested that this sense
of excitement contains two connotations: high arousal and positive valence. The con-
notation of excitement is conventionally attached to pleasure or recreation (e.g., Fulton,
2005). This interpretation of excitement can also be valid in this coup phenomenon as
many people referred to their experience as fun, as a response to the way they helped
each other in searching and sharing information during the disruptive moment of the
coup. This dimension of excitement may also be explained by the idea of information en-
countering (e.g., Erdelez, 1996) or incidental information acquisition (Heinstro¨m, 2006).
Especially for active doers or “super-encounterers”, the sense of excitement may also
come from the perception that the information they found was useful and important.
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The presence of the super-encounterers was an especially interesting finding
in this study. These respondents appeared to share a common excitement
for information encountering. They believed in creating situations conducive
to information encountering and in that way finding useful and important
information.
(Erdelez, 1996, p.412)
Besides the positive connotation, the sense of excitement deals with arousal that
leads to an intensified and energetic emotional response. Chatman, in her early work
on information poverty (1991), discusses a sense of excitement as one of the leading
constructs in explaining the information behavior of the information poor.
Poor people seek immediate gratification because of behavioral characteristics
not found in other classes. That is, because they are more inclined toward
quick arousal, pleasure, or excitement, and they engage in activities that result
in instantaneous pay-offs.
(Chatman, 1991, p.442)
In the context of the coup, the intensity of arousal could be primarily derived from
the situation of the coup. The overwhelming notion of “being a part of an historic
moment” seems to be prominent during that time as discussed in Chapter 4.
The sense of excitement is nothing new when it comes to the study of information
behavior or information system development. It is almost conventional knowledge, both
academically and professionally, that excitement is a major construct for increasing the
attractiveness of an information system as well as users’ satisfaction with it. This may be
another area of research in the role of excitement in information behavior (for instance,
a comprehensive study of the role of excitement in various contexts of information be-
havior, developing a measure to evaluate the sense of excitement in information and
system interaction, etc.).
7.2.3 Reconsidering the Outsider in a Disruptive Context
The roles of social types in Chatman’s small world framework and social roles in collective
behavior are remarkable. Chatman (1999, p.209) pointed out that, “if the typecasting
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is fundamental to the definition of a role, that role becomes the ideal representation of
public expression behavior.” Aligned with Chatman’s social types, J. Perry and Pugh
(1978, p.23) asserted that social roles make life easier by increasing the predictability
of behavior and serving as a mechanism for coordinating behavior. However, at the
fundamental level, both concepts deal with social classification.
In this study, Merton’s Insider and Outsider was used to observe the interaction
among different groups of people based on nationality and geographical location at the
time of the coup. The Insider has already been discussed when examining information
behavior during a crisis in the terms of an everyday life context. However, in addition
to the strength of the Insider derived from everyday life experience, the phenomenon
during the disruptive moment of the 2006 coup in Thailand apparently highlights the
enriched life of the outsiders.
The findings indicate that absolute insiders (i.e., local Thai people) and outsiders-in
(i.e., foreigners in Thailand) had to at least partially rely on absolute outsiders (i.e.,
foreigners outside Thailand) and insiders-out (i.e., Thais living abroad) to obtain infor-
mation about what was happening in Thailand. In this picture, the worldview of insiders
was limited, especially by the control of mainstream media by the coup leaders and the
difficulties of accessing communication networks. However, insiders still could (and did)
contact information sources from outside Thailand, unlike other situations (e.g., natural
disaster) where none of the information infrastructure was functioning.
In addition, the findings from this study confirmed the conditions that motivated
members of a small world to seek information from outsiders. The three conditions
include:
1. information is perceived as critical
2. there is a collective expectation that the information is relevant, and
3. a perception exists that the life lived in the round is no longer functioning.
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The findings from this study show that people’s behaviors were variable, partly based
on how they perceived whether the coup situation was critical to them, judged by the
level of threats and risks to the sense of collectivity (i.e., Thailand as a nation and
the political system) and their everyday life routines. People tried to make sense of
obstacles or gaps that they were facing (e.g., media censorship, difficulties of network
access, language, etc.). When the perceived threat of the situation is high and the
obstacles and gaps are out of control, given that in this case available information could
not satisfy insiders’ needs, insiders stepped outside their small world. Right after I signed
on to instant messenger, for instance, many of my Thai friends in the contact list asked
me to turn on the television and report back what I saw on the TV screen. Apparently
I was not the only one who noticed this phenomenon, as examined in Chapter 4.
However, the way insiders connect to outsiders is still through the chain of trust, even
though they do not know each other, as it is evident from, for instance, the recruitment
of members into new web forums and chat rooms and the way insiders raised questions
about the quality and quantity of information disseminated from international media.
The Outsider seems to be applicable to many other disruptive moments beyond polit-
ical situations. On the day of the Virginia Tech massacre in 2006, for example, MSNBC’s
Newsweek (“Panic, in real time”, 2007) reported on its website messages exchanged be-
tween a student (blueiyed) who apparently was locked down in a building near Norris
Hall where the shootings happened and her brother (chiknman).
blueiyed (10:37:35 AM): ug?
chiknman (10:37:10 AM): ey joke
chiknman (10:37:24 AM): day haha
chiknman (10:37:28 AM): snow day*
blueiyed (10:39:25 AM): i’m on lockdown under a desk right now..there’s been
shootings on campus and 1 person has been killed and another injured
chiknman (10:38:54 AM): wtf?
chiknman (10:38:57 AM): at vt?
blueiyed (10:40:33 AM): yeh put cnn on
chiknman (10:39:07 AM): what the s***
blueiyed (10:40:51 AM): watch the news and tell me whats going on
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chiknman (10:39:44 AM): they dont have it on there
chiknman (10:39:48 AM): ill check other stations
blueiyed (10:42:17 AM): ok its on the news tho i promise b/c drew was telling
me then he had to go to class
chiknman (10:41:18 AM): ya its on fox news
chiknman (10:41:19 AM): 1 sec
blueiyed (10:42:58 AM): ok
chiknman (10:42:19 AM): moms here
chiknman (10:42:36 AM): hey
blueiyed (10:44:06 AM): ok i tried calling her
chiknman (10:42:40 AM): what’s going on now
blueiyed (10:44:25 AM): we can hear cops outside talking on loud phones
chiknman (10:43:00 AM): there’s a gunman who shot someone
chiknman (10:43:05 AM): they said he’s near the dorms
blueiyed (10:44:44 AM): apparently an ra was shot and 2 pewople jumped
from the building and one person walked out bloody of burress
chiknman (10:43:34 AM): that’s the building they are showing
chiknman (10:43:42 AM): reporter in pritcher hall
blueiyed (10:45:21 AM): no it happened in west aj
chiknman (10:44:08 AM): hang on
chiknman (10:44:57 AM): west ambler johnston hall
blueiyed (10:46:31 AM): yeh
chiknman (10:45:01 AM): is he still there?
blueiyed (10:46:39 AM): yeh apparently
chiknman (10:49:13 AM): are you class or at home
blueiyed (10:51:00 AM): im in class under a desk
chiknman (10:49:36 AM): oh dear god
blueiyed (10:51:13 AM): yeh
chiknman (10:49:47 AM): what happened
blueiyed (10:51:17 AM): my thoughts exactly
blueiyed (10:51:40 AM): we heard the cops outside on their mega phones so
we turned the lights off and drew the blinds and go on the floor
chiknman (10:50:33 AM): how did you know what was going on and to get
down
blueiyed (10:52:22 AM): b/c we were getting e-mails from the university
chiknman (10:52:08 AM): oh
blueiyed (10:53:55 AM): OMG
blueiyed (10:54:14 AM): i just found out the 1st shooting happened at 7:15 we
didn’t get a damn e-mail until 9:30!!
chiknman (10:52:49 AM): is the teacher taking charge or is someone in com-
munication w/ the outside
blueiyed (10:54:44 AM): yeh hes been calling and getting updates and our
doors are locked, lights off and blinds shit
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chiknman (10:54:49 AM): you mean shut or is shit a Fruedian slip ;-)
chiknman (10:55:01 AM): what class is this?
chiknman (10:55:16 AM): and you thought h.s. taught you lessons
blueiyed (10:57:47 AM): shut shoot...media writing we’re all like writing arti-
cles about it..yeh seriously like this is such terrible press for us i can’t believ
this
chiknman (11:00:09 AM): don’t worry about the press. Worry about surviv-
ing
blueiyed (11:02:05 AM): unconfirmed report from campous spokesperson: 2
people have been apprehended , 2 people killed
chiknman (11:01:00 AM): are they killed students?
chiknman (11:01:11 AM): who are the apprehended
blueiyed (11:02:43 AM): yeh i htink so i’m not sure
blueiyed (11:02:46 AM): i don’t know
chiknman (11:01:26 AM): do i have the ability to log on to vt website and get
the news?
chiknman (11:01:37 AM): what’s the site
blueiyed (11:03:24 AM): this is what i’m hearing in class
blueiyed (11:04:25 AM): 5-6 gunshots outside my building =-O
chiknman (11:03:13 AM): right now - shooting?
blueiyed (11:06:13 AM): like 5 mins ago
blueiyed (11:06:45 AM): 7-8 casualities
chiknman (11:09:31 AM): are they students?
chiknman (11:10:59 AM): they said there were 2 shootings
chiknman (11:11:09 AM): one at 7:15 and the other at 10 ish
chiknman (11:11:19 AM): they said they have one person in custody
blueiyed (11:13:43 AM): apprently they have 2 in custodyu
blueiyed (11:15:08 AM): we just got this e-mail
blueiyed (11:15:09 AM): In addition to an earlier shooting today in West Am-
bler Johnston, there has been a multiple shooting with multiple victims in
Norris Hall.
[The conversation is interrupted while the three exchange news forwarded from
friends]
Another example can be drawn from the recent political turmoil in Thailand. Note
that the political situation after the coup has not totally settled down. After the coup,
Thailand had had four prime ministers in three years by different legislative measures.
Until December 2009, Apisit Vejjajiva, a leader of Thaksin’s opposition party, was elected
from the lower house to become Thailand 27th prime minister. When Apisit began his
term, a group of people, including those who support Thaksin and those who oppose
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the military coup as well as those who disagree with the monarchy system, formed an
alliance named “United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship” (UDD), also known
as “Red Shirt” to protest againt Apisit’s government. During May 2010, the peaceful
demonstration turned into violence. There was fighting and shooting between soldiers
and protesters after a state of emergency was announced. On May 19, 2010, the situation
turned into a riot after the leaders of the Red Shirt group announced the end of the
demonstration. Apparently the protesters were not satisfied with the announcement.
They went around the central part of Bangkok and other cities and set major buildings,
such as department stores, government offices, and media stations, on fire. The following
is the transcript of the interview given by a news anchor who was inside the Maleenon
building, one of the target buildings.
อยู่ต้ังแต่ต้นจบจบเลยครับ (หัวเราะ) ผมเข้าไปต้ังแต่ 11 โมงเช้า เพราะมีรายงานข่าวตอนห้า
โมงเย็น ก็เลยเข้าไปติดตามข่าว ตอนที่ดูข่าวพวกเราก็รู้อยู่แล้วว่าเสื้อแดงจากคลองเตยจะมา
หาพวกเราที่ช่อง 3 ซ่ึงเวลาน้ันผมช่วยพี่ๆ ทาข่าวเที่ยงออนแอร์กันอยู่ แล้วก็เห็นว่าพวกเขา
เริ่มมากันแล้ว แต่ไม่คิดว่าจะรุนแรงขนาดน้ี เพราะจริงๆ แล้วเขาก็มาหาเราบ่อย แต่ส่วนใหญ่
จะมาร้องมาโวยวายเฉยๆ บางครั้งก็ให้ตัวแทนมาส่งหนังสือ แต่เจ้าหน้าที่ก็มาเคลียร์ให้ไม่มี
อะไร ครั้งน้ีก็เลยพากันทางานไปเรื่อยๆ แล้วตัวเองต้องอ่านข่าวช่วงเรื่องเด่นเย็นน้ีด้วย ก็เลย
ยังไม่ออกไป ยังไงก็อยากจะรอดูท่าทีก่อนว่าจะเป็นยังไง
จนกระทั่งพี่ๆ วิ่งข้ึนมาบอกว่าทุกคนต้องลงข้างล่างแล้ว เพราะไฟมันไหม้ ผมก็เลยลงไป
พร้อมกับทุกๆ คน แต่พอลงไปถึงชั้น G ปรากฏว่า ควันมันเริ่มเข้ามาแล้ว ทุกคนก็เลยบอก
ให้ผู้ประกาศข้ึนไปด้านบนอีก เพราะไม่แน่ใจว่าพวกเขา (เสื้อแดง) อยู่ข้างนอกกันหรือเปล่า
สรุปทุกคนก็ออกไปไม่ได้ เพราะควันก็เริ่มเข้ามาแล้ว ทุกคนก็เลยกลับข้ึนมาเหมือนเดิม พอ
กลับข้ึนมาทุกคนก็จะสับสนว่าแล้วเราจะไปอยู่ชั้นไหน ตอนแรกก็กระจายๆ กันอยู่ จนสุดท้าย
ก็มารวมกันอยู่จุดนึงในตึก
ทีน้ีมันก็เริ่มเป็นสถานการณ์ที่ค่อนข้างต่ืนตระหนก เพราะว่าเรามองไม่เห็นเหตุการณ์ข้างนอก
ด้วยตา เพราะว่าเราไม่สามารถไปเกาะกระจกได้ เราก็รับข่าวจากทางโทรศัพท์กันอย่างเดียว
ว่า ตอนน้ีไฟไหม้แล้ว ตอนน้ีมีคนตาย ตอนน้ีเกิดอย่างน้ันอย่างน้ี ซึ่งข่าวก็จะโอเวอร์จาก
ข้อเท็จจริงไปเยอะมาก ถึงกับบอกว่าเริ่มเอาระเบิด เริ่มเอายางรถยนต์เข้ามาถึงชั้นน้ันชั้นน้ี
แล้ว พวกเราก็เลยอยู่ด้วยความต่ืนตระหนกกับข่าวสารมาก ทาให้นาทีน้ันเราไม่ค่อยพูดถึง
เหตุการณ์ เพราะไม่อยากให้ต่ืนตระหนกกันไปมากกว่าน้ี เราก็เลยเลี่ยงๆ ไปพูดคุยกันเรื่อง
อื่นมากกว่า และผมต้องขอบคุณทุกคนมากที่เป็นห่วงพวกเรา มีโทรศัพท์เข้ามาเยอะมาก ทา
ให้มีกาลังใจมากเหมือนกัน (หัวเราะ) แล้วพี่น้องสื่อก็ช่วยกัน คือ น่ารักมาก เพื่อนๆ จากทุก
ช่องก็โทร.เข้ามาถามตลอดว่าจะให้ช่วยอะไรได้บ้าง เราประทับใจกับความช่วยเหลือมากครับ
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[I was there from the beginning to the end (laugh). I went to work around
11AM because I had a how around 5PM. When we checked the news, we
already knew that Red Shirt group, in Klong Toei area, would come to us
at Channel 3. At that time, I was helping my friends preparing news to be
reported during noon. We began to see them coming closer but did not think it
was going to be this serious. Actually they came to us quite often. Nonetheless,
they just yelled most of the time. Sometimes, they sent a representative to
give use letters. Our staff went to see them and there was nothing. So we
continued working this time. I also had to be on air for Rueng Den Yen Nee
[Evening highlight news]. So I did not go anywhere. I wanted to see the
situation first what it would be like.
Until my friends ran upstairs and told us that everyone had to go downstairs
because there was a fire. I went down with everyone. However, when I went
to the ground(G) floor, the smoke was getting in. Everyone then told that the
news anchors should go back upstairs because it was not sure whether or not
the protesters were outside of the building. At the end, no one could escape
because the smoke was getting in. We went back upstairs [to our office]. After
getting back, everyone was frustrated which floor we should go. At first, we
spread out. At the end, we were together in one spot in the building.
Now the situation turned into a panic situation because we could not see the
situation in the outside with our eyes. We had to receive the news from phone
only. Now [the building] was already on fire. Now there was death. Now
this and that happened. The news was way over [exaggerated]. Someone even
told us that they brought bombs and car wheels into particular floor. We
then lived with panic of information we received. In that minutes we did not
talked about the situation because we did not to create more panic. We then
changed the topics to others. I have to thank you everyone who worried about
us. There were loads of phone calls. We felt supported (laugh). And brothers
and sisters (media) helped each other. My friends from every channels called
and asked how they could help. We were impressed with your help so much.]
(“Kai Pasit”. . . , 2010)
The way he had to rely on phone calls from outsiders and the way they stopped
talking about the situation among insiders was remarkable. This kind of phenomenon
seems to be found in many other critical incidents (e.g., September 9/11, the riot in Iran
in June 2009).
These examples indicated that, during the critical moment, the sense of conflict or
competition between insiders and outsiders was apparently no longer functioning. In-
stead the chain of trust seemingly secured the sense of collaboration – working together
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to achieve particular goals and support. In addition, the example from 2006 also high-
lights the role of converted members, as discussed in Chapter 6, who helped break the
boundaries of their small world to allow their transition in worldview to be more effective.
In order to apply this framework to other contexts, one must be aware of the interpre-
tation of small world membership in this study. Clearly people did not construct their
small world solely on nationality and geographical location. These two characteristics
were chosen for this study because they were two of the most evident manifestations
during that time. In addition, they are relatively objective determinants that carry
important subjective constructs. Nationality is a proxy for the sense of attachment
and belonging and, partly, political knowledge. Geographical location represents the
ability to gain firsthand experience. Using these two factors as proxies increased the
operationalizability of the framework.
Nevertheless, in reality, Chatman (1999) argued that social type is rather subjec-
tive and never neutral. The complexity of the structure of worldview can also be de-
rived from understanding that one person usually belongs to multiple social groups and
maintains more than one social role at one time (e.g., Killian, 1952). Therefore, this
two-dimensional classification is considered only as a part of social structure in reality.
For instance, I found that there are substantial distinctions between foreigners who had
lived in Thailand for quite some time and who were there for a short visit. The length
of time in Thailand seems to be somewhat associated with political knowledge about
Thai politics. As a result, people who have more knowledge about Thai politics and/or
local culture tend to be more willing to share information with others. Therefore, the
length of time spent in Thailand, for foreigners, seems to be another proxy that should
be observed for future research. In addition, readers should also be aware of variation
in the granularity of the classification scheme. For example, based on geographical lo-
cation, this study distinguishes insiders from outsiders in the broadest sense: whether
they were inside or outside Thailand during the time. However, the findings suggest
that there were differences in worldviews created and maintained by people inside and
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outside Bangkok and its vicinity, since most of the coup activities were operated around
Bangkok and vicinity.
Another challenge is that one could argue that a virtual environment can be con-
sidered as a distinct dimension of space as opposed to physical space. The premise of
online discussion is based on the creation and maintenance of collectivity regardless of
the geographical stances of group members. However, it is noteworthy that, in a polit-
ical situation such as the 2006 coup, the sense of physical boundaries (e.g., Thailand)
seemed stronger than the sense of online community. People attempted to communicate
to others on the other side of the world.
7.3 Limitations and Challenges of Research Meth-
ods
There is no doubt that this qualitative research study is a product of subjective obser-
vation. Providing some critiques of the research method should help readers to be aware
of the applicability of the findings of this research study as well as the methods used.
The limitations and challenges, which emerged from the research design and methods
are discussed below based on the two data collection methods: document analysis and
interviews.
7.3.1 Document Analysis
The first issue to be noted in terms of document analysis concerns the selection of docu-
ments. Although specific keywords and document creation dates were applied to search
engines, the availability of documents retrieved was also based on the performance of
search engines (e.g., crawlers and algorithms). Google Blog search, Flickr, and YouTube
were selected as popular retrieving tools, representing popular collections during the
time of the coup. However, a number of researchers (e.g., Thelwall & Hasler, 2007;
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Escher, 2008) point to the imperfect performance of different blog search engines, in-
cluding Google Blog Search. There are, therefore, some issues regarding the reliability
of Google Blog Search that are related to this.
It is not possible, as yet, to precisely estimate the number of blogs in the blogosphere.
Although Google is currently one of the most popular search engines, the way that
Google crawlers identify blogs is not disclosed. For example, how does Google crawler
differentiate blogs from general websites? What are the characteristics of blogs that are
taken into account during the web crawl? Apparently, in addition to content hosted
by blog service providers (e.g., Wordpress.com, Blogger.com, or Windows Live Spaces),
Google Blog Search also retrieves content that was hosted on independent servers (i.e.,
servers with their own domain names). Therefore, the search results apparently include
content from mainstream media websites, web forums, and static web pages that use
a blog platform as a content management system. Additionally, for Thai blog content,
perhaps because Google uses the popularity of website (domain-level) and particular
pages as parts of its Page Rank algorithms (Brin & Page, 1998; Bihun et al., 2007), there
were not many representations of content hosted by local blog services (e.g., Exteen.com
or Pantip’s Bloggang). In other words, content hosted by international providers seemed
to get higher page ranks.
In terms of search results, one should be aware of the imperfection of search results
presented by Google Blog search. As Escher (2008) and Thelwall and Hasler (2007)
found out, the estimates of the number of search results changes every time the page is
refreshed, regardless of whether or not new queries were entered. This issue also occurred
for Flickr search results. In order to solve the inconsistency caused by variations in search
engine operation, I decided to use feeds (i.e., RSS/Atom) to store search results before
uploading to NVivo. However, it is apparent that using feeds provided by Google Blog
Search contributed to another major challenge to the operation of this study. Google
Blog Search limits the number of results to 100 items per feed. Therefore, I had to
divide the search results into 100 item intervals. Apparently the crawler of Google Blog
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Search, as well as queries, are updated every few days. Every time the queries were
updated, Google Blog Search appended the results to the old feeds. As a result, time
and resources were largely used for managing redundant items.
Another challenge of document analysis was from the perspective of historic doc-
uments. Note that the data collection was not begun until two years after the coup.
Therefore, the persistence of content is very important in this stream of research. For
example, the study on bloggers’ perceptions and behaviors regarding digital preserva-
tion (Hank, Choemprayong, & Sheble, 2007) indicated that nearly all bloggers make
decisions to keep, edit, and delete blog posts after they publish them.
During the data collection, I also found that there were some blog posts that could
not be aggregated (for example, broken links, age verification requirement, password
protected, and invited list only). As a result, the readers of this research study must
be aware of the dynamic of digital content in general in considering the data collection
approach and research findings.
Besides blogs, photos, videos, and Wikipedia entries, I originally intended to include
web forums as part of the document analysis. Most of the local web forums did not
archive their content extensively. Therefore, I decided to not include web forums in the
data collection of this study.
Another view of the dynamic of digital content as an impact on this study was evident
from the search results of Flickr and YouTube. I found that the results of Flickr and
YouTube yielded photos and videos where the creation and upload date are different.
Interestingly enough, it took years for some people to upload such content. There were
still people uploading photos taken on the coup date when I began collecting data. The
last upload date stamp of photo in this collection was November 28, 2009, over three
years after the coup. This challenge of aggregating digital content, in the context of
the life cycle of personal information management, highlights the role of creation and
dissemination of information in relation to time.
Additionally, while NVivo facilitates various types of media and open coding based
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on the grounded theory approach, there are some technical issues that need to be ad-
dressed as they provided a challenge for this research study. NVivo does not support
the management of large amounts of data. By appending original documents into a
project file, the original NVivo project file of this study was very large, including thou-
sands of PDF files, hundreds of photos and videos, which requires a large amount of
resources and time to support the operation of the application. Therefore, I decided to
separate the project file into five files based on document types - blog posts, photos,
videos, Wikipedia, and interviews. Although, the separation helped the efficiency of file
management, coding data in multiple files was challenging in that codes needed to be
synchronized among the five working files.
Furthermore, the way in which NVivo deals with multimedia is also worth mention-
ing. Since NVivo does not support HTML documents, I decided to download blog posts
in PDF format in order to preserve the context of the blog. Even though it is a pro-
prietary format, it is a standard document file on the Web. Although NVivo supports
textual PDF documents, the rendition of PDF documents with image and table, which
are the majority of blog posts, is problematic. Note that using different PDF converters
gives different results when importing documents to NVivo. Adobe PDF Professional,
doPDF, and ConvertPDF were compared with a sample of blog content in PDF format.
Apparently, ConvertPDF gave the best results for this study because it includes Opti-
cal Character Recognition (OCR) texts and still preserves the look and feel of blogs.
Interestingly, NVivo has problems importing PDF documents generated from Adobe
PDF Professional. At the same time, doPDF removes some features (e.g., high contrast
image, URL link) in order to reduce file size, which decreases the richness of context of
the document.
The coding of non-textual data in NVivo was also challenging. The process of coding
itself was not too complicated. However, it is quite ambitious to make sense of a code
when related data points are collocated. NVivo stores and displays the selection of visual
and (non-transcribed) audio data in numerical values of space, which is meaningless to
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normal users. Therefore, the researcher had to go back and forth to each data point to
make sense of a code.
7.3.2 Interviews
The challenge of the interviews begins with the low response rate. Eight informants
agreed to participate, out of 40 invitations selected from document selection. This seems
to be a common issue among contemporary researchers. However, for this particular
study, there are some observations that need to be examined.
A number of people who declined the invitation said in the response message that it
was because they perceived themselves as outsiders. Some mentioned that s/he is not
a politician or journalist or did not have a relationship with the “very insiders”. Some
said that they were not in Thailand at the time. Even though I tried to explain the
study, the perception that this study is far from their experience and interests (i.e., like
politics is not a part of my daily life) seems to be strong.
In addition, the snowball technique was also not a big success. Informants recruited
from document analysis were quite reluctant to provide names of references. There
seemed to be two motivations related to the reluctance to refer to other persons. The first
motivation seemingly comes from the informants themselves. A number of informants
reported that they wanted to preserve their privacy. Some did not want to bother their
family members or friends. Secondly, another motivation came from the instructions for
the recruitment. The criteria for the snowball sampling technique was to find people
who were different from the informants (e.g., Internet vs. non-Internet users, different
age groups, geographical location, etc.). This criterion was too complicated. Therefore,
a number of informants, when asked to provide the name of a reference, said that they
did not know anybody to refer to right away.
In addition, this study focuses on the actions/behaviors that occurred during the
2006 coup in Thailand, which happened about two years prior to the beginning of data
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collection. Although field observation has been conducted and was possible in some stud-
ies of critical situations (e.g., Kraus et al., 1975), such observation requires planning and
a large amount of resources. Therefore, the interviews heavily relied on the informants’
memories. Even though the Sense-Making Methodology was selected to increase the
richness of the data, the way in which people recall their memories could potentially be-
come sources of error (Watt, 2007). Such errors can be discussed in terms of, for example,
severe memory bias (Schacter, 2001), recency bias (Festinger, 1957; Gilbert, 2006), hind-
sight bias (Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000), and the tendency “to fill in details
of partly remembered events, substituting stock footage like cultural norms or role per-
ceptions for actual events and people” (Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, & Sailer, 1984;
Gilbert, 2006). A number of people had responded and had to correct their own an-
swers during the interview. Most of them stated that they did not remember the coup
events clearly. For example, when asked about the first exposure to the news about the
coup, AnonymousOut2 thought that he did not remember the event clearly. However,
when asked specifically what he did during that time, the explanation indicated that he
remembered the situation in detail.
I remember it vividly. I was outside of Thailand at the time.
...
I was watching a DVD of the West Wing. I was just about to turn off the
computer, but went to check my e-mail.
(AnonymousOut2 - Interview)
For AbsoluteInsider16, she reportedly was confused when I asked her about when
she heard from her colleagues that the next day was a holiday. She was afraid that what
she said would mix with her recent memory of the insurgency in Bangkok.
AbsoluteInsider16: จำไม่ได้อ่ะ
AbsoluteInsider16: กลัวว่าจะสับสนกับตอนคนเสื้อแดงอ่ะ
Interviewer: ทำไม
Interviewer: สับสนยังไง
AbsoluteInsider16: ก็จาได้ว่ามันมีเหตุการณ์เสื้อแดงที่ยึดถนนด้วยอ่ะ [ที่ทำให้ต้องหยุดงาน]
224
[AbsoluteInsider16: I don’t remember.
AbsoluteInsider16: I am afraid that I am confused with the event with the
Red Shirt group.
Interviewer: Why?
Interviewer: How does it confuse you?
AbsoluteInsider16: I remember that Red Shirt seize the streets [in Bangkok.
And I did not have to go to work the next day.]
(AbsoluteInsider16 - Interview)
As a result, the complication from this source of error apparently directly affects the
usability of the Micro-Moment Timeline interview technique. When asking informants
to describe a particular activity in detail, a lot of them said they did not remember.
Nevertheless, the retrospective aspect of this research also has a brighter side.
Maclean (1993) learned from the field research of the Mann Gulch crisis that “we don’t
remember as exactly the desperate moments when our lives are in the balance as we re-
member the moments after when the balance has tipped in our favor” (p.212). Therefore,
gaining information some time later could yield a more accurate reconstruction of an
event than recalling the memory during the event or right after the event ended (Weick,
1993). During the interviews, a number of respondents, when asked about subjective
constructs (such as feelings or impressions), instead of telling what they were feeling
(e.g., sad), gave answers about their current state (see AbsoluteInsider5’s response in
Chapter 5).
The second limitation/challenge comes from the nature of the mediated interview
mode, especially in an online environment. Compared to face-to-face communication,
the lack of co-location in mediated communication means the investigator cannot ef-
fectively observe the non-verbal cues and other realities outside the interview context
(see also J. Miller & Glassner, 2004). In addition, mediated communication heavily
relies on the reliability of the medium. Thus, the effectiveness and efficiency of an in-
terview is dependent on the medium. Hinds and Kiesler (1999) observed two features
of the medium effect on social processes: bandwidth (“reflects the number of different
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cues or signals that a medium transmits”) and synchrony (“the potential to exchange
information rapidly and adjust messages in response to signals from one’s partner”;
Straus, Miles, & Levesque, 2001, p.364). Therefore, the interview may potentially be
influenced by the delay or loss of communication. Although allowing informants to se-
lect interview modes at their preference and convenience increased participation and
the richness of the data, this approach raises the cost for the researcher in terms of
recording and transcription. The variety of interview data formats (e.g., textual, audio,
visual data) requires more effort for cleaning data. Nonetheless, in comparison in this
particular study, it seems that audio modes of communication (i.e., phone) seem to pro-
vide more richness of data as the interviewer can probe the questions, followed by email
and instant messaging. This may reflect an implication of using instant messenger for a
research interview. It was apparent that peoples’ responses were shorter than responses
provided by other means. Probably people perceived instant messaging as a means of
quick communication. Therefore, it is suggested that instant messaging may be most
useful for structured and quick interviews.
7.4 Implications for Future Research and Practice
Concerning the methodological critiques above, the experience of conducting this study
informs a few recommendations for future research. To improve this kind of study in the
future, it is important to realize the grand challenges emerging from the use of a political
crisis in the past as a case study. Firstly, since this kind of study is time-sensitive, one
should be aware of the dynamic of the existence of information and knowledge. However,
there is no concrete instruction in terms of how soon should the data collection begin in
order to preserve the freshness of data that happens in the past. Therefore, it could be
another venue of social research to improve the validity and reliability of historic data.
In addition, in order to strengthen this kind of research, quantitative measures such
as the social network approach could also help to validate the findings from this study,
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particularly in terms of confirming the strength of the Outsider in disruptive situations.
However, when conducting a research study on insiders and outsiders, one should
keep in mind the complexity of the construction of one’s worldview and that the struc-
ture of small worlds is multidimensional. Therefore, a measurement of the validity of
the development of the pre-defined structure of a small world (e.g., nationality and ge-
ographical location in this study) might be considered to improve the quality of the
analysis. In addition, researchers may want to focus on a particular group of people in a
community (e.g., participants of a web forum). Analyzing data for this particular study
was somewhat overwhelming due to the large amount of data. By narrowing down to a
particular group, the effectiveness of the data analysis process could be improved (i.e.,
manageable datas set).
There are a couple lines of research that can grow out of this particular study. The
first research stream is to extend the understanding of the Outsider in various disruptive
contexts. This study shed some light on the role of outsiders and converted members
in order to bridge the gaps and help insiders to continue the functioning of their small
world (i.e., outsider as a life saver). However, as mentioned at the beginning of this
study, the 2006 coup d’e´tat in Thailand is only one single case focusing on a particular
political crisis. There are other contexts where this reversion of small world might be
applicable; in particular different types of censorship. For example, it is interesting to
see how people get away with Internet censorship in different countries. Even from a
traditional perspective, the way in which people obtain banned books or media may also
indicate the strength of the Outsiders.
Another area that is not in the focus of this study but worth further studying is
looking at information behavior through the lens of personal information management.
This study confirms the substantial role of small devices (e.g., digital camera, camcorder,
cell phone) to help people seek and share information during the coup. Therefore,
it would be interesting to explore the information life cycle in a disruptive context.
For example, how do people improvise devices and techniques to help them get the
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information they want?
The last area that is noteworthy is the application of the Outsider in designing
emergency information systems. In a current and conventional emergency system, the
emergency system is designed based on the assumption that, when there is an emergency
happening to someone, his/her contacts are the receivers of information. However,
the strength of outsiders in disruptive moments can be applied in the transition of
information (i.e., outsiders as source of information). People who are not at risk can
save lives of those who are. The implication of the Outsider in this context is worth
further development.
Finally, it was observed in Chapter 4 that the coding scheme may be comparable
to the metaphor of Sense Making metatheory (e.g., Dervin, 1999b). It is important to
note this research study adopted Sense Making metathoery as data collection guideline,
particularly for the interview, in order to enhance the richness of the data set. However,
the data analysis primarily relied on grounded theory’s open coding technique, without
consulting any particular pre-define coding scheme. The coding scheme was solely de-
rived from the data set. The goal of this study is to validate Chatman’s small world
and Merton’s notion of Insider and Outsider. Therefore, it is recommended that this
would be an opportunity for a future work to validate the applicability of Sense Making
metatheory to information seeking and sharing behavior in a disruptive context.
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Appendix A: Fact Sheet
English version
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Information about a Research Study
IRB Study # 09-1398 Consent Form Version Date: 09-17-2009
Title of Study: The Transition of Worldview: Collective Information Behavior during
Thailand 2006 Coup D’tat
Principal Investigator: Songphan Choemprayong
UNC-Chapel Hill Department: School of Information and Library Science
Faculty Advisor: Paul Solomon (psolomon@mailbox.sc.edu); Barbara B. Moran
(moran@ils.unc.edu)
Study Contact telephone number: +1 919-338-2985
Study Contact email: songphan.coup06@gmail.com
What are some general things you should know about research studies?
You are being asked to take part in a research study. Your participation in the study is
voluntary. You may decline, or you may withdraw your consent to be in the study, for
any reason, without penalty.
Research studies are designed to obtain new knowledge. This new information may help
people in the future. You may not receive any direct benefit from being in the research
study. There also may be risks to being in research studies.
Details about this study are discussed below. It is important that you understand
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this information so that you can make an informed choice about participating in this
research study. You may ask the researchers named above any questions you have about
this study at any time.
What is the purpose of this study?
We want to understand how and why people sought, shared, and used information during
the September 19, 2006 coup d’tat in Thailand.
How many people will take part in this study?
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of approximately 40 people in this
research study.
How long will your part in this study last?
It depends on your choice of interview mode. Overall, the interview sessions for the
real-time mode, such as instant messenger (e.g., MSN Live messenger, AIM, Yahoo
messenger, Google Talk) and private chat (e.g., Skype), will take about 30 minutes to
one (1) hour each. It is very likely that you will be asked to be interviewed more than
once (up to 3-4 sessions). The interview(s) should be done within a week timeframe.
For an asynchronous mode, such as email, Hi5, Facebook, or YouTube message, the
conversations would take about a week or two to complete. Length of time will depend
upon the length of your answer and your skill level (i.e., to use computer, software, and
telephone). It could take from about 15 minutes to an hour for one session. Over a
week’s time, there may be up to 3-4 sessions depending upon your responses. You would
be expected to respond to the question within a day or two after receiving the question.
If more time is needed, you will need to contact the researcher.
Please note that you may choose to stop either type of the interview at any time.
What will happen if you take part in the study?
The researcher will ask you questions about your experience during the early stage of the
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September 19 coup in 2006 (roughly from September 19 - 23, 2006). The researcher will
take notes about what you say. You will be asked to voluntarily provide your personal
documents (e.g., diary/journal entries, blog posts, chat transaction logs) created during
that time. In addition, you will be asked to identify one or more of your contacts during
the early period of the coup. In order to seek a more diverse perspective, we would like
to contact those who are different from you (for example, those who are different in age,
location, occupation, or those who are non-Internet users, or who have different political
points of view).
You do not have to answer any questions or provide any information that you do not
wish to disclose, for any reason.
What are the possible benefits from being in this study?
Research is designed to benefit society by gaining new knowledge. Your participation is
important to help us understand the way people seek, share, and use information during
socio-political crises, but you may not benefit personally from being in this research
study.
If you are interested in learning about the results of this study, we are happy to provide
you with an electronic copy of the findings of this study when the study ends.
What are the possible risks or discomforts involved from being in this study?
Since political distress could be a sensitive topic, if you experience emotional distress
during the interview, please tell the researcher immediately. You may request extra time
to think about the topic or even decline to answer any questions.
In addition, there may be some risks for expressing contrary perspectives to the current
government, which could put you in legal jeopardy, for instance lse majest law. The
major concern is from the communication modes that may be monitored by a third
party. Therefore, please consider the interview mode in which you feel most secure in
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that it will not be monitored or wiretapped. However, you may change the means of
communication at anytime, if you feel uncomfortable during the interview.
How will your privacy be protected?
I will create a pseudonym for you, not related to your identity, and use it on the tran-
scripts and the notes from the interview. No one will know what you said. Your contact
information will be stored separately and destroyed after the study ends.
Prior to the interview, the interviewer will ask a permission to quote your responses and
contents in the public and personal documents in the research report. Please note that
someone may be able to identify you from reading your responses and the contents in
the document, though we will take steps to minimize this possibility. The researcher will
not publish your responses or contents in the document if you do not grant permission.
Moreover, you are advised to delete any related interview documents (e.g., emails, his-
tory, transaction logs) after the interview is done. This is to protect your privacy at the
highest level. Please contact the researcher if you need instructions on how do so.
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Will you receive anything for being in this study?
While there is no compensation available for your participation, your participation is
very important to us.
Will it cost you anything to be in this study?
You will need access to a reliable communication medium such as the Internet and tele-
phone. Also, there might be additional costs from making a copy of personal documents
(e.g., photocopying and scanning).
Can you share information about this study to others?
Due to the controlled selection method, please do not forward the invitation to others. If
you receive the invitation from someone other than the researcher named above, please
disregard the invitation. In addition, to preserving the privacy and integrity of this
study, please do not share data used in this study, such as email conversations or chat
history logs, with anyone else until the study ends. Please contact the researcher if you
would like to share the data with others.
In general, you can talk to others briefly about this study. However, it is highly suggested
that you not reveal your participation of this study until this study ends, which is around
May 2010.
What if you have questions about this study?
You have the right to ask, and have answered, any questions you may have about
this research. If you have questions, or concerns, you should contact me at song-
phan.coup06@gmail.com or +1 919-338-2985. You can also contact me or my advisor at
the email addresses listed at the beginning of this form.
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What if you have questions about your rights as a research participant?
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your
rights and welfare. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research
subject you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board at
+1 919-966-3113 or by email to IRB subjects@unc.edu.
Thank you for helping me with this study.
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Thai version
มหาวิทยาลัยนอร์ทแคโรไลนา แชเปิลฮิลล์
ข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับงานวิจัย
หมายเลข IRB # 09-0398 แบบฟอร์มใบยินยอมรุ่นที่: 09-17-2009
ชื่อเรื่อง: การเปลี่ยนผ่านของมุมมองต่อโลก: พฤติกรรมสารสนเทศหมู่ในช่วงการปฏิวัติ พ.ศ. 2549 ใน
ประเทศไทย
ผู้วิจัย: ทรงพันธ์ เจิมประยงค์
ภาควิชาของ UNC-Chapel Hill: โรงเรียนสารสนเทศศาสตร์และบรรณารักษศาสตร์
อาจารย์ที่ปรึกษา: Paul Solomon (psolomon@mailbox.sc.edu); Barbara B. Moran (moran@ils.unc.edu)
หมายเลขโทรศัพท์ที่ใช้ติดต่อในการศึกษาวิจัย: +1 919-338-2985
อีเมล์ที่ใช้ติดต่อในการศึกษาวิจัย: songphan.coup06@gmail.com
คุณควรทราบอะไรบ้างในเบื้องต้นเกี่ยวกับการวิจัย
คุณกำลังถูกทาบทามให้เข้าร่วมในการศึกษาวิจัย การเข้าร่วมเป็นไปด้วยความสมัครใจ คุณอาจปฏิเสธที่จะ
เข้าร่วม หรือคุณอาจยกเลิกความยินยอมที่จะเข้าร่วมในการศึกษาด้วยเหตุผลใด ๆ ก็ตาม โดยปราศจาก
ข้อผูกมัดใดๆ
งานศึกษาวิจัยออกแบบมาเพื่อสร้างองค์ความรู้ใหม่ ข้อมูลใหม่เหล่าน้ีอาจนำไปช่วยมนุษย์ในอนาคต คุณ
อาจไม่ได้ รับผลประโยชน์โดยตรงจากการเข้าร่วมในงานวิจัย นอกจากน้ียังอาจมีความเสี่ยงในการเข้าร่วม
ให้ข้อมูลในงานวิจัยอีกด้วย
รายละเอียดเกี่ยวกับงานวิจัยปรากฏอยู่ ด้านล่างน้ี เป็นสิ่งที่สำคัญที่คุณต้องเข้าใจข้อมูลเหล่าน้ี เพื่อที่
คุณสามารถ ตัดสินใจโดยรับทราบเกี่ยวกับการเข้าร่วมในงานวิจัยน้ี คุณควรสอบถามนักวิจัยที่ปรากฏชื่อ
ข้างต้น หากมีคำถาม ที่เกี่ยวข้องกับงานวิจัยน้ีได้ทุกเมื่อ
จุดประสงค์ของงานวิจัยน้ีคืออะไร
235
นักวิจัยต้องการที่จะทำความเข้าใจว่า อะไรทำให้คนตัดสินใจที่จะค้นหา แลกเปลี่ยน และใช้ข้อมูลสารสนเทศ
ในช่วงการปฏิวัติเมื่อวันที่ 19 กันยายน 2549 ในประเทศไทย และอย่างไร
มีผู้เข้าร่วมในงานวิจัยน้ีกี่คน
ถ้าคุณตกลงที่จะเข้าร่วมให้ข้อมูลในงานวิจัยน้ี คุณจะเป็นหน่ึงในประมาณ 40 คน
คุณจะต้องใช้เวลาเท่าไหร่
ข้ึนอยู่กับวิธีการสัมภาษณ์ที่คุณต้องการ โดยทั่วไป การสัมภาษณ์ที่ผู้สัมภาษณ์และผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์จะต้อง
คุยพร้อม กัน เช่น instant messenger (IM ได้แก่ MSN Live messenger, AIM, Yahoo messenger,
Google Talk) หรือ สนทนาส่วนตัว (เช่น Skype) จะใช้เวลาประมาณ 30 นาทีถึงหน่ึงชั่วโมงต่อหน่ึงช่วง
การสัมภาษณ์ และก็เป็นไปได้ สูงมากที่คุณจะต้องให้ข้อมูลมากกว่าหน่ึงครั้ง (อาจถึง 3 – 4 ครั้ง) และ
คาดว่าน่าจะเสร็จสิ้นภายในหน่ึงสัปดาห์
สำหรับการสื่อสารที่ไม่ได้เกิดข้ึนในเวลาเดียวกัน (asynchronous) เช่น อีเมล์ Hi5 Facebook หรือ Y-
ouTube message การสัมภาษณ์อาจใช้เวลาประมาณ 1-2 สัปดาห์จึงจะเสร็จสิ้น การใช้เวลาตอบคำถาม
แต่ละข้อข้ึนอยู่กับ ความยาวของคำตอบและทักษะในการใช้เครื่องมือของคุณ คุณอาจใช้เวลาตอบคำถาม
ต้ังแต่ 15 นาทีถึง 1 ช่ัวโมง ในช่วงเวลา 1 สัปดาห์ อาจมีการสอบถาม 3-4 ครั้ง ข้ึนอยู่กับการตอบคำถาม
ของคุณ โดยปรกติคุณควรจะตอบ คำถามภายใน 1 -2 วันหลังจากที่ได้รับคำถาม หากต้องการเวลาเพิ่ม
กรุณาแจ้งผู้วิจัย
คุณสามารถเลือกที่จะหยุดการสัมภาษณ์ในทุกช่องทางได้ทุกเม่ือ
จะเกิดอะไรข้ึนหากคุณเลือกที่จะเข้าร่วมในงานวิจัย?
นักวิจัยจะถามคุณเกี่ยวกับประสบการณ์ในช่วงแรกของการปฏิวัติ 19 กันยายน 2549 (โดยประมาณ
ต้ังแต่วันที่ 19 – 23 กันยายน 2549) และจะจดบันทึกเกี่ยวกับสิ่งที่คุณพูด คุณจะถูกถามให้เปิดเผย
เอกสารส่วนตัวที่สร้างข้ึนใน ช่วงเวลาดังกล่าวด้วยความสมัครใจ (เช่น ไดอารี่ บล็อก ประวัติการสนทนา
นอกจากน้ีคุณจะถูกถามให้ระบุช่ือและ ข้อมูลติดต่อบุคคลที่คุณติดต่อด้วยในช่วงเวลาท่ีเกิดการรัฐประหาร
และเพื่อให้ได้ภาพที่แตกต่างออกไป หาก เป็นไปได้ นักวิจัยต้องการข้อมูลของบุคคลมีที่มีความแตกต่าง
จากตัวคุณเอง เช่น อาชีพ อายุ เพศ การศึกษา การ ใช้งานอินเตอร์เน็ต และความคิดเห็นและมุมมอง
ทางการเมือง
คุณไม่จำเป็นต้องตอบคำถามหรือเปิดเผยข้อมูลใด ๆ ที่คุณไม่ต้องการ ด้วยเหตุผลใด ๆ ก็ตาม
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อะไรคือผลประโยชน์ที่คุณจะได้รับจากการเข้าร่วมในงานวิจัย
งานวิจัยถูกออกแบบมาเพื่อให้เป็นประโยชน์ต่อส่วนรวมด้วยการสร้างองค์ความรู้ใหม่ การเข้าร่วมของคุณ
มี ความสำคัญที่จะทำให้เราเข้าใจการที่มนุษย์ค้นหา แลกเปลี่ยนและใช้สารสนเทศในช่วงวิกฤตการณ์ทาง
สังคมและ การเมือง อย่างไรก็ตามคุณอาจจะไม่ได้รับประโยชน์ส่วนตัวจากการเข้าร่วมในงานวิจัยน้ี
หากคุณสนใจที่จะทราบเกี่ยวกับผลการวิจัย เรายินดีที่จะมอบสำเนาอิเล็กทรอนิกส์ของผลการศึกษาเมื่อ
งานวิจัย เป็นอันเสร็จสิ้น
มีความเส่ียงหรือความไม่สะดวกสบายอะไรบ้างที่จะเกิดข้ึนจากการเข้าร่วมงานวิจัย
เน่ืองจากความวุ่นวายทางการเมืองอาจเป็นประเด็นที่เปราะบาง หากคุณมีข้อขัดข้องทางกายภาพหรือทาง
อารมณ์ อันเน่ืองมาจากการสัมภาษณ์ กรุณาแจ้งผู้วิจัยโดยทันที คุณสามารถร้องขอเวลาเพิ่ม หากต้องการ
หรือปฏิเสธที่จะ ตอบคำถามใด ๆ
นอกจากน้ีอาจมีความเสี่ยงจากการแสดงออกที่ขัดแย้งกับระบอบการปกครองหรือข้อกฎหมายในปัจจุบัน
เช่น กฎหมายหมิ่นพระบรมเดชานุภาพ เป็นต้น ข้อกังวลสำคัญน้ันอยู่ที่ความปลอดภัยในช่องทางการ
สื่อสาร ดังน้ัน โปรดพิจารณาช่องทางที่คุณคิดว่าปลอดภัยที่สุด (จากการดักฟังหรือตรวจค้นจากผู้อื่น)
อย่างไรก็ตามคุณสามารถ เปลี่ยนช่องทางการสื่อสาร หากคุณรู้สึกไม่ปลอดภัยหลังจากที่เริ่มการสัมภาษณ์
ไปแล้ว
เพื่อความปลอดภัยของคุณเอง คุณอาจจะลบเอกสารที่เก่ียวข้องกับการสัมภาษณ์ทั้งหมด ไม่ว่าจะเป็นอี
เมล์ ประวัติการสนทนา หลังการสัมภาษณ์เสร็จสิ้น กรุณาติดต่อนักวิจัยหากคุณต้องการคำแนะนำในการ
ลบเอกสาร ดังกล่าว
ข้อมูลส่วนตัวของคุณจะถูกปกป้องอย่างไร
นักวิจัยจะสร้างชื่อปลอมข้ึนมาสำหรับคุณ โดยที่ไม่มีความเกี่ยวข้องกับอัตลักษณ์ของคุณ ชื่อปลอมน้ันจะ
ถูก นำมาใช้ในบทบันทึกการสัมภาษณ์ และการจดบันทึกของผู้วิจัยในระหว่างการสัมภาษณ์ จะไม่มีใคร
ทราบว่าคุณ พูดอะไร ข้อมูลติดต่อของคุณจะถูกจัดเก็บแยกไว้ต่างหาก และถูกทำลายเมื่อเสร็จสิ้นการ
ศึกษา
ก่อนการสัมภาษณ์ นักวิจัยจะขออนุญาตจากคุณในการอ้างอิงบทสนทนาและเน้ือหาทั้งในเอกสารสาธารณะ
และ เอกสารส่วนตัวในรายงานการวิจัย โปรดตระหนักว่าอาจมีความเสี่ยงที่บุคคลอื่นจะสามารถระบุตัวคุณ
ได้ หากได้ อ่านบทสนทนาหรือเน้ือหาในเอกสารของคุณ นักวิจัยจะไม่ตีพิมพ์ข้อมูลดังกล่าวหากไม่ได้รับ
อนุญาตจากคุณ
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คุณจะได้รับอะไรจากการเข้าร่วมงานวิจัยน้ีหรือไม่
เราไม่มีค่าตอบแทนใด ๆ สำหรับข้อมูลของคุณ แต่ข้อมูลของคุณน้ันมีความสำคัญอย่างมากต่อเรา
คุณจะต้องเสียค่าใช้จ่ายอะไรบ้างหรือไม่จากการเข้าร่วมงานวิจัยน้ี
คุณอาจจะต้องมีค่าใช้จ่ายในการเข้าถึงการสื่อสารท่ีเชื่อถือได้ เช่น อินเตอร์เน็ต และโทรศัพท์ นอกจากน้ี
คุณอาจะ มีค่าใช้จ่ายในการทำสำเนาเอกสารส่วนตัว (เช่น การถ่ายสำเนา หรือการแสกน)
คุณสามารถแบ่งปันข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับงานวิจัยชิ้นน้ีให้กับผู้อ่ืนได้หรือไม่
เน่ืองจากการคัดเลือกผู้ให้ข้อมูลเป็นแบบควบคุม ดังน้ันขอความกรุณาอย่าส่งต่อจดหมายเชิญให้กับผู้อื่น
หากคุณ ได้รับจดหมายเชิญจากผู้อื่นนอกเหนือจากผู้วิจัยนามข้างต้น กรุณาละเลยจดหมายเชิญ นอกจากน้ี
เพื่อเป็นการ รักษาข้อมูลส่วนบุคคลและความสมบูรณ์ของงานวิจัยน้ี กรุณาอย่าแบ่งปันข้อมูลที่ใช้ในงาน
วิจัยน้ี เช่น บทสนทนา ในอีเมล์ การสนทนาส่วนตัว (Chat) และข้อมูลอื่น ๆ ให้ผู้อื่น จนกว่างานวิจัยน้ี
จะเสร็จสิ้น โปรดติดต่อผู้วิจัยหาก คุณต้องการที่จะแบ่งปันข้อมูลให้ผู้อื่น
โดยทั่วไป คุณสามารถพูดคุยกับผู้อื่นเกี่ยวกับงานวิจัยน้ีได้โดยคร่าว อย่างไรก็ตาม เราขอแนะนำว่า คุณ
ไม่ควร เปิดเผยการเข้ามามีส่วนร่วมในงานวิจัยน้ีจนกว่างานวิจัยจะเสร็จสิ้น (ประมาณเดือนพฤษภาคม
2553)
หากคุณมีคำถามหรือข้อสงสัยเกี่ยวกับงานวิจัยน้ี?
คุณมีสิทธ์ิที่จะถามคำถามและได้รับคำตอบที่เกี่ยวข้องกับงานวิจัยน้ี หากคุณมีคำถามหรือข้อสงสัย คุณ
สามารถติดต่อได้ที่ songphan.coup06@gmail.com หรือโทรศัพท์ +1 919-338-2985. คุณสามารถติดต่อ
อาจารย์ที่ปรึกษาของผมได้ที่อีเมล์ที่ให้ไว้ข้างต้นของแบบฟอร์มน้ี
หากคุณมีคำถามเกี่ยวกับสิทธิของคุณในฐานะผู้เข้าร่วมการวิจัย?
งานวิจัยทุกช้ินที่เกี่ยวข้องกับความสมัครใจของมนุษย์จะถูกพิจารณาโดยคณะกรรมการที่ทำงานเพื่อรักษา
สิทธิ และสวัสดิภาพของคุณ หากคุณมีคำถามหรือข้อสงสัยเกี่ยวกับสิทธิของคุณในฐานะผู้ให้ข้อมูลในงาน
วิจัย คุณ สามารถติดต่อ Institutional Review Board โดยสามารถไม่ประสงค์จะออกนามได้หากต้องการ
ที่หมายเลข โทรศัพท์ +1 919-966-3113 หรืออีเมล์มาที่ IRB subjects@unc.edu
ขอบพระคุณที่ให้ความร่วมมือกับงานวิจัยครั้งน้ี
238
Appendix B: Invitation Letter
Invitation Letter: English version
Subject:
An invitation to participate in a study of information behavior during the 2006 coup
dtat in Thailand
Message:
Hi [informant’s name],
My name is Songphan Choemprayong, a doctoral student at the School of Information
and Library Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. I am conducting
a study about how people sought, shared, and used information during the first couple
of days of the September 19, 2006 coup dtat in Thailand.
[Describe how informant is selected and provide a reference source. (e.g., blog post,
YouTube, Wikipedia, Flickr, snowball)] I would like to ask you to participate in an
interview about your activities and experiences during the early stage of the coup.
The main objective of this study is to gain an understanding of information behavior
during socio-political crises. The study involves one or more interview sessions (10-20
minutes each) asking about your personal experience during the first few nights after
the coup was staged. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may
decline to answer any questions or stop the interview at any point.
Here is a link to a fact sheet containing detailed information about this study: http://
ils.unc.edu/~songphan/coupstudy/factsheet en.pdf. If you are interested, please
reply with your preferred choice of interview mode by next week. You can choose the
mode from various alternatives including: email, instant messenger (e.g., MSN Messen-
ger, Yahoo Messenger, AOL, Google Talk, etc.), telephone, private chat (e.g., Skype),
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Hi5, Facebook, or any other private channels as you prefer. Then I will contact you to
schedule the interview or I could begin the interview right away, if you choose to talk
via email.
Due to the focused selection method, please do not forward this invitation letter to
others.
Your real identity is not necessary to this study. You can remain anonymous. Your
identifiable information (e.g., name, and contact information) will be replaced by
pseudonyms and de-indentified tags (e.g., telephone and email) in all personal and
private documents as well as interview transcripts. The information will be maintained
separately in a contact sheet throughout the data collection and analysis process. I will
be the only one who can access the contact sheet. The contact sheet will be destroyed
after the study ends.
Your participation is valuable to the understanding of human information behavior which
will inform recommendations for information system and policy development. If you
have any questions or concerns, please contact me at songphan.coup06@gmail.com or
+1 919-338-2985.
Best Regards,
Songphan Choemprayong
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Invitation Letter: Thai version
Subject:
ขอเชิญให้ข้อมูลสาหรับการศึกษาเรื่อง พฤติกรรมสารสนเทศในช่วงรัฐประหาร 19 กันยายน 2549
Message:
สวัสดีครับ คุณ<ช่ือผู้ให้ข้อมูล>,
ผม ทรงพันธ์ เจิมประยงค์ นักศึกษาระดับปริญญาเอก โรงเรียนสารสนเทศศาสตร์และบรรณารักษศาสตร์
มหาวิทยาลัย นอร์ทแคโรไลนา แชเปิลฮิลล์ ประเทศสหรัฐอเมริกา กาลังทาการศึกษาเกี่ยวกับพฤติกรรม
ของมนุษย์ ในการค้นหา แลกเปลี่ยน และใช้สารสนเทศ ในช่วงที่ต้องเผชิญวิกฤตการณ์ทางสังคมและ
การเมือง โดยใช้เหตุการณ์รัฐประหารในประเทศไทย เมื่อวันที่ 91 กันยายน 2541 ที่ผ่านมา เป็นกรณี
ศึกษา
จากการศึกษาเบื้องต้น ผมพบว่าคุณได้มีกิจกรรมทางสารสนเทศในช่วงรัฐประหารผ่านทาง <แหล่งที่มา
ของผู้ให้ข้อมูล> จึงอยากเชิญคุณมาให้สัมภาษณ์เกี่ยวกับกิจกรรมและประสบการณ์ของคุณในแรกของ
การรัฐประหาร
วัตถุประสงค์สำคัญของการศึกษาครั้งน้ี คือ การสร้างความเข้าใจเกี่ยวกับพฤติกรรมทางสารสนเทศของ
มนุษย์ ในช่วงวิกฤตการณ์ทางสังคมและการเมือง การศึกษาประกอบไปด้วยการสัมภาษณ์หน่ึงครั้งหรือ
มากกว่า (ใช้เวลาประมาณ 30 – 60 นาทีต่อครั้ง) เกี่ยวกับประสบการณ์ของคุณในช่วงรัฐประหาร การเข้า
ร่วมให้ข้อมูลของคุณครั้งน้ี เป็นไปด้วยความสมัครใจทั้งสิ้น คุณสามารถปฏิเสธที่จะตอบคาถามใด ๆ ก็ได้
หรือหยุดการสัมภาษณ์เมื่อใดก็ได้
เอกสารที่แนบมาด้วยน้ี คือ เอกสารข้อเท็จจริง ระบุรายละเอียดเกี่ยวกับการศึกษาในครั้งน้ี ที่คุณควร
ทราบก่อนตอบรับการให้สัมภาษณ์ โปรดอ่านโดยละเอียดและตอบรับการให้สัมภาษณ์ภายใน <9 สัปดาห์
หลังจากวันส่ง> หากคุณสนใจ กรุณาตอบกลับมาพร้อมระบุช่องทางหลักในการติดต่อสื่อสารที่คุณต้องการ
คุณสามารถเลือกช่องทางการติดต่อสื่อสารได้หลายรูปแบบ ไม่ว่าจะเป็น <ชื่อของบริการส่งข้อความ>, อี
เมล์, instant messenger (IM) (เช่น MSN Messenger, Yahoo Messenger, AOL, Google Talk และอื่น
ๆ), โทรศัพท์, การสนทนาส่วนตัว (private chat) (เช่น Skype), Hi5, Facebook, หรือช่องทางอื่น ๆ ที่
เป็นการสนทนาส่วนตัว
เน่ืองจากมีการควบคุมการคัดเลือกผู้ให้ข้อมูล โปรดอย่าส่งต่อจดหมายเชิญฉบับน้ีให้ผู้อื่น
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คุณไม่จาเป็นต้องเปิดเผยช่ือจริงในการให้ข้อมูลครั้งน้ี ข้อมูลส่วนตัวของคุณ (เช่น ชื่อ, ข้อมูลการติดต่อ)
จะถูกเปลี่ยนเป็นช่ือปลอมและตัวซ่อนข้อมูลส่วนตัว (de-identiﬁed tags) ในเอกสารต่าง ๆ ไม่ว่าจะเป็น
เอกสารสาธารณะและเอกสารส่วนตัว รวมถึงบทสัมภาษณ์ ข้อมูลส่วนตัวของคุณจะถูกจัดเก็บไว้ต่างหาก
และจะถูกทาลายเมื่อการศึกษาน้ีเสร็จสิ้น มีเพียงผมผู้เดียวเท่าน้ันที่จะเข้าถึงข้อมูลน้ีได้
การให้ข้อมูลของคุณครั้งน้ี จะมีประโยชน์ต่อความเข้าใจพฤติกรรมสารสนเทศของมนุษย์ อันจะนำไป
สู่ การพัฒนาระบบสารสนเทศและเป็นข้อเสนอแนะต่อการพัฒนานโยบายทางสารสนเทศต่อไป หากมี
ข้อสงสัยหรือข้อแนะนา กรุณาติดต่อกลับมาที่ songphan.coup06@gmail.com หรือโทรศัพท์ +1 919-
338-2985
ขอแสดงความนับถือ,
ทรงพันธ์ เจิมประยงค์
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A brief study description: English version
Do you remember what did after hearing about the September 19, 2006 coup in Thailand?
Please consider participating in a research study about how people sought, shared, and
used information during the September 19, 2006 coup dtat in Thailand. The study is
conducted by Songphan Choemprayong, a doctoral student at School of Information and
Library Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA.
The study involves a series of interviewing sessions asking about your experience during
the coup. The interviews can be done via telephone or online. Its up to you!
Your participation is valuable to the understanding of human information behavior,
which will inform recommendations for the development of communication and infor-
mation system and policy.
If you are interested or have any questions, please contact the principle investigator at
songphan.coup06@gmail.com or +1 919-338-2985 by [a week after the sent date].
Thanks!
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A brief study description: Thai version
คุณจาได้ไหมว่าคุณทาอะไรหลังจากได้ยินข่าวครั้งแรกเก่ียวกับการรัฐประหารในประเทศไทยเมื่อ 19 กันยายน
2549?
โปรดพิจารณาเข้าร่วมให้ข้อมูลในการศึกษาเกี่ยวกับพฤติกรรมของมนุษย์ในการแสวงหา แลกเปลี่ยนและ
การใช้สารสนเทศในช่วงรัฐประหาร 91 กันยายน 2541 ในประเทศไทย การศึกษาในครั้งน้ีจัดทาโดยนาย
ทรงพันธ์ เจิมประยงค์ นักศึกษาปริญญาเอก โรงเรียนสารสนเทศศาสตร์และบรรณารักษศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัย
นอร์ทแคโรไลนา แชเปิลฮิลล์ ประเทศสหรัฐอเมริกา
การศึกษาจะประกอบไปด้วยการสัมภาษณ์เกี่ยวกับประสบการณ์ของคุณในช่วงรัฐประหาร คุณสามารถ
เลือกได้ว่าจะให้สัมภาษณ์ผ่านทางโทรศัพท์หรืออินเตอร์เน็ตการให้ข้อมูลของคุณในครั้งน้ี จะมีผลประโยชน์
ต่อความเข้าใจของพฤติกรรมทางสารสนเทศของมนุษย์ อันจะนำไปสู่ การพัฒนาระบบสารสนเทศและการ
สื่อสาร และเป็นข้อเสนอแนะต่อการพัฒนานโยบายทางสารสนเทศต่อไป
หากสนใจเข้าร่วมให้ข้อมูลหรือมีคาถาม กรุณาติดต่อหัวหน้าโครงการวิจัยที่ songphan.coup06@gmail.com
หรือโทรศัพท์ +1 919-338-2985 ภายในวันที่ <1 สัปดาห์หลังจากวันที่ส่ง>
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Appendix C: Interview Question Roster
English Version
To Obtain Consent and Remind Participant about the Risks of Being Mon-
itored:
• Do you understand the information in the fact sheet? Do you have any questions
about this study before beginning the interview? Please note that you may ask
any questions regarding to the fact sheet and this research at any time during the
interview.
• Would you allow me to use some of your interview responses and quotations either
from public or personal documents in my research report? Please be aware that
there might be a risk that someone would be able to recognize your identity from
reading your quotes, though I will take steps to minimize this possibility.
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• Since I cannot guarantee the security of your comments that may involve political
opinions, are you confident that this mean of communication is secure enough (i.e.,
that it will not be monitored by someone else)? You can choose other means of
communication if you want to. In addition, you can change it later, if you feel
uncomfortable.
To Tap Situations:
• When did you first hear about the coup?
• Where were you?
• What were you doing?
• From whom/where?
• What happened next?
• What issues were you facing?
• Did that experience connect with your past event? How?
Assisting to recall the situation:
• To help you recall a situation, I want to you to watch a video of the coup an-
nouncement (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0sUUzxwv8ts).
• Based on your posts/discussions on [URL], you said Could you explain the situa-
tion at that moment?
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To Tap Gaps:
• Did you have any big questions?
• What were your big questions?
• What were you trying to (unconfuse, figure out, or learn about)?
• What did you struggle with?
To Tap Bridges:
• What conclusion/ideas did you come to?
• What emotions did you come to? How did you feel?
• What led you to that conclusion/idea/emotion/feeling?
To Tap Outcomes Sought and/or Obtained:
• How did that [name that] help? facilitate?
• How did that [name that] hinder?
• If you could wave a magic wand, what would have helped?
To Dig Deeper Into Gaps and Struggles:
• What was missing?
• How did that stand in the way?
• And how did that prevent you getting more help?
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To Dig Deeper Into What Led To An Evaluation:
• What led you to that assessment?
• How did that evaluation connect with your situation?
• What was limited or incomplete about that?
To Dig Deeper Into How Things Help:
• And, how did that help?
• What did that allow you to do/achieve/think?
To Explore Connections to Self, Identity:
• How has this experience related to building/changing your sense of self?
• How has this experience had impact on you?
• Do you see yourself as connected to . . . ([information source],PAD, UDD, CDR)?
• Do you see yourself as different from . . . ([information source], UDD, CDR)?
To Find Out More about Something:
• Tell me a bit more about that.
• Could you give me a few more details about that so I can understand better?
To Get Additional Items on A List:
• Anything else?
• Where there any more?
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To Ask for Personal Records:
• Did you keep journal/diary during that period? Would you mind giving a copy to
me?
• Did you keep history log of your instant messenger/chat? Would you mind giving
a copy to me?
• Did you write, record, create any other contents regarding your experience during
that period? If so, where are they? How can I access to those contents?
To Get Further Informants (Snowball Sampling):
• I am looking for other persons for an interview. Would you be able to recommend
someone that you think s/he might be a useful source? Think of these criteria:
– S/he is a person whom you first heard about the coup from, or whom you
contacted during the early period of the coup, and
– you think s/he was different from you in terms of demographics (for instance,
age, sex, education, location), or who had a contrast/opposite political point
of view.
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Demographic:
• Can you give me background information about yourself a bit?
– gender
– age
– highest level of education
– current occupation
– computer/Internet experience (Optional)
• How long have you used the Internet?
• How long have you used a computer?
• How long have you used [reference source’s name]?
End
You may delete any related interview documents (e.g., emails, history, transaction logs)
if you feel uncomfortable about what you said during the interview. Please let me know
if you need any advices on how to delete those files.
Thank you very much for your participation.
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Thai version
To Obtain Consent and Remind Participant about the Risks of Being Monitored:
• คุณเข้าใจข้อมูลในเอกสารข้อเท็จจริงเกี่ยวงานวิจัยน้ีหรือไม่? คุณมีคำถามเกี่ยวข้องกับงานวิจัยน้ี
ก่อนเริ่มต้นการสัมภาษณ์หรือไม่? อย่างไรก็ตาม คุณสามารถถามคำถามเก่ียวเอกสารข้อเท็จจริง
หรืองานวิจัยชิ้นน้ีได้ทุกเมื่อในระหว่างการสัมภาษณ์
• คุณจะอนุญาตหรือไม่หากผมจะอ้างอิงคำพูดของคุณท้ังจากการสัมภาษณ์และเอกสารที่ปรากฏในที่
สาธารณะหรือเอกสารส่วนบุคคลในรายงานการวิจัย? โปรดตระหนักว่าอาจมีความเสี่ยงที่บุคคลอื่น
จะสามารถระบุตัวคุณได้ หากได้อ่านคำพูดของคุณ
• เน่ืองจากผมไม่สามารถรับประกันความเสี่ยงอันเกิดจากการแสดงออกทางการเมืองได้ คุณมั่นใจ
หรือไม่ว่าการสื่อสารด้วยวิธี น้ีจะมีความปลอดภัยเพียงพอ (ที่จะไม่ถูกจับตามองหรือดักฟังโดย
ผู้อื่น)? คุณสามารถเลือกช่องทางการส่ือสารอื่น ๆ หากต้องการ หรือคุณสามารถเปลี่ยนช่องทาง
การสื่อสารได้ระหว่างการสัมภาษณ์ หากคุณรู้สึกไม่ปลอดภัย
To Tap Situations:
• เล่าให้ฟังหน่อยได้ไหมครับ ว่าคุณทราบข่าวปฏิวัติเมื่อไหร่?
– ตอนน้ันคุณอยู่ที่ไหน?
– กำลังทำอะไร?
– ทราบจากใคร?
• เกิดอะไรข้ึนต่อจากน้ัน?
• คุณกำลังพยายามจะทาอะไร?
• เหตุการณ์น้ีเชื่อมโยงกับเหตุการณ์ในอดีตของคุณหรือไม่ อย่างไร
• ช่วยเหลือเพื่อให้ระลึกถึงเหตุการณ์
– เพื่อช่วยให้คุณนึกถึงเหตุการณ์ในวันน้ัน ผมอยากจะให้คุณดูวิดีโอของประกาศฉบับแรกบน
หน้าจอโทรทัศน์ (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0sUUzxwv8ts).
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– จากที่คุณเขียนไว้ในโพส <URL> คุณบอกว่า... กรุณาอธิบายเกี่ยวกับเหตุการณ์ในตอนน้ัน
ให้ทราบหน่อยได้หรือไม่ครับ
To Tap Gaps:
• ณ ตอนน้ัน คุณมีปัญหา/คำถามข้อใหญ่ในใจหรือไม่
• ปัญหา/คาถามข้อใหญ่ของคุณคืออะไร?
• คุณต้องการที่จะ (แก้ปม, ค้นหา, หรือเรียนรู้) อะไร?
• คุณมีปัญหาหรือติดขัดเรื่องอะไร?
To Tap Bridges:
• ตอนน้ันคุณได้ข้อสรุปหรือไอเดีย (ความคิด) อะไรบ้าง?
• ตอนน้ันคุณรู้สึกหรือมีอารมณ์อย่างไร?
• อะไรทาให้คุณได้ข้อสรุป/ความคิด/อารมณ์/ความรู้น้ัน?
To Tap Outcomes Sought and/or Obtained:
• (ช่ือ) ช่วยอย่างไร? เอื้อประโยชน์อย่างไร?
• (ช่ือ) ขัดขวางอย่างไร?
• หากคุณมีไม้วิเศษในขณะน้ัน อะไรที่จะช่วยคุณได้ (คุณต้องการ)
• หากย้อนกลับไปได้ คุณจะอยากทำอะไรในตอนน้ัน
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To Dig Deeper Into Gaps and Struggles:
• อะไรขาดหายไป?
• มีอะไรขวางทางอยู่?
• และมันขัดขวางการได้รับความช่วยเหลืออย่างไร?
To Dig Deeper Into What Led To An Evaluation:
• ทำไมคุณถึงประเมินเช่นน้ัน?
• สิ่งที่คุณประเมินน้ันเช่ือมโยงกับเหตุการณ์ของคุณอย่างไร
• คุณมีข้อจำกัดอะไร หรือมีอะไรที่ไม่สมบูรณ์
To Dig Deeper Into How Things Help:
• และมันช่วยอย่างไร?
• มันทำให้คุณทำ/ไปถึงตรงน้ัน/คิดได้อย่างไร?
To Explore Connections to Self, Identity:
• ประสบการณ์ในครั้งน้ันเกี่ยวข้องกับการสร้างและเปลี่ยนแปลงความเป็นตัวตนของคุณอย่างไร?
• เหตุการณ์วันน้ันมีอิทธิพลต่อคุณอย่างไร?
• คุณเห็นว่าตัวคุณเชื่อมโยงเข้ากับ . . . (<แหล่งข้อมูล>, พันธมิตรฯ, นปช., คมช.) หรือไม่?
อย่างไร?
• คุณเห็นว่าตัวคุณแตกต่างจาก . . . (<แหล่งข้อมูล>, พันธมิตรฯ, นปช., คมช.) หรือไม่? อย่างไร?
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To Find Out More about Something:
• ช่วยเล่าเพิ่มเติมให้หน่อย
• รบกวนช่วยบอกรายละเอียดให้อีกเล็กน้อย เพื่อที่ผมจะได้เข้าใจได้ดีข้ึนได้หรือไม่?
To Get Additional Items on A List:
• มีอะไรจะเพิ่มเติมไหมครับ?
• มีอะไรอย่างอื่นที่อยากจะเล่า/อธิบายเพิ่มเติมอีกไหมครับ?
To Ask for Personal Records:
• คุณได้จดบันทึกหรือเขียนไดอารี่ในช่วงเวลาดังกล่าวหรือไม่? จะขอสาเนาได้หรือไม่?
• คุณได้เก็บประวัติการใช้งานเครื่องคอมพิวเตอร์ หรือโปรแกรมต่าง ๆ เช่น Instant messenger หรือ
การแชท ในช่วงเวลาน้ันหรือไม่? จะขอสาเนาได้หรือไม่?
• คุณได้เขียน บันทึก หรือสร้างเอกสารใด ๆ ที่เกี่ยวกับประสบการณ์ของคุณในช่วงเวลาดังกล่าวหรือ
ไม่? ผมจะเข้าถึงข้อมูลเหล่าน้ันได้อย่างไร?
To Get Further Informants (Snowball Sampling):
• ผมกำลังหาคนให้ข้อมูลเพิ่มเติม ไม่ทราบว่าคุณจะช่วยแนะนำใครที่พอจะเป็นแหล่งข้อมูลที่เป็น
ประโยชน์หรือน่าสนใจได้บ้างครับ โดยนึกถึงคุณสมบัติเหล่าน้ี:
– เป็นคนที่คุณติดต่อด้วยในช่วงแรก ๆ ของการทำรัฐประหาร หรือคนที่แจ้งข่าวรัฐประหารให้
กับคุณเป็นคนแรก และ
– เป็นคนที่คุณคิดว่า เขาหรือเธอมีความแตกต่างจากคุณ ไม่ว่าจะในแง่อายุ เพศ อาชีพ การ
ศึกษา ภูมิลำเนา ผู้ไม่ใช้อินเตอร์เน็ต เครื่องมือสื่อสาร หรือสื่อ ตลอดจน มุมมองและความคิดเห็น
ทางการเมือง
• ทำไมคุณจึงแนะนาบุคคลน้ี?
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• คุณคิดว่าบุคคลน้ีจะปฏิเสธที่ให้คุณเปิดเผยข้อมูลติดต่อ หรือปฏิเสธที่จะให้ผมติดต่อได้โดยตรงหรือ
ไม่?
• ในกรณีที่ผู้ให้ข้อมูลปฏิเสธที่จะเปิดเผยข้อมูลติดต่อ: ช่วยกรุณาส่งต่อจดหมายเชิญเข้าร่วมให้ข้อมูล
ในการศึกษาครั้งน้ีได้หรือไม่?
Demographics
• รบกวนช่วยบอกข้อมูลส่วนตัวได้ไหมครับ
– เพศ
– อายุ
– การศึกษาข้ันสูงสุด
– อาชีพ
• ประสบการณ์การใช้คอมพิวเตอร์ (ตัวเลือก)
– คุณใช้คอมพิวเตอร์มานานเท่าไหร่
– คุณใช้อินเตอร์เน็ตมานานเท่าไหร่?
– คุณใช้ <แหล่งที่มา> มานานเท่าไหร่?
End
ผมอยากจะแนะนำว่า คุณควรลบเอกสารที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการสัมภาษณ์ในครั้งน้ี ไม่ว่าจะเป็นอีเมล์ ประวัติการ
พูดคุย หากคุณรู้สึกไม่ปลอดภัยอันเน่ืองมาจากการสัมภาษณ์ คุณสามารถสอบถามผมได้หากต้องการ
ข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับวิธีการลบข้อมูลเหล่าน้ีออกจากเครื่องคอมพิวเตอร์
ขอบพระคุณอย่างสูงที่ให้ความร่วมมือ
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Appendix D: Codebook
Codes for content analysis (Deductive)
Scheme: Small world membership
Description: Identifies people (e.g., interview informants, blog authors, Flickr accounts,
etc.) by types of membership in small world notion
Absolute Insider
Definition: Thai people living in Thailand during September 19 - 23, 2006
Absolute Outsider
Definition: Foreigner living outside Thailand during September 19 - 23, 2006
Insider-Out
Definition: Thai people living outside Thailand during September 19 - 23, 2006
Outsider-In
Definition: Foreigner living in Thailand during September 19 - 23, 2006
Anonymous-In
Definition: A person whose nationality is unidentifiable but living in Thailand during
September 19-23, 2006
Anonymous-Out
Definition: A person whose nationality is unidentifiable but living outside Thailand
during September 19-23, 2006
Insider-Anonymous
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Definition: Thai people whose whereabout during September 19-23, 2006 is unidentifi-
able
Outsider-Anonymous
Definition: Foreigner whose whereabout during September 19-23, 2006 is unidentifiable
Rule:
If the content is collaborative authored (e.g., written/created by more than one person),
identify the first author.
Source:
1. Profile page
2. Post/content/caption
3. Comment
4. Web domain name/IP address
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Indicator:
1. Nationality is identified by one or a combination of these elements:
• Language used (Thai language = Thai)
• Name (e.g., Prameth - Thai; ExpatJohn - Foreigner)
• Affiliation (e.g., Thai university, government)
• Pronoun addressed to (e.g., to you, Thai people. Us - Thai people)
• Idiom
• Narration - textual, photo, and video
2. Geographical location is identified by one or a combination of these elements:
• Identification = location field
• Narration - textua, photo, and video
258
Open coding scheme (Inductive)
The following is the code book with a sample of data. Note that the codes without
sample were emerged from axial coding.
Scheme: Seeking and sharing
Description: How people sought and shared information during the early stage of the
coup
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1. How I first heard about the coup
Definition: People describe the first moment they heard about the coup and their reac-
tions
Note: For interview data, it is the first set of opening question.
1.1 I first saw it myself
Definition: Coup exposure from firsthand experience
Sample:
“Latest eyewitness reports - 22:49, September 19, 2006
Tanks on the streets... at Nangloeng intersection, in front of Prem’s house, at government
house and at the Rama V statue”
(Blog)
“I was in Kuala Lumpur yesterday but flew into Bangkok at 6 p.m. local time this
evening; during the 30-minute ride from the airport to my apartment, which is located
in central Bangkok, I witnessed a solitary military truck carting soldiers through the
city. More military forces are stationed elsewhere.”
(Blog)
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1.2 Mainstream media as a battle field
Definition: Coup exposure from witnessing the on television
Sample:
“At first, when I heard of the coup, it was uncertain there was actually a coup. I was
lucky to have a fast internet connection and was able to watch Nation Channel, a then
popular news channel, to see what was happening. You saw music with pictures of the
royal family which was the sign of a coup. However, just 20 minutes later, programming
appeared to resume to normal. Then Chulalongkorn professor Dr. Panitan, and now
Govt. spokesman, appeared on TV stating that it appeared the coup was unsuccessful.
He was cut off mid-sentence and then we had coup announcements. It was clear then
there had been a coup. There was a sense of shock. There has been rumours of a coup
for a while, but they had come and gone. In hindsight, it was naive to think there would
not be a coup, but at the time, it was a sense of surprise.”
(Interview)
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1.3 I heard it from word of mouth
Definition: Coup exposure from other people by interpersonal channels (e.g., email,
telephone, face-to-face)
Sample:
“I and Paula had no idea what was happening on the street as well. We were about
to start our quite time in my room when my colleague called and informed me about
the revolution. Both of us rushed to downstairs and turned on the TV just to find that
every government channels were displaying the story of King Bhumiphol on the screen.
We looked at each other eyes and knew that it was the sign of something very unusual
was going on!!!”
(Blog)
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1.4 I first heard from media reports
Definition: Coup exposure from media report
Sample:
“Waking up this morning with some news from Thailand about coup taking over streets
of Bangkok, I follow the situation unfolding from its beginng to some hours (until 2 pm)
after couple announcement from the coup group leader.”
(Blog)
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2. Making sense of situations
Description: To understand what was happening and relate to people’s lives during that
time; What happened next after first hearing about the coup?
2.1 Making sense of obstacles
Description: Experience of difficulties and hardship that prevent people to resume their
lives in normal situation
2.1.1 Media censorship
Definition: Experience and/or reaction to media control and disruption
Sample:
“They blog Thailand Channel 3,5,7 ,9,1,ITV including UBCTV (Cable TV).
And also CNN and BCC from UBCTV Channel.
So I didn’t know any news .
Now i can still use Internet and Cellphone. But rumor say they will shut it off within
an hour.
Hope I can use it.”
(Blog)
“Hey you! You no allowed to be here!”
(Photo caption of a soldier with a hand up)
“I thought, “In this day and age, censorship is clumsy, if not impossible to pull off.”
It makes the coup plotters look ridiculous. However, I did understand the immediate
extreme sensitivity that exists after the coup as an insincere military makes sure all
bases are covered and no resistance will come.”
(Interview)
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2.1.2 Trouble with network access
Definition: Experience or/or reaction to difficulty to access telecommunication network
Sample:
“The internet is becoming very slow... - 22:55, September 19, 2006
We will try to keep posting as long as we are able.”
(Blog)
“You won’t believe me but I had been cut off from the Internet for a whole day. I just
manage to log in. My frustration grew by the minutes. As a blogger, I feel pressured to
update this blog, but everything was against me?.sigh.”
(Blog)
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2.1.3 Cultural barriers
Description: Issues emerging from different socio-cultural background
2.1.3.1 Language barrier
Definition: Lack of appropriate language skills to access information (either from Thai
to English or English to Thai)
Sample:
“[Comment1] says: What does it say?
[Poster] says: oh!, I’m not good at english, anyone could help me this? please...
sorry, but I’ll try later if I could.” (Photo caption - Photo of a TV screen capture
displaying the first coup message)
“I’m in Bangkok right now, but I can’t speak Thai... we desperately need someone to
translate. News/phone networks has been cut off and we can’t find out anything but
from the slow internet”
(Video comment)
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2.1.3.2 political knowledge
Definition: The difficulty to understand Thai political system and personnel
Sample:
‘‘ปฏิรูปฯลูก ไม่ใช่ปฏิวัติ’’ พ่อบอกตอนโทรกลับบ้านเมื่อวาน
‘‘ต่างกันยังไงหว่า’’ คิดในใจ แต่ก็คุยๆต่อไป ‘‘ เด๋ียวจะไปเปิดดูว่าต่างกันยังไง’’
แล้วก็เปิดดูเรียบร้อยละ ข้อมูลจาก Wikipedia
รัฐประหาร (Coup d’e´tat) คือ การเปลี่ยนแปลงการปกครองหรือองค์ประกอบของการปกครองอย่างกระ
ทันหันและไม่เป็นแบบแผน เช่น ที่เกิดข้ึนเน่ีย
ปฏิวัติ (Revolution) คือ การเปลี่ยนแปลงระบอบการปกครอง เช่น การเปลี่ยนแปลงการปกครองสมัยพ.
ศ.๒๔๗๕
ปฏิรูป (Reform) คือ การเปลี่ยนแปลงอย่างค่อยเป็นค่อยไป และเป็นไปในทางที่ดีข้ึน
สรุปว่า เมื่อวานเขาทำรัฐประหาร เพื่อจะได้มีการปฏิรูปการเมืองการปกครอง ปฏิวัติมันแรงไป
[“A revolution, son, not a coup.” My dad told me when I called back home yesterday.
“How do they differ?” I thought, but keep talking “I will check about this afterward.”
And I already checked it out. This is fom Wikipedia.
(Ratthapraharn) Coup d’e´tat is a sudden and non-pattern change of administration or
any component of administration like what is happening now.
(Patiwat) Revolution is a change of administration system such as the change of admin-
istration in 1932.
(Patiroop) Reform is a slow-moving change and for a better result.
Therefore, they staged a coup d’e´tat to change politics and administration. The term
Revolution is too harsh.]
(Blog)
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2.2 making sense of bridging the gap
Description: Information needs and purposes of information activities;
2.2.1 Fact finding and validation
Definition: To learn more about the situation; to check if the information received is
correct; to evaluate the plausibility of rumor
Sample:
“My key concern was whether there was any “counter-attack” from Thaksin’s allies. In
the hours and days after the coup that was, by my estimation, all that really mattered.
As it turned out, there was only a whimper of immediate resistance, and that burned
out quickly. We then had to wait until 2007 before the real anti-coup resistance took up
the electoral challenge of fighting the pro-coup forces. We all know how that ended.”
(Interview)
‘‘อยากรู้ว่ามีต่อสู้ มีนองเลือดหรือเปล่า มีการปิดกั้นสื่ออะไรบ้าง ออกไปนอกบ้านจะอันตรายไหม วันรุ่งข้ึน
ต้องไปทำงานหรือเปล่า’’
[I wanted to know whether or not there was any fighting or violence. What media was
censored? Was it dangerous to go outside? Did I have to go to work the next day?]
(Interview)
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2.2.2 Being a part of history
Definition: The importance of being in a historic situation
Sample:
“Great to see these pictures from the ground. Let’s hope the situation is resolved
peacefully. I was in Thailand a few weeks ago and found it to be a wonderful country
with friendly people. However the army and police were not to be messed with. I have
friends out there and as long as they stay respectful and away from any mass protests
they should be safe. Must be a fascinating place to be right now. Thanks for the photo.”
(Photo comment)
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2.2.3 Clarification
Definition: To clarify what was happening or what they saw that may be different from
sender ; To insert more detail; To convince or try to change readers’ attitudes or concerns
Sample:
“I was writing a rather lengthy post in English about my thoughts on the recent bloodless
coup, but I thought I should first post a few pictures of the coup, for foreign friends
and visitors who may be concerned about my safety (thank you for all the kind e-mails
), so everyone can see how peaceful this event has been and that most of us don’t feel
threatened whatsoever by these tanks and humvees. The atmosphere now in Bangkok
as you can see from the pictures below is much more like Children’s Day than a country
under siege.”
(Blog)
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2.2.4 Translation
Definition: Translation of content from one language to another (i.e., Thai to English
or English to Thai)
Sample:
“English translation (please correct if wrong): COMMUNIQUE NO 1 It has been clear
that the administration of the country’s affairs by the current caretaker government has
created conflicts and division, and sowed discord among the people of the nation. It
is unprecedented in the history of the Thai nation that groups were determined to win
through ways and means. The trend is getting more violent every passing day. The
majority of the people are suspicious of extensive corruption and malfeasance practices
among the bureaucracy. Independent agencies and organisations have been dominated
by politics and unable to fulfil the objectives as stipulated in the constitution of the
Kingdom of Thailand. Consequently, political activities have encountered numerous
problems and obstacles. Frequently, the dignity of the Thai people’s king was affected.
The efforts exerted by several sectors of society to alleviate the situation have failed to
bring an end to the conflict. It is necessary for the Administrative Reform Group under
the Democratic System with the King as the Head of State, comprising commanders of
the armed forces and the National Police Bureau, to seize national administrative power
from now on. In so doing, the Administrative Reform Group under the Democratic
System with the King as the Head of State wishes to reaffirm that it has no intention to
become the administrators of the country. The administrative power under the demo-
cratic system with the king as the head of the state will be returned to the Thai people as
quickly as possible in order to maintain peace and order and preserve national stability,
as well as to uphold the beloved institution of the monarchy of all the Thai people.”
(Video description of the first coup announcement)
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2.2.5 Support
Definition: Expression of good will given to local people; Offering and/or seeking help
Sample:
“First off, my thoughts and prayers go out to all my online friends in Thailand who
have to experience this firsthand. I pray that events will continue to remain essentially
peaceful and non-violent.
Of course, whenever the military of any country stages a coup to overthrow the current
leader and government, that’s a very serious matter. I couldn’t even begin to imagine if a
military coup like that would happen on American soil. I would definitely be traumatized
and shellshocked, like many were when 9/11 occured.
We just hope that anything like this anywhere will resolve itself by peaceful means?”
(Blog)
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2.2.6 Recreation and entertainment
Definition: expression of joyful to seek and share information; The appearance of satire,
humor, parody in message
Sample:
“There has been a coup in Bangkok. I just want to say Bangkok. I just say it again.”
(Video transcript)
“Thai Coup Strands Thousands of U.S. Sex Tourists
The ousting of Thai Prime Minister Thanksin Shinawatra has thrown Thailand into
political unrest, and filled the U.S. Embassy with thousands of American sex tourists
seeking safe passage to Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Red Cross is urging all sex tourists to
remain calm, and telling families that their relatives need not be suspected of murdering
Jon-Benet Ramsey to secure safe passage. New military leader Gen. Sondhi Boon-
yaratkalin insists his country is still safe for the perverts of the world saying, ”Thailand
- come for the come, stay for the come.”
(Blog)
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2.2.7 Passive information seeking
Definition: Waiting to hear from others; not actively looking for information
Sample:
“It’s just begin normal. we are just at home, waiting the news to get to us and we got
dvds to few of us. we are just waiting to see things to blow over and get the green light
to go to work.” (Video transcript)
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2.2.8 Stopping behavior
Definition: People decided to stop actively looking for information or reporting infor-
mation (either at the first night of the coup or after the first few days of the coup)
Sample:
“Announcement: The Excitement is Over
Please be advised that the excitement related to our recent coup d’tat is officially over.
Unless you are a junkie for Thai political news, there really isn’t much more to see or
talk about. So unless we have any developments, I think I’ll just move on to other
stories.”
(Blog)
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2.3 Information sources/channels
Description: The use and satisfaction of various information sources or communication
tools
2.3.1 multitask/multiple sources
Definition: Use of different sources and doing different task at a time
Sample:
“I didn’t do anything other than to turn on the TV and see the montage of patriotic
songs and images that was playing. There wasn’t anything in particular to do. I recall
going online and trying to get some news. I also posted a blog entry, posting updates
throughout the evening and following days. I also sent a message to a friend from the
US who was here visiting. I wanted to ensure he was okay and understood what was
happening. As it turns out, he actually went out and took photos of the tanks.
...
I followed the situation by visiting websites, reading the paper and seeing what additional
limited information was available.”
(Interview)
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2.3.2 mainstream media as sources
Definition: Use and satisfaction of mainstream media during the coup
Sample:
‘‘รู้สึกว่าประเทศไทยกับการควบคุมสื่อมันยังคงเป็นของคู่กัน ข้อเท็จจริงของข่าวสารในประเทศไทย
ยังคงตกอยู่ภายใต้การควบคุมของระบอบการเมืองอยู่อีกมาก ทั้งต้ังแต่ก่อนการปฏิวัติและหลังจากปฏิวัติ
ความน่าเชื่อถือของสื่อลดน้อยลงมากในความรู้สึกของ [ดิฉัน] ข้อเท็จจริงในสื่อต่างๆ หาไม่มีอีกแล้ว ทำ
ให้ประชาชนที่รับรู้ข่าวสารด้านเดียวตกเป็นเครื่องมือของคนบางกลุ่ม
...
หนังสือพิมพ์ไทยส่วนใหญ่ก็ลงข่าวเกี่ยวกับการที่ประชาชนออกมาถ่ายรูปกับทหาร ลงข่าวเกี่ยวกับประกาศ
ของคณะปฏิวัติ คือมีการลงข่าวในแง่มุมเดียวเพื่อให้ประชาชนรู้สึกว่าการปฏิวัติครั้งน้ีดี’’
[I feel that Thailand and media control are still inseparable. Fact in news in Thailand
is still under the control of political system, both before and after the coup. The trust-
worthiness of media were decreasing substantially, in my opinion. We could no long find
fact in media. This makes people who receive information from one side are used as a
tool by some groups of people.
...
Most Thai newspaper provided news about the way people came out and took photos
with soldier and the coup announcement. It was one-side of the story to make people
feel that this is a good coup.]
(Interview)
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2.3.3 firsthand experience as sources of sense making
Definition: Going outside in order to gain firsthand experience
Sample:
“My first response was a sense of excitement that I was in the midst of an exciting
situation. I responded by rushing outside with my camera and hailing a motorcycle taxi
to take me to Rachdamnern Nok Avenue (approx 20 minutes from my home by bike).”
(Interview)
“I went for a jog around my neighbourhood at 12:30 am to see how things appeared.
All was quiet, uncannily quiet, even the soi dogs were not barking and chasing me. So,
I figured why not take a drive around on my bike with a video camera in tow. It’s
quite difficult to drive a bike and take video at the same time. Mistake! At first I took
video of whatever I saw. What I saw was multiple tanks at every intersection, armoured
vehicles, gun mounted jeeps and 50 soldiers at ever intersection. I have never seen so
many tanks. I must have seen over 20 tanks and I only drove two miles before I thought
I better get back home. As I head back I was taking video and stoped[sic] at a red light,
btw, all lights were red! at one intersection soldiers saw my camera and approached me,
guns aimed at me. I freaked and I quickly offered them my tape hoping they would not
take my video camera. They checked my video bag for more tapes. I had only brought
two with me. One in the camera and one I had stashed in my pants. When they were
sure I had no more tapes they let me continue home. 300 meters down the road I loaded
my video camera again. This time I knew if I got caught again I would probably have a
bigger problem than last time. So I tried to take hidden footage. Which I did but the
footage is really bad and you can’t really make out stuff... Sorry. As I drove around taxi
drivers gave me the thumbs up and said ”Thaksin” and put their wrists together as if
in handcuffs. I will venture out again tomorrow and see if I can get some good stuff.”
(Video description)
278
2.3.4 Cell phone as communication tool and recorder
Definition: Communication with others via cell phone (e.g., SMS, MMS, call) and/or
use cellphone to record the situation
Sample:
“Taken with a Nokia N73”
(Photo description)
‘‘ก็คนที่ทำงานส่งข้อความต่อๆกันมา เพราะฝ่ายบุคคลได้รับโทรศัพท์จากผอ.สถาบัน ว่าเน่ืองจากเหตุการณ์
บ้านเมืองไม่สงบ จึงให้หยุด 1 วัน’’
[People at my work sent messages to each other in forming that the HR department
received a phone call from the director saying that since there was a difficult situation
in the country, the next day was a holiday.]
(Interview)
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2.3.5 Internet as source
Definition: Using various Internet applications to access and disseminate information;
The discussion of the use of Internet, in general, as opposed to particular applications
Sample: “I had no problems with the internet at all. I was able to keep up with th enews
on the internet all day. Perhaps it’s just a congestion issue. I’m using SME package from
True, but I don’t know if that has anything to do with it.” (Blog) I and a few others
monitor newspapers, TV, some radio, and the net (although back then there were not
as many blogs and news sites on Thai issues or opinions). These were simply sources of
information. The internet turned out to be a main source as many people went out on
the street, took photos and posted them. (Interview)
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2.3.6 Instant messenger
Definition: Experience and expression in response to the use of instant messenger to
access and disseminate information
Sample:
‘‘คืนน้ันก็ต้ังห้อง chat ใน msn จับกลุ่มคุยถึงสถานการณ์ แล้วก็ตามข่าวจากแหล่งที่พอหาได้ เช่นจาก
live blogging ที่ 19sep.blogspot.com
...
เป็นกลุ่มเพื่อนที่ทำงานที่เดียวกันครับ ประมาณ 6-7 คน ปกติก็ไม่ค่อยได้คุย MSN กับคนกลุ่มน้ีเท่าไหร่
แต่คืนน้ันในกลุ่มก็ invite ให้ผมเข้าไป join ในห้อง chat ที่สักคนหน่ึงในกลุ่มต้ังไว้แล้ว
...
ได้ประโยชน์แค่ว่า วันรุ่งข้ึนต้องไปทำงานหรือเปล่า เพราะในกลุ่มคนที่ chat กันอยู่น้ัน เกือบทั้งหมดเป็น
คนกลุ่มอายุ 20 ต้นๆ และไม่มีความสนใจเรื่องการเมือง’’
[At that night, I set up a chat room on MSN, talking about the situation with a group
of people. We followed and looked for news from sources that we could find, for example,
live blogging at 19sep.blogspot.com.
...
They were my colleagues at work, around 6-7 people. Normally, I did not talk on MSN
with this group of people. However, at that night, they invited me to join one of the
chat room that someone already set up.
...
The benefit we got [from using MSN] was just to know that whether or not we had to
go to work because nearly all people in the group were around early 20 and were not
interested in politics.]
(Interview)
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2.3.7 Email
Definition: Experience and expression in response to the use of email to access and
disseminate information
Sample:
“I sent lots of e-mails – always do. We were all confused, and before too long the coverage
of the coup was overwhelmed by the ”guns and roses” images that flashed around the
world. In general terms, I was in contact with my colleagues and friends.”
(Interview)
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2.3.8 Blog
Definition: Experience and expression in response to the use of blog to access and
disseminate information
Sample:
“My blog exists to help family and friends back home stay up-to-date about my life
overseas. I know as a communication major that the way media represents events if
often more sensational and over-focused than in real life. Because of that, I wanted my
family and friends to know that I was okay and to try to put the information they might
be hearing in a larger perspective.”
(Interview)
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2.3.9 Web forum
Definition: Experience and expression in response to the use of web forums to access
and disseminate information
Sample:
“Travel-related discussion boards such as Lonely Planet’s ThornTree, 2bangkok.com and
Thai Visa are abuzz with the coup, with many posters worried if the events of the past
24 hours will affect their holiday plans.”
(Blog)
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2.3.10 WWW
Definition: Experience and expression in response to the use of websites to access and
disseminate information
Sample:
“Since the coup, internet coverage of Thailand by all methods (news sites, blogs,
youtube[sic], etc.) has exploded. Back in 2006 there were not as many sites cover-
ing events moment to moment other than Thai newspaper sites. And the newspaper
sites just crib their information from Thai-language TV reports. I was very satisfied
with the sites at the time–there was a glut of event-based information coming out that
was quite exciting to follow. However, there is little background–just what is happening.
The situation was especially good for me as I was one of the few English-language sites
to have moment-to-moment posts. It led a lot of readers to me.”
( Interview)
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Scheme: Factors related to information behavior during the
coup
Description: Various constructs (concepts/ideas/objects) that seem to be important to
information seeking and sharing during the disruptive moment of the coup
1. Cognition and affection of individual
Description: Psychological constructs that are related to information behaviors
1.1 Mixed of feeling
Definition: Expression of more than one feeling at a time (e.g., frustration, confusion,
mix)
Sample:
“I stayed there until about 1.30 am. It was raining when I left the studio. I had to
stand with three soldiers, no more than 25 years old, each holding rifles. I was filled
with different emotions - sadness that we had to have a coup to solve our problems, relief
that the stress and bad feelings we’ve had in Thailand might be coming to a close, and
excitement that I was in the middle of something very historic.”
(Blog)
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1.2 Sense of excitement
Definition: Expression of having high energy (e.g., exciting, enthusiastic, etc.) as well
as the loss of such feeling
Sample:
Q: “What was your first response and feeling after hearing about the coup?”
A: “My first response was a sense of excitement that I was in the midst of an exciting
situation. I responded by rushing outside with my camera and hailing a motorcycle taxi
to take me to Rachdamnern Nok Avenue (approx 20 minutes from my home by bike).”
Q: “Did you have any questions at the time related to the coup? If so, what was the
biggest question/issue?”
A: “Although I was concerned for my well-being in a potentially dangerous situation,
my sense of excitement was far more powerful. I realized that the media was unlikely
to provide objective coverage of the situation (being de facto state-controlled) and so
decided to see things for myself.”
(Interview)
“@ 4:48 AM: My phone has finally stopped ringing, so I’m off to get some shut-eye now.
Things seem to have calmed down around the city; hopefully it stays that way when
dawn breaks in a few hours...”
(Blog)
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1.3 Memory
Definition: Expression of how the coup remind someone of events in the past or some-
thing
Sample:
“I quickly went downstairs and took out some money from the ATM. Why? I don’t
know. Just to be safe. Who knew what was going to happen. It reminded me of when,
in 1997, the Baht devalued, and it tumbled and tumbled against the American dollar.
In the end I withdrew Baht and hid it under my bed, for fear I would have to flee the
country! That was nearly ten years ago, and here I was doing it again.”
(Blog)
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1.4 Perception: It is my role and responsbility
Definition: People see an opportunity or necessity for themselves to become a source of
information
Sample:
“My website has a long tradition of shooting photos like this. I wanted the site to be
”almost like being there” so people could see themselves what is going on (as opposed
to having it filtered through reporters who try to tell you what things are like). At one
point, I was one of the only sites doing it in Thailand, but today everyone is doing it
and it is not remarkable anymore.
I had to go way downtown to the government district to take the shots and my goal was
to give the website viewers a look at what was happening.”
(Blog)
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2. Physical capacity
Definition: The expression of physical weakness (e.g., I am tired; Stay up all night; etc.)
Sample:
“Was simply tired. ... Simply that the coup had been successful. Was too busy trying
to catch up on news and hadn’t started to think about longer term consequences.”
(Interview)
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3. Technical resources
Definition: Discussions of particular devices or technical ability
Sample:
“I did have a screen capture hardware device that plugged into the TV and computer,
but I can’t recall if I used that at the time. At some point around that time I just
started taking photos of the screen with a digital camera. That is probably how I got
those shots.”
(Interview)
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4. Collective construct
Description: Discussion of how people as a group perform information activities together
during that time
4.1 We help each other learning about the situation
Definition: People set up a space or environment to exchange information
Sample:
Q: ‘‘รบกวนอธิบายเพิ่มเติมเกี่ยวกับต้ัง group ใน msn หน่อยได้ไหมครับ เช่น’’
A: ‘‘เป็นกลุ่มเพื่อนที่ทำงานที่เดียวกันครับ ประมาณ 6-7 คน ปกติก็ไม่ค่อยได้คุย MSN กับคนกลุ่มน้ี
เท่าไหร่ แต่คืนน้ันในกลุ่มก็ invite ให้ผมเข้าไป join ในห้อง chat ที่สักคนหน่ึงในกลุ่มต้ังไว้แล้ว’’
[Q: Can you explain more about how you joined group chat on MSN?
A: They were my colleagues at work around 6-7 people. I didn’t usually talk to them on
MSN. However, on that night, they invited me to join a group that someone had already
set up.]
(Interview)
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4.2 To finish a task(s) together
Definition: A group was formed or maintain to do a collective task, mostly sharing
information to other (e.g., writing Wikipedia entries or contributing to collaborative
blogs)
Sample:
‘‘วิกิพีเดียเป็น log repository เหรอ
ขออภัยที่พูดตรงๆบทความน้ีทุเรศที่สุดเท่าที่ผมเคยเห็นในวิกิพีเดียมาเลย คุณคิดว่า วิกิพีเดีย เป็นlog
repository รึอย่างไร? มีอะไรก็ append มีอะไรก็ append มันเป็นสารานุกรมนะ ใช้มันให้เป็น Collabora-
tive writing tool หน่อย"ิ’’
[Is Wikipedia a log repository?
Mind my frank speaking. This entry is the worst entry I’ve ever seen in Wikipedia. Do
you think Wikipedia is a log repository that you can append whatever? This is ency-
clopedia. Use it as collaborative writing tool.]
(Wikipedia discussion)
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4.3 We feel secured together
Definition: Forming a group or setting certain rules to protect group members
Sample:
‘‘ผมบอก[เพื่อนผู้ร่วมก่อต้ัง]ไปเป็นชุดว่าต้องทำอะไรบ้าง (เสียดายไม่มี chatlog เก็บไว้) ดังน้ี
• ไปสมัครอีเมลใหม่ อย่าใช้ช่ือให้สาวึงตัวได้
• เอาอีเมลไปลงทะเบียนเว็บบล็อก ตอนแรกจะเอา Exteen แต่กลัวพาน้องซวย เลยเอาของฝรั่ง"ึ่ง
มาลงเอยที่ Blogger
• แจก account ให้กับคนรู้จักที่ไว้ใจได้ และส่งต่อกันไปเป็นทอดๆ ตอนเขียนอย่าใส่ข้อมูลที่สาวถึง
ตัวได้เหมือนกัน
• เขียนเป็นภาษาอังกฤษ!
เขียนมาถึงตรงน้ี หลายคนคงรู้แล้วว่า หมายถึง 19sep.blogspot.com ’’
[I told [the co-founder] what to do (Too bad I did not keep chat log) as follows:
• register a new email account that cannot be tracked.
• use this new email to register a new blog. At first, we thought about using Exteen
[a local Thai blog service]. But we were afraid that it would bring trouble to our
friend (the blog service owner). So we decided to use a foreign service, ending up
with Blogger.
• send this account to trustworthy people and let them distribute as snowball. When
writing, do not put any information that can be tracked.
• write in English.
After this point, many people would know that I mean 19sep.blogspot.com]
(Blog)
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4.4 We give courage to each other
Definition: A group or many people encourage oneself to seek and share information
(i.e., fame; popularity)
Sample:
“I can’t recall exactly, but it was really fun to follow events as they happened–especially
when I knew people were checking back to my site constantly. That night I was expecting
the internet would be cut off (by the military) at some point so I wanted to make sure
I had as much posted to be useful as possible.”
(Interview)
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5. Time
Definition: The discussions about time-related issues or time-sensitive activities; The
importance of time
Sample:
“I think it was good idea for the coup to be put into action late at night... less traffic
and people to have to deal with, and when opponents would be at their lowest reaction
point. By day, the army had announced a ’holiday’ was to be in effect... this kept many
people from having to go to work or school.” (Blog)
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Scheme: Insiders and outsiders
Description: The appearance of insiders’ and outsider’s doctrine in information behavior
during the coup
1. The strength of insiders
Description: The privilege of access of information and knowledge is given to insiders
1.1 I know better because I am Thai
Definition: A perception that non-Thai would not understand the situation
Sample:
“As I always say to my non-Thai friends.
Personally I don’t like the coup. But this coup, it’s apparently the last choice. My friend
in Denmark told me that their Minister called us ”banana republic” :-P
But they never walked in our shoes, They never know.
There’re so many factors. Not just one word that’s called ‘Democracy’ ”
(Photo comment)
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1.2 I know better because I see it
Definition: A perception that one who was in Bangkok had a privileged access of infor-
mation and knowledge
Sample:
“After the coup on Sep 19th, tonight I was drove around bangkok downtown to see
and feel an atmosphere of the coup, one sentence I can explain about bangkok now is
“Nothing to worried about”. People can go where they’re wanna go, no curfew, just
only martial law is active, but as I told you “Nothing to worried about”. The situation
in bangkok no is same as before the coup.”
(Photo description)
“I wish I was living in Thailand right now. I look at pictures of people posing with next
to tanks in downtown bangkok and I can’t help but think how much cooler Thai politics
are than American or Japanese politics.”
(Blog)
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2. The strength of outsiders
Description: The privilege of access to information and knowledge is given to outsiders
2.1 Insiders relied on outsiders as information sources
Definition: People (both Thais and non-Thais) in Thailand had to rely on sources
outside Thailand
Sample:
“So last night like at 1:20 am I was awakened from my peaceful slumber to my ringing
cell phone. I slipped out of bed looked at the number on the phone and thought maybe
one of the students parents or something were calling. It was [student]’s mother. She’d
just seen on the news that a military coup had taken over power in Thailand that there
were tanks in Bangkok and that Americans would be moved out of the country... boy was
that a crazy call to get in the middle of the night... I was disoriented some too....ahhhh!”
( Blog)
‘‘เอาอีเมลไปลงทะเบียนเว็บบล็อก ตอนแรกจะเอา Exteen แต่กลัวพาน้องซวย เลยเอาของฝรั่งซึ่งมา
ลงเอยที่ Blogger’’
[Use this new email to register a new blog. At first, we thought about using Exteen [a
local Thai blog service]. But we were afraid that it would bring trouble to our friend (the
blog service owner). So we decided to use a foreign service, ending up with Blogger.]
(Blog)
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3. Conversion paradigm
Description: The discussion about roles of converted members (i.e., insiders-out and
outsider-in) as well as the strenghtes and weaknesses
3.1 Seeking out converted members
Definition: Absolute insiders and absolute outsiders sought help from converted mem-
bers in terms of access and sharing information
Sample:
“A day after the coup d’e´tat in Thailand, the situation is becoming clearer to distant
observers. Local political observers are saying that the coup was predictable and should
have been seen by Thaksin, the PM of Thailand. I can’t see how this is going to help
Thailand in the short term but the problems of corruption were widespread. During my
own visits to Thailand I always heard about corruption but it was not clear to me who
was orchestrating it or where the money flowed.
(Excerpt from other unidentified source)
Are there any [blog] readers in Thailand who have some local information? It’s a shame
to see this happen again so any feedback from the region would be well appreciated.”
(Blog)
300
3.2 Pretend to be the other side
Definition: Insiders pretended to be outsiders and vice versa
Sample:
‘‘จุดเริ่มต้นในตอนแรก ต้องการเป็นแหล่งข้อมูลกลางสำหรับการรัฐประหาร ผมจำลองตัวเองเป็นคน
ไทยที่อยู่เมืองนอกในขณะน้ัน ย่อมกระวนกระวายร้อนใจอยากได้ข้อมูลมากกว่าคนที่อยู่ในไทยเสีย อีก
ส่วนภายหลัง19sep ได้ปรับตัวมาเป็นกระบอกเสียงให้ คนต่างชาติได้รู้ว่า ประเทศไทยยังสบายดีอย่าเพิ่ง
ตระหนก’’
[At the beginning, I wanted it to be a center point of information about the coup.
I pretended that I was Thai living abroad during that time who would have stronger
desire to have information than local Thai. However, later on, 19sep was turned into a
speaker to foreigners; letting them know that Thailand is still fine. Don’t panic.]
(Blog)
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3.3 Outsider: You should listen to me
Definition: Outsiders give reasons why others should listen to them
Sample:
“I know that might seem a little of out of place because I’m obviously not Thai. but
several years ago I dated a very nice Thai girl who was over here in US to get her MBA.
and we were very serious about each other, for a while. and she flew back east and she
met my parents. and I took off a couple of week and went and flew to Thailand so that
I can meet her family. and it was very nice experience. let me tell you that country is
a very beautiful country. and the people over there for the most part are so very nice.
They’re called the land of smile. Now I know that it’s just the slogan from the tourism
department, but it really is true that people are extremely friendly.
That’s not to say that they are perfect people. They are things about their culture that
I don’t particularly care for. I’m not a big fan of their unwritten class system. I don’t
particularly like the fact that they talk bad about people behind their backs quite a bit.
And the level of corruption that they accept as a way of life particularly is saddening
to me. But that’s not to say that my country, United States is any example of how
to be. I understand that every country every culture has good and bad people and I
understand that good people make mistakes and sometimes do bad things. But on the
whole I found Thailand, the Thai people, to be extraordinarily friendly and warm and
caring and all around with great people. I think that’s why it’s particularly saddening
to me so much. The reason of the event with the coup by the army.
I understand that the Thai history is filled with coup....”
(Video transcript)
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Appendix E: Samples of Memo-notes
Title: Searching and aggregating photos
(Dec 9, 2009 4:09PM)
My first impression from browsing through the collection of photos focuses on the joyful
expression. Most of the photos uploaded on Flickr show positive attitude. It would be
interesting to investigate how the metaphor of the coup to many people (e.g., as a life
saver, as a festival, as a tank show). Foreign travelers seemed to enjoy taking photos
with tanks, soldiers, and guns. Photos of kids are everywhere! It looks like a time for
celebration.
(Dec 10, 2009 3:58PM)
People copied photos from news agency and posted them on their Flickr accounts. There-
fore, it is easy to find redundant photos. ([AbsoluteInsider23]’s and [AbsoluteInsider24]’s
collections are nearly identical!) Most interestingly, they even copyrighted these photos.
:)
(Dec 15, 2009 5:57PM)
There were few photos replaced or updated. Why did they do that?
(Dec 22, 2009 2:14 PM)
There seems to be four types of photos based on the source. 1. captured from TV 2.
computer screen capture (website, MSN) 3. photos from other news source (e.g., AP)
4. photos taken by themselves (eyewitness)
—
Everytime I refresh the search result pages, the number of photos is never consistent.
There were 931, 933, 951, 954 photos variably. This time I got only 819 photos. I am
not sure why? Maybe it is because of the performance of the index. I have to refresh
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pages a couple of times before getting the data.
—
Searching for photos taken by cameraphones:
I used cellphone brands (e.g., Nokia, Samsung) as keywords to search using query in
NVivo. There are not that much but they don’t look any different from photos taken
by digital cameras.
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Title: Importing photos to NVivo
(Dec 13, 2009)
1. What if title does not means anything (e.g., automatically generated from a camera),
should I still collect it?
Yes, keep it. At least it might be able to tell the sequence of the photos (e.g., DSC0978,
DSC0979, DSC0982).
2. It would be nice if Nvivo could some way to import image/video and description at
the same time automatically.
3. It would be nice if Nvivo could detect redundant items (photos, videos, text).
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Title: Just for the coup
(Feb 5, 2010 3:56PM)
People created a new account particularly to build a space to express about the coup
(e.g., Flickr account, YouTube account, collaborative iblog). The purposes can be in-
terpreted in three ways. The first one may be for organization and presentation of the
content (i.e., grouping the documents together). The second is for security reason. So a
new account could be liked to the author/creator. The last one is to reach out to people
because the new accounts tend to have some sort of pointer to the coup (e.g., 19sep06,
coupthailand, patiwat, etc.)
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Title: Time conflict of photos
(Jan 30, 2009)
On Flickr, there are a number of photos stating that it was taken on September 20, 2006
but uploaded on September 19, 2006.
It was quite confusing at first. However, it is possible that EXIF on the camera records
the time in Thailand after 11:59PM of September 19, 2006 while it was still 11:59am of
September 19 in the USA, EST.
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Title: Voice from outsiders: You should listen to me
(Jan 22, 2009)
People were trying to convince or reach out others by relating oneself to Thailand or
people before sharing his/her information.. This phenomenon seems to be common
amongst outsiders who commented on blog posts, photos, and videos. Here are some
interesting reasons.
“I just got back from Thailand yesterday.”
“You know that my mom lives in Thailand.”
“I have lived and worked in Thailand for many years.”
“I have studied Thailand for many years.” “I follow Thai politics”
And the best one so far: “I dated a Thai girl back in 2005. I went to Thai and visited
her parent.”
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Appendix F:
Thailand: Political & Information Infrastructure
This appendix provides background information about the political system of Thailand
from historical, sociological, and democratic perspectives. To construct the political
worldview of the Thai people in general, two approaches are used: chronology and
typology. Basically, the chronological approach follows the political history of Thailand,
while the typological one synthesizes the main attributes of political institutions in
Thailand. Furthermore, there are various perspectives that help provide a context for
the coup more broadly than the moment when the military seized power, including the
disruption of mass media and the role of information and communication technologies
(ICT).
It is essential to note that this chapter serves two different purposes. Firstly, it aims to
provide insights on how Thai people construct their political worldview. This is probably
a brief introduction to Thai politics for those readers who might not be familiar with
the Thailand political system. Secondly, this chapter provides the researcher’s political
knowledge and perceptions toward the political system of Thailand. Therefore, for those
who are familiar with Thai politics or Thai readers, this chapter can be used to evaluate
the trustworthiness of this study based on bias that pertains to the researcher.
Political history of Thailand
From absolute monarchy to Thai-style democracy
It is quite domestically conventional to divide the history of Thailand chronologically into
four periods based on empires, kingdoms, and dynasties: Sukhothai (1237-1488), Ayut-
thaya (1350-1767), Thonburi (1767-1782), and Rattanakosin (1782-Present). However,
some scholars believe the post-absolute monarchy period (since 1932) can be classified
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as a separate contemporary period.
The political history of Thailand began with an absolute monarch. During the
Sukhothai period (1238-1488), the oldest period during which the kingdom was ruled by
an ethnically Thai person (see also Syam-anada, 1971, p.1-14), the kingdom was mostly
about art, culture, religion and peace (Gosling, 1991). Thai alphabets were invented
in this period, around 1283 (Jumsai, 1970). The kings had close relationships with the
populace. Since the kingdom was small, the King himself could attend to all complaints
raised by citizens.
The politics during Ayutthaya, the next and longest period, were about establishing
the empire and consolidating and protecting territory. There were evidently 46 wars, av-
eraging one every nine years in this era (Samudavanija, 1987b). Bureaucratic values were
rising as well as the prosperity brought about by commerce. The king’s authority and
power, according to Girling (1981), was distributed through noblemen. As the French
royalist described, during the late Ayutthaya period, “[i]n the Indies there is no state
that is more monarchical than Siam.” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005) The distinguished
social status was primarily categorized into two groups: noblemen and their families,
and the mass who surrendered some or all of their labor to the elites. “Entry into the
official ranks was a noble preserve. Families presented their sons at court, where they
were enrolled as pages. Ascent up the ladder of success then depended on personal skill,
family connections and royal favour.” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.15)
The next period, Thonburi, was the recovery period from Burmese occupation. How-
ever, the span of this period was quite short (1767-1782). A coup ended King Taksin’s
reign, the only king in this period, and transitioned to the present era, known as Rat-
tanakosin (Bangkok), ruled by the Chakri dynasty. It is apparent that the early Chakri
dynasty restored Ayutthaya traditions, including the divides between elites and slaves,
and the hereditary administration and bureaucracy.
The traditional polity started to decline during the reign of King Mongkut (Rama IV).
Ideologies from western countries were increasingly adopted among elites, primarily to
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defend the country from colonization. The essential reformation of the country occurred
after the accession of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V). The period was characterized by
a modernization of the country’s infrastructure, in areas such as commerce, education,
transportation, communication, public administration, and the legal system. This trans-
formation also included a cultural shift, especially later during King Vajiravudh (Rama
VI) period, affecting architecture, literature, performing arts, and history. In addition,
King Rama V proclaimed the end of slavery by ruling that nobody born from that date
forward could sell himself or be sold into slavery. The noble status was also transformed
to a service rank (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005). The notion of the centralized and
unified nation-state was introduced in this period, however, with the force of authority.
The next milestone in Thailand’s politics was the fall of the absolute monarchy in
1932 (Stowe, 1991), which marked the beginning of the democratization of Thailand.
It was the People’s Party (Khana Ratsadorn) that initiated the bloodless revolution,
during King Prachatipok’s reign. There were about a hundred members of the Party,
over half in the armed force. Most of them were educated in Europe. King Prachatipok
announced the first constitution. The first prime minister of Thailand was Phraya
Manopakorn Nithithada. However, the conflict between the liberals and compromised
royalists caused another coup in June 1933, a year after the revolution by the liberals,
followed by yet another coup attempt by royalists in October 1933. The king seemed
to be uncomfortable with the political climate and the proposed solution by the coup
leaders. He then announced his abdication, while seeking medical treatment in Europe.
The years after the revolution saw rivalry over the control of the nation-state among
militarists, royalists, and liberals with the interventions of World War II. At the same
time, the economic recession due to the war provoked workers to begin street demon-
strations and unionization. The liberals used this mass politics as an experiment, while
the militarists cooperated with communist intellectuals to deliver propaganda through
newspapers. In June 1946, King Ananda Mahidol (Rama VII) was shot and found dead
in his bedroom in the palace. His apparent assassination remains unexplained to the
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public until today. Pridi Panomyong, the leader of the liberals, was blamed for the
assassination by royalist politicians. He was arrested and eventually executed. King
Bhumibol Adulyadej, King Ananda’s younger brother, succeeded him to the throne.
It is worth noting that there were two coups during the period after the death of
King Ananda and before the return of King Bhumibol after completing his education
in Switzerland. The first one was in November 1947 by royalist politicians. The reason
given was ”to uphold the honour of the army, to clarify the royal assassination plot, and
to install a government...” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.142) The second coup was
on November 26, 1951, the eve of the King’s return. This coup, also known as the Silent
or Radio Coup, was initiated by militarists. The justification of the coup was to purge
communists from the parliament and Cabinet.
After the accession to the throne of King Bhumibol, there were many consequences
of note. Beginning with the American era during the early period of King Bhumibol’s
reign (1940-1960s), the United States, an ally after World War II, was allowed to use
Thailand as a military base during the Cold War (i.e. the Korean, Indochina, and
Vietnam Wars), which opened the door for economic development in Thailand. The
Thai economy was growing rapidly with the exploitation of natural resources and labor.
However, it was still elites and urban people who benefited from the development. Thai
armed forces received tremendous support from the US, gaining political power and
bringing a military dictatorship to Thailand. In addition, the US had a strong political
influence. Apparently the major political decisions in the country, including the two
coups led by Sarit Thanarat and Phao Sriyanon, were supported by the US. The Thai
military was strengthened by the aid money from the US. The role of the monarchy was
restored. People from rural areas began to migrate to urban areas.
American influence was not only about economic development, but also led to a
conflict of political ideologies. Baker and Phongpaichit (2005, p.167) point out that
“[i]n Thailand, the US underwrote dictatorship, but at home it exemplified ideals of
liberalism and republicanism... Opposition to neo-colonialism, military dictatorship, and
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rapid capitalist exploitation also looked for inspiration both backwards into Thailand’s
pre-American past and outwards to American’s Cold War rivals.” The leftists, who were
influenced by Maoism and Marxism, gathered to form the Communist Party of Thailand
(CPT). The CPT formed guerrilla troops that fought with the government in the 1960s
and 1970s. Another form of rebellion opposing military dictatorship was brought about
by college students in urban areas. The right gained strength through the Nawaphon
group and the Village Scouts with strong support from the military. Eventually there
was a confrontation between soldiers and student demonstrators on October 14, 1973
and another encounter between rightists and students on October 6, 1976. Eventually
the military gained its power back. However, the political situation afterward was not
stable. There were two successful coups, and another attempt, during 1977 and 1980.
All of them were the result of the fight over “the spoils of power and the direction of
policy.” (p.196) In addition, as a result of the crises, the role of the monarchy was
revived.
The next era (1980-1988) saw the rise of another group of military men, who mostly
came from mid-rank officers and Democratic Solders, also known as “Young Turks”.
General Prem Tinasulanond was revered by the group and became Prime Minister.
However, Prem’s leadership did not depend only on military support. He also had a close
relationship with the monarchy. Therefore, the role of the monarchy in government was
bolstered during this period. In addition, discourse on democracy began to influence
policy. However, there was no commitment to full representation of democracy in any
of the eight years of Prem’s government. The major ministries were still allotted to
militarists, while a number of MPs were trusted technocrats and elected constituents.
At the same time, businessmen increased their influence over various political parties,
especially those parties operating at a provincial level. At the end of the “Premocracy”
period, the military came under attack by the press and political parties over issues with
the national budget. Prem was pressured to retire at the 1988 election.
Chatichai Choonhawan was elected as the next prime minister. Although his personal
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background was military, his affiliations rather leaned toward diplomatic and business
interests. Along with rapid economic growth, it seems that the government had a larger
financial stake than ever. Ministers were suspected of corruption and inadequate budget
allocations. At the same time, the role of the military in governance declined. This situa-
tion led to the 1991 coup commanded by the generals from the Armed Forces Academy’s
Preparation Class Five claiming to clean up the corruption in Chatichai’s government.
However, during the interim period, people seemed to be suspicious the spoil of power
and resources of the coup leader. The draft of constitution was questionable. The junta
later formed a political party in which a number of Chatichai’s MPs attended. The party
won the election in March 1992 and brought the coup leader back. The protest, also
known as the mobile phone mob, was arranged and largely supported by urban middle
class. The demonstration led to another outbreak of violence between soldiers and civil
protestors. The king, once again, intervened in the situation. The military seemed to
disappear from the forefront of the political arena, although it still “resisted in internal
change or greater supervision.” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.246)
The crisis in 1992 opened a lot of room for businessmen and activists (including
academics) in the Thai political sphere. Although both groups had different interests,
they were able to compromise on a reform political agenda of stabilizing the political
system and sustaining the country in the context of globalization. The new constitution
was ratified in 1994, introducing a variety of administrative mechanisms including an
Election Commission, National Counter Corruption Commission, Constitutional Court,
National Human Rights Commission, as well as decentralizing democratic power by
granting certain control mechanisms to local administrations.
The economic crisis in 1997 brought the country to another political challenge. Busi-
nessmen and the middle class blamed politicians for mismanagement and staged demon-
strations in favor of reforming the constitution. As a result, the cabinet, led by Chawalit
Yongchaiyut, had to resign. The Democrat Party formed an alliance with other parties
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and technocrats to set up a government without an election. However, the adminis-
tration of the Democrat party could not lessen the deepening economic crisis. Chuan,
prime minister at that time, turned the economic crisis into a political opportunity
to reform Thai politics, campaigning for the need for good governance (Bunbongkarn,
1999). Thus, during 1997 there was another constitutional reform attempt to stabilize
the parliamentary system as well as increase the role of monitoring mechanisms.
It was Thaksin Shinawatra, then the country’s most successful telecommunications
entrepreneur, who saw an opportunity to rise politically. He launched a new political
party name Thai Rak Thai (Thai Love Thai: TRT). The party got support from var-
ious powerful business groups who survived the crisis. Also, he appealed to small and
medium business people with his personal style, which differentiated him from the previ-
ous government. In addition, a number of NGOs and rural activists helped to formulate
campaign strategies to attract villagers and the poor. Thaksin apparently spent enor-
mous amounts of money on his campaign. The party, eventually, won the 2001 election
by a landslide, taking nearly half of the seats in the house.
From Political Tension to the 2006 Coup D’e´tat
After elected as the 23rd prime minister of Thailand, it was hoped that Thaksin Shinawa-
tra would repair the economic crisis. His social agendas, also criticized as populist pro-
grams, were rapidly implemented right after he assumed office (Phongpaichit & Baker,
2005; Hewison, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005; McCargo, 2001). These included a debt relief
program for the rural poor, village funds (one million baht per village), and a 30-baht-
a-visit program to cover medical expenses. Thaksin’s government delivered “more of its
promises than its supporters expected; polls after the election showed that many voters
believed [Thai Rak Thai’s2 ] platform was too good too be true.” (Phongpaichit & Baker,
2004)
2Thaksin’s political party. The transliteration of the name is Thais Love Thais.
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Politically, Thaksin’s position as prime minister was very strong. His strength being
supported by three major factors, according to Phongpaichit and Baker: support from
the reformed 1997 constitution, the scale of his victory at the election, and his personal
popularity.
The fact that there were so many political parties in the election arena caused some
concerns and raised issues regarding the transparency and stability of the political sys-
tem. Historically no elected party in history had ever taken as large a majority of votes.
Therefore, a leading party, according to a number of elected MPs, would have to have
sought alliances from other small parties to set up a government. The practice resulted
in negotiations that used money to secure minister positions. As a result, none of the
cabinets, prior to Thaksin’s government, ever finished a four-year term of administra-
tion, mostly due to alleged corruption scandals and pressure by the press. The 1997
constitution aimed to solve such issues, by favoring a two-opposing-political party sys-
tem. The 1997 constitution reform attempted to stabilize the politics by decreasing the
power of no-confidence votes for the cabinet and prime minister. However, because of
the landslide victory of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in 2001, a number of small
parties dissolved themselves to join TRT, leaving only one party in opposition. Thus,
the monitoring of the opposition faction in the parliament became very weak.
The way in which Thaksin made promises to end the economic crisis and help the
poor earned him a lot of support during his first term of administration. In addition,
his open-and-intimate style of communication touched people, especially those who were
from rural areas. On the very first day of his administration, Thaksin spent some time
talking to leaders of the Assembly of the Poor’s years-long protest. The protest was
later temporarily dissolved. Moreover, Thaksin launched his weekly radio program to
communicate with the people. A number of polls indicated that his popularity sharply in-
creased. As such, he decided to continue his government for another term as indicated by
his slogan “four years of repair, and four years of construction.” Phongpaichit and Baker
(2004)
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The Thaksin style of economic management was widely known as Thaksinomics
(e.g., Looney, 2004; Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). Aeusrivongse (2002, para.1) defined
Thaksinomics as a situation in which “the government bestows patronage on its affiliated
crony capitalist groups on the one hand and garners support from the lower classes by
increasing their economic power on the other.” Phongpaichit and Baker (2004, p.129)
further commented that “Thaksinomics approaches the national economy as a bundle
of resources to be managed to deliver a higher profit. . . . The keys to raising profit are
better skills and better infrastructure but, especially, more entrepreneurship to exploit
the potential of resources available.” The ultimate goal of his approach was the growth
of the gross domestic product (GDP). It was apparent that the GDP growth rate rose
impressively during his period, about 6.7 percent in 2003. Instead of following the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF)’s advice, Thaksin managed the economy according to
his own style, apparently by viewing Thailand as a company, and eventually paid off all
of the IMF loans in 2003, two years ahead of schedule. His success was internationally
recognized, especially by leaders of neighboring countries.
Thaksin was reelected to a second term in February 2005. At that time Thai Rak Thai
won more than half of the total seats (377 out of 500). Rather than stabilizing his admin-
istrative position, it was instead the beginning of his political downfall. Thaksin’s pop-
ularity and success turned into a double edged sword. The large majority of MPs in the
coalition should have strengthened the position of the government. However, it caused
concerns about the role of parliament since public objections to policy or ministers’ con-
duct would be less likely to be effective in the parliament (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004,
p.95).
In addition, Thaksinomics posed numerous risks to the economy as perceived by
academics (e.g., Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004, p.130–133). His populist policies had
been widely criticized as a device for political purposes. For instance the 30 baht per
medical visit policy seemed to be untenable, causing operational issues (p.93–94).
By attempting to reach people directly, his relationship with NGOs became sour
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as there was evidence that the government attempted to persuade foreign sponsors of
Thai NGOs to withdraw support. He derided NGOs as dishonest and disloyal for their
acceptance of support from foreigners. His proposals to solve issues were then rejected
by people who were affected by government projects (i.e., dam construction). The
protesters returned and confronted polices posing concerns for the National Human
Rights Commission and the Senate.
Thaksin’s War on Drugs program, launched in 2003, became controversial. Even
though the anti-drug agenda was generally supported by the public, its violent im-
plementation caused a huge negative public reaction. Thaksin threatened to with-
draw officials who failed in the campaign as he thought that officials and policemen
were involved in drug dealing. On the other hand, there were also incentives for each
arrest. 329,000 names were listed and targeted to be arrested within three months
(Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004, p.161). During the three month period of the campaign,
2,637 people were killed and 68 were officially reported as being shot by police in self
defense (p.162). A major contributor to the death toll was the practice of criminals
killing their own accomplices to evade arrest. The campaign was roundly criticized by
international agencies such as the United Nations and the foreign press.
The government handling of the insurgency in the South of Thailand also unsettled
the public. The violence in the South, particularly in the three southern-most provinces
(Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) where the majority of the population is Muslim, began
in 2001 and increased throughout Thaksin’s period. Hundreds of people were killed, most
of them were bystanders. A number of scholars believe that the issue was historically
rooted in a political and cultural conflict between residents and the government, which
resulted in regional separatism (e.g., Nguyen, 2008; Albritton, 2008). Some suspected
the ideological influence of foreign terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah
Islamiya (Nguyen, 2008, p.5). At the beginning of his period, Thaksin declared on his
radio program that he did not believe in these causes. He instead believed that it was
318
about local politics (Shinawatra, 2007). The government declared the State of Emer-
gency Decree in those areas and set up a special committee. In the end the committee
criticized Thaksin’s policy, citing ineffective policing and the arrest of innocent people,
which engendered further distrust among residents (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004, p.161).
The worst criticism of Thaksin leveled by the media and academia was that his
style of internal administration had turned into dictatorship, especially for his threats
to academics and journalists who criticized him and the government (e.g., Winichakul,
2008). Tejapira (2006a, p.230) stated that Thaksin’s regime was an “elected capitalist
absolutism.” In addition, he tried to control the media in a variety of ways. Siriyuvasak
(2007) pointed out that during Thaksin’s term there were numerous measures (i.e.,
business, legal, technical, political) to intervene in the operation of the mass media.
In 2002, Thaksin bought ITV, an independent TV stations during the economic crisis.
Under the administration of the government, there were also two TV stations under
Thaksin’s control, MCOT (Channel 9) and Television of Thailand (now NBT). He also
had investments in other types of media such as newspaper and entertainment businesses.
A political television program, Muang Thai Rai Sup Da [Weekly Thailand], was
canceled from the station’s schedule due to an inappropriate reference to the monar-
chy according to the Mass Communication Office of Thailand (MCOT) (Ch 9 drops
Sondhi . . . , 2005). Thailand Weekly was hosted by Sondhi Limthongkul, an owner of
Manager Media Group. After the cancellation, Sondhi vowed to continue his program
weekly at Thammasat University and Lumpini Park and began attacking Thaksin and
his government. The audiences grew steadily. Sondhi later set up a new satellite channel
to gain mass support.
Thaksin and his government were accused of corruption on the basis of many inci-
dents. For instance, Thaksin granted multi-million baht loans to Myanmar to initiate
telecommunications projects. Obviously the projects would hugely benefit his telecom-
munication business. It is important to note that Thaksin’s business owned major
communication infrastructure in Thailand, including paging service, cellular network,
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Cable TV, Internet, and satellites. The business has apparently expanded to neighbor
countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.
Another major issue came up over corruption in the Suvarnabhumi Airport project,
a new international airport. Media discovered irregularities in the acquisition of the
baggage scanning machines. Thaksin was pressured to remove the Minister of Trans-
portation.
Nevertheless, the situation reached its peak when Thaksin and his family members
sold a multi-billion baht business to Temasak Holding, a Singapore government-owned
corporation, without paying taxes.
All around, the criticism of his alleged conduct was growing. Sondhi formed an
alliance with other anti-Thaksin activists called People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD).
Another of the founders of PAD was Chamlong Srimuang, who was also the leader of the
demonstrations against the military government in 1992 (McCargo, 1997). Chamlong
previously had a close relationship with Thaksin. He actually invited Thaksin to join
his political party in 1994 (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005). However, Chamlong began
mass protests when there were attempts to list alcohol producers in the stock market
(Pathmanand, 2008). In addition, Chamlong also adamantly opposed Thaksin’s policy
on bringing monies that were out of the mainstream market, mostly from gambling, into
the system by legalizing those businesses.
Thaksin eventually announced the dissolution of parliament on February 24, 2006 ex-
pecting this measure to minimize the pressure from media and demonstrators. However,
his decision to arrange the next election in two months resulted in a boycott from other
political parties, since it was too rushed and seen as technique to eliminate competi-
tion. Additionally, it was claimed that he would use the election to legitimize himself.
During Thaksin’s campaign for the election, the PAD was also getting stronger in terms
of demonstrations and its mobilization of the crowd. At the same time, people who
supported Thaksin began to demonstrate.
The election results show that Thai Rak Thai, once again, dominated the election for
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seats in the parliament. However, there were a large number of voters who chose the no
vote option on the ballot. In the very next month (May 2006), the Constitutional Court
revoked the election results, deciding that the ballots were set up inappropriately, and
rescheduled a new election for October 15. Both pro- and anti-Thaksin demonstrations
intensified. There were concerns that the groups might violently confront each other.
Thailand 2006 Coup D’e´tat
The October 2006 election never occurred due to the military coup on September 19,
2006. The Royal Thai Army staged the coup while Thaksin was traveling to New York
to attend the United Nations General Assembly. Thaksin had actually been out of the
country for a week before the coup. During that period, the rumors about the coup were
widely spread throughout news media (Focus: Yonroy 11 won kon ja pen nayok re ron,
2006). During his trip, he gave an interview in which he stated that he might give up
his political career.
The military initially called themselves the “Council of Democratic Reform (CDR)”,
changing to the “Council for National Security (CNS)” later on serving as advisory
board to the interim government. The coup was led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin,
the commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Army, who, a week prior to the coup, denied
that the military would seize power (Focus: Yonroy 11 won kon ja pen nayok re ron,
2006). He admitted later that he and General Anupong Phaochinda had planned the
coup for about seven months (Nanuam, 2008). The military used government corruption
and the need for national reconciliation as the main justification for staging the coup.
In November 2006, the coup released a white paper providing the justifications of the
coup (Council of Democratic Reform, 2006), including:
1. corruption and conflicts of interest,
2. abuse of power,
3. breaking the moral backbone and tarnishing the virtue of leadership,
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4. intervening in the political and constitutional monitoring systems,
5. policy mistakes that breached human rights, and
6. destroying the unity of the nation and exposing it to risks and violence.
In addition, the coup also referred to the King’s speech, given to administrative court
judges on April 25, 2006 (King Bhumibhol Adulyadej, 2006), urging them to solve the
crisis and move the country forward.
This coup resulted in the declaration of martial law nationwide, arrest of some of
Thaksin’s allies, suspension of the constitution, dissolution of the Cabinet, banning
of political gatherings, and controls on the media, especially television. By the late-
evening of September 19, people throughout Bangkok began noticing tanks entering the
city. The military mainly used the national television stations to control the situation.
Major television stations replaced their own regular program with video footage of the
royal family accompanied by patriotic songs. Around 10:20PM, Thaksin tried to declare
a state of emergency via telephone on a government-owned national television station.
However, the declaration was interrupted and returned to clips of the royal family.
Around 11PM, the first announcement from the coup was displayed on all free-to-air
television channels saying (Nelson, 2008):
At the moment, the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional
Monarchy, which is composed of the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces
and the Commission-General of the Royal Police, has successfully taken con-
trol over Bangkok and its vicinity without meeting any resistance. So as to
maintain peace and order in the nation, the Council seeks the cooperation of
the public to remain calm and offers its apologies for any inconvenience caused.
The second announcement, aired about fifty minutes after the first announcement,
explained the justification for and purposes of the coup. The first appearance of the
coup leaders was not until around midnight (see also the chronology of the first two
days from “Coup as it unfolds”, 2006). The coup leaders met the King at the palace
seeking approval for the organization of the coup.
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Later on the coup set up the National Legislation Assembly to review the constitution.
It is apparent that the Assembly has been perceived as an elite group containing royalists,
military commanders, and technocrats. Connors and Hewison (2008, p.2) suspected that
the new constitution was intended “to allow the palace, the military and the bureaucracy
to reassume a guardian role over the legislature that the 1997 Constitution had removed.”
The leaders of the coup set up an interim government instead of taking control of the
power themselves, nominating General Surayuth Chulanon, a member of Privy Council,
to serve as prime minister.
The reactions of the Thai people to the coup are noteworthy. According to a national
Suan Dusit poll (Chaleeuysup, 2006), 84 percent of respondents agreed with the coup.
Most of them believed that it would change the political climate in a positive direc-
tion. Peaceful images of people bringing food and flowers to armed solders and taking
photos with tanks were highlighted in the national and international media. Both the
media and scholars observed that this coup might be represented as a good coup (e.g.,
Connors & Hewison, 2008). A number of academics and thinkers asserted that the coup
was necessary for the political development in Thailand (Boonmi, 2006; Pitsuwan, 2006).
Some recalled the notion of Thai-style democracy to justify the coup (e.g., Kittiarsa,
2006; Connors, 2007).
However, there were also people that disagreed with the coup, including those from
pro-Thaksin groups. Pro-democracy activists began their campaigns to protest the coup.
The pro-Thaksin and democracy activists later formed an alliance known as the Demo-
cratic Alliance against Dictatorship (DAAD). The group changed their name again, after
the constitutional ratification vote, to the United Front of Democracy against Dictator-
ship (UDD). The common objectives of the UDD were the removal of the political power
of militarists and royalists. International governments and organizations raised concerns
about the coup as a threat to democratic stability (for instance, Commission, 2006). A
number of scholars are concerned about the return of semi-democracy and military dic-
tatorship (e.g., Pathmanand, 2008, p.138–9), even though the coup leaders repeatedly
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expressed that they intended to relinquish power as soon as possible.
It seems that the coup itself could not relieve the political turmoil. Even after the
coup relinquished its power, political tensions have persisted to the present. The elec-
tion after the interim government in December 2007 brought Thaksin’s allies back into
parliament causing the return of pro- vs. anti-Thaksin dilemma. The major event was
when PAD demonstrators closed down the operation of two major international airports.
The intervention of the judiciary ended two cabinets within a year. At the time of this
writing, a new cabinet has been formed, led by the Democrat party, politically opposed
to Thaksin’s allies. While the role of the PAD has dwindled, the UDD demonstrators
seemed to be more active than ever. In April 2009, the demonstrators interrupted the
ASEAN leaders’ Summit in Pattaya, Thailand by closing down major traffic spots in
Bangkok. Eventually, the government declared a State of Emergency in response to
confrontations between the protesters and the military.
Coup D’e´tats in Thailand
The notion of coup d’e´tat usually entails the use of force and violence to change political
structures and constitutions. However, Xuto (1987) observes that the force has not
often been used in Thai coups. Instead most Thai coup d’e´tats only threaten to use
force. History records twelve successful and eleven failed coups prior to the 2006 coup.
Table F.1 shows the coups in Thai democratic history.
Table F.1: Coup d’e´tats in Thailand from 1932–2006 (Su-
varnajata, 1994).
No Date Coup name Type
Successful coups
1 June 24, 1932 Khana Ratsadorn military &
(The People’s Party) civilian
2 June 20, 1932 Khana Rattapraharn military &
(Military Group coup) civilian
3 November 8, 1947 Kana Taharn khong Chart military
(National Military
Group coup)
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Table F.1: Coup d’e´tats in Thailand from 1932–2006 (Su-
varnajata, 1994).
No Date Coup name Type
4 April 6, 1948 Khana Rattapraharn military
(Military Group coup)
5 November 29, 1951 Khana Rattapraharn military
(Military Group coup)
6 September 16, 1957 Khana Taharn military
(Military Group)
7 October 20, 1958 Khana Patiwat military
(Revolutionary Group coup)
8 November 17, 1971 Khana Patiwat military
(Revolutionary Group coup)
9 October 14, 1973 People uprising civilian
10 October 6, 1976 Khana Pati-roop Karn military
Pok Krong Pan Din
(National Administrative
Reform Council)
11 October 20, 1977 Khana Patiwat military
(Revolutionary Council)
12 February 23, 1991 Khana Raksa Kwam Sa-ngob military
Reab Roi Hang Chart
(National Peace Keeping
Council)
13 September 19, 2006 Khana Patiroop Karn military
Pok Krong nai Rabob
Prachatipatai un mee
Phra Maha Kasat Song Pen
Pra muk (Council of
Democratic Reform under
Constitutional Monarchy)
Failed coups
1 October 11, 1933 Kabot Bowaradet military
(Boworadet rebels)
2 August 3, 1935 Kabot Naisib military
(Sergeant rebels)
3 January 29, 1938 Kabot Praya Song Suradet military
(Song Suradet rebels)
4 February 28, 1948 Kabot Bang-yak Din Dan Members of Parliament
(Separation rebels)
5 October 1, 1948 Kabot Senathikarn military
(General Staff rebels)
6 June 26, 1949 Kabot Wang Luang civilian
(Grand Palace rebels)
7 June 29, 1951 Kabot Manhattan military
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Table F.1: Coup d’e´tats in Thailand from 1932–2006 (Su-
varnajata, 1994).
No Date Coup name Type
(Manhattan rebels)
8 November 8, 1954 Kabot Santipharb civilian
(Peace Movement rebels)
9 March 26, 1977 Kabot Yee Sib Hok Meena military
(March 26th rebels)
10 April 1, 1981 Kabot Neung Mea-sa military
(April 1st rebels)
11 September 9, 1984 Kabot Kao Ganya military
(September 9th rebels)
The coup attempts happened about every three years on average including both suc-
cessful and failed coups. As shown in Table F.1, the military is usually involved in coup
d’e´tats in Thailand, particular the army. Note that a coup normally becomes a legiti-
mate coup group when the coup succeeds, whereas the failed coups are conventionally
called rebellions (Suvarnajata, 1994, p.40). For failed coups the rebels were usually sen-
tenced to jail, and most of them were eventually given royal pardons and returned to
their previous jobs. Some even turned into professional politicians (p.41).
Suvarnajata (1994, p.77) indicates that the leaders of the most successful coup since
1932 were granted royal pardons for two main reasons: legitimacy of the coup via the
King’s consent, and popular acceptance. Xuto (1987, p.203) observes that publicly
anticipated coups tend to be more successful in Thailand, as opposed to the surprise
ones.
Coup d’e´tat has become a critical stage in the vicious cycle of Thai politics. The
cycle illustrates the reality of the political system in Thailand as shown in Figure F.1.
The cycle emerges as a result of two types of politics: constitutional authoritarianism
(usually adopted by a ruling group who are moderate, flexible, and careful to avoid
confrontation), and constitutional democracy (Xuto, 1987, p.202). A number of students
of Thai politics have attempted to intervene in the cycle to transform it into an ideal
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Figure F.1: The vicious cycle of Thai politics (Suvarnajata, 1994)
system, efforts, which led to the 1997 constitutional changes.
Despite the rarity of bloodless coups in other countries (Hebditch & Connor, 2008,
p.32), Xuto (1987, p.202) indicates that Thai coups are typically swift and peaceful,
often without any fighting or casualties. However, confrontations usually took place
when the authoritarians noticeably turned to totalitarians, which usually resulted during
the transition out of the coup periods.
It is usually expected that coup makers intend to seize power for themselves and
assume the leadership of the government personally. However, there have been a num-
ber of coups in Thailand, including the 2006 coup, after which the military set up a
figurehead government. There seem to be three major justifications for such action:
1) the military intends to demonstrate that they did not seek power for their own, 2)
the coup makers seek legitimation by requesting a royal pardon through the figurehead
government, and 3) the government is used as an intermediary to avoid confrontations
and conflicts (Suvarnajata, 1994, p.20).
Even though the 2006 coup set up an interim civilian government, it is still commonly
perceived that the military took advantage of the situation. For instance, Pathmanand
(2008) observes that the military budget and personnel got a boost during that period.
In addition, a number of officers obtained executive appointments to various state agen-
cies and enterprises. Most of them are telecommunications- and transportation-related
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organizations. In addition, during the coup period, the budget allocation to the Armed
Forces increased by 34 percent (Cropley, 2007).
Political systems and institutions in Thailand
It is apparent that the Thai political system is rather complex and unique. As men-
tioned above, a number of scholars have attempted to adapt the notion of democracy
into a specifically Thai style of democracy. The idea of adapting democracy into the
Thai political system was mentioned as early as the end of King Rama V’s period.
Baker and Phongpaichit (2005) note that King Chulalongkorn ordered Vajiravudh, later
King Rama VI, to set up a parliamentary system before he died. After 77 years of at-
tempting to integrate a democratic system into Thai society, the issue of whether or
not Thailand is suited for democracy is still debated in Thai society. For example,
Boonmi (2007 cited in Winichakul, 2008) argues that Thai politics should not follow the
example of Western countries. Rather it should be based on Thai intellectuals and cul-
ture. Laothamatas (2006 Winichakul, 2008) points out that electoral and parliamentary
democracy that is suitable for Thailand should respect intellectuals and the monarchy.
The Thai political system can be described as an electoral, parliamentary, and con-
stitutional government with the King as a head of state. The executive branch is led
by Prime Minister who is nominated and elected by the House of Representatives. The
prime minister sets up a cabinet consisting of 36 ministers responsible for 19 ministries
and the office of Prime Minister. The parliament of Thailand, a legislative branch, has
two chambers: the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representa-
tives consists of 480 elected members: 400 through single constituency elections and 80
elected through proportional representations of political party membership. The Senate
contains 150 members. Seventy six of them were elected from each of the provinces,
while the rest were nominated and selected by a selection committee. It is notable that
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since 1932 all 150 members of the senate were selected by the monarchy. Until the con-
stitutional change in 1997, the whole upper house was elected by province. The National
Legislature Assembly, appointed by the coup in 2006, changed the constitution to the
current system of senate selection. In addition to the executive and legislative branches
there is also a judicial branch that is independent from the other two.
Besides the parliamentary system, Thai politics also includes various other institu-
tions, which hold different values and power in the society.
“Nation, Religion, and Monarchy” (Chart, Satsana, Phramahakasat) is the patri-
otic slogan coined by King Vajiravudh shortly after his accession, to propagate the
“devotion to Fatherland, Nation, and [the] Holy Religion as a focus for Thai unity.”
Baker and Phongpaichit (2005) assert that the slogan was derived from “God, King,
and Country” metaphor. The slogan was revived by the 1947 coup, strongly empha-
sized under the Sarit regime, and it has since become the “watchword of the post-1976
coup regimes.” (Girling, 1981, p.139) Article 69 of the 2007 constitution states that
“[e]very person shall have the duty to uphold the nation, religion, the King, and the
democratic form of government with the King as head of the state under this constitu-
tion.” In addition, the Thai flag was changed during Vajiravudh’s period in order to
respond to the theme above. Thus, the colors of the flag represent these three elements:
red is Nation, white is Religion, and blue is King.
Nation-state
The red color of the flag represents the life-blood of ancestors dedicated to the con-
struction and protection the country. The notion of nation-state was originally estab-
lished, primarily, to protect the country from western colonization during King Vaji-
ravudh’s reign. However, the discourse surrounding the national identity of Thailand
began in earnest after the revolution of 1932 under the government of Marshal Plaek
Pibulsongkram. With foreign support, especially from other Asian countries, Marshal
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Pibulsongkram became a nationalistic-minded leader propagating national reconstruc-
tion and attempting to monopolize the national identity.
In 1939, Marshal Plaek changed the name of the country from Siam to Thailand.
The justification of name-change was to represent actual racial origins and the popular
practice of Thai people. It is worth noting that Thailand is a diverse country, especially
in terms of ethnicity. The name change has been criticized to mostly benefit the ruling
elite, who spoke Thai, “to instill pride and equality with the West in the country’s
citizenry.” (Anderson, 1978, p.212 cited in C. J. Reynolds, 2006, p.248) In addition,
the fact that the word “Thai” also means “free” was significant during the colonial
period. The debate over using “Siam” versus “Thailand” has continued until today
(Chachavalpongpun, 2009).
Along with the name-change, Pibulsongkram also changed the national flag, national
anthem, and royal anthem. He also discouraged the use of various terms that reflected
segmentation in the country (e.g., northern Thais, northeastern Thais, southern Thais,
and Islamic Thais) (C. J. Reynolds, 2002, p.5). His propaganda also included support
for the domestic economy. Later on in his regime, prescriptions for everyday were also
mandated, for instance using the official national language, dressing properly (in more
Western style), engaging in healthy and productive activities, visiting art museums,
banning the custom of chewing betel, and even mandating the use of the phrase “sawas-
dee” in greetings. C. J. Reynolds (2002, p.6–7) points out that Pibulsongkram’s regime
aspired to what was called “civilization”, including the cultivation of “the value of en-
terprise, propriety, decorum, self-reliance, valour, and purity.” However, some scholars
believe that the attempt to prescribe national uniformity indicates the real heterogeneity
of Thai society (C. J. Reynolds, 2002).
Pibulsongkram’s regime laid out the discussion of what constitutes “Thainess” in
the sense of national identity. In addition to international forces, national ideology
was also a major factor. For example, communism became legally recognized as “un-
Thai” during the Cold War period. C. J. Reynolds (2002) discusses various factors
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that could determine the boundary of the nation-state of Thailand, including history,
the country’s name, monarchy, language, ethnicity, and Buddhism. The relationship
between the military and nationalism have also become intertwined since the notion of
national security and peacekeeping has so often been used to seek justification of the
military’s operations (including coups).
Peacekeeping, derived from the patriotic sense, also bears the meaning of unity
(samakkhi). The theme was created in King Chulalongkorn’s era to strengthen the
state and the foundation of the country (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.105). During
Pridi’s government, he urged Thai people “to love the nation and preserve the consti-
tution” by using unity as a justification. It is apparent that unity is among the most
often highlighted themes addressed by King Bhumibol and other royal family members,
referred to as a necessary moral principal for the survival of the country. Note that
seeking unity was also used as a justification for the 2006 coup.
Above all, nationalism in the context of Thailand is centered on the notion of loy-
alty, especially to the monarchy. As Baker and Phongpaichit (2005, p.107) point out,
“[n]ationalism and royalism were identical: ‘loyalty to the King is identical with loving
the nation because the King is the representative of the nation’. The duty of the ordinary
people was only to be unified, obedient, and grateful, to the point of self-sacrifice.” A
number of appropriate “Thai” customs, before the Pibulsongkram’s Cultural Mandates,
were diffused from the palace. Siwalak (1987) indicates that the prescription of cultural
norms during Pibulsongkram’s regime was driven by royalists’ concerns. In 1981, during
the early Prem administration, the National Identity Board was established primarily to
preserve and promote Thai culture. The board used mass media, including TV, radio,
and newspapers, to propagate Thai culture. It also created numerous publications re-
garding various topics such as local events, the royal family’s biographies and activities,
and Buddhist’s special occasions. It also identified six major components of Thai iden-
tity including: 1) territory, 2) people, 3) independence and sovereignty, 4) government
and administration, 5) culture, and 6) pride (C. J. Reynolds, 2002, p.15).
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One of the common criticisms of this conceptualization of Thai nationalism is that
the hegemonic influence was distributed from ruling class and state institutions through
various techniques such as education, forces, and reproduction (e.g., Anderson, 1991;
Winichakul, 2008). C. Reynolds (1987) suggests the adoption of the theory of false
consciousness to investigate how Thai populations adopted the idea of national identity.
However, a new form of nationalism came to attention when the economic crisis struck
the country in 1997. Phongpaichit and Baker (2004, p.76) describe how a number of
new organizations were set up to oppose IMF policies claiming that IMF policy was
another means to economic colonization. The theme was transmitted to mass media
and politicians. It seemed likely that Thaksin found his way to use nationalism to
contribute to his political rise. His party name, Thai Rak Thai, was resonant of the
theme of national defense (p.78). Thus, it is perceived that the new nationalism was
no longer about opposition to a racial or territorial enemy. Rather, the true enemy
of the nation apparently was capitalist. Phongpaichit and Baker (2004) state that the
conceptualization of nationalism during Thaksin’s period was influenced by Greenfeld’s
Spirit of Capitalism (2001). Thaksin cited nationalism as a primary mechanism for
solving economic problems. Phongpaichit and Baker (2004) also level the criticism that
in the later term of his administration, the enemy of the nation, in Thaksin’s view,
seemingly expanded to any foreign journalists or United Nations agencies that made
negative comments about him or his administration.
Religion
It is well known that Thailand is dominated by Buddhism. According to National
Statistical Office (2000), about 94 percent of Thai populations are Buddhist. As of
December 31, 2004, there were a total of 33,902 wats, sacred precincts or temples where
monks live and preach Buddhism, in Thailand (Buddhist Monastery Division, 2004).
Buddhism and Thai politics seemed to be intertwined throughout history. Buddhism
first entered Thailand in the thirteenth century in the form of the Theravada Buddhist
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tradition from Sri Lanka (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). The rulers since the Sukhothai
period have patronized Buddhism to some extent. The basic tasks of governorship
included building wats, appointing abbots, and leading rituals. The justification used to
relinquish territories in Laos and Khmer (modern Cambodia) was to protect people from
“less perfectedly Buddhist governance.” (p.32) In addition to Buddhism, Hinduism and
Brahmanism also have strong relationships with monarchs. Hindu-Brahmanical ideology
has been adopted since Ayutthaya period (Samudavanija, 1987b) which led to a belief
that the King is a living god. Although this belief has been in common currency up to
the contemporary period, Hinduism and Brahmanism have not been popularly adopted.
Although Buddhist monks are commonly thought to be excluded from political power,
there have been a number of cases where Buddhism played a significant role in political
context. For example, Buddhist monks during the Sarit government were sent to the
northeast, not only to preach Buddhism, but also to “organize villagers in development
projects, explain about laws, and discourage communism” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005,
p.172). During the trouble between the leftists and rightists in 1976, Phra Kittiwutho,
a Buddhist monk who was among the leaders of the Nawaphon group, said “it was not
sinful to kill communists” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.194) provoking a confronta-
tion between the two groups. In addition, capitalist development of Thailand also led
Buddhism to be adapted to the commercialized world (P. A. Jackson, 1997).
Another controversial incident occurred during the 1997 economic crisis: Luangta
Maha Bua, one of the most respectful and popular monks in the northeast, launched a
campaign to donate money, especially US dollars, to the government for international
deposits. He was also one of the earlier supporters of Thaksin. Members of the Assembly
of the Poor, his followers, canvassed to collect signatures to support Thaksin during the
asset declaration lawsuit.
In addition, there was recently a controversial demonstration by thousands of Bud-
dhist monks and supporters requesting to formally recognize Buddhism as the national
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religion during the 2007 constitutional reform process. However, the request was even-
tually denied (Silp, 2007). The demonstration was dispersed after a speech by Queen
Sirikit (2007) on her birthday in which she argued that religion is above politics.
Monks play significant roles in teaching peace and harmony, values which are trans-
ferred to Thai political culture. Most political changes in Thai history were conducted
by selecting a path that avoids conflict and violence (Nakata, 1987, p.189). Buddhism
influenced Thai social and political life by teaching individuals to respect elders’ age,
birth, virtue, and merit. These personal concepts are transformed into seniority, supe-
riority, nobility, wealth, power, knowledge, and religious or governmental position when
enlarged into the public sphere. In addition, the common assumption among Thai peo-
ple is that everyone deserves respect – recognition of personal dignity. Thai people are
more likely to accept certain ideas without challenge or question (e.g., superstitions and
horoscope) (Nakata, 1987, p.180-181). Thus, it can be partly inferred that there is a
high level of interpersonal trust (Phillips, 1965; Piker, 1968). On the other hand, the
perception of collective action among Thai people is deemed to be negative partly be-
cause it is derived from the “primacy of individual action and responsibility” that is
immensely rooted in Buddhism (Jumbala, 1987, p.110; Somvichian, 1979). However,
this individualism/independence seems to contrast with the fact that most Thais are
obedient and submissive to the ruling class (Nakata, 1987). This internal conflict has
in some ways caused problems with the democratization of Thailand, even though it is
argued that Buddhism in Thailand favors democracy in principle (Jirakraisiri, 2004).
The politics of Buddhism has evidently influenced the politics of the country. The
evidence of the administration of Buddhism in Thailand began during the Sukhothai
period. However, the official politicization of Buddhism did not occur until the 1902
Royal degree, also known as the Sangha Act, which dictates the administrative structure
of Buddhist temples, during King Chulalongkorn’s Reign (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005).
The revolution in 1932 led to the change of Sangha Act to comply with constitutional
democracy. However, the 1932 Sangha Act caused concerns regarding harmony between
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the two types of Thai Buddhism, Mahanikaya and Dhamma-yutika Buddhism. The coup
d’e´tat in 1962 led to the reform of the act, which has been used since then. The core
of the act addresses the administrative structure and responsibility of Buddhist monks
in different levels. The Supreme Patriarch (sangharaja) is the highest ranking monk,
appointed by the King.
Monarchy
One of the allegations the coup made against Thaksin was that he was disloyal to the
monarchy. During the PAD campaign, Sonthi Limthongkul accused Thaksin of tres-
passing on the King’s power by appointing an acting Supreme Patriarch in place of
the critically ill Somdet Phra Yanasangworn. In addition, Sonthi claimed that Thaksin
breached royal tradition at the merit-making ceremony at the royal Temple of the Emer-
ald Buddha (Pathmanand, 2008). Even though the latter case was clarified by Bureau
of The Royal Household, the allegation helped PAD demonstrators gain support from
royalists.
Traditionally the King has been portrayed as a Bodhisattva, a Buddha-to-be (Neher,
1979, p.6). Thus, the King is conventionally recognized as “inviolable and infallible,
and remains free of any accusation” (Connors, 2007). After the 1932 revolution, the
King became a constitutional monarch supposedly positioned under the constitution
and above politics. Members of the royal family whose rank is above Mom Chao (His
Serene Highness) were barred from politics. A number of royal family members were
purged from the high ranking military and civilian offices (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005).
However, the revival of the monarchy began since Sarit’s coup in 1957. Sarit sought
legitimation from the monarchy and announced that “the King and Nation are one and
indivisible.” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.177) Sarit encouraged the expansion of
royalism by retaining royal customs that exhibits kingship. The King launched numerous
rural and agricultural projects. His appearances were disseminated through mass media
and publications. The portrayal of the King turned into a father-like figure (Connors,
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2007, p.130). The monarchy became the “soul source of unity and strength” of the
country (OPPS, 1987, p.11 cited in Hewison, 1997, p.61).
On the other hand, the negative images of the military and politicians opened an
opportunity for the monarchy to revive in a modernized society. The role of the King
became crucial after the King’s intervention of the 1976 political crisis. In response
to the request from students, the King demanded that the military leaders to go into
exile, nominated the new prime ministers, and set up the National Convention. The
terms “democracy with the King as a head of state” has been popularized since then. In
the May 1992 uprising, the King ceased the political crisis once again. Connors (2007,
p.131) remarks that his intervention led to the implication that the monarchy is “an
indispensible para-political institution in Thailand democracy.” Winichakul (2008) notes
that, while the King remains a sacred being, his authority is also based on popularity and
democracy for justification. Hewison (1997, p.63) addresses that the King is typically
viewed as “a popular, egalitarian, ‘elected’ and constitutionally correct monarch, vitally
interested in the democratic transition, and as the architect of democratic development,
while being cautious and avoiding excessive palace political involvement.”
During the political tension prior to the 2006, the role of monarchy once again was
brought back to the forefront of the political arena. PAD leaders, opposing politicians,
and some scholars launched a campaign requesting the King to intervene by citing the
Constitution’s Article 7 stating:
When no provision of this Constitution is applicable to any case, it shall be
decided in accordance with traditional practices in the democratic form of
government with the King as head of the state.
It is apparent that the article provides an opportunity for the King to overrule the
government. Traditionally, those actions include, for example, issuing royal decrees,
proclaiming martial law, declaring war, making peace, concluding treaties with foreign
states, and granting pardons. However, it was the King himself who denied stepping in
through such a mechanism during the 2006 coup. Instead he suggested using the court
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system to solve the crisis (King Bhumibhol Adulyadej, 2006). Apparently, the image
of democratic kingship was once again revisited, while some scholars, such as Tejapira
(2006b), addressed that the monarchy take advantage of the political crisis.
Another constant portrayal image of the monarchy, revived from a traditional per-
spective, is tightly attached to Buddhism. The king is believed to be a naturally elected
(i.e., born to be king) and hold a high level of charisma (barami - usually referring to in-
nate authority) that is relating to his karmic merit (Connors, 2007, p.128). In addition,
the King is expected to follow the ten royal virtues (tosapitrajadharma) and reassert
himself as the King of Righteous (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.175; Samudavanija,
1987b, p.9).
The constitution has one chapter addressing the position and responsibility of the
King. The main features include: 1) the King is the chief of state and holds exclu-
sively respectful position that nobody shall accuse him by any sorts, 2) he is honorarily
positioned as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and 3) he is a Buddhist and
upholder of religions. In addition, the King shall also appoint the Privy Council which
supplies advice on all matters under the constitution. The King has to approve and put
his signature of the legislation prior to publishing in the Government Gazette.
There is another type of law that deals specifically with the royal family, which
is referred to as the Palace Law. The current constitution cites the Palace Law in
the matter of succession to the throne. Historically, the Palace Law contains specific
rules inside the court, first proclaimed by King Trailok in 1458 (Samudavanija, 1987b,
p.13). The core principle of the law is strict loyalty, honesty, and obedience. The royal
customs are still in place today in the palace. One of them is the court language that
functions as a “safeguard and naturalizes the sacerdotal/common divide by enforcing
and policing a linguistic divide which makes humble and earthy the addressee to royalty.”
(Chantornvong, 1992 cited in Connors, 2007, p.129)
As the role of the King becomes increasing important, the le`se majeste´ law, prevent-
ing the King from criticism, has been getting more attention. The discourse of le`se
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majeste´ has moved from the defense of monarchy to national security since 1957. The
current sentence associated with breaking of the le`se majeste´ law is 15 years in prison,
although the convicted usually get royal pardon. Traditionally, the law is perceived to
cover not only the present extended royal family, but also deceased members (Terwiel,
2005, p.296). The National Legislation Assembly, appointed by the 2006 coup leaders,
proposed to extend the law to cover the Privy Council. However, the proposal was even-
tually withdraw. The le`se majeste´ law has been used to attacked political opponents
prior to and after the 2006 coup. The King himself indicated that he would like to al-
low criticism (King Bhumibhol Adulyadej, 2005). Winichakul (2008) blamed censorship
covered by the le`se majeste´ law on a misconception about the role of the monarchy in
Thai politics. He suggested that, for the King, being above politics no longer means
being outside of politics, but rather being “on top of or overseeing normal politics.” (p.
20)
A number of scholars (e.g., Winichakul, 2008; Pye & Schaffar, 2008; Pathmanand,
2008) even regarded the 2006 coup as a royal coup, which was backed up by royal military.
The king’s speech led to the invalidation of the April 2 election by the Constitutional
Court. General Prem, the president of Privy Council, insisted prior to the coup at the
Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy that “the solders belong to His Majesty the
King, not to a government. A government is like a jockey. It supervises soldiers, but
the real owners are the country, and the King.” (Bangkok Post, July 15, 2006 quoted in
Pathmanand, 2008, p.128; Winichakul, 2008, p.30)
Military
The coup, representing as one of the royal military, used the King’s speech partly as a
justification for seizing power. Winichakul (2008, p.30) argues that instead of seizing
power for themselves, the coup leaders acted for the King. The notion of Army of
the King, as mentioned earlier, has been introduced since 1957 during Sarit’s period
(Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.177).
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The pattern of early militarization of the state highlighted the powerful role of war-
riors. Even when the country was not at war, military organizations and their members
were still powerful and influential (Samudavanija, 1987b). The military personnel in the
old time mostly came from either noble or aristocratic background (Nakata, 1987).
The role of the military has been strengthened in every political movement since
the 1932 revolution. Suvarnajata (1994) discusses the transition of military ideology
since the first coup attempt in 1912 prior to the change to democracy. The role of the
military was highlighted around the idea of being a guardian or protector of the nation
and avoidance of politics. The major responsibility was defense of the country from the
outsider enemy.
However, after the democratic revolution, the soldiers have increasingly been in-
volved in internal affairs. C. J. Reynolds (2002, p.22–23) asserts that the military had
cited national security as a reason to monopolize and control Thai culture during Pibul-
songkram’s period. The perception of military to civilian government seems to be around
the notion of distrust (Girling, 1981, p.125), which had also been used during the anti-
communism campaign. The relationship between the military and other sectors of Thai
society has been increasingly closer. (Elliott, 1978) argues that the role of the military in
Thai society actually rose from relationships with businessmen and rural people. After
the fall of military power by unarmed civilians in May 1992, the military was perceived
to be back in their barracks. However, McCargo and Pathmanand (2005) resist the idea
that the military has been totally depoliticized, instead it has “adjusted itself to chang-
ing socio-political conditions, maintaining a low profile until conditions were right for
a reassertion of influence.” The military has recently played a significant role in social
control, for example, engaging in rural development projects, monitoring situations in
the South, and controlling the demonstrations in rural areas (Baker & Phongpaichit,
2005).
Suvarnajata (1994) indicated that the general ideology of the military after the 1932
revolution contains three major concepts: statism and national security, militarism, and
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leadership. When it comes to political turmoil, civilian leaders are seen as relatively weak
and indecisive (Nakata, 1987, p.175). In addition, military officers perceive themselves
as well-equipped and capable of handling difficult situations better. These perspectives
have been the main reasons for the military to seize power (Suvarnajata, 1994, p.46–47).
In particular, it has become a part of the Thai culture for the military to seize power
when success needs to be assured and associated actions executed effectively.
One of the perceived reasons for the 2006 coup was the fact that the military
did not agree with the way in which Thaksin promoted his relatives in the military
power structure against the reshuﬄe of traditions of seniority. Thaksin also promoted
his classmates at the Armed Force’s Preparation Academy during his period of rule.
McCargo and Pathmanand (2005) said that it was Thaksin’s actions, which brought
back the power of military in the Thai political arena.
Civil administration
It is apparent that the civil administration began during the transition to the end of slav-
ery in Thailand. Prince Damrong, a Minister of Interior Affair in King Chulalongkorn’s
period, reformed the bureaucracy to a more distributed system (Neher, 1979). Recruit-
ment and promotion had depended on personal patronage. In 1928, the bureaucracy
began to be formalized by legislation (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.111). The revo-
lution in 1932 transformed the bureaucratic system to depend on rank, position, and
education. Additionally, the effect of World War II mitigated the superiority of gov-
ernment officers. During Sarit’s period, government power was decentralized to the
provincial level. The number of lay people working in government offices had increased
(p.172). It was during the same period that Thailand began to require national identifi-
cation and household registration. In the mid-1980s, the economic acceleration changed
the perception of civil officials since the salaries of those who works in commercial units
were substantially higher than those who worked for the government. Throughout these
changes, Thai bureaucrats or civil officers, however, has still been called Kha ratchakan,
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the servant of the King (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.164; Girling, 1981, p.125).
According to the Office of the Civil Service Commission (2006), it was estimated that
1.92 million people worked in civil service in 2006. About 77 percent of them had at
least an undergraduate degree.
Thailand has three levels of administrative structure: central, provincial, and local
(Samudavanija, 1987a). The central level includes ministries and independent agencies
under the control of the national government. There are 76 provinces under the direction
of governors. Although the governor is the highest rank of the provincial administra-
tion, his authority directly controls only those who are in the Ministry of the Interior.
A province consists of districts (amphur), which are governed by district officer (nai am-
phur). Township (tambon) is a subsection of a district whose head of township is called
Kamnan. The smallest unit of the provincial administration is the village (Moo ban),
which is led by head of the village (Phuyai ban). It seems likely that opinion leaders
have a lot of influence in these local levels (both township and village) e.g., Moerman,
1969).
There are a number of researchers who have studied the social values and characteris-
tics of the Thai bureaucracy. Four major characteristics of the Thai bureaucracy, which
have been discussed included: hierarchical status, personalism, security, and social plea-
sures (e.g., Siffin, 1966). Girling (1981, p.147) addressed that these characteristics, in
the sense of democracy, are quite individualistic, which is contrary to Western values. He
further identified that family upbringing, education, peer values and career expectations
influence these characteristics.
Riggs (1966 cited in Neher, 1979, p.469) identified four principles underlying the
operating code of behavior of Thai bureaucrats, including:
1. reducing the work load for officials, particularly the necessity for making and en-
forcing hard decisions,
2. reducing tensions between the bureaucracy and the public primarily by distributing
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benefits rather than enforcing regulations,
3. extracting the means of subsistence for officials from the public, and
4. being well situated in the bureaucracy by identifying with and servicing prominent
officials.
Moreover, the instability of politics in the past, resulting in the frequent change of
government, affects the effectiveness of the Thai bureaucracy, particularly considering
that Thai officials heavily rely on top-down development (Samudavanija, 1987a).
These unique characteristics have led to unsupportive perceptions of Thai bureaucrats
in the eyes of the public. McCargo and Pathmanand (2005, p.8) note that:
The police suffer from serious image problems in Thailand because of pervasive
corruption. In the perception of most Thai’s, for a boy from a good family
to join a civilian branch of the civil service could imply a willingness to gain
prestige and job security, while working on behalf of the country for a low
salary. Joining the army might imply a quest for status and, traditionally,
political power or influence. Joining the police, however, is generally seen as
reflecting a simple desire to make money.
Corruption is a significant issue of the Thai bureaucracy and politics in general. It
is also a crucial argument in the political system as it has been used numerous times as
a reason for the coups in Thailand. Corruption in Thailand has usually been explained
through the cultural perspective of the patron-client relationship (e.g., Neher, 1977).
Scott (1972, p.60) briefly explains that “the patron is expected to protect his clients and
share his good fortune with them. The client must, in turn, support his patron in every
way possible.” It is seen as an exchange of mutual interest between two parties. The
simple formulation would be that the money or gift was given in exchange for security,
stability, power, and convenience. A number of scholars view corruption as a normal
phenomenon, especially regarding a traditional perspective, as the social norms tolerates
such actions (Riggs, 1966; Nakata, 1987). (Phongpaichit & Piriyarangsan, 1998, p.5) in-
dicate the three common forces that allow corruption in Thailand: 1) low level of official
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personal incomes, 2) limitations of legal provisions and procedures for policing corrup-
tion, and 3) poor public support. Interestingly enough, Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan
(1998, p.162) further point out that the general public still did not view the works of
public administration such as government offices, police, and politics, as public services.
The perceptions of corruption in Thailand range from unacceptable (such as cheating
on the people, and cheating on the King) to acceptable (e.g., gifts or good will - sin
nam jai). It is criticized as the conflict of traditional and modernized perspectives.
Generosity (nam jai) is one of the most desirable attributes in Thai social value system.
The rationale for what is acceptable or not is typically based on the amount (value) of
the gift or money, intentions, and consequences (Phongpaichit & Piriyarangsan, 1998).
Interestingly enough, those who have lower socio-economic status tended to perceive
that politicians are more corrupt than bureaucrats. On the other hand, Thai’s who have
higher socio-economic status view bureaucrats as more corrupt (p.184).
Political parties
The birth of political parties in Thailand occured when the military was temporarily
forced out of politics in 1946 (Bunbongkarn, 1987, p.68). There were originally three
parties. As of February 2009, there were 68 parties registered with the Election Commis-
sion of Thailand. The Democrat party, the oldest and currently the governing party, has
been in the Thai electoral battlefield for 63 years. Political parties in Thailand are gen-
erally perceived as weak and fragile in terms of organizational structure (Bunbonkarn,
1987, p.68), especially considering that Thai society has maintained the culture that
depend on leadership and personal ties.
McCargo and Pathmanand (2005) identify three complimentary points of view, which
characterize Thai political parties, including political economy, political sociology, and
political sciences. From a political economy perspective, the close relationship between
political activity and business activity is highlighted. Politics is seen as “the continuation
of business by other means.” In this view, “parties were alliances of different factions,
343
brought together not by common ideology, but rather through shared financial interests,
personal ties, and opportunism.” (p.71) Within one party, there needs to be at least
one individual who is central to all factions. Not necessarily to be the head of the party,
this person rather acts as “power broker and fixers”.
The concept of patron-client relationship has been commercialized in the view of po-
litical sociologists. From a broader perspective, this group signifies the role of political
parties in Thai social structure. Political parties are viewed as groups of personalized
factions (phuak). The benefits result in the form of cabinet positions, which were allo-
cated on a quota basis (reflecting the size and number of political parties). Therefore,
this leads to corruption and mismanagement, since the personnel were not associated
with tasks or policy assigned.
Opposing the political economy perspective, political scientists see that political par-
ties are driven by politics and secondarily influenced by business or patron-client rela-
tionships. There are two main elements of a political party: ideology and organizational
structure (including mass membership and branches). Political scientists disagree with
the coalition political system. Instead, the two-party system is preferred. The constitu-
tional reform in 1997 apparently favored a two-party system, which later was criticized
during Thaksin’s period as it allowed Thaksin to use a dictatorship style to administer
the country.
Civic movement
Civic movement was quite alien in Thai society from the traditional perspective. In this
context, civic movement refers to political movements and activities operated by lay
people (e.g., labor unions, those who had effect by government’s projects, etc.). Due to
the hierarchical structure and interest in avoiding confrontation, the masses historically
had not been considered as a threat to the ruling elites. The most common way to
respond to oppression traditionally was to escape to the jungle, which is far from political
and social order (Samudavanija, 1987a, p.23). According to Samudavanija (1987a), there
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are only a few major civic movements in Thai history. There were only three incidents
during the Ayutthaya period and two early in the Rattanakosin era, which are limited
to a specific area of the country and mostly among the ruling elites. Even during
the transition period to the democratic system, the royalists were actually the group
who circulated the rumor about social disorder and foreign intervention attempting to
provoke civic movement (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.120).
The first non-elite civic movements seemed to begin after the Second World War in
the form of street demonstrations. Most of the early demonstrations were driven by
economic conditions. Baker and Phongpaichit (2005, p.142) pointed out that strikes by
workers who worked in rice mills, docks, cement works, oil refineries, and timber yards
in 1945 led to the establishment of the Association of United Worker of Thailand, the
first unionization, in 1947 by friends of Pridi, a leader of the socialist faction.
The role of mass demonstrations has been crucial in Thai politics. There are three ma-
jor mass demonstrations in Thai political history: two demonstrations in 1973 and 1976
led by student movements (Samudavanija, 1987a; Jumbala, 1987; Baker & Phongpaichit,
2005), and the 1992 demonstrations perceived as “middle class” or “mobile phone” mob
(A. Brown, 1997). Although they were driven by different causes and contexts, all of
them primarily shared the same agenda, against the military dictatorship. They also
ended up with bloodshed. Interestingly enough, these three incidents were eventually
interrupted by the King.
Another form of civic movement is driven by the discourse of rural and community
development, which usually represents Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). NGOs
have been around in Thailand since the late 1960s (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p.216).
The ineffectiveness of protests by local groups by themselves led to the establishment
of one of the most active groups called the Assembly of the Poor founded in December
1995. The Assembly began with a loose collective network of activists and local groups
who protest governments on the establishment of Pak Mun Dam. The Assembly later
expanded to other groups with various issues such as agricultural product price drops,
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agrarian debt, and natural resource exploitation, primarily in order to strengthen their
negotiation power. The street demonstration of the Assembly, mostly through villagers,
began in 1997 and reached its peak after the economic crisis hit the country in the same
year. The demonstrations of the Assembly have continued intermittently since then.
However, it was People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) demonstrations that has
substantial influence in ousting Thaksin. Pye and Schaffar (2008) analyzed the mass
movements against Thaksin, indicating that PAD is incorporated by both royalist elites
and the grassroots opposition to Thaksin. For elites, the campaign was supported by
academics and businessmen who were dissatisfied with Thaksin’s policies and actions,
and the old network of civil servants around the King. It was apparent that PAD
leaders, such as Sonthi Limthongkul, used royalist nationalism to unify the campaign as
the slogan says “we fight for the King”, recognizing themselves as “guards of the land”,
(Winichakul, 2008, p.30) and use the yellow, representing the King Bhumibol’s birthday
(Monday), as the theme color. The grassroots supporters of PAD included farmers,
students, workers, and urban poor. During Thaksin’s period, his policy to privatize state
organizations such as Electric Generation Authority of Thailand, Petroleum Authority
of Thailand also led state employees and local groups to join PAD. In addition, the
attempt to initiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Thai and US governments
became a new inspiration of various NGOs and activists.
The first large gathering of PAD was on February 4, 2006, a few days after the
announcement of the deal of selling Thaksin’s main telecommunication business, Shin
Corporation, embracing approximately 50,000 people (Pye & Schaffar, 2008, p.41). The
PAD demonstrations gained wider support and were more widely distributed geographi-
cally. On the other hand, after Thaksin dissolved the parliament, people who supported
Thaksin, which is believed that mostly from rural areas and taxi drivers, began their
demonstration as well, beginning in March 2006, even though they had been widely
criticized that these demonstrations were set up by Thai Rak Thai and Thaksin himself.
The demonstrations between both pro- and anti-Thaksin parties raised concerns that
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there would be violence and bloodshed. PAD along with a number of academics and
professionals asked the King to intervene. The King declined and indirectly suggested
the Constitutional Court to solve the problem. However, failure to cancel the elections
seemed to leave the issue unsolved. Thaksin and his alliances got elected again in April
2006. However, he declined to take the prime minister, but resumed his care taker
position until his successor is elected. Then, the coup took place on September 19, 2006.
To summarize, Thai political culture is quite unique. Neher (1979, p.459) summarized
the major characteristics of Thai society, regarding political development, including the
loosely structured social system, Buddhism, democracy and culturally rich. Also it can
be explained through the notions of a bureaucratic polity, and patron-client relationship.
Additionally, Nakata (1987) characterizes the Thai political culture as authoritarian, as
well as involving patron-client relationships, personalism (leader’s personality), hierar-
chical relationships, individualism, traditionalism, passitivity, and peace-loving compro-
mise.
The discourse of democratization in Thailand mostly focuses on the conflicts among
different social classes, ideologies, and powers. These conflicts have been brought about
by the demands of royalists, militarists, socialists, and capitalists. Moreover, the social
status of civic movements has been collectively represented in the form of academics,
middle-class, and the poor (both urban and rural). The complexity of the discourse of
democracy in Thailand led to the emergence of Thai-style democracy, which is based in
nationalism.
Neher (1979 cited in Girling, 1981) once suggested that “Thai favors democracy;
but when queried specifically, [Thai people] prefer security, or development, deference,
or economic stability.” These two contrasting characteristics lead to the continuous
desire to reform democracy to fit Thailand. Winichakul (2008, p.24) addressed that
among the elites, the expectation of clean politics has greatly impacted the discussion
of democratic development in Thailand. There are four aspects of clean politics: the
extreme perception of corrupt politicians, a belief that people in the rural areas are the
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cause of vote-buying, the distrust of an election as a result of the two earlier discourses,
and use of moral rules as the superior and ultimate legitimacy in democracy.
The 2006 coup can be perceived as a reasonable solution to some people. It is worth
noting that it was not the first time for royal intervention, or military intervention
(Winichakul, 2008). Additionally, corruption is not a new issue, but viewed as a chronic
threat to the country. As a result, perhaps the coup d’e´tat in 2006 was just a repeat of
the vicious cycle of Thai politics.
Information Infrastructure during the 2006 coup
Mass media is perceived as the fourth estate due to its pivotal role in society. In ad-
dition, people take advantage of technology to communication, not only publicly, but
also personally. Although Thai syntactically means freedom and Thai people love in-
dependence, such rights are not guaranteed in the context of communication in public,
especially regarding politics.
The incident of the 2006 coup is an extreme case of the disruptive flow of information
created by humans. As Luttwak (1979) describes, any government or coup leaders
control the mass media and telecommunication facilities in order to neutralize dissenting
political forces. Luttwak asserted that “control over the flow of information emanating
from the political center will be [the] most important weapon in establishing authority
after the coup.” He also suggested that such an operation would be more effective in
a place where illiteracy is widespread. Additionally, to prevent revenge against coup
members, the coup also has to paralyze the opponent’s reaction by taking control of
telecommunications and other important resources of the country (e.g., electric power).
This section primarily reviews the current state of mass media in Thailand, especially
its roles in Thai political life and the 2006 coup. In addition, the roles of ICTs, the
Internet and mobile communications in particular, are also discussed.
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Mass Media
Mass Media Adoption
According to the results of the household survey conducted by National Statistical Office
(2008a), about 95 percent of the Thai population watched television in 2008, increasing
from 80.4 percent in 1989. Interestingly enough, the proportion of children age 6-14 who
watch television is the highest, 97 percent, comparing to other age groups. In addition,
age seems to have an effect on the consumption of news program. Older people are likely
to watch news more than the other age groups. From another survey done in 2004, Thai
people tend to spend on average 2.7 hour a day watching television.
Currently there are six free-to-air television stations in Thailand. Three of them
are owned and operated by the government and army. The other three are owned
by the government but operated by private corporations. In general, the law controls
the proportion of contents shown on televisions. For example, at least 15 percent of
broadcasting time should be allocated to news and knowledge programs. The alloca-
tion of entertainment programs should not be over 65 percent, while advertisement and
commercial service programs are limited to 20 percent. Programming in the 4:30PM -
6:30PM time slot is particularly dedicated to children and youth programs. A program
related to Buddhism must be allocated once a week and no less than 15 minutes per
program. In addition, the officials also censor the advertisement of amulets, cigarettes,
and alcohol during the daytime (5AM-10PM).
Alternative to free-to-air television is subscription television, which is primarily di-
vided into two groups, national and local services. According to Tangkitvanich (2003),
the sole national operator, True UBC (once belonged to Thaksin’s Shin Corp), attracts
the higher socioeconomic group. Economies of scale led them to monopolize some of their
services, particularly an exclusive deal with the international providers. As a result, the
local operators could not afford to buy such international programs.
In terms of radio, there were about 524 free-to-air radio stations in Thailand in
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2003, not including community radio stations, covering 98 percent of the country
(Tangkitvanich, 2003, p.26). In addition to AM and FM transmission, there are also a
few radio stations that use satellite to broadcast their programs as well. The majority
of the radio stations are now operated by private companies. Radio programs have also
been monitored by the government as well as through the Department of Public Rela-
tions. Similar to the TV regulations, no less than 25 percent of broadcasting time should
be allocated to news and knowledge programs. Entertainment programs are limited to
58 percent of time, while 17 percent to advertisements and commercial services equally.
The concession contract is usually for less than two years.
For community radio stations, there were reportedly about 2,500 stations around the
country in 2006. However, there were approximately a additional 1,000 community ra-
dio stations that did not register with the Department of Public Relations (Kheunkaew,
2006). Note that participatory programs such as reporting traffic and public legal dis-
putes have become very popular for radio listeners in metropolitan areas. Pongsawat
(2002) pointed out that it was because such programs deal with local issues that were
closer to the interests of the public. Siriyuvasak (2007) examined the roles of community
radios in rural area especially during/after critical situations such as storms and floods.
Despite the increase in community radio stations, it seems likely that the number of
radio listeners in Thailand is on the downturn. Statistics from the National Statistical Office
(2008a) show that only 31.1 percent of Thai people listened to radio in 2008, decreasing
from 42.8 percent in 2003. Note that the proportion of Thai people who listen to news
programs on the radio essentially fell from five years ago, while those who listen to
entertainment programs increased. On average, Thai people spend about 1.4 hour listen
to the radio in 2004 (National Statistical Office, 2004).
Another national survey focusing on reading behavior indicates that the proportion of
the Thai population (6 years old and older) who read a newspaper was about 47.1 percent
in 2008, which increased from 35.4 percent in 1995 (National Statistical Office, 2008c).
Interestingly enough, the young adult group (age 15-24) had the highest proportion of
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newspaper reading, 57.2 percent, followed by the working age group (age 25-59). At the
same time, only 25.5 percent of seniors (60 years old and older) and 19.4 of children
(6-14 years old) read newspapers.
Mass Media and Thai Politics
Print press in Thailand began even before the transition to democracy. As early as
1844, a printed newspaper called Bangkok Recorder, published by a missionary, began
its distribution (Suvarnajata, 1994, p.91; Pongsudhirak, 1997, p.219). By 1910, there
were 17 newspapers and 47 magazines distributed in Thailand (Morell & Samudavanija,
1981). Since the revolution in 1932, the press has increasingly played a significant role in
every political movement. Most newspapers in Thailand are run by private companies
and non-profit organizations.
Radio was first launched in Thailand around 1930, while the adoption of TV began in
1955 (Pongsudhirak, 1997, p.229). During the early period, the concessions were solely
given to the government and the army. Some stations were operated by the government
and the army directly. Some were run by private companies who subcontracted from
the government and the army. Until the enactment of Frequency Allocation for Radio,
Television, and Telecommunications Act in 2000 (Siriyuvasak, 2007), the regulations to
manage radio frequencies were updated to ensure fair and neutral operations. Then the
concessions of these broadcasting media began to be given directly to private companies
and people (i.e., community media). A new TV station, ITV, was established due to the
need for an independent news station after the 1992 uprising. Technology has influenced
the expansion of alternative media in Thailand, including cable and satellite television,
and community radio stations.
However, mass media has still not been viewed as a transparent and honest institu-
tion. Historically, media in Thailand have been used to promote nationalism (Hamilton,
2002). The national anthem is played at 8AM and 6PM everyday at government offices,
schools, and on national televisions and radios. At the beginning of every theatrical show,
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everyone must stand up to respect the King represented by the royal anthem. During
the period of recovery during the economic crisis of 1999-2000, Phongpaichit and Baker
(2004, p.76) observed that nationalism became a common theme in TV dramas and
films.
On the other hand, media owners have also tapped into political power as well, pri-
marily to take advantage of the business of political candidates (Phongpaichit & Baker,
2004, p.72). The economic crisis in 1997 resulted in the demise of many small inde-
pendent media operators. The ones who survived are now the giants in the industry
(Pongsawat, 2007). These surviving media owners, for instance Nation Group, Manager
Group, BEC-TERO, and Matichon have become conglomerates, expanding their cover-
age to other types of media business, including newspaper, radio, television, and even
film. In addition, some media corporations expanded their empires to other non-related
types of business, such as real estate and property management (Pongsudhirak, 1997,
p.217), sport organization, and ticket distribution.
Instead of being a gatekeeper (Jirasopon, 2008), Pongsudhirak (1997, p.218) used to
Pharr’s typology of media role (1996) to argue that the role of the Thai press, particu-
larly during the 1992 massacre, falls in between servant and watchdog, leaning toward
opposition to the government. When the opposition in the parliamentary is weak, the
press usually is tougher on the government. Newspapers additionally educate readers, as
Pongsudhirak (1997, p.227) pointed out, through columns by respected commentators in
the newspapers. Pongsawat (2007) asserted that such columns tend to provide in-depth
analysis mostly from an anti-state perspective. Instead of having intermediaries from
the interviews, these commentators are able to deliver their independent messages and
opinions. These observations seem to be applicable to the role of news media during
Thaksin’s period.
Pongsawat (2007, p.105) argued news reports regarding politics and elections are
conventionally framed by editors’ experiences and perceptions solely with no influence
from outsiders. Such practices could impose risks in terms of ethical issues. The most
352
controversial occurred during the PAD demonstration. Sonthi Limthongkul, who is one
of the PAD leaders, used a variety of media through his Manager Group to openly
attack Thaksin and broadcast the demonstrations. PAD leaders have been subject to
a number of defamation lawsuits for criticizing Thaksin and his government. The Thai
press has long been criticized for corruption and bias in favor of particular individuals,
politicians, and parties (Pongsudhirak, 1997, p.228). By applying the Agenda Setting
model to examine the relationship between Thai politicians and journalists, Komonbut
(2006) found that apparently every political change in Thai history has proved that “the
press was not able fully to assert itself as an independent political force.” (p.217)
The Thai media has also been criticized about being unprofessional, using such devices
as benign plagiarism, usually among reporters (Pongsudhirak, 1997, p.229) and recently
from online sources as well. In addition, accuracy has also been a concern. The most
controversial concern recently would be the deletion of the King’s pictures on Thai Rath’s
front page (e.g., Jee “Thai Rath”. . . , 2007).
Media Intervention
The press is a representation of freedom of expression. The constitution of Thailand
guarantees such rights since the introduction of democratic government. However, it is
not always the case that such rights are applied in reality. Thai governments have long
been known to influence the media. Attempts to manipulate the media have appeared
since the establishment of the press in Thailand. However, it was not until 1919, when
Thailand announced its first censorship law that prohibits criticism of the bureaucracy
(Suvarnajata, 1994, p.92).
There is a new form of intervention sought by the business community that has been
of concern to scholars and media professionals recently. While the mass media is not
always influenced by business, various political and business mechanisms are used to
control what appears in the media (Komonbut, 2006). The Thai Journalist Association
(2004 cited in Komonbut, 2006) reported that, while the press is independent in theory,
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because it is normally owned by a private company, advertisements have been used as a
main mechanism to set the agenda of the press.
Thaksin’s approach to political management seemingly was aimed toward calming the
political climate for the benefit of the country’s economy. He apparently tried to manip-
ulate the political context to be on his side, including controlling the media. Thaksin
technically bought ITV (Yong, 2007) when it was on the down turn from the effects of
an economic crisis. After the take over, ITV perceivably softened its news content and
programming to be more sympathetic to Thaksin’s government3 . In addition, Thaksin
often urged the press to present only positive news and avoid negative political comments
(Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004, p.150).
During Thaksin’s period, the selection of members of the National Broadcasting Com-
mission, an independent regulatory body, became controversial due to speculations that
there were conflicts of interest among the candidates. This led to the perception that
the Thaksin government did not attempt to solve the conflict of interest issue and
delayed the process of moving the administration of television and radio frequencies
from the hands of the government. His business would thus benefit from such a delay
(Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004, p.153).
Komonbut (2006) explored the media intervention during 2005 - 2006 by Thaksin
alliances. He found that there were in total 21 ways that had been used to intervene in the
content of the mass media from direct approaches (such as giving orders, providing faulty
information, declining to answer questions, and even using jurisdictional methods) to
indirect actions (such as attempting to take control of the press’ stocks, intervening in the
operations of independent agencies, and launching new laws favoring the government’s
intervention actions).
Self-censorship is another important issue (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004, p.154).
3The coup leaders later nationalized ITV citing the station did not pay the concession in 2005–2006.
Siriyuvasak (2007) observed that it was mainly because of the sale of Thaksin’s Shin Corp.
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Table F.2: Thailand Press Freedom Index from 2002–2008
Year Ranking (Total Countries) Index Score
2002 65 (139 ) 22.75
2003 82 (166 ) 19.67
2004 59 (167 ) 14
2005 107 (167 ) 28
2006 122 (168 ) 33.5
2007 135 (169 ) 53.5
2008 124 (173 ) 34.5
Rojanaphruk (2006) observed that editors, reporters, media organizations, media mar-
kets, and regulations played essential roles, which led to self-censorship, especially re-
garding le`se majeste´ cases. The media tended to set their own internal standards dealing
with content about the monarchy. The le`se majeste´ law creates what Rojanaphruk (2006,
p.7) coined as the upward spiral effect, consisting of three major elements: optimistic
trend setting, dominating discourse on royal family, and manipulating (such as hiding,
changing, or blurring) the complexity of political issues. Self-censorship ostensibly con-
tributed to various counter reactions and side effects across the mass media. However,
the boundaries of self-censorship were still subjective among media professionals.
Reporters without Borders, an independent international advocate for freedom of
speech, has annually published the international Press Freedom Index, measuring the
freedom of the press of each country based on “every kind of violation directly affecting
journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) and news me-
dia (censorship, confiscation of newspaper issues, searches and harassment). [I]t includes
the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible for these press freedom violations.”
(Reporters Without Border for Press Freedom, 2008, para.4) Table F.2 illustrates the
press freedom index of Thailand from 2002-2008.
According to the index, 2007 was apparently the worst year for the Thai press in terms
of freedom of the press. The sharp drop of Thai press freedom evidently happened in
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2005 when the political crisis began. Note that the survey year begins on September 1.
Thus, the effect of the 2006 coup would fall into the year 2007, which has the highest
index score.
Mass Media in the 2006 Coup
The accusations from the mass media, either about the failure in administration or
corruption of the government, have been a significant force for the military to stage
the coups, especially the coups in 1947 and 1957 (Suvarnajata, 1994, p.93). The 1992
uprising also originated from the fact that people could not get information from the
media and they wanted first-handed information. Additionally, radio stations did not
report the protest as a result of self-censorship. The role of the foreign press in reporting
what was happening was substantial during that period (Pongsudhirak, 1997).
For the 2006 coup, the situation was quite similar to the 1992 political upris-
ing. Free-to-air television channels were used as an official source of information
(i.e.,announcements from the coup leaders). Channel 5, which is controlled by the army,
was the first one to report the coup around 9:30PM. Nearly an hour later, Thaksin
attempted to declare a state of the emergency via telephone on Channel 9. However,
the declaration by Thaksin was interrupted. It is worth noting that Channel 9 is owned
and operated by MCOT, which has been privatized since Thaksin’s regime. At the time
the station was under the administration of Mingkwan Saengsuwan, who has a close
personal relationship with Thaksin. Mingkwan was forced to resign his position after
the coup for allowing Thaksin’s appearance.
It was apparent that all the television stations were under the control of the coup
leaders after that. Tanks surrounded the television stations, in addition to the govern-
ment house. At the same time, the international broadcasting channels such as CNN
and BCC on cable television were blacked out for several hours. Note that CNN was
among the earliest to provide international coverage of the coup at around 10:10PM,
even before the official announcement (“Coup as it unfolds”, 2006). Only satellite TV
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stations, such as ASTV and the Nation Channel, were able to broadcast their normal
programs. By around 9:30PM on September 20, after the first press conference by the
coups leaders, were all television channels allowed to resume their normal programmmes
with intermittent interruptions by coup announcements.
The first announcement was broadcasted around 11PM on September 19. Within
three days, the CDR had 12 announcements. The 10th announcement, in particular,
sought cooperation from the media to present the news “according to the facts and in a
creative way to rebuild the unity within the nation and bring peace back to the country
as fast as possible.” Prior to that, the 7th announcement banned a political meeting
involving more than 5 people. On September 21, the CDR leaders met with the media
operators to request them to temporarily withdraw public participatory functions such
as live text messaging on a news ticker, live interviews, and phone-in comments. On
September 22, the first demonstration against the coup was launched. However, there
was no media coverage of the protest on local television. Any footage that involved the
ousted Prime Minister on the international TV channels was censored. Aglionby (2006)
also reported that there were soldiers around the television studios and control rooms.
On September 21, the CDR suspended the broadcast of more than 300 community
radio stations as they were perceived to support Thaksin (Kheunkaew, 2006). However,
it was apparent that the CDR was skeptical about newspapers (AsiaMedia, 2007). There
was no specific intervention for the press from the CDR. The distribution of newspapers
was as usual. However, the level of self-censorship was very high during that period
considering that the majority of the press in Thailand favored the departure of Thaksin
(Reporters Without Border for Press Freedom, 2008). However, what concerned CDR
the most seemed to be the criticism from foreign media regarding the roles of the monar-
chy.
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Internet
Internet Adoption
The Internet in Thailand was firstly adopted among higher education institutions and
then began to be commercialized through Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in 1995
(Koanatakool, 2007). The Communication Authority of Thailand (CAT), a state agency,
originally provided concessions to ISPs. However, the 1997 constitution reform trans-
ferred the duty of Internet regulation to an independent commission, the National
Telecommunication Commission (NTC). In 2008, there were 75 licensed ISPs. CAT
was later commercialized as a service provider in 2003, however, still owned by the
government (Paireepairit, 2008).
Approximately 28 percent of the Thai people, older than 6 years old, owned computers
in 2008, while 18.2 percent used the Internet (National Statistical Office, 2008b). The
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimated the number of Internet users
in Thailand in 2006 to be around 11.41 millions (13.42 millions in 2007). About 105,000
users were broadband subscribers. Figure F.2 and Figure F.3 illustrate the trend of
Internet users from 1992-2007.
Figure F.2: Estimated Internet users in Thailand from 1992–2007 (Source: ITU)
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Figure F.3: Estimated Internet users in Thailand per 100 populations from 1992–2007
(Source: ITU)
The household survey conducted by National Statistical Office (2008b) found that
age and education seem to be related to Internet use. School, home and workplace were
the most favorite locations to access the Internet. The most favorite search terms in
Thai generally include game, song, and horoscope.
The most popular platform of online participation is the online discussion forum
(commonly known as web board in Thailand). Pongsawat (2002) remarked that there
are three major characteristics of online discussion that facilitate political discourse:
allowing freedom of expression (e.g., anonymous post, be able to express feelings and
emotions (Pongsawat, 2007)), increasing speed (e.g., real-time), and interactivity. He
(2009) later classified the characteristics of political web boards in Thailand into two
groups: independent online forum (e.g., Pantip.com, Fah Diew Kun) and extension of
news website (e.g., Manager Online, Prachatai). In addition, Pongsawat (2002) con-
cluded there are three common topics that have been discussed in the political web
boards: politics of personality (regarding personality and personal life of leaders and
person of interest), politics of development (whether Thailand is ready for democracy),
and politics of memory (accuracy of historical political events).
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Another way of sharing political opinions online is blogging. In addition to inter-
national blog providers (e.g. Wordpress.com, Blogger.com), there are also local blog
providers as well, including privately owned providers (e.g., Exteen.com), those that are
extensions from online communities (e.g., Pantip.com’s Bloggang), and those that are
attached to the media corporations (e.g., Nation Group’s OKNation). The last group
seems intended to expand the number of citizen journalists in Thailand. Additionally,
microblogging services such as Twitter, even though it was not invented until March 2007
(after the 2006 coup), also support political discussions among Thai as well. Paireepairit
(2008, p.28) also pointed out that Internet video is another services that people use to
express their opinions online. PAD demonstration, for instance, has used video stream-
ing technology to broadcast their activities. People use online video services such as
YouTube and Metcalfe to share their views in support or opposition of various matters
in Thai life.
In addition to online discussion and blogging, it seems likely that people use other
means of Internet communication to share their political thoughts such as instant mes-
saging (e.g., MSN Live Messenger, Yahoo Messenger, AOL, Skype, and Google Talk) and
chat rooms (e.g., IRC and Camfrog). However, such technologies have not been studied
as alternative platforms for political discussion in Thailand.
Even though the Internet has enabled Thai people to share their various opinions
about Thai politics, Winichakul (2000 quoted in Pongsawat, 2002 ) argued that people
in rural areas, who are perceived as “ignorant, selling their votes, and electing those
corrupt politicians to the parliament” by middle class and elites are still less evident in
online communities. Moreover, Pongsawat (2002) observed that although the Internet
penetration is increasing, the discussions using political online forums may contribute
to fragmentation of Thai society. The example could be drawn from Pantip.com’s Ra-
jdumnern forum, one of the most popular online forums dedicated to political topics.
During the political turmoil before the coup, Rajdumnern was flooded by two contrast-
ing groups: pro- and anti-Thaksin. However, those who supported the ousted prime
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minister seemed to dominate the room. Therefore, those who did not favor Thaksin left
the room and set up their own community elsewhere.
Internet Censorship
Paireepairit (2008) studied Internet censorship in Thailand. He found that there are
9 topical areas that are sensitive to censorship in Thailand: pornography, the royal
institution, politics, gambling, online gambling, religion, terrorism and separatism, proxy
and anonymity software, and unknown/accidental censorship. The references to the
monarchy during the political turmoil in 2005 and 2006 caused the le`se majeste´ law to
be the most cited law for censorship. However, it was not until the interim Cabinet was
appointed in late 2006 that the number of blocked websites increased sharply as shown
in Figure F.4.
Thailand 2006 Coup d'état>
Figure F.4: Thai websites blocked by any means from 2004–2007 (Paireepairit, 2008,
p.47)
Thai government has used different mechanisms to censor the problematic websites.
Based on Lessig’s framework of regulation, (Paireepairit, 2008) found that the Thai
government has manipulated laws, social norms (self-censorship), and technology archi-
tecture to force the shut down of websites. Two dimensions regarding the boundaries
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of censorship were mentioned by the respondents of Paireepairit’s survey (2008): topic
(i.e., what topics are not allowed), and the process of the censorship (i.e., transparency
and trustworthiness).
Internet during the 2006 Coup
During the coup, Internet use reached its peak. Popular news websites such as Manager
Online, The Nation and Bangkokbiznews had to redesign their appearances to minimize
degradation of server performance. The coup led to the greatest number of website
visits, including page views and unique IP addresses, in 2006 as shown in Figure F.5
and F.6. In addition, news and event related keywords, for instance news, newspapers,
coup, and revolution, apparently dominated search engine searches that indexed Thai
websites.
Figure F.5: Thai website visits (page views) in 2006 by months (Source: Truehits.com)
Considering the news-related websites in specific, the proportion of visits to such
websites increased slightly in September 2006. After that, the proportion went down as
shown in Figure F.7. It is speculated that people became bored with the longstanding
political tension.
For the general public, the first sign of the coup would be from national television.
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Figure F.6: Thai website visits (unique IP) in 2006 by month (Source: Truehits.com)
However, it was apparent that there were a number of message posts on web boards
reporting the appearance of soldiers and tanks around Bangkok, even before the inter-
ruption on television (“Coup as it unfolds”, 2006).
Although the military did not directly intervene in the operation of the Internet dur-
ing the night of the coup and the day after, Paireepairit (2008) remarked that this may
be because the army lacked experience. In fact, the coup’s fifth order on September
20 concerned the information transmitted through networks. The order granted the
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology the authority to limit, control,
stop or destroy the distribution of news and information containing articles, messages
or dialogue that could “affect the democracy reform with the King as a head of state.”
Such order was later cited to block numerous websites that criticized the coup and the
monarchy, such as 19sep.org and Midnight University. The moderator of Pantip.com’s
Rajdumnern forum self-censored the room, closing its operations until the appointment
of the interim government in October 2006. Soon after, the interim government an-
nounced the Computer Crime Act, which has become one of the most controversial laws
affecting Internet providers, web service operators, Internet users and the media.
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Figure F.7: Thai website page views in 2006 by month and type of website (Source:
Truehits.com)
Mobile Communications
Cellular Adoption
Thailand is among the fastest mobile phone adopters in the world with 28 percent growth
in the last decade (Dasgupta, Lall, & Wheeler, 2001). According to ITU, the number
of mobile phone subscribers in Thailand reached 40.72 million in 2006, accounting for
62.88 percent of the population as shown in Table F.3. The adoption of mobile phone
has even been faster than Internet usage.
According to National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (2005), 95 per-
cent of the Internet users owned mobile phones in 2004. This could partly represent the
dual relationship of the adoption of these two technologies. The most popular mobile
phone data communication services were short messaging service (SMS), multimedia
messaging service (MMS), and email, which accounted for 73.6, 25.7, and 16.2 percent
of mobile users respectively. Only 0.7 percent of users connected to the Internet via
mobile devices in 2004.
There are a number of domestic factors supporting the adoption of mobile phones.
For instance, Thailand’s network growth has been greatly influenced by the policy shift
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Table F.3: Estimated mobile phone users in Thailand from 2001–2006
Year Total subscribers Five-year Subscribers per % of total
(thousands) growth rate (%) 100 populations telephone subscribers
2001 7,550 32.6 12.3 55.5
2002 16,117 48.9 26.04 71.1
2003 27,894 65.9 40.15 79
2004 27,379 63.6 44.18 80.1
2005 31,137 59.1 48.47 81.6
2006 40,723 40.2 62.88 85.2
2007 79,066 50.7 123.77 91.8
in the early 1990s and the 1997 economic crisis (Gray, Kelly, & Minges, 2002). In addi-
tion, the Telecommunication Act of 2005 regulates the administration and competition
of telecommunication businesses as well as promoting universal access. The government
owned telecommunication business, Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT), was re-
cently privatized, in order to promote a more competitive market environment. In terms
of business, the price of mobile phone subscriptions has declined due to the high degree
of competition in the market. There are four major players in the mobile phone market:
Advance Info Services (AIS), DTAC, True Move (previously TA Orange), and TOT. In
order to operate the services, Thai government currently reserves and licenses four radio
frequencies for the mobile phone communications: 470MHZ, 900 MHZ, 1800MHZ, and
1900MHZ.
Mobile Communication and Thai Politics
Mobile communication has been well recognized as a facilitator of interpersonal com-
munication. Additionally, broadcast media, including political programming, has been
enabling such mobile communication features as SMS to encourage mobile communica-
tion use. However, the role of mobile communication in Thai political discourse reached
its peak when the demonstrators against the military government in May 1992 called
365
themselves the Mob mue thue (mobile phone mob). In fact, mobile phones were not
directly involved in the protest. Instead, it was used as a metaphor to explain the char-
acteristics of the crowd, while at the time the mobile devices were employed only among
businessmen, professionals, and other members of the middle class. The phenomenon
was similar to what happened politically in Philippines in 1986 and 2001.
In addition to the use of mobile phone in politics, the politics of mobile commu-
nication is also of interest. It was Thaksin himself who caused concerns (see also
McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005). Thaksin first received his telecommunication con-
cession from his close relationship with politicians in Chatichai’s government4 . His
business began with a paging service, and then was followed by mobile phone, card
phones, phone directories, data networks, Cable TV and satellites. It seems likely that
his special relationship with politicians and bureaucrats paid off, not just for getting the
concessions, but also in minimizing competition (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). From
the day Thaksin began his political career to the night of the 2006 coup, he had the
image of a businessman who took advantage of his political connections and power to
promote his business.
By 2006, mobile phones were nearly omnipresent in Thailand. It was no longer con-
sidered as a representation of middle class. However, there has not been any substantial
study in terms of how people used mobile phone during the 2006 coup. In general, the
major evidence was through photos taken via mobile phone cameras and SMS sent to the
press and/or posted on various websites, while interpersonal communication via mobile
phone has not been studied. On the other hand, there was no sign of concern about or
intervention in mobile communication from the coup.
4General Chatichai Choonhavan was the 17th prime minister of Thailand. Although his personal
background was military, his affiliations rather leaned toward diplomatic and business interests. Along
with rapid economic growth, it seems that Chatichai’s government had a large financial stake. Ministers
were suspected of corruption and inadequate budget allocations. At the same time, the role of the
military in governance declined. Chatichai’s government was eventually removed by the coup in 1992
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